President/Executive Department Commons^™

Mapping Minority Investigative Powers In Congress, David Rapallo

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

“Shut down the Senate . . .” “Roll over and play dead . . .” In the first hundred days of President Donald Trump’s second term, these were the rallying cries of two far ends of a debate among Democrats about how to respond to the administration’s unprecedented actions. This debate, which rages on today, has been marked by a lack of specificity about the various oversight tools available to members of the minority party in Congress, particularly when they investigate whether the Executive Branch is faithfully executing the laws Congress passes. Scholarship too has focused little on the full …

The Executive’S Takeover Of Independent Agencies: How Institutional Design Gave Way To Political Will, Neal Devins

Pepperdine Law Review

The anticipated demise of the independent agency is a saga that implicates Congress as much as it does the President or the Supreme Court. By capitulating to presidential initiatives and failing to defend their institutional prerogatives, Congress has facilitated presidential control of the administrative state. Indeed, irrespective of whether the Court formally repudiates Humphrey’s Executor, Congress has largely acquiesced to a regime whereby presidents essentially control independent agencies. By highlighting the competing incentives of Congress and the White House, this Essay explains the rise of presidential unilateralism vis-à-vis independent agencies. This Essay also casts light on a critically important but …

“The Future Of Executive Power”: An Overview, Robert J. Pushaw Jr.

Pepperdine Law Review

This symposium overview examines the rapid expansion of presidential power in the modern era, culminating in what the author and contributors describe as an unprecedented assertion of Article II authority during President Trump’s second term. It argues that the Constitution’s original separation-of-powers framework—designed to prioritize legislative authority and constrain the executive—has been inverted due to the growth of presidential control over foreign affairs, the administrative state, and policymaking. The article traces this shift through historical developments such as the New Deal, the rise of independent agencies, and the emergence of the “unitary executive” theory, while also analyzing recent Supreme Court …

Separation-Of-Powers Lochnerism, Andrea Scoseria Katz

Scholarship@WashULaw

One hundred and twenty years ago, the Supreme Court handed down one of the single most notorious opinions ever rendered, striking down a New York labor law for violating a right to contract found nowhere in the text of the Constitution. The era of Lochner v. NY (1905) is well past us, but not the judicial impulses that gave rise to the case. With a new champion in the Roberts Court, Lochnerism is alive and well, deployed in a new context to redefine the relationships between the President, Congress, federal agencies, and the courts. Bringing together two lines of case-law-on …

Separation Of Powers By Contract: How Collective Bargaining Reshapes Presidential Power, Nicholas Handler

Faculty Scholarship

This Article demonstrates for the first time how civil servants check and restrain presidential power through collective bargaining. The executive branch is typically depicted as a top-down hierarchy. The President, as chief executive, issues directives with vast implications for federal policy. Usually, the tenured bureaucracy of civil servants below him follow these directives. Occasionally, when the President’s policies appear corrupt or ill-advised, bureaucrats may illicitly “resist” them. This presumed top-down structure shapes many influential critiques of the modern administrative state. Proponents of a strong President decry civil servants as an unelected “deep state” usurping popular will. Skeptics of presidential power …

The President And Individual Rights, Mark Tushnet

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

No abstract provided.

Destructive Federal Decentralization, David Fontana

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

This Article—written for a symposium hosted by the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal—focuses on the efforts by the Trump administration to relocate federal officials outside of Washington to reduce the capacity of the federal government. Federalism and the separation of powers are usually the twin pillars of structural constitutional law. Locating federal officials outside of Washington— federal decentralization—has been an additional tool of diffusing power that has started to gain some scholarly attention. These debates largely focus on structural constitutional law as constructive—as improving the capacity and operation of the federal and state governments. The power …

Who Constrains Presidential Exercise Of Delegated Powers?, Rebecca L. Brown

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Building on the work of administrative law scholars who have identified and illuminated the several components of the problem over the years, this Article will seek to show what has happened when a cluster of separate circumstances have come together to create a new and serious threat to individual liberty when the President exercises expansive delegated authority. Several doctrinal components lead to this confluence: First, the moribund “intelligible principle” test has evolved to provide little or no constraint on this or any other delegation. Second, a delegation to the President, specifically, is not subject to the procedural requirements of the …

Judicial Autonomy V. Executive Authority: Which Prevails In The Case Of A Postcommutation Collateral Attack?, Vincent A. Marrazzo

Notre Dame Law Review

An inmate with a commuted sentence will sometimes collaterally attack his already commuted sentence. This raises the question: Does an act of executive clemency divest the courts of authority to hear the collateral attack? In other words, does clemency moot the issues involved in the collateral attack? While multiple circuit courts have weighed in on this question, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have developed the most robust discussions, disagreeing about whether federal courts may hear these cases. The Fourth Circuit has held that a collateral attack postcommutation is moot as the “President’s commutation order simply closes the judicial door.” In …

A Separation Of Powers Analysis Of Forum Non Conveniens’ Adequate Available Forum, Jason S. Palmer

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

“Boehner snubs [White House], invites Netanyahu to address Congress.” These words, or words remarkably similar, headlined newspapers all around the United States on January 21, 2015. Without consulting President Obama, House Speaker John Boehner invited Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu to address a joint session of Congress in opposition to the White House’s overtures to Iran with respect to its nuclear program. Speaker Boehner extended the invitation in apparent response to President Obama’s State of the Union Address, in which he informed Congress that any further economic sanctions bill against Iran at that time would be detrimental to ongoing …

Presidential Control Of Elections, Lisa Marshall Manheim

Articles

In recent decades, presidents of both political parties have asserted increasingly aggressive forms of influence over the administrative state. During this same period, Congress has expanded the role that the federal government plays in election administration. The convergence of these two trends leads to a troubling but underexamined phenomenon: presidential control of elections. Relying on their official powers, presidents have the ability to affect the rules that govern elections, including elections meant to check and legitimize presidential powers in the first place. This self-serving arrangement heightens the risk of harms from political entrenchment and subordination of expertise. These harms, in …

The Kavanaugh Court And The Schechter-To-Chevron Spectrum: How The New Supreme Court Will Make The Administrative State More Democratically Accountable, Justin Walker

Indiana Law Journal

In a typical year, Congress passes roughly 800 pages of law—that’s about a seveninch

stack of paper. But in the same year, federal administrative agencies promulgate

80,000 pages of regulations—which makes an eleven-foot paper pillar. This move

toward electorally unaccountable administrators deciding federal policy began in

1935, accelerated in the 1940s, and has peaked in the recent decades. Rather than

elected representatives, unelected bureaucrats increasingly make the vast majority

of the nation’s laws—a trend facilitated by the Supreme Court’s decisions in three

areas: delegation, deference, and independence.

This trend is about to be reversed. In the coming years, Congress will …

Presidential Control Over Disputed Elections, Lisa Marshall Manheim

Articles

An election that is “disputed” lacks two qualities after Election Day: a clear winner and a concession. These elections instead depend on legal processes — recounts, court proceedings, and more — for resolution. As a result, when a sitting President, running for reelection, becomes immersed in a disputed presidential election, he potentially enjoys an advantage over his opponent. He can attempt to exploit the powers of the presidency to push these legal proceedings in his favor. As a practical matter, this advantage can be formidable. A sitting president can resort to his extraordinary bully pulpit, for example, to influence public …

Rediscovering The Journal Clause: The Lost History Of Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, Nicholas Handler

Faculty Scholarship

Article I, Section 5 of the United States Constitution requires that each house of Congress keep a Journal of its proceedings. Contemporary observers have largely ignored this provision, treating it as a vestigial record-keeping requirement with little significance for modern law. This dismissive attitude is misguided. Historically, legislative Journals were one of the primary mechanisms by which Parliament, and later Congress, made and interpreted constitutional law. Journals are the official histories of legislatures’ activity. They record what legislatures do as institutions—what powers they exercise, what procedures they use, and what actions by the coordinate branches they protest or resist. In …

Taxing Combat, Samuel Kan

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

When you are being shot at or dodging landmines you are in a combat zone. Diplomatic niceties aside, these brave warriors are in danger because of the policies of their Government and we must take care of them. Quite frankly, we must act to insure that we do not have a repeat of what happened in Somalia. In Somalia, the families of the soldiers who lost their lives could not receive the benefits that should have gone to them under the Tax Code because the President never declared it a combat zone.

We don’t know exactly where we’re at in …

When Influence Encroaches: Statutory Advice In The Administrative State, William C. Hudson

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

This Article revisits the D.C. Circuit’s 1993 decision in FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, and concludes that the separation of powers reasoning applied in NRA Political Victory Fund could invalidate other common practices in the administrative state, such as statutory requirements that Executive Branch officers serve on the boards of corporations created and staffed by Congress.

May Federal Prosecutors Take Direction From The President?, Bruce Green, Rebecca Roiphe

Articles & Chapters

Suppose the president sought to serve as prosecutor-in-chief telling prosecutors when to initiate or dismiss criminal charges in individual cases and making other discretionary decisions that are normally reserved to trained professionals familiar with the facts, law, and traditions of the U.S. Department of Justice. To what extent may prosecutors follow the president's direction? In recent presidential administrations, the president has respected prosecutorial independence; while making policy decisions, the president deferred to the Attorney General and subordinate federal prosecutors to conduct individual criminal cases. In a recent article, we argued that this is as it should be because the president …

Congress, The Courts, And Party Polarization: Why Congress Rarely Checks The President And Why The Courts Should Not Take Congress’S Place, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Executive Branch Fact Deference As A Separation Of Powers Principle, Emily A. Kile

Indiana Law Journal

This Note concludes that, although Zivotofsky I provides a basis for judicial review of the legality of the Obama Administration’s “hostilities” determination (and, by extension, other questions of statutory interpretation related to foreign affairs), that review could be blunted by judicial deference to the executive branch’s factual determinations relevant to whether the Libyan airstrikes constituted “hostilities” within the War Powers Resolution. By addressing the political question doctrine’s history and the response to Zivotofsky I, this Note will explore whether the political question doctrine—particularly in cases of statutory interpretation—has lost some of its force as a justiciability doctrine. This Note will …

Failure To Act And The Separation Of Powers-The Vice Presidency And The Need To Surmount Divided Power In Pursuit Of A Workable Government, Douglas W. Kmiec

Pepperdine Law Review

Is the Vice President an executive officer, a legislative officer, or both? This query has existed since the time of the founding. The question poses more difficulty than one might suppose, and it remains unsettled. It can be convenient to ignore questions that one cannot answer, and thus, the Vice President has been the object of political humor and treated as an appendage without present function. Yet, because we attribute great genius to those who drafted the Constitution, what is the effect of leaving this high-ranking officer without adequate definition or purpose? For the first century and a half of …

Category Errors And Executive Power, Jonathan H. Adler

Faculty Publications

The purpose of this brief essay is to provide some clarity in the muddled discussion over executive power. Specifically, the aim is to help clarify what sorts of actions taken by the executive branch can be properly characterized as “enforcement” actions—where the President’s inherent authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion applies—and what sorts of actions cannot. Specifically, this essay seeks to explain why some particularly controversial actions—such as the Administration’s decision to delay the so-called employer mandate imposed by the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and to “tailor” the application of federal regulations governing greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act …

Section 2: Congress & The Obama White House, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

Standing Outside Article Iii, Tara Leigh Grove

Faculty Publications

The U.S. Supreme Court has insisted that standing doctrine is a “bedrock” requirement only of Article III. Accordingly, both jurists and scholars have assumed that the standing of the executive branch and the legislature, like that of other parties, depends solely on Article III. But I argue that these commentators have overlooked a basic constitutional principle: federal institutions must have affirmative authority for their actions, including the power to bring suit or appeal in federal court. Article III defines the federal “judicial Power” and does not purport to confer any authority on the executive branch or the legislature. Executive and …

The American Dream: Daca, Dreamers, And Comprehensive Immigration Reform, Heather Fathali

Seattle University Law Review

On June 15, 2012, President Obama made an announcement that changed the lives of millions. Effective immediately, the Obama administration would implement a new program—what would come to be known as Deferred Action for Child-hood Arrivals (DACA)—offering eligible undocumented young people both a two-year respite from the haunting possibility of deportation as well as the eligibility to apply for employment authorization. While millions were elated by the President’s announcement, he also faced harsh criticism. Many claimed that his action exceeded federal statutory limits, exceeded his Executive powers, and usurped congressional authority. Still others, anxious to see comprehensive immigration reform implemented, …

The Powers Of Congress And The President On Matters That Affect U.S. Foreign Affairs, Malvina Halberstam

Articles

No abstract provided.

Montesquieu's Theory Of Government And The Framing Of The American Constitution , Matthew P. Bergman

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

United States V. Alvarez-Machain: Kidnapping In The "War On Drugs" - A Matter Of Executive Discretion Or Lawlessness?, Michael G. Mckinnon

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Federalism And Preemption In October Term 1999, Jonathan D. Varat

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Rediscovering A Principled Commerce Power , Douglas W. Kmiec

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Congress In Court, Amanda Frost

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

Congress rarely participates in litigation about the meaning of federal law. By contrast, the executive branch joins in federal litigation on a regular basis as either a party or amicus curiae. Congress simply assumes that the president’s lawyers adequately represent its interests save in those rare instances when the two branches have a direct conflict. This Article questions that assumption.

The federal judiciary’s approach to statutory and constitutional interpretation diminishes Congress’s influence, often to the benefit of the executive branch. The rise of textualism, the canon of constitutional avoidance, the reliance on Chevron deference, and the courts’ reluctance to second-guess …