President/Executive Department Commons^™

The Threat To Government Ethics, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

That was quite a week. Over seven days in mid-October:

• President Trump hosted a White House dinner for three dozen super-wealthy individuals and representatives of major corporations who pledged funds for his $300 million ballroom.
• The president commuted the sentence of former Congressman George Santos, who had served less than three months of an 87-month term for corruption, and canceled Santos’s obligation to pay restitution to his victims.
• The president fired, without providing a reason or giving the 30 days’ notice required by law, the Inspector General for the Export-Import Bank.
• We learned the president is demanding the Department of …

Democracy Needs The Administrative State, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

In public debate, the federal bureaucracy is not typically praised for its democratic credentials. Consisting of a wide array of agencies staffed by a permanent civil service and governed by detailed regulations, the administrative state is more likely to be portrayed as a bastion of red tape and unelected power. To hear members of the Supreme Court tell it, for example, the administrative state’s “unaccountable bureaucrats” and “vast power[s]” pose a dire threat to constitutional democracy that only expanded presidential control can solve. President Trump has offered an even darker view, attacking a “deep state” of entrenched government officials as …

Presidential Immunity: Before And After Trump, Thomas P. Schmidt

Faculty Scholarship

“All the officers of government,” the Supreme Court said long ago, “from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.” Despite that ringing and categorical language, however, the Court has held that the President — the “highest” and most powerful of all government officers — is “immune” from judicial oversight in several respects. Indeed, when the Court held last Term that former presidents are presumptively immune from criminal prosecution for officials acts, the dissenters warned: “In every use of official power, the President is now a king above the law.”

This Article …

The Administrative Law Of Mccarthyism, Nicholas Handler

Faculty Scholarship

This Article recovers the largely overlooked legal and administrative history of the federal loyalty-security program, and argues that it played a formative role in the development of modern civil service protections and administrative law. During the McCarthy era, the United States Civil Service Commission (CSC), under pressure from Congress, implemented a sweeping loyalty program aimed at rooting out purportedly disloyal federal employees. Though often remembered as a moment of political overreach and civil liberties violations, this Article shows that the loyalty program simultaneously catalyzed a surprising expansion in procedural rights for government workers—both through internal reforms initiated by the CSC …

The Vanishing Enforcer: Consumer Protection In An Era Of Dual Retrenchment, Alisher Juzgenbayev

Northwestern University Law Review

Recent developments, including reductions in the federal workforce, effective suspension of certain enforcement activities, and attempted centralization of independent agency rulemaking in the White House, have significantly weakened administrative agencies. This administrative retrenchment is concerning as private enforcement of a number of consumer protection statutes has been simultaneously curtailed through the Supreme Court’s decisions in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins and TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, which dramatically narrowed plaintiffs’ standing. These decisions rely in part on a vision of strong executive authority, positing that broad private standing conflicts with an Article II framework where a politically accountable President faithfully implements laws …

The Foreign Commerce Power, Kathleen Claussen, Timothy Meyer

Faculty Scholarship

This Article is the first to scrutinize presidential trade authority under the Constitution. The Constitution grants the President no independent power to regulate foreign commerce. That conclusion, while apparent from a straightforward reading of Articles I and II, stands in stark contrast to executive conduct of U.S. trade policy in recent years. This Article traces the roots of this constitutional distortion to a confluence of doctrinal drift and academic oversight. Courts and commentators have increasingly relied on an expansive conception of executive power grounded in a perceived general foreign affairs authority. In doing so, they have blurred the line between …

Rethinking Judicial Power & Remedial Restraint, Caprice L. Roberts

Catholic University Law Review

This Article maintains that groundbreaking Supreme Court cases reshaping judicial power and restraint are frequently remedies centric. The much- anticipated ruling in Trump v. CASA illustrates this correlation. Interpreting traditional equity, the Supreme Court circumscribed federal judicial power to issue universal relief. The Court relied on Marbury v. Madison to bolster its reasoning on the limits of judicial power. Ironically, both cases denied any remedy while enhancing the potential for future judicial power. Whether via judicial review and supremacy power or the Court’s future ability to now be the only federal court able to issue universal remedies—the Court’s role in …

Removal: A Response To Professor Nelson, Philip A. Hamburger

Faculty Scholarship

In an essay published earlier this fall, Professor Caleb Nelson argues that, as a matter of originalism, the President does not have a constitutional power to remove executive officers. Professor Nelson is a renowned scholar, whose arguments could well influence the Supreme Court in two upcoming removal cases: Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook. It’s therefore important to evaluate whether his historical claim about removal is correct.

All The President's Men: Congressional Appointment Restrictions At The Founding, Nicholas Holmes, Eric Walker

Michigan Law Review

The appointment power is exercised through a unique unicameral process. The Founders emphasized its distinctiveness from our system’s general bicameral legislative process, yet the power has largely been overlooked by scholars and jurists. This Note reveals that appointment discretion is the crucial, but understudied, flipside of the removal-power coin and is essential for presidential administration. Constitutional text, structure, and history indicate that there is a line beyond which congressional restrictions on who is eligible to hold federal office exceed Congress’s delegated powers and infringe on the president’s nomination and appointment power under Article II. The conventional wisdom on this line, …

Disqualification, Immunity, And The Presidency, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

Trump v. Anderson and Trump v. United States were two momentous decisions in a momentous Supreme Court term. Sharing then former — and now current — President Trump as a party, the decisions hold important implications for presidential power and accountability.

Anderson arose from a suit brought by Colorado voters to challenge Trump’s inclusion on the Republican primary ballot in that state. They argued that Trump organized and incited the mob that attacked the Capitol on January 6, 2021, and disrupted the Electoral College vote count and certification. In their view, this disqualified him from serving as President under section …

Constraining The Executive Branch: Delegation, Agency Independence, And Congressional Design Of Judicial Review, Jennifer L. Selin, Pamela J. Clouser Mccann

Northwestern University Law Review

While scholarship examining the relationship between Congress, federal agencies, and the judiciary reveals variation in the statutory details that affects administrative and judicial decision-making, few studies explore the extent to which congressional delegation decisions balance both the substantive and procedural independence of agencies against the possibility of the federal judiciary’s review of administrative action.

This Article enhances scholarly understanding of delegation by providing a qualitative, theoretical, and empirical account of the circumstances under which Congress manipulates federal agency exposure to the federal judiciary. Ironically, combined with statutory provisions dictating agency independence, increasing an agency’s exposure to unelected federal judges can …

Next In Line: Addressing The Constitutional And Policy Problems With The Current Presidential Line Of Succession, Arian Carlo Rubio

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The presidential line of succession is a critical component of the United States government, designed to ensure continuity and stability in the executive leadership during crises. This Note examines the current statutory provisions concerning presidential succession to identify constitutional ambiguities and practical challenges that could undermine governmental operations during unforeseen emergencies.

Through a detailed analysis of historical instances, such as the incapacitation scenarios of past presidents and recent threats to government officials, including the COVID-19 pandemic and a rise in political violence, this Note highlights the risks posed by the existing succession framework. The ambiguity primarily revolves around the roles …

Implied Consent In Administrative Adjudication, Grace Moore

Washington and Lee Law Review Online

Article III of the Constitution mandates that judges exercising the federal judicial power receive life tenure and that their pay not be diminished. Nonetheless, certain forms of adjudication have always taken place outside of Article III—in state courts, military tribunals, territorial courts, and administrative tribunals. Administrative law judges, employed by various federal administrative agencies, decide thousands of cases each year. A vast majority of the cases they decide deal with public rights, which generally include claims involving federal statutory rights or cases in which the federal government is a party. With litigant consent, however, the Supreme Court has upheld administrative …

War Powers Reform: A Skeptical View, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

Debates about war powers focus too much on legal checks and on the President’s power to start wars. Congressional checks before and during crises work better than many reform-ists suppose, and there are ways to improve Congress’s political checking without substantial legal reform.

“Improve Your Privileges While They Stay”: A Guide To Improve The Privileges Of U.S. Citizenship For Everybody, Joshua J. Schroeder

Touro Law Review

In 1767, the young Phillis Wheatley wrote from her position of slavery in the Wheatley home of Boston to “ye sons of Science” at Harvard College, telling them to “improve your privileges while they stay.” She beheld the startling privileges of learning and discovery bestowed upon an elite group of young, rich white men in Boston and celebrated their privileges. Neither did she scorn those whose luck had placed a bounty of privilege upon their laps, for she likely planned to share in that bounty herself, one day. When she was only 13 or 14, Wheatley sublimely encouraged grown men …

Economic Security And The Separation Of Powers, Kathleen Claussen, Timothy Meyer

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,” but today the exercise of the foreign commerce power resides primarily with the executive branch. That transfer of control is partly the result of significant delegations of responsibility for managing foreign commerce from Congress to the executive. It is also, however, the result of the securitization of foreign commerce. The executive branch asserts that foreign commerce issues fall under its constitutional powers over foreign affairs, and, thus, that it enjoys authority over foreign commerce that exceeds the scope of congressional delegations.

This Article makes three contributions. First, …

The Major Questions Doctrine At The Boundaries Of Interpretive Law, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s apparent transformation of the major questions doctrine into a clear statement rule demanding clear congressional authorization for “major” agency actions has already had, and will continue to have, wide-ranging impacts on American public law. Not the least of these is the impact it will have on the enterprise of statutory interpretation. Indeed, while it is easy to focus on the policy repercussions of a newly constrained Congress and newly hamstrung administrative state, this Article argues that equally important is the novel precedent that is set in this particular formulation of a clear statement rule, which stands almost …

Movement On Removal: An Emerging Consensus On The First Congress, Jed Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

What did the “Decision of 1789” decide about presidential removal power, if anything? It turns out that an emerging consensus of scholars agrees that there was not much consensus in the First Congress.

Two more questions follow: Is the “unitary executive theory” based on originalism, and if so, is originalism a reliable method of interpretation based on historical evidence?

The unitary executive theory posits that a president has exclusive and “indefeasible” executive powers (i.e., powers beyond congressional and judicial checks and balances). This panel was an opportunity for unitary executive theorists and their critics to debate recent historical research questioning …

The Immigration Implications Of Presidential Pot Pardons, Jason A. Cade

Scholarly Works

This Essay examines the immigration implications of President Joe Biden’s Proclamation on October 6, 2022, pardoning most federal and D.C. offenders who committed the offense of simple marijuana possession. A late twentieth century interpretive shift by the Board of Immigration Appeals holds that pardons only prevent deportation for certain criminal history categories, which do not include controlled substance offenses, and thus far lower federal courts have deferred to the agency’s approach.Nevertheless, according to the analysis I offer, President Biden’s cannabis pardons should be deemed fully effective to eliminate all immigration penalties. All of the immigrant pardon cases to reach the …

Bring On The Chicken And Hot Oil: Reviving The Nondelegation Doctrine For Congressional Delegations To The President, Loren Jacobson

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

The so-called “nondelegation doctrine” posits that Congress may not transfer its legislative power to another branch of government, and yet Congress delegates its authority routinely not only to the President, but to a whole host of other entities it has created and that are located in the executive branch, including executive branch agencies, independent agencies, commissions, and sometimes even private parties. Recognizing that “in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives,” the Supreme Court of the United States …

The Electoral Count Mess: The Electoral Count Act Of 1887 Is Unconstitutional, And Other Fun Facts (Plus A Few Random Academic Speculations) About Counting Electoral Votes, Jack M. Beermann, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In this essay, and in light of the controversy that arose in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, we explain the constitutional process for counting electoral votes. In short, every four years, the Twelfth Amendment requires the President of the Senate (usually the Vice President of the United States) to open certificates provided by state presidential electors and count the votes contained therein. The Constitution allows no role for Congress in this process, and thus the provisions of the Electoral Count Act purporting to grant Congress the power, by concurrent resolution, to reject a state's electoral votes are unconstitutional. …

Health Choice Or Health Coercion? The Osha Emergency Temporary Standard Covid-19 Vaccination Mandates: Ax Or Vax, Savannah Snyder

Helm's School of Government Conference - 2021-2024

No abstract provided.

Impartial Justice: Restoring Integrity To Impeachment Trials, Justin D. Rattey

Pepperdine Law Review

In recent decades, we have witnessed the diminution of the impeachment process by various actors—especially political parties. But the Founders envisioned a vastly different process, one that was insulated from partisanship. In Alexander Hamilton’s words, impeachment trials were assigned to the Senate because the Senate is “a tribunal sufficiently dignified [and] sufficiently independent.” Examples from the most recent impeachment trials of President Donald J. Trump reflect the Senate’s loss of dignity and independence, with Senator McConnell pledging to work with the White House throughout the first impeachment process and senators from both parties conceding that they made up their minds …

The Electoral Count Mess: The Electoral Count Act Of 1887 Is Unconstitutional, And Other Fun Facts (Plus A Few Random Academic Speculations) About Counting Electoral Votes, Jack Beermann, Gary Lawson

FIU Law Review

In this essay, and in light of the controversy that arose in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, we explain the constitutional process for counting electoral votes. In short, every four years, the Twelfth Amendment requires the President of the Senate (usually the Vice President of the United States) to open certificates provided by state presidential electors and count the votes contained therein. The Constitution allows no role for Congress in this process, and thus, the provisions of the Electoral Count Act purporting to grant Congress the power, by concurrent resolution, to reject a state’s electoral votes, is unconstitutional. …

House Rules: Congress And The Attorney-Client Privilege, David Rapallo

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In 2020, the Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision in Trump v. Mazars establishing four factors for determining the validity of congressional subpoenas for a sitting president’s personal papers. In an unanticipated move, Chief Justice John Roberts added that recipients of congressional subpoenas have “long been understood” to retain not only constitutional privileges, but common law privileges developed by judges, including the attorney-client privilege. This was particularly surprising since Trump was not relying on the attorney-client privilege and the Court had never treated this common law privilege as overriding Congress’s Article I power to set its own procedures for conducting …

Making Appointment The Means Of Presidential Removal Of Officers Of The United States, David M. Driesen

Lewis & Clark Law Review

This Article examines the relationship between appointment and removal of officers of the United States, focusing on the administrations of Andrew Jackson, Andrew Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Donald Trump. These administrations’ use of appointment and removal underlines the potential tension between political removal accomplished without Senate approval of a successor and the Constitution’s goal of securing the rule of law.

To remedy these issues, this Article proposes that Congress pass a statute forbidding presidential removal of an agency head (and other Senate-approved appointees) until the President nominates a qualified successor or until the Senate confirms a successor. Integrating Appointments Clause …

Litigating The Separation Of Powers, Elizabeth Earle Beske

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

No abstract provided.

Inspectors General And The Law Of Oversight Independence, Andrew C. Brunsden

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

President Trump’s defiance of basic norms threatened the oversight institutions of American democracy. His brazen assault on the prosecutorial and investigative independence of federal law enforcement was well documented. Yet few have thoroughly scrutinized his violations of the oversight independence of internal institutions that monitor the government to promote integrity, transparency, and accountability. This Article examines the independence of Inspectors General (IGs), the internal watchdogs of the Executive Branch, and the President’s attacks on the institution. President Trump breached long-standing independence norms when he fired or replaced IGs in retaliation for their legitimate exercise of oversight duties. Then, in some …

“Drive-By” Jurisdiction: Congressional Oversight In Court, Daniel Epstein

Pepperdine Law Review

On July 9, 2020, in Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP and Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, the Supreme Court held that the lower courts did not adequately consider the separation of powers concerns attendant to congressional subpoenas for presidential information. Given that the question presented in Mazars concerned whether Congress had a legitimate legislative purpose in subpoenaing the President’s personal records, the Supreme Court’s decision is anything but a model of clarity. The Court simultaneously opined that disputes “involving nonprivileged, private information” “do[ ] not implicate sensitive Executive Branch deliberations” while claiming “congressional subpoenas for the President’s information unavoidably pit …

Neither Safe, Nor Legal, Nor Rare: The D.C. Circuit’S Use Of The Doctrine Of Ratification To Shield Agency Action From Appointments Clause Challenges, Damien M. Schiff

Seattle University Law Review

Key to the constitutional design of the federal government is the separation of powers. An important support for that separation is the Appointments Clause, which governs how officers of the United States are installed in their positions. Although the separation of powers generally, and the Appointments Clause specifically, support democratically accountable government, they also protect individual citizens against abusive government power. But without a judicial remedy, such protection is ineffectual—a mere parchment barrier.

Such has become the fate of the Appointments Clause in the D.C. Circuit, thanks to that court’s adoption—and zealous employment—of the rule that agency action, otherwise unconstitutional …