President/Executive Department Commons^™

Reorganizing The Administrative State: Executive Ambition And Legislative Constraint, Jordan Graber

Fordham Law Review

Beginning in the 1930s, Congress enacted a series of statutes granting presidents the authority to initiate reorganizations of the administrative state. Under these reorganization statutes, the president determined any necessary changes in agency organization and submitted a reorganization proposal to Congress, which could approve or reject the plan. Over the next fifty years, the president and Congress worked cooperatively to promote the effective and efficient functioning of the administrative state.

Despite the successful reorganization initiatives undertaken pursuant to these statutes, Congress has not conferred reorganization authority on any president in the last four decades. As a result, the organization of …

The Unitary Executive And The Federal Reserve, Lev Menand

Fordham Law Review

The U.S. Supreme Court may soon embrace an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution that would significantly expand the power of the president over federal administrators and invalidate key provisions in dozens of federal statutes. A critical question is whether this interpretation—known as the unitary executive theory (UET)—would also render unconstitutional central bank independence (CBI), an arrangement where a country’s monetary policy is formulated by a semiautonomous body of experts insulated from partisan political pressure. Several justices have suggested that it would not, and a growing scholarly literature has proposed ways for the Court to distinguish the country’s central banking apparatus …

All The King’S Lawyers, Rebecca Aviel

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Ai Procurement As Regulatory Reconnaissance, Sam Adler

Fordham Law Review

Artificial intelligence (AI) is a black box technology in a black box industry. Some view AI as a life-changing technology capable of advancing society and perhaps even saving the world, while others fear its capacity to harm. Like Dr. Frankenstein, developers fear the unpredictability of their own creations; deployers fear the unknown risks of third-party AI tools that market pressures drive them to assume; members of civil society fear AI’s capacity to oppress the already oppressed and degrade trust in institutions; and everyday users fear the undisclosed potential of AI to cause harm by means they cannot readily comprehend. These …

Separation-Of-Powers Lochnerism, Andrea Scoseria Katz

Fordham Law Review

One hundred and twenty years ago, in 1905, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered one of the single most notorious opinions in history, striking down a New York labor law for violating the right to contract—a right found nowhere in the text of the Constitution. Though the era of Lochner v. New York is well past us, the judicial impulses that gave rise to the case remain. With a new champion in the Roberts Court, Lochnerism is alive and well, deployed in a new context to redefine the relationships between the president, Congress, federal agencies, and the courts.

Bringing together two …

Competition, Comity, And Confusion: Reconciling The Ftaia’S Import Exclusion With Its Direct Effects Provision, Elliot Lam

Fordham Law Review

The debate surrounding the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial scope represents a tension between two competing objectives: protecting the U.S. economy from foreign anticompetitive conduct on one hand and respecting the sovereign authority of other nation-states on the other. Applying U.S. law abroad risks undermining sovereign authority by regulating foreign economies, though such regulation appears necessary in some cases to protect U.S. consumers.

Congress’s attempt to square these objectives through enacting the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA) failed to settle the matter. The statute left courts with two new questions: how to distinguish “import” from “nonimport” commerce, and how …

Oligarchy, State, And Cryptopia, Julie E. Cohen

Fordham Law Review

Theoretical accounts of power in networked digital environments typically do not give systematic attention to the phenomenon of oligarchy—to extreme concentrations of material wealth deployed to obtain and protect durable personal advantage. The biggest technology platform companies are dominated to a singular extent by a small group of very powerful and extremely wealthy men who have played uniquely influential roles in structuring technological development in particular ways that align with their personal beliefs and who now wield unprecedented informational, sociotechnical, and political power. Developing an account of oligarchy and, more specifically, of tech oligarchy within contemporary political economy therefore has …

Ending Exemption 5 Expansion: Toward A Narrower Interpretation Of Foia’S Exemption For Inter- And Intra-Agency Memorandums, Ryan W. Miller

Fordham Law Review

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) creates a judicially enforceable right to access almost any record that a federal agency creates or obtains. Its crafters aimed to strike a careful balance in promoting disclosure of government records to increase transparency while still protecting the confidentiality of certain information. Although any person can request an agency record, FOIA’s nine exemptions allow agencies to withhold records if certain conditions are met. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) permits agencies to withhold “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters” that would normally be privileged in civil discovery. Through this exemption, Congress sought to prevent FOIA from …

The President's Fourth Branch?, Bijal Shah

Fordham Law Review

Unitary executive theory has taken hold of the administrative state, motivated by the view that agencies constitute a rogue fourth branch of government. Emboldened by the U.S. Supreme Court, the President has begun to interfere with administrative accountability to important criteria including statutory procedural requirements that impact both public participation and administrative due process, the expectation that agencies engage neutral expertise to implement the law, and the obligations of judicial review. As a result, this Essay argues, rather than constituting a fourth branch that is unaccountable to the President, the administrative state has been encouraged by the President and courts …

The Diffuse Executive, Anya Bernstein, Cristina Rodriguez

Fordham Law Review

A unitary executive is an exacting ideal. It asks that all power in an administration be gathered in the person of the President, who should have full authority to determine the actions of officials and employees. Even if the President does not directly control every executive action (how could he?), when officials fail to implement presidential preferences, the unitary theory dictates that the President must have the power to remove them. The model posits a tightly organized hierarchy—every rung implementing the substantive decisions of the rung above, with orders flowing from the top: a command-and-control structure for government action. And, …

The President's Subjective And Objective Legal Obligations, Shalev Gad Roisman

Fordham Law Review

Congress has granted the President enormous power. This is well known, but how we are to assess the legality of exercises of such power still is not. Put simply, there is no clear framework to understand the legality of presidential exercises of statutory power. Scholars have noticed this and, in response, have largely turned to administrative law for guidance. This turn to administrative law is somewhat intuitive but misguided.

Administrative law is a highly reticulated body of law that has developed over decades to regulate executive branch agencies, not the President. It has focused on legitimizing agency power in the …

The President's Approval Power, Christine Kexel Chabot

Fordham Law Review

This Essay introduces the President’s approval power as it was originally understood in the United States. Leading proponents of a unitary executive President have asserted that the President’s absolute power to control subordinate officers includes power to veto or approve subordinates’ discretionary actions before they take effect. This Essay reconsiders the approval power’s purportedly unitary function and presents previously overlooked evidence of the originalist foundations of a presidential approval power. My comprehensive analysis of every public act passed by the First Congress shows that the founding generation never understood Article II to grant the President general authority to approve subordinates’ …

Executive Power, Drone Executions, And The Due Process Rights Of American Citizens, Jonathan G. D'Errico

Fordham Law Review

Few conflicts have tested the mettle of procedural due process more than the War on Terror. Although fiery military responses have insulated the United States from another 9/11, the Obama administration’s 2011 drone execution of a U.S. citizen allegedly associated with al-Qaeda without formal charges or prosecution sparked public outrage. Judicial recognition that this nonbattlefield execution presented a plausible procedural due process claim ignited questions which continue to smolder today: What are the limits of executive war power? What constitutional privileges do American citizens truly retain in the War on Terror? What if the executive erred in its judgment and …

Rethinking Presidential Eligibility, Eugene D. Mazo

Fordham Law Review

Many aspiring American Presidents have had their candidacies challenged for failing to meet the Constitution’s eligibility requirements. Although none of these challenges have ever been successful, they have sapped campaigns of valuable resources and posed a threat to several ambitious men. This Article examines several notable presidential eligibility challenges and explains why they have often been unsuccessful. The literature on presidential eligibility traditionally has focused on the Eligibility Clause, which enumerates the age, residency, and citizenship requirements that a President must satisfy before taking office. By contrast, very little of it examines how a challenge to one’s candidacy impacts a …

Reforming The Contested Convention: Rethinking The Presidential Nomination Process, Michael T. Morley

Fordham Law Review

The presidential nomination process could be substantially improved through a few minor tweaks that would reduce unnecessary uncertainty, bolster its democratic underpinnings, and improve the connections among its various components. First, certain fundamental rules governing national conventions should be determined well in advance of the presidential nominating process, before any primaries or caucuses are held or delegates selected, and not be subject to change or suspension at the convention itself. Second, parties should enhance the democratic moorings of their national conventions by requiring presidential candidates to win a greater number of presidential preference votes to be placed into nomination. Third, …

“Natural Born” Disputes In The 2016 Presidential Election, Derek T. Muller

Fordham Law Review

The 2016 presidential election brought forth new disputes concerning the definition of “natural born Citizen.” The most significant challenges surrounded the eligibility of Senator Ted Cruz, born in Canada to a Cuban father and an American mother. Unlike challenges to President Barack Obama’s eligibility, which largely turned on conspiratorial facts, challenges to Cruz’s eligibility turned principally on the law and garnered more serious attention concerning a somewhat cryptic constitutional clause. Understandably, much attention focused on the definition of “natural born citizen” and whether candidates like Cruz qualified. Administrative challenges and litigation in court revealed deficiencies in the procedures for handling …

Election Law And The Presidency: An Introduction And Overview, Jerry H. Goldfeder

Fordham Law Review

Americans now fully appreciate that presidential candidates are vying for a majority of the Electoral College votes, rather than the individual votes of constituents. Modern campaigns are organized around this goal, and commentators are focused on this reality. As a result, there has been an increased cry to reform the electoral process. After all, if every other public official in the land is elected by receiving more votes than their competitors, why should the President of the United States be elected in this apparently undemocratic fashion? The process appears even more unusual in that electors are chosen pursuant to state …

Third-Party And Independent Presidential Candidates: The Need For A Runoff Mechanism, Edward B. Foley

Fordham Law Review

Consider what 2016 might have looked like if this better electoral system had been in place. Bloomberg then could have entered the race without risking being a spoiler. In a three-way race—Bloomberg, Clinton, and Trump—Bloomberg might have fizzled out, leaving a two-way race between Clinton and Trump. Since that is essentially how the election ended up anyway, the country would have been no worse off for having had a chance to consider Bloomberg as an alternative. But suppose, however, with Trump’s candidacy spinning out of control in a series of unacceptable comments (as it appeared to do in early August),11 …

Ramshackle Federalism: America’S Archaic And Dysfunctional Presidential Election System, Anthony J. Gaughan

Fordham Law Review

Accordingly, this Article proposes five sensible and achievable reforms to modernize the presidential election system. Each requires Congress and the federal government to play a much more proactive role in the presidential election system. The Constitution may be founded on federalist principles, but excessive decentralization is not serving us well in presidential election administration. In an age of tumultuous and accelerating change, the presidential election system must be modernized to meet the needs of twenty-first century America.

Does The Constitution Provide More Ballot Access Protection For Presidential Elections Than For U.S. House Elections?, Richard Winger

Fordham Law Review

Both the U.S. Constitution and The Federalist Papers suggest that voters ought to have more freedom to vote for the candidate of their choice for the U.S. House of Representatives than they do for the President or the U.S. Senate. Yet, strangely, for the last thirty-three years, the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts have ruled that the Constitution gives voters more freedom to vote for the candidate of their choice in presidential elections than in congressional elections. Also, state legislatures, which have been writing ballot access laws since 1888, have passed laws that make it easier for minor-party and …

Time To End Presidential Caucuses, Sean J. Wright

Fordham Law Review

Following the 2016 election cycle, there will be a great opportunity to implement reform. A major change should be to move away from presidential caucuses. They persist with, in the words of John Oliver, “complex, opaque rules.” These complex rules, which include participating in person for over an hour, negatively impacts participation in the electoral process. For example, in 2012, “participation rates in the Republican Party’s caucuses averaged 3 percent.” 3 percent. Compellingly, PolitiFact has observed that “[c]aucuses and delegate math can be incredibly confusing, and the arcane party structures don’t reflect how most people assume presidential selection works.” Yet, …

The Problem Of Presidential Inability—Will Congress Ever Solve It?, John D. Feerick

Fordham Law Review

    One of the most critical and intriguing constitutional questions ever presented for solution is: What happens when the President of the United States becomes incapable of discharging the powers and duties of his office? Does the Vice-President "become President" for the remainder of the term or does he merely "act as President" during the period of the inability? The Constitution is not explicit..

Fair Trade: The President’S Power To Recover Captured U.S. Servicemembers And The Recent Prisoner Exchange With The Taliban, Celidon Pitt

Fordham Law Review

    The Obama Administration’s controversial exchange of five Taliban detainees for a captured U.S. soldier in May 2014 reignited a heated debate over the proper scope of wartime executive authority. From a legal perspective, the primary issue centers on the constitutional balance of power between congressional appropriations and the President’s power as Commander in Chief. A complete analysis incorporates both judicial and historical precedent to evaluate the conflict within the broader context of prisoner recovery efforts.

    This Note argues that, regardless of the validity of legislative restrictions on the transfer of Guantánamo detainees, the President possessed sufficient authority to conduct the …