President/Executive Department Commons^™

How Presidents Interpret The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

The President's Faithful Execution Duty, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

Beyond Legality: The Legitimacy Of Executive Action In Immigration Law, Ming H. Chen

Publications

Recent uses of executive action in immigration law have triggered accusations that the President is acting imperially, like a king, or as a lawbreaker. President Obama’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Deferred Action for Parental Accountability (DAPA) programs, which provide protection from deportation and a work permit during a temporary period of lawful presence, serve as the lightning rod for these accusations. But even as legislative and litigation challenges to DACA proceed, many states appear to accept and comply with it, including nearly all of the states that have joined the Texas v United States lawsuit that challenges …

More Than Just A Potted Plant: A Court's Authority To Review Deferred Prosecution Agreements Under The Speedy Trial Act And Under Its Inherent Supervisory Power, Mary Miller

Michigan Law Review

In the last decade, the Department of Justice has increasingly relied on pretrial diversion agreements as a means of resolving corporate criminal cases short of prosecution. These pretrial diversion agreements—non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements—include substantive terms that a company must abide by for the duration of the agreement in order to avoid prosecution. When entering a deferred prosecution agreement, the Department of Justice files charges against the defendant corporation as well as an agreement outlining the variety of terms with which the company must comply. This delay in prosecution is permitted under the Speedy Trial Act, which provides an exception …

Congressional Dysfunction And Executive Lawmaking During The Obama Administration, Raquel Aldana

McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles

No abstract provided.

Congressional And Presidential War Powers As A Dialogue: Analysis Of The Syrian And Isis Conflicts, Charles Tiefer, Kathleen Clark

All Faculty Scholarship

Much of the scholarship on war powers looks back on whether U.S. military interventions were authorized, examining the President's powers under Article II of the Constitution, and congressional enactments. That legal question is important, but it does not capture the interactive nature of the dynamic between Congress and the President. This Article instead focuses on the process of dialogue between Congress and the President prior to the exercise of war powers. We examine in detail how that dialogue operates in two recent episodes: the U.S. response to Syrian President Assad's use of chemical weapons in 2013, and the rise of …

The President As Spiritual Leader: Pardons, Punishment, Forgiveness, Mercy, And Justice, Henry L. Chambers Jr.

Law Faculty Publications

The Constitution of the United States empowers the president of the United States to curtail or eliminate punishment for actual or possible federal criminal wrongdoing by issuing pardons. As the quotes that begin this chapter suggest, the nature of a presidential pardon is subject to dispute. A pardon can be thought to be an act of grace or an extension of the president's executive power to administer the criminal justice system, or something in between. This chapter does not resolve the issue, but considers the nature of the pardon power while considering whether or how the president can or should …

Transforming The “Thurmond Rule” In 2016, Carl W. Tobias

Law Faculty Publications

This piece first analyzes the Rule’s history. Part II explains the convention and its deleterious consequences. Finding that each party reinterprets the notion to stymie appointments—which perverts the selection process, deprives courts of judicial resources for delivering justice, and intensifies the “confirmation wars”—the final Part proffers solutions. Because the Rule has multiple detrimental effects, it warrants abolition.

Things Left Unsaid, Questions Not Asked, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

The University of Pennsylvania Law Review’s symposium on executive discretion, held in the fall of 2015 but just published this November, is an important undertaking, but it is remarkable for several silences – for things left unsaid on this important subject – and for questions not asked. First, although the Constitution’s “Take Care” Clause is extensively discussed, the one power Article II gives the President over domestic administration – to require the “Opinion, in writing” of the heads of the agencies Congress has invested with administrative duties – is not. Second, the discussion of the President’s undoubted but possibly …

Separations Of Wealth: Inequality And The Erosion Of Checks And Balances, Kate Andrias

Articles

American government is dysfunctional: Gridlock, filibusters, and expanding presidential power, everyone seems to agree, threaten our basic system of constitutional governance. Who, or what, is to blame? In the standard account, the fault lies with the increasing polarization of our political parties. That standard story, however, ignores an important culprit: Concentrated wealth and its organization to achieve political ends. The only way to understand our current constitutional predicament—and to rectify it—is to pay more attention to the role that organized wealth plays in our system of checks and balances. This Article shows that the increasing concentration of wealth and political …

Politics And Agencies In The Administrative State: The U.S. Case, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

The pending American presidential election, culminating a period of extreme political partisanship in our national government generally, gives point to an essay on politics and agencies in the American regulatory state. In our two-party system, it has often been the case in recent times, including the last six years, that the President comes from one of our two major political parties and one or both houses of Congress are controlled by the other. All American agencies (including, in the American case, the so-called independent regulatory bodies) are associated with the President in the executive branch, yet dependent on the Senate …

A Bipartisan Tax Reform?, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

Articles

A Bipartisan Tax Reform?By Reuven S. Avi-YonahIf one listens to what Democratic and Republicancandidates for president are saying on the cam-paign trail, it would appear that the chances for taxreform in 2017 and beyond are minimal. A biparti-san approach is essential for tax reform to passbecause even if there are majorities from the presi-dent’s party in both houses, major tax reform wouldnot likely get through the Senate without 60 votes.But the parties seem very far apart on tax reform.Democrats are focused on using the tax system toreduce inequality and are determined to raise thetax rates at the top of the …

Confronting Power In Public Law, Kate Andrias

Articles

In his important and provocative Foreword, Professor Daryl Levinson criticizes American constitutional law for failing to attend sufficiently to questions of power, which he defines as “the ability to effect substantive policy outcomes by influencing what the government will or will not do.” As Levinson details, structural constitutional law has focused on how power is distributed among governmental institutions. It has not consistently or adequately considered how power is — or should be — distributed among social groups. Ultimately, Levinson suggests that the narrow focus of separation of powers law and theory on “equalizing the power of government institutions” lacks …

International Law Constraints As Executive Power, Rebecca Ingber

Faculty Scholarship

The use of international law to understand domestic authority has a long pedigree. It is also the subject of heated debate, which focuses predominantly on the extent to which international law can or should serve as a limit on political actors, in particular the President, and the extent to which it can be invoked to expand our understanding of domestic individual rights. Yet there is another significant dynamic at work in this interplay between international and domestic law. This is the invocation of international law not as a constraining force on government actors, but as an enabling force within the …

Kcon Xi Essay Introduction: Compulsory Arbitration And Adhesion Contracts In The Age Of Donald Trump, Peter Linzer

St. Mary's Law Journal

Remarks of Peter Linzer on receiving the Lifetime Achievement Award from the 11th International Contracts Conference (K-CON XI). Revised after Election Day, 2016.

Fda's Troubling Failures To Use Its Authority To Regulate Genetically Modified Foods, Leslie Francis, Robin Kundis Craig, Erika George

Faculty Scholarship

This Article concerns the particular regulatory responsibilities only of FDA. It sets to one side the possible regulatory authority of agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") or the U.S. Department of Agriculture ("USDA"). This approach risks replicating the regulatory fracture introduced during the Reagan Administration and criticized by some scholars,¹⁵ but there is a great deal to say about current FDA practices. Out of similar considerations of space and focus, this Article also sets to one side many other important issues that surround GM foods: intellectual property rights; rights to free speech or commercial speech; fair trade …

Obama's Aumf Legacy, Curtis A. Bradley, Jack Landman Goldsmith

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Hey America! Let's Get Smart: The Need For A Reliable Modern Smart Electrical Grid Resistance To Cyberattacks, Richard J. Kisielowski Ii

Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology

No abstract provided.

Presidential Pronouncements Of Customary International Law As An Alternative To The Senate’S Advice And Consent, Eric Talbot Jensen

BYU Law Review

The Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States has thus far focused on the status of treaties in United States law, and has not specifically considered the topic of customary international law. While the American Law Institute undoubtedly has good reasons for its approach, there is an emerging presidential practice that should catch the attention of the drafters and encourage them to make at least a small foray into customary international law’s impact on the domestic law of the United States. This practice consists of presidents proclaiming to the international community that certain provisions of treaties that …

Newsroom: Logan On 2015'S Record Settlements, Roger Williams University School Of Law

Life of the Law School (1993- )

Also available @ http://law.rwu.edu/story/logan-2015s-record-settlements

Accountability And The Foreign Commerce Power: A Case Study Of The Regulation Of Exports, Richard R. Carlson

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Presidential Control Across Policymaking Tools, Catherine Y. Kim

Florida State University Law Review

Over the past quarter century, administrative law scholars have observed the President’s growing control over agency policymaking and the separation-of-powers concerns implicated by such unilateral exercises of power. The paradigmatic form of agency policymaking—notice-and-comment rulemaking—mitigates these concerns by ensuring considerable oversight by the courts, Congress, and the public at large. Agencies, however, typically have at their disposal a variety of policymaking tools with which to implement White House goals, including the issuance of guidance documents and the strategic exercise of enforcement discretion. While commentators have drawn attention to the risk that agencies will circumvent the extensive checks associated with rulemaking …

Deferred Action And The Bounds Of Agency Discretion: Reconciling Policy And Legality In Immigration Enforcement, Peter Margulies

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Deferred Action: Considering What Is Lost, Elizabeth Keyes

All Faculty Scholarship

This response to Professor Motomura considers what is lost through the elaboration of formally defined boundaries around prosecutorial discretion. Professor Motomura and others in this Issue rightly extol the many benefits of the President's November 2014 executive actions. While I share the view that those benefits are considerable, I believe a full accounting requires us to consider what gets lost in this process, including identification of the immigrants in the limbo space between the actions' prospective beneficiaries at the one end and those who are priorities for removal on the other. This Essay focuses on the cost that comes from …

The Dependent Origins Of Independent Agencies: The Interstate Commerce Commission, The Tenure Of Office Act, And The Rise Of Modern Campaign Finance, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

Independent regulatory agencies are some of the most powerful institutions in the United States, and we think of them today as designed to be insulated from political control. This Article shows that their origins were the opposite: this model first emerged in the late nineteenth century because it offered more political control.

The modern executive's design of unitary presidential control over most offices, alongside "independent" regulatory agencies, took shape in the winter of 1886-1887. Congress repealed the Tenure of Office Act, giving the President the unchecked power to dismiss principal officers and ending the Senate's power to protect those officers. …

Taking Care Of Federal Law, Leah Litman

Articles

Article II of the Constitution vests the “executive power” in the President and directs the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” But do these provisions mean that only the President may execute federal law? Two lines of Supreme Court precedent suggest conflicting answers to that question. In several prominent separation-of-powers cases, the Court has suggested that only the President may execute federal law: “The Constitution requires that a President chosen by the entire Nation oversee the execution of the laws.” Therefore, the Court has reasoned, Congress may not create private rights of action that allow nonexecutive …

Arms Control: Salt Ii- Executive Agreement Or Treaty?, Keith E. Fryer, J. Michael Levengood

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Presidential Impoundment Of Funds: A Constitutional Crisis, Gerald A. Figurski

Akron Law Review

It seems that our maligned Congress, so docile at times in the face of presidential aggrandizement of power, is forging a constitutional crisis. The basic issue involved is whether the President has authority, either constitutional or statutory, to refuse to spend funds appropriated by Congress. The questions pursued in the following pages are basically four: does the President have the (1) statutory, (2) historical, (3) case, or (4) constitutional authority to continue to impound?

Executive Privilege: A Review Of Berger, R. H. Clark

Akron Law Review

RAOUL BERGER HAS ONCE AGAIN placed within a solidly professional framework an issue of considerable public interest and debate. As was the case with impeachment,' Berger's scholarly study on executive privilege brings to the controversy surrounding the issue a much needed analytical construct and massing of evidence which can only result in a greater level of general understanding. Although it is not accurate to suggest that Berger is neutral on the topic, since he published a significant study as far back as 1965 attacking the concept, 2 his method of massing every conceivable argument and piece of evidence on both …

New Patterns In Judicial Control Of The Presidency: 1950'S To 1970'S, P. Allan Dionisopoulos

Akron Law Review

NEW PATTERNS IN JUDICIAL CONTROL of the presidency have emerged since the early 1950's, permitting us to question the validity of the usual commentaries of constitutional scholars.' For the most part, these commentaries have focused upon the infrequency and inefficacy of judicial checks upon presidential powers, claiming that they operate only upon minor issues or in cases arising under unique circumstances. For example, Professor Schubert has stated that Americans expect the Supreme Court to "uphold the majesty of the law against the pretensions of a usurper." However, he adds that such an expectation is not supported by history, since "in …