President/Executive Department Commons^™

Some Realism About Constitutional Remedies, Thomas P. Schmidt, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court has wavered between two approaches to questions of executive power, which are often labeled institutional formalism and realism. Formalism treats an institution like the presidency as a “black box” to which the Constitution assigns certain powers. In Trump v. Hawaii,  for example, the Supreme Court upheld President Trump’s infamous travel ban by focusing not on the “particular President” and his past call for a “complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States,” but rather on “the authority of the Presidency itself.” That is the language of institutional formalism.

Realism, on the other hand, peers into the “black …

The Rhetoric Of Law In Executive Order No. 12,333, Noah C. Chauvin

Faculty Articles

Scholars have long disputed the extent to which Congress may permissibly regulate the nation's foreign intelligence apparatus. Positions in this debate range from the view that Congress and the President share power over intelligence to the opinion that intelligence matters fall within the President's exclusive Article II authority. This Article examines the extent to which the text of Executive Order No. 12,333-the intelligence community's governing charter-supports the most expansive conceptions of presidential authority over intelligence matters. It concludes that the Order is best understood as recognizing Congress's power to pass laws governing the conduct of intelligence-laws that preclude executive refinement …

What Are “Wartime Authorities” And When Can The President Use Them? An Expert Q&A, Tess Bridgeman, Rebecca Ingber, Scott Roehm

Online Publications

The first several months of President Donald Trump’s second administration have been marred by the chaotic and often unlawful use, or threatened use, of wartime and terrorism-related authorities for what are essentially domestic immigration or criminal law enforcement purposes. This is not the first time a president has sought to push the boundaries of his wartime powers, or outright claimed those he did not have, but it may well be the most extreme. Indeed, Trump’s reliance on wartime authorities in contexts entirely divorced from armed conflict, or even the threat of force against the United States, puts the country on …

The Trump Administration’S Recent Removals To El Salvador Violate The Prohibition On Transfer To Torture, Rebecca Ingber, Scott Roehm

Online Publications

Several of our colleagues have already provided excellent analyses of the fast-evolving legal and factual questions presented by President Donald Trump’s pretextual and abusive invocation of the Alien Enemies Act to transfer to El Salvador 238 Venezuelan men who it alleges are members of the Tren de Aragua gang. We are writing to flag a separate issue that this case has created, one that applies to anyone removed from the United States under any authority: the administration is sending people to a country where there is a quite significant risk they will be abused. Whatever the authority the administration might …

Partisanship Creep, Katherine Shaw

Northwestern University Law Review

It was once well settled and uncontroversial—reflected in legislative enactments, Executive Branch practice, judicial doctrine, and the broader constitutional culture—that the Constitution imposed limits on government partisanship. This principle was one instantiation of a broader set of rule of law principles: that law is not merely an instrument of political power; that government resources should not be used to further partisan interests, or to damage partisan adversaries.

For at least a century, each branch of the federal government has participated in the development and articulation of this nonpartisanship principle. In the legislative realm, federal statutes beginning with the 1883 Pendleton …

The Diffuse Executive, Anya Bernstein, Cristina Rodriguez

Faculty Scholarship

A unitary executive is an exacting ideal. It asks that all power in an administration be gathered in the person of the President, who should have full authority to determine the actions of officials and employees. Even if the President does not directly control every executive action (how could he?), when officials fail to implement presidential preferences, the unitary theory dictates that the President must have the power to remove them. The model posits a tightly organized hierarchy—every rung implementing the substantive decisions of the rung above, with orders flowing from the top: a command-and-control structure for government action. And, …

Overview Of Bicameral Legislatures’ Potential Impact On The Executive Selection Process, Kyle Kopchak

Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design

Bicameral legislature is a common constitutional design model, with bicameral legislatures making up roughly 41 percent of all legislatures worldwide. As of April 2014, 79 bicameral and 113 unicameral systems were recorded in the database of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. In general, “bicameralism is more common in federal, large, and presidential states, while unicameralism is more common in unitary, small, parliamentary ones”. Bicameral systems operate two legislative chambers, both of which play a role in drafting and passing national legislation. However, each house often fulfills a unique role in the legislative process and is usually elected by different methods. Proponents of …

House Rules: Congress And The Attorney-Client Privilege, David Rapallo

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In 2020, the Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision in Trump v. Mazars establishing four factors for determining the validity of congressional subpoenas for a sitting president’s personal papers. In an unanticipated move, Chief Justice John Roberts added that recipients of congressional subpoenas have “long been understood” to retain not only constitutional privileges, but common law privileges developed by judges, including the attorney-client privilege. This was particularly surprising since Trump was not relying on the attorney-client privilege and the Court had never treated this common law privilege as overriding Congress’s Article I power to set its own procedures for conducting …

Prosecuting Executive Branch Wrongdoing, Julian A. Cook

Scholarly Works

Attorney General William Barr's handling of Robert Mueller's Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election was undeniably controversial and raised meaningful questions regarding the impartiality of the Department of Justice. Yet, Barr's conduct, which occurred at the conclusion of the Mueller investigation, was merely the caboose at the end of a series of controversies that were coupled together from the outset of the investigation. Ensnarled in dissonance from its inception, the Mueller investigation was dogged by controversies that ultimately compromised its legitimacy.

Public trust of criminal investigations of executive branch wrongdoing requires prosecutorial independence. To …

“Drive-By” Jurisdiction: Congressional Oversight In Court, Daniel Epstein

Pepperdine Law Review

On July 9, 2020, in Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP and Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, the Supreme Court held that the lower courts did not adequately consider the separation of powers concerns attendant to congressional subpoenas for presidential information. Given that the question presented in Mazars concerned whether Congress had a legitimate legislative purpose in subpoenaing the President’s personal records, the Supreme Court’s decision is anything but a model of clarity. The Court simultaneously opined that disputes “involving nonprivileged, private information” “do[ ] not implicate sensitive Executive Branch deliberations” while claiming “congressional subpoenas for the President’s information unavoidably pit …

The People's Court: On The Intellectual Origins Of American Judicial Power, Ian C. Bartrum

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

This article enters into the modern debate between “consti- tutional departmentalists”—who contend that the executive and legislative branches share constitutional interpretive authority with the courts—and what are sometimes called “judicial supremacists.” After exploring the relevant history of political ideas, I join the modern minority of voices in the latter camp.

This is an intellectual history of two evolving political ideas—popular sovereignty and the separation of powers—which merged in the making of American judicial power, and I argue we can only understand the structural function of judicial review by bringing these ideas together into an integrated whole. Or, put another way, …

Issuance Of The Keystone Xl Permit: Presidential Prerogative Or Presidential “Chutzpah”, Hope M. Babcock

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article uses President Trump's issuance of the Keystone XL Pipeline permit to illustrate the dangers of an imperial presidency, one in which the exercise of discretionary authority, based on neither the text of Article II of the Constitution nor a statute, will in all likelihood be unchecked by Congress, the courts, or popular opinion. To understand the dimensions of this concern, Part I of this article briefly describes the process and requirements for a presidential permit. Part II identifies key facts surrounding issuance of the Keystone XL Pipeline permit, the chronology of its issuance, and commonly given reasons supporting …

Congressional Administration Of Foreign Affairs, Rebecca Ingber

Faculty Scholarship

Longstanding debates over the allocation of foreign affairs power between Congress and the President have reached a stalemate. Wherever the formal line between Congress and the President’s powers is drawn, it is well established that, as a functional matter, even in times of great discord between the two branches, the President wields immense power when he acts in the name of foreign policy or national security.

And yet, while scholarship focuses on the accretion of power in the presidency, presidential primacy is not the end of the story. The fact that the President usually “wins” in foreign affairs does not …

Presidential Crimes Matter, Julian A. Cook

Scholarly Works

The resignations of United States Attorneys Geoffrey Berman and Jessie Liu from their respective positions in the Southern District of New York and the District of Columbia, and Attorney General William Barr’s and President Donald Trump’s persistent undermining of Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s Russian interference and obstruction of justice investigations and prosecutions are clarion calls to reform the process by which the executive branch criminally investigates itself. But there is another critical circumstance—the Special Counsel regulations—that has been largely overlooked and has been grossly underappreciated in the public discussion about undue executive branch influence. These regulations are foundational, their impact …

National Security Lawyering: The Best View Of The Law As A Regulative Ideal, Mary B. Derosa

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In The National Security Lawyer in Crisis: When the “Best View” of the Law May Not Be the Best View, Robert Bauer describes the challenges for executive branch lawyers providing advice during a national security crisis. Bauer focuses on two especially perilous episodes in United States history—the Cuban Missile Crisis and the run-up to U.S. involvement in World War II—and analyzes the legal advice Presidents Kennedy and Roosevelt, respectively, received. In both cases, widely respected lawyers gave legal advice that supported the President’s preferred outcome, but almost certainly did not represent what the lawyers considered the best view of …

Qui Tam Litigation Against Government Officials: Constitutional Implications Of A Neglected History, Randy Beck

Scholarly Works

The Supreme Court concluded twenty-five years ago, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, that uninjured private plaintiffs may not litigate “generalized grievances” about the legality of executive branch conduct. According to the Lujan Court, Congress lacked power to authorize suit by a plaintiff who could not establish some “particularized” injury from the challenged conduct. The Court believed litigation to require executive branch legal compliance, brought by an uninjured private party, is not a “case” or “controversy” within the Article III judicial power and impermissibly reassigns the President’s Article II responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” The …

Promoting Executive Accountability Through Qui Tam Legislation, Randy Beck

Scholarly Works

For hundreds of years prior to ratification of the U.S. Constitution, Anglo-American legislatures used qui tam legislation to enforce legal constraints on government officials. A qui tam statute allows a private informer to collect a statutory fine for illegal conduct, even if the informer lacks the particularized injury normally required for Article III standing. This essay explores whether qui tam regulation should be revived as a means of ensuring executive branch legal accountability."

Preventing Presidential Disability Within The Existing Framework Of The Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Ryan T. Harding

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.

Norms, Law And The Impeachment Power, John M. Greabe

Law Faculty Scholarship

[Excerpt]

"Most experts believe that, while a president can be criminally prosecuted after leaving office, he cannot be prosecuted while he is president. And while the president may be sued civilly while holding office, the office confers powerful immunities and other constitutional defenses that are unavailable to ordinary civilian defendants."

Failure To Act And The Separation Of Powers-The Vice Presidency And The Need To Surmount Divided Power In Pursuit Of A Workable Government, Douglas W. Kmiec

Pepperdine Law Review

Is the Vice President an executive officer, a legislative officer, or both? This query has existed since the time of the founding. The question poses more difficulty than one might suppose, and it remains unsettled. It can be convenient to ignore questions that one cannot answer, and thus, the Vice President has been the object of political humor and treated as an appendage without present function. Yet, because we attribute great genius to those who drafted the Constitution, what is the effect of leaving this high-ranking officer without adequate definition or purpose? For the first century and a half of …

Introducing Govinfo: A New Source For Federal Government Documents Online, Erik Beck

Publications

No abstract provided.

Cognitive Competence In Executive-Branch Decision Making, Anna Spain Bradley

Publications

The decisions Presidents and those operating under their authority take determine the course of our nation and the trajectory of our lives. Consequently, understanding who has the power and authority to decide has captured both the attention of legal scholars across a variety of fields for many years and the immediate worry of the public since the 2016 Presidential election. Prevailing interventions look for ways that law can offer procedural and institutional reforms that aim to maintain separation of powers and avoid an authoritarian regime. Yet, these views commonly overlook a fundamental factor and a more human one: the individuals …

Congress To Judges: We’Re The Boss Of You Now, Joanne Doroshow

Other Publications

No abstract provided.

Co-Belligerency, Rebecca Ingber

Faculty Scholarship

Executive branch officials rest the President’s authority in today’s war against ISIS, al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups on an expansive interpretation of a 15-year-old statute, the 2001 “Authorization for Use of Military Force” (AUMF), passed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. They rely on that statute to justify force against groups neither referenced in – nor even in existence at the time of – the 2001 statute, by invoking a creative theory of international law they call “co-belligerency.” Under this theory, the President can read his AUMF authority flexibly, to justify force against not only those groups covered …

The Obama War Powers Legacy And The Internal Forces That Entrench Executive Power, Rebecca Ingber

Faculty Scholarship

In exploring the Obama war powers legacy, this essay examines the systemic forces inside the executive branch that influence modern presidential decision-making and, barring a total reimagining of the executive branch, will operate on administrations to come. These mechanisms and norms fall broadly within two categories: (1) features that favor continuity and hinder presidents from effecting change, including both novel assertions of executive power and attempts to dial back that power; and (2) features that incrementally aggrandize such power claims. Together, these two sets of forces operate as a one-way ratchet, slowly expanding and ultimately entrenching executive branch power.

Controlling Presidential Control, Kathryn A. Watts

Michigan Law Review

Presidents Reagan and Clinton laid the foundation for strong presidential control over the administrative state, institutionalizing White House review of agency regulations. Presidential control, however, did not stop there. To the contrary, it has evolved and deepened during the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Indeed, President Obama’s efforts to control agency action have dominated the headlines in recent months, touching on everything from immigration to drones to net neutrality. Despite the entrenchment of presidential control over the modern regulatory state, administrative law has yet to adapt. To date, the most pervasive response both inside and outside the …

Political Dysfunction And The Election Of Donald Trump: Problems Of The U.S. Constitution's Presidency, David Orentlicher

Scholarly Works

In this article, Professor Orentlicher examines the Constitution's design for the executive branch. He argues that by opting for a single executive rather than a multi-person executive, the Constitution causes two serious problems-it fuels the high levels of partisan polarization that we see today, and it increases the likelihood of misguided presidential decision making. Drawing on the experience in other countries with executive power shared by multiple officials, he proposes a bipartisan executive.

The New Era Of Presidential Immigration Law, Michael Kagan

Scholarly Works

At the dawn of the Obama Administration, Professors Adam Cox and Cristina Rodríguez wrote: “[T]he inauguration of a new President can bring with it remarkable changes in immigration policy.” At the time they wrote that, this proposition was in some ways more a matter of advocacy than a description of reality. As we approach the election of a new president in 2016, we finally live in the world that Professors Cox and Rodríguez advocated. The election of a new President will likely carry significant immediate consequences for immigration policy. My goal in this short space will be to focus on …

A Functional Theory Of Congressional Standing, Jonathan Remy Nash

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court has offered scarce and inconsistent guidance on congressional standing—that is, when houses of Congress or members of Congress have Article III standing. The Court’s most recent foray into congressional standing has prompted lower courts to infuse analysis with separation-ofpowers concerns in order to erect a high standard for congressional standing. It has also invited the Department of Justice to argue that Congress lacks standing to enforce subpoenas against executive branch actors. Injury to congressional litigants should be defined by reference to Congress’s constitutional functions. Those functions include gathering relevant information, casting votes, and (even when no vote …

The Uncertain Effects Of Senate Confirmation Delays In The Agencies, Nina A. Mendelson

Articles

As Professor Anne O’Connell has effectively documented, the delay in Senate confirmations has resulted in many vacant offices in the most senior levels of agencies, with potentially harmful consequences to agency implementation of statutory programs. This symposium contribution considers some of those consequences, as well as whether confirmation delays could conceivably have benefits for agencies. I note that confirmation delays are focused in the middle layer of political appointments—at the assistant secretary level, rather than at the cabinet head—so that formal functions and political oversight are unlikely to be halted altogether. Further, regulatory policy making and even agenda setting can …