President/Executive Department Commons^™

Congressional Oversight Reports As Legislative Branch Work Product And Research Resource, Grace A. Moore, David Rapallo, Sean M. Theriault

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Levin Center for Oversight and Democracy at Wayne State University Law School is in the process of creating the first-ever comprehensive database of congressional oversight reports for all House and Senate Committees since the 106th Congress (1999–2000). In this article, we place these reports into the broader context of the tools Congress has to conduct oversight in service of its many legislative branch responsibilities under the Constitution. We also explain the development of the database. We conclude the article by discussing how the congressional scholars in this special issue use this database to examine how Congress conducts oversight, and …

Mapping Minority Investigative Powers In Congress, David Rapallo

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

“Shut down the Senate . . .” “Roll over and play dead . . .” In the first hundred days of President Donald Trump’s second term, these were the rallying cries of two far ends of a debate among Democrats about how to respond to the administration’s unprecedented actions. This debate, which rages on today, has been marked by a lack of specificity about the various oversight tools available to members of the minority party in Congress, particularly when they investigate whether the Executive Branch is faithfully executing the laws Congress passes. Scholarship too has focused little on the full …

The Power To Declare Peace, Michael Stokes Paulsen

Pepperdine Law Review

The Constitution gives Congress the power “to declare War.” The meaning of that grant of power is much debated, but its converse is much neglected: To whom does the Constitution assign the power to declare peace? This Article comprehensively examines the Constitution’s various assignments of the power(s) to make peace—constitutional powers to end, as a practical matter and as a binding legal matter, a prior legal condition of war. Both the President and Congress possess several such powers. The President has the power, with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, to make treaties, including peace treaties that …

Third-Party Funding: Balancing Transparency, National Security, And Access To Justice, Victoria Shannon Sahani

Seattle University Law Review

Many lawmakers who have recently become aware of the multi-billion-dollar global third-party funding industry are raising new national security concerns that further complicate preexisting, longstanding debates about transparency, disclosure, access to justice, and the best way to regulate third-party funding. In response, this Article briefly asserts three main points relating to the question of how best to regulate third-party funding. First, this Article explains the third-party funding industry, including its global regulatory landscape and how it serves three distinct populations: consumers, businesses, and law firms. Second, this Article explains that third-party funding is one tool that can help expand access …

The Missing Constitutional Law Of Executive Conditions, Nicole Huberfeld, Matthew B. Lawrence

Faculty Articles

This Article contributes to the development of the constitutional law of executive conditions. The appropriations presidentialism of the second Trump Administration—the shift from bilateral executive/legislative cooperation and compromise in federal spending to executive unilateralism in defiance of congressional control—has forced courts into the administration of federal spending like never before. As a result, judges have been forced to confront legal questions that remained mostly dormant during the era of executive/legislative cooperation, including questions about the constitutionality of efforts to encourage through spending conditions what the federal government cannot mandate (or has not mandated) directly, like speech or silence on particular …

The Crisis Of Appropriations Law, Samuel R. Bagenstos

Articles

Appropriations law is a unique body of federal law.  Appropriations law imposes its own somewhat baroque set of statutory interpretation principles, approves of very broad delegations to the Executive Branch without meaningful limiting principles, and is often exempt from judicial review.  But perhaps that is all about to change.  Donald Trump’s historically aggressive challenge to Congress’s power of the purse has spurred an unusually large volume of exceptionally high-stakes appropriations law litigation. 

The potential implications go beyond the high-profile issues such as enforcement of the Impoundment Control Act.  In general, the unusual features of appropriations law are built on a …

What Are “Wartime Authorities” And When Can The President Use Them? An Expert Q&A, Tess Bridgeman, Rebecca Ingber, Scott Roehm

Online Publications

The first several months of President Donald Trump’s second administration have been marred by the chaotic and often unlawful use, or threatened use, of wartime and terrorism-related authorities for what are essentially domestic immigration or criminal law enforcement purposes. This is not the first time a president has sought to push the boundaries of his wartime powers, or outright claimed those he did not have, but it may well be the most extreme. Indeed, Trump’s reliance on wartime authorities in contexts entirely divorced from armed conflict, or even the threat of force against the United States, puts the country on …

How We Broke Impeachment And Why We Need To Fix It: Presidential And Cabinet Level Impeachments, 1974–2024, Perry H. Apelbaum

Journal of Legislation

From 1974 to 2024, the House of Representatives initiated a total of 6 presidential and cabinet level impeachments—4 more than were brought in the Nation’s first 185 years. In the aftermath of the “gold standard” set during the Nixon impeachment inquiry, the process has experienced a steady decline in fairness and effectiveness and increase in partisanship, with the result being the weakening of our constitutional system of checks and balances.

During this period, impeachment proceedings have become more frequent and less meaningful, rarely led to disclosures of significant non-public information, and not resulted in conviction by the Senate The procedural …

Federal Communications Commission V. Consumers' Research: Brief Of Julian Davis Mortenson And Nicholas Bagley As Amici Curiae In Support Of Petitioners, Julian Mortenson, Nicholas Bagley

Appellate Briefs

Julian Davis Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley are professors at the University of Michigan Law School. Mortenson is a specialist on the history of executive authority and the separation of powers. Bagley is a leading scholar in administrative law. They are the co-authors of Delegation at the Founding, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 277 (2021), a leading article examining Founding- era constitutional principles regarding legislative delegations of authority, and Delegation at the Founding: A Response to the Critics, 122 Colum. L. Rev. 2323 (2022).

Condensing The Alphabet Soup: Missed Administrative Rulemaking Concerns In U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission V. Alpine Securities Corporation, David Davani

Cardozo Law Review

For decades, the political landscape in the United States, characterized by deadlock in Congress and increasingly polarized relations among the country’s major political parties, has put the responsibility of keeping the government functioning in the hands of the administrative state. An absence of regular, substantive legislation (and a President willing to sign the bills given to her by Congress into law) leaves the advancement of meaningful policy to the rulemaking functions of federal executive agencies. Agency rules, developed pursuant to Congressional commands, aim to ensure that private industries will keep air and water clean, make sure drugs are safe, and, …

Command And Control: Operationalizing The Unitary Executive, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The concept of the unitary executive is written into the Constitution by virtue of Article II’s vesting of the “executive Power” in the President and not in executive officers created by Congress. Defenders and opponents alike of the “unitary executive” often equate the idea of presidential control of executive action with the power to remove executive personnel. But an unlimitable presidential removal power cannot be derived from the vesting of executive power in the President for the simple reason that it would not actually result in full presidential control of executive action, as the actions of now-fired subordinates would still …

Legislating Against Liberties: Congress And The Constitution In The Aftermath Of War, Harry Blain

Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

How far can a democracy go to protect itself without jeopardizing the liberties upon which democracy depends? This dissertation examines why wartime restrictions on civil liberties outlive their original justifications. Through a comparative historical analysis of five major American wars, it illustrates the decisive role of the U.S. Congress in preserving these restrictions during peacetime. This argument challenges the prevailing consensus in the literature, which identifies wartime executive power as the main threat to postwar freedoms. It also reveals broader narratives of American constitutional development, including the rise and fall of intrusive congressional investigations, the decline of sedition legislation since …

Delegating Climate Authorities, Mark P. Nevitt

Faculty Articles

The science is clear: the United States and the world must take dramatic action to address climate change or face irreversible, catastrophic planetary harm. Within the U.S.—the world’s largest historic emitter of greenhouse gas emissions—this will require passing new legislation or turning to existing statutes and authorities to address the climate crisis. Doing so implicates existing and prospective delegations of legislative authority to a large swath of administrative agencies. Yet congressional climate decision-making delegations to any executive branch agency must not dismiss the newly resurgent nondelegation doctrine. Described by some scholars as the “most dangerous idea in American law,” the …

How Can Federal Actors Compete On Noncompetes? Examining The Need For And Possibility Of Federal Action On Noncompetition Agreements, Robert Mcavoy

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Employees have been frustrated by the restrictiveness of noncompete agreements and confused about their enforceability for decades. The added complication of choice-of-law provisions in employment contracts with noncompetes creates a sea of unpredictability for both employees and employers.

Each state applies its own policy to noncompete agreements. While every state treats noncompetes differently than typical contract provisions, a broad spectrum exists between the states that are friendly and those that are hostile to the enforcement of noncompetes. Employees and employers often fail to understand whether their noncompete is enforceable under the jurisdiction chosen by the contract, and courts override choice-of-law …

House Rules: Congress And The Attorney-Client Privilege, David Rapallo

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In 2020, the Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision in Trump v. Mazars establishing four factors for determining the validity of congressional subpoenas for a sitting president’s personal papers. In an unanticipated move, Chief Justice John Roberts added that recipients of congressional subpoenas have “long been understood” to retain not only constitutional privileges, but common law privileges developed by judges, including the attorney-client privilege. This was particularly surprising since Trump was not relying on the attorney-client privilege and the Court had never treated this common law privilege as overriding Congress’s Article I power to set its own procedures for conducting …

Delegation, Administration, And Improvisation, Kevin Arlyck

Notre Dame Law Review

Nondelegation originalism is having its moment. Recent Supreme Court opinions suggest that a majority of Justices may be prepared to impose strict constitutional limits on Congress’s power to delegate policymaking authority to the executive branch. In response, scholars have scoured the historical record for evidence affirming or refuting a more stringent version of nondelegation than current Supreme Court doctrine demands. Though the debate ranges widely, sharp disputes have arisen over whether a series of apparently broad Founding-era delegations defeat originalist arguments in favor of a more demanding modern doctrine. Proponents—whom I call “nondelegationists”—argue that these historical delegations can all be …

Oversight Riders, Kevin M. Stack, Michael P. Vandenbergh

Notre Dame Law Review

Congress has a constitutionally critical duty to gather information about how the executive branch implements the powers Congress has granted it and the funds Congress has appropriated. Yet in recent years the executive branch has systematically thwarted Congress’s powers and duties of oversight. Congressional subpoenas for testimony and documents have met with blanket refusals to comply, frequently backed by advice from the Department of Justice that executive privilege justifies withholding the information. Even when Congress holds an official in contempt for failure to comply with a congressional subpoena, the Department of Justice often does not initiate criminal sanctions. As a …

How Biden Began Building Back Better The Federal Bench, Carl Tobias

Washington and Lee Law Review Online

In October 2020, Democratic presidential nominee Joseph Biden famously expressed regret that the fifty-four accomplished, conservative, and young federal appellate court jurists and the 174 comparatively similar district court judges whom former– Republican President Donald Trump and the recent pair of analogous Grand Old Party Senate majorities in the 115th and 116th Congress appointed had left the courts of appeals and the district courts “out of whack.” Lamentable were the numerous detrimental ways in which President Trump and these Republican Senate majorities attempted to undercut the appeals courts and district courts, which actually constitute the tribunals of last resort in …

“Drive-By” Jurisdiction: Congressional Oversight In Court, Daniel Epstein

Pepperdine Law Review

On July 9, 2020, in Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP and Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, the Supreme Court held that the lower courts did not adequately consider the separation of powers concerns attendant to congressional subpoenas for presidential information. Given that the question presented in Mazars concerned whether Congress had a legitimate legislative purpose in subpoenaing the President’s personal records, the Supreme Court’s decision is anything but a model of clarity. The Court simultaneously opined that disputes “involving nonprivileged, private information” “do[ ] not implicate sensitive Executive Branch deliberations” while claiming “congressional subpoenas for the President’s information unavoidably pit …

Can President Trump Be Impeached As Mr. Trump? Exploring The Temporal Dimension Of Impeachments, Harold J. Krent

Chicago-Kent Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Senate, The Trump Impeachment Trial And Constitutional Morality, Joel K. Goldstein

Chicago-Kent Law Review

No abstract provided.

Like “Nobody Has Ever Seen Before”: Precedent And Privilege In The Trump Era, Heidi Kitrosser

Chicago-Kent Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Misguided On-Off Theory Of Congressional Authority, Steven D. Schwinn

Chicago-Kent Law Review

No abstract provided.

Subordination And Separation Of Powers, Matthew B. Lawrence

Faculty Articles

This Article calls for the incorporation of antisubordination into separation-ofpowers analysis. Scholars analyzing separation-of-powers tools—laws and norms that divide power among government actors—consider a long list of values ranging from protecting liberty to promoting efficiency. Absent from this list are questions of equity: questions of racism, sexism, and classism. This Article problematizes this omission and begins to rectify it. For the first time, this Article applies critical-race and feminist theorists’ subordination question—are marginalized groups disproportionately burdened?—to three important separation-of-powers tools: legislative appropriations, executive conditions, and constitutional entrenchment. In doing so, it reveals that each tool entails subordination by creating generalized …

Ostracism And Democracy, Alex Zhang

Faculty Articles

The 2020 Presidential Election featured an unprecedented attempt to undermine our democratic institutions: allegations of voter fraud and litigation about mail-in ballots culminated in a mob storming of the Capitol as Congress certified President Biden’s victory. Former President Trump now faces social-media bans and potential disqualification from future federal office, but his allies have criticized those efforts as the witch-hunt of a cancel culture that is symptomatic of the unique ills of contemporary liberal politics.

This Article defends recent efforts to remove Trump from the public eye, with reference to an ancient Greek electoral mechanism: ostracism. In the world’s first …

The People's Court: On The Intellectual Origins Of American Judicial Power, Ian C. Bartrum

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

This article enters into the modern debate between “consti- tutional departmentalists”—who contend that the executive and legislative branches share constitutional interpretive authority with the courts—and what are sometimes called “judicial supremacists.” After exploring the relevant history of political ideas, I join the modern minority of voices in the latter camp.

This is an intellectual history of two evolving political ideas—popular sovereignty and the separation of powers—which merged in the making of American judicial power, and I argue we can only understand the structural function of judicial review by bringing these ideas together into an integrated whole. Or, put another way, …

Presidential Control Of Elections, Lisa Marshall Manheim

Articles

In recent decades, presidents of both political parties have asserted increasingly aggressive forms of influence over the administrative state. During this same period, Congress has expanded the role that the federal government plays in election administration. The convergence of these two trends leads to a troubling but underexamined phenomenon: presidential control of elections. Relying on their official powers, presidents have the ability to affect the rules that govern elections, including elections meant to check and legitimize presidential powers in the first place. This self-serving arrangement heightens the risk of harms from political entrenchment and subordination of expertise. These harms, in …

Presidential Progress On Climate Change: Will The Courts Interfere With What Needs To Be Done To Save Our Planet?, Michael B. Gerrard

Faculty Scholarship

The Biden Administration is undertaking numerous actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and transition away from fossil fuels as part of the fight against climate change. Many of these actions are likely to be challenged in court. This paper describes the various legal theories that are likely to be used in these challenges, assesses their prospects of success given the current composition of the Supreme Court, and suggests ways to minimize the risks.

Rethinking The Federal Courts: Why Now Is Time For Congress To Revisit The Number Of Judges That Sit On Federal Appellate Panels, Mitchell W. Bild

Chicago-Kent Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Permissibility Of Acting Officials: May The President Work Around Senate Confirmation?, Nina A. Mendelson

Articles

Recent presidential reliance on acting agency officials, including an acting Attorney General, acting Secretaries of Defense, and an acting Secretary of Homeland Security, as well as numerous below-Cabinet officials, has drawn significant criticism from scholars, the media, and members of Congress. They worry that the President may be pursuing illegitimate goals and seeking to bypass the critical Senate role under the Appointments Clause. But Congress has authorized—and Presidents have called upon—such individuals from the early years of the Republic to the present. Meanwhile, neither formalist approaches to the constitutional issue, which seem to permit no flexibility, nor current Supreme Court …