President/Executive Department Commons^™

Agenda: Water Quality Control: Integrating Beneficial Use And Environmental Protection, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center

Water Quality Control: Integrating Beneficial Use and Environmental Protection (Summer Conference, June 1-3)

Conference organizers and/or faculty included University of Colorado School of Law professors David H. Getches, Lawrence J. MacDonnell and Charles F. Wilkinson.

Protecting water quality is essential to preserve the many beneficial uses of western water resources. This conference addresses the dominant federal requirements in the Clean Water Act, including the important major revisions enacted by Congress in 1987, with special attention to western problems regarding nonpoint source pollution. Developments in groundwater quality regulation are considered, as are selected issues concerning the implications of state and federal water quality regulation for the traditional exercise of water rights.

Pretreatment Issues, Sue Ellen Harrison

Water Quality Control: Integrating Beneficial Use and Environmental Protection (Summer Conference, June 1-3)

28 pages.

Contains references.

A Framework For Evaluating The Antitrust Legacy Of The Reagan Administration, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Independent Counsels Under The Ethics In Government Act Of 1978: A Violation Of The Separation Of Powers Doctrine Or An Essential Check On Executive Power?, Alexander I. Tachmes

University of Miami Law Review

No abstract provided.

Presidential Influence On Congressional Appropriations Decisions, D.Roderick Kiewiet, Mathew D. Mccubbins

Faculty Scholarship

We investigate the extent to which possession of the veto allows the president to influence congressional decisions regarding regular annual appropriations legislation. The most important implication of our analysis is that the influence the veto conveys is asymmetrical: it allows the president to restrain Congress when he prefers to appropriate less to an agency than Congress does; it does not provide him an effective means of extracting higher appropriations from Congress when he prefers to spend more than it does. This asymmetry derives from constitutional limitations on the veto, in combination with the presence of a de facto reversionary expenditure …

Administrative Law In A Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change, And The Rise Of The Administrative Presidency, Alfred C. Aman

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Independent Counsel And The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Confirmation Process: Law Or Politics?, Henry Paul Monaghan

Faculty Scholarship

In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, I argued (and still believe) that Judge Robert Bork possessed surpassing qualifications for an appointment to the Supreme Court. Subsequently, I became persuaded that my submission was incomplete. Additional argument was necessary to establish that my testimony, if accepted, imposed a constitutional duty on senators to vote for confirmation. To my surprise, further reflection convinces me that no such argument is possible.

The President's Powers As Commander-In-Chief Versus Congress' War Power And Appropriations Power, Charles W. Bennett, Arthur B. Culvahouse, Geoffrey P. Miller, William Bradford Reynolds, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Publications

This joint work explores a variety of viewpoints all centered around the War Powers Resolution and its application to the situation in the Persian Gulf.

Some Modest Proposals On The Vice-Presidency, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

There are many good things in the Constitution, but the vice-presidency isn't one of them. In Part I of this essay, I will argue that there are three basic problems with the vice-presidency: the method of nomination, the method of election, and the office itself. That just about covers the waterfront.' If we had to do it all over again, we almost certainly would not" create the system we currently have. We cannot undo history, but we do have a very strong incentive to develop a better system of succession to the presidency. Whom we choose as vice-president is a …

What The Constitution Means By Executive Power, Charles J. Cooper, Orrin Hatch, Eugene V. Rowstow, Michael E. Tigar

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The President’S Powers As Commander-In-Chief Versus Congress’ War Power And Appropriations Power, Charles Bennett, Arthur B. Culvahouse Jr., Geoffrey P. Miller, William Bradford Reynolds, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Why The Reagan Administration Resists Radical Transformation Of The Constitution, Gary C. Leedes

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Political Question Revisited: War Powers And The "Zone Of Twilight", Abner J. Mikva

Kentucky Law Journal

No abstract provided.

The Removal Power And The Federal Deficit: Form, Substance, And Administrative Independence, Jonathan L. Entin

Kentucky Law Journal

No abstract provided.

The Constitution, The Presidency, And The Rule Of Law, L. Peter Schultz

Kentucky Law Journal

No abstract provided.

On The Constitutional Status Of The Administrative Agencies, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

Symposium: Bowsher V. Synar: Introduction, Alfred C. Aman

Articles by Maurer Faculty

The papers in this symposium examine constitutionally significant separation-of-powers themes that were particularly controversial in Franklin Roosevelt's administrations and once again command our attention. The Supreme Court's decision in cases such as Immigration & Naturalization Services v. Chadha I and Bowsher v. Synar2 have helped to resurrect questions that have been ignored, if not resolved, since the 1930s. This symposium focuses on the contemporary debate that these issues have generated, and it provides us with an array of approaches to and perspectives on that debate. As this Introduction emphasizes, that these issues have arisen before is significant, both legally and …

Averting Government By Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits On The Enforcement Of Settlements With The Federal Government, Jeremy A. Rabkin, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Congress And The Executive: Who Calls The Shots For National Security? – Remarks By Lori Fisler Damrosch, Lori Fisler Damrosch

Faculty Scholarship

Professor Firmage's reaffirmation of the Framers' conception of a President who would wait for congressional instructions appeals to traditional values of democratic control and congressional primacy that have deep roots in our national consciousness. But this model of presidential passivity has some of the same strengths and weaknesses as the advocacy of chastity to solve today's problems of teenage pregnancy and sexually transmitted disease. The basic values may be sound, but when one moves from the assertion of those values to the identification of policy prescriptions, then it becomes clear that contemporary problems are too complex to be solved by …

Extended Voluntary Departure: Limiting The Attorney General's Discretion In Immigration Matters, Lynda J. Oswald

Michigan Law Review

Fifteen times in the past quarter-century, the Attorney General has decreed that aliens of certain nationalities could temporarily remain in the United States regardless of their visa status. Government officials have characterized these grants of blanket extended voluntary departure (EVD) as a means of protecting aliens from life-threatening conditions in their homelands. The Attorney General's actions were apparently undertaken for humanitarian reasons and went largely unnoticed by the public.

Part I of this Note defines EVD and distinguishes it from related forms of deportation relief. Part II describes the Employees Union court's holding. The evolution of American perceptions of immigration …

Ombudsmen For American Government? Edited By Stanley V. Anderson, Robert H. Haggerty

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Conceptualizing National Identification: Informational Privacy Rights Protected, 19 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1007 (1986), Eric Grossman

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Congressional Standing To Sue: Whose Vote Is This, Anyway?, R. Lawrence Dessem

Faculty Publications

The article is divided into three major sections. Section I traces the development of a separate doctrine of “congressional standing.” It examines the doctrine's development from the Supreme Court's initial consideration of legislative standing through the current opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Section II then analyzes three possible theories of congressional injury and standing. Derivative, representative, and third-party standing theories are all rejected as a basis for congressional standing. While rejecting the suggestion that congressmen possess a personal interest in “their” votes sufficient to constitute the “distinct and palpable injury” required …

The Legislative Veto, The Constitution, And The Courts, Robert F. Nagel

Publications

No abstract provided.

How Successfully Can The States' Item Veto Be Transferred To The President?, Louis Fisher, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Role Of The President And Omb In Informal Rulemaking, Peter L. Strauss, Cass R. Sunstein

Faculty Scholarship

Regulatory reform has been a subject of frequent discussion in the last decade, especially in the context of presidential efforts to assert control over the rulemaking process. Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan have all attempted to increase presidential authority over regulation. In particular, President Reagan has issued two executive orders that give the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) considerable power over the rulemaking activities of executive agencies.

In this article, we set forth our views on the role of presidential supervision in the regulatory process, with particular attention to the questions raised by the recent executive orders.

Separation Of Political Powers: Boundaries Or Balance, Alan L. Feld

Faculty Scholarship

One of the most significant structural elements of the United States Constitution divides the political power of the government between two discrete political institutions, the Congress and the President, in order to prevent concentration of the full power of the national government in one place. This governmental structure has posed a continuing dilemma of how to allow for the shared decisionmaking necessary to effective government while maintaining the independence of each political branch. As the United States Congress reaches its two hundredth anniversary, questions concerning the relationship between Congress and the President, for a substantial time thought by legal scholars …

Erisa Enforcement: Mandate For A Single Agency, Beverly M. Klimkowsky, Ian D. Lanoff

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In Part I, this Article reviews the aspects of pensions that justify the attention of Congress during consideration of budgets and the federal deficit. Part II documents the initial administrative problems created by the congressional compromise that divided administrative responsibility between the Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service. Although Reorganization Plan No. 4 solved some of the initial problems, the remaining problems are not amenable to resolution within a system of responsibility divided between separate agencies. The specific problems associated with enforcement are discussed in Part III, which identifies the total failure of enforcement as a major threat …

Operating Under New Laws Pertaining To Mineral Development On Indian Lands, B. Reid Haltom

Public Lands Mineral Leasing: Issues and Directions (Summer Conference, June 10-11)

89 pages.

Contains 8 attachments:

1) Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, Public Law 97-382 - Dec. 22, 1982.

2) Proposed BIA Regulations, 25 C.F.R. 225 and 211, Federal Register, Vol. 48, No. 134, Tuesday, July 12, 1983.

3) Billings Area Office Procedures.

4) Flow Chart.

5) Oil and Gas Exploration Joint Venture Agreement.

6) Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982, Public Law 97-451 [H.R. 5121], January 12, 1983.

7) 30 C.F.R., Part 210, 212, 217, 218, 219, 228, 229, 241, 243, Federal Register, Vol. 49, No. 185, Friday, September 21, 1984.

8) 43 C.F.R., Part 3160, …