Law Commons^™

Are They All Textualists Now?, Austin Peters

Northwestern University Law Review

Recent developments at the U.S. Supreme Court have rekindled debates over textualism. Missing from the conversation is a discussion of the courts that decide the vast majority of statutory interpretation cases in the United States—state courts. This Article uses supervised machine learning to conduct the first-ever empirical study of the statutory interpretation methods used by state supreme courts. In total, this study analyzes over 44,000 opinions from all fifty states from 1980 to 2019.

This Article establishes several key descriptive findings. First, since the 1980s, textualism has risen rapidly in state supreme court opinions. Second, this rise is primarily attributable …

The Problem Of Extravagant Inferences, Cass Sunstein

Georgia Law Review

Judges and lawyers sometimes act as if a constitutional or statutory term must, as a matter of semantics, be understood to have a particular meaning, when it could easily be understood to have another meaning, or several other meanings. When judges and lawyers act as if a legal term has a unique semantic meaning, even though it does not, they should be seen to be drawing extravagant inferences. Some constitutional provisions are treated this way; consider the idea that the vesting of executive power in a President of the United States necessarily includes the power to remove, at will, a …

Does Federal Law Ban Mailing Abortion Drugs? A Textual Analysis Of 18 U.S.C. § 1461, Peter Allevato

Pepperdine Law Review

As the regulation of abortion availability returned to the States, many have grappled with so-called trigger laws: dormant laws that were set to take effect to restrict or ensure access to abortion should constitutional protection be revoked. While the federal government has no true trigger law, it does have long-unenforced laws prohibiting the mailing of “[e]very article or thing designed, adapted, or intended for producing abortion.” 18 U.S.C. § 1461 is an old law, and it has not been enforced for at least fifty years. But the law’s potential effect on the growing practice of mail-distribution of chemical abortion pills …

A Textualist Defense Of A New Collateral Order Doctrine, Adam Reed Moore

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

As a general rule, federal appellate courts have jurisdiction over “final decisions.” Though the rule seems simple enough, the Court’s current approach to interpreting “final decisions,” the collateral order doctrine, is anything but straight­forward. That is because the Court has left the statutory text by the wayside. The collateral order doctrine is divorced from statutory text and is instead based on policy considerations.

Commentators (and, at times, the Court) have offered an alternative reading of “final decisions”: the final-judgment rule. This rule would allow appeals from final judgments only. But this alternative is not the product of close textual analysis. …

Who Cares Whether A Monopoly Is Efficient? The Sherman Act Is Supposed To Ban Them All, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Section 2 of the Sherman Act was designed to impose sanctions on all firms that monopolize or attempt to monopolize regardless whether the firm engaged in anticompetitive conductor, and regardless whether the firm is efficient. This conclusion emerges from a textualist analysis of the language of Section 2. This article briefly analyzes contemporaneous dictionaries, legal treatises, and cases, and demonstrates that when the Sherman Act was passed the word “monopolize” simply meant that someone had acquired a monopoly. The term was not limited to monopolies acquired through anticompetitive conduct or monopolies that were inefficient. An attempt to monopolize also had …

Interpreting The Administrative Procedure Act: A Literature Review, Christopher J. Walker, Scott Macguidwin

Law & Economics Working Papers

The modern administrative state has changed substantially since Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946. Yet Congress has done little to modernize the APA in those intervening seventy-seven years. That does not mean the APA has remained unchanged. Federal courts have substantially refashioned the APA’s requirements for administrative procedure and judicial review of agency action. Perhaps unsurprisingly, calls to return to either the statutory text or the original meaning (or both) have intensified in recent years. “APA originalism” projects abound.

As part of the Notre Dame Law Review’s Symposium on the History of the Ad- ministrative Procedure Act …

Textualism As An Ally Of Antitrust Enforcement: Examples From Merger And Monopolization Law, Robert H. Lande

Utah Law Review

This Article will first briefly present an overview of the textualist method of statutory interpretation. It will then briefly engage in a textualist analysis of important portions of two antitrust statutes: Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act. At least in these areas, textualist analysis should, if anything, help re-invigorate antitrust enforcement.

A Response To Professor Choi’S Beyond Purposivism In Tax Law, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

Law & Economics Working Papers

This response to Professor Choi’s excellent article questions whether the proposals made by the article can solve the tax shelter problem, and argues that a better response is to bolster purposivism with a statutory general anti-abuse rule (GAAR).

The Misunderstood History Of Textualism, Tara Leigh Grove

Northwestern University Law Review

This Article challenges widespread assumptions about the history of textualism. Jurists and scholars have sought for decades to distinguish “modern textualism” from the so-called “plain meaning school” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—an approach that both textualists and non-textualists alike have long viewed as improperly “literal” and “wooden.” This Article shows that this conventional historical account is incorrect. Based on a study of statutory cases from 1789 to 1945 that use the term “plain meaning” or similar terms, this Article reveals that, under the actual plain meaning approach, the Supreme Court did not ignore context but looked to …

Forgotten "People": Reviving Textualism In The Fourth Amendment, Peter C. Douglas

San Diego Law Review

For more than a century, the Supreme Court has struggled to develop a coherent and sustainable theory of the Fourth Amendment. Before the ink is dry on a new Fourth Amendment opinion, it is cabined, abrogated, or outright overruled. As one scholar has commented, the “evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine over the past century bears a striking resemblance to Hamlet’s descent into insanity.” While the Court vacillates between “theories” of the Fourth Amendment that might bring clarity to a difficult body of constitutional law, the rights it bespeaks lie vulnerable and unprotected. This Article argues that the problem flows from …

When Judges Were Enjoined: Text And Tradition In The Federal Review Of State Judicial Action, Alexandra Nickerson, Kellen R. Funk

Faculty Scholarship

It is virtually a tenet of modern federal jurisdiction that judges, at least when they are acting as judges, are inappropriate defendants in civil suits. Yet on rare but salient occasions, state judges might be the sole or primary party responsible for violating the constitutional rights of citizens, for instance by imposing excessive bail or by opening their courtrooms to oppressive private suits like those under Texas’s Senate Bill 8 bounty regime. In such cases, injunctive relief against judicial officers may be the only or most effective remedy against constitutional violations, but federal courts from the trial level up to …

Interpreting The Administrative Procedure Act: A Literature Review, Christopher J. Walker

Articles

The modern administrative state has changed substantially since Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946. Yet Congress has done little to modernize the APA in those intervening seventy-seven years. That does not mean the APA has remained unchanged. Federal courts have substantially refashioned the APA’s requirements for administrative procedure and judicial review of agency action. Perhaps unsurprisingly, calls to return to either the statutory text or the original meaning (or both) have intensified in recent years. “APA originalism” projects abound.

As part of the Notre Dame Law Review’s Symposium on the History of the Administrative Procedure Act and …

Ordinary Meaning And Ordinary People, Kevin Tobia, Brian G. Slocum, Victoria Frances Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Article considers the relationship between ordinary meaning and ordinary people in legal interpretation. Many jurists give interpretive weight to the law's ordinary meaning (i.e., general, nontechnical meaning). Modern textualists adopt a strong commitment to ordinary meaning and justify it by alluding to ordinary people: people understand law to communicate ordinary meanings. This Article begins from this textualist premise and empirically examines the meaning that legal texts communicate to the public. Five original empirical studies reveal that ordinary people consider genre carefully, and regularly take phrases in law to communicate technical legal meanings, not only ordinary ones. Building on the …

Textualism In Practice, Anita S. Krishnakumar

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

It is by now axiomatic to note that textualism has won the statutory interpretation wars. But contrary to what textualists long have promised, the widespread embrace of textualism as an interpretive methodology has not resulted in any real clarity or predictability about the interpretive path—or even the specific interpretive tools—that courts will invoke in a particular case. Part of the reason for this lack of predictability is that textualism-in-practice often differs significantly from the approach that textualism-in-theory advertises; and part of the reason is that textualism-in-theory is sometimes in tension with itself. In light of textualism’s ascendance—and now dominance—on the …

Biden V. Nebraska: The New State Standing And The (Old) Purposive Major Questions Doctrine, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Biden v. Nebraska does not sufficiently explain how Missouri has standing under established Article III doctrine, nor how the Court approaches the major questions doctrine as a method of statutory interpretation. Clarification can come from other opinions, even other cases entirely, in which Justice’s counterarguments are suggestive of the real arguments underlying the decisions.

MOHELA may have faced a concrete injury from the student debt waiver, but there was no evidence that Missouri would – and the majority had no answer for how Missouri had standing without an injury. A debate over special state …

Textualism's Immigration Problem: Stabilizing Interpretive Rules On Noncitizens' Rights And Remedies, Peter Margulies

Hofstra Law Review

The article focuses on textualism immigration problem as the U.S. Supreme Court has applied textualist methodology in immigration cases and misread the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). It mentions application of linguistic canons occurs in a comparative, probabilistic assessment to resolve conflicts and analysis of statutory interpretation generally and immigration law in particular. It also mentions discusses inconsistencies in multi-member tribunals, such as appellate courts.

Limiting Limited Liability: Requiring More Than Mere Subsequence Under Federal Rule Of Evidence 407, Cynara Hermes Mcquillan

Scholarly Works

Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the “Subsequent Remedial Measures” Rule, is troubling. This exclusionary rule of evidence prohibits using subsequent remedial measures to demonstrate negligence, culpable conduct, or product defect. But, other than in the title of the rule, the phrase “subsequent remedial measures” does not appear anywhere in the rule’s text and the rule itself does not expressly define what measures fall within its purview. This omission creates space for different judicial interpretations of the rule’s language and ultimately disparate judicial outcomes. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence lend themselves to fact-specific inquiries that can lead …

Dueling Textualisms Or Multimodal Analysis? Using Bostock To Show Why No One Is Really A Textualist, Anne Marie Lofaso

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Textualism, Judicial Supremacy, And The Independent State Legislature Theory, Leah M. Litman, Katherine A. Shaw

Articles

This piece offers an extended critique of one aspect of the so-called "independent state legislature" theory. That theory, in brief, holds that the federal Constitution gives state legislatures, and withholds from any other state entity, the power to regulate federal elections. Proponents ground their theory in two provisions of the federal Constitution: Article I's Elections Clause, which provides that "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof," and Article H's Presidential Electors Clause, which provides that "[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature …

Taking Care With Text: "The Laws" Of The Take Care Clause Do Not Include The Constitution, And There Is No Autonomous Presidential Power Of Constitutional Interpretation, George Mader

Faculty Scholarship

“Departmentalism” posits that each branch of the federal government has an independent power of constitutional interpretation—all branches share the power and need not defer to one another in the exercise of their interpretive powers. As regards the Executive Branch, the textual basis for this interpretive autonomy is that the Take Care Clause requires the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” and the Supremacy Clause includes the Constitution in “the supreme Law of the Land.” Therefore, the President is to execute the Constitution as a law. Or so the common argument goes. The presidential oath to “execute …

Textualism Today: Scalia’S Legacy And His Lasting Philosophy, Chase Wathen

University of Miami Law Review

Appointed to the Supreme Court in 1986 by President Reagan, Justice Antonin Scalia redefined the philosophy of textualism. Although methods like the plain meaning rule had been around for over a century, the textualist philosophy of today was not mainstream. While Scalia’s textualism is thought to be a conservative philosophy, Scalia consistently maintained that it was judicial restraint rather than conservatism at the heart of his method. The key tenant of Scalia’s new textualism was an outright rejection of legislative history, which he often brought up in opinions only to mock and dismiss as irrelevant. Starting with the hypothesis that …

Disentangling Textualism And Originalism, Katie Eyer

ConLawNOW

Textualism and originalism are not the same interpretive theory. Textualism commands adherence to the text. Originalism, in contrast, commands adherence to history. It should be self-evident that these are not—put simply—the same thing. While textualism and originalism may in some circumstances be harnessed to work in tandem—or may in some circumstances lead to the same result—they are different inquiries, and command fidelity to different ultimate guiding principles.

In this Essay, I argue that disentangling textualism and originalism is critical to the future vibrancy and legitimacy of textualism as an interpretive methodology. When conflated with originalism, textualism holds almost endless opportunities …

Textualism As Fair Notice?, Benjamin Minhao Chen

Washington Law Review

The opportunity to know the law is one of the bedrocks of legality. It is also a powerful and attractive reason for giving statutory language the meaning it has in everyday discourse. To do otherwise would be to hide the law from those it governs.

Or so the argument goes. Despite its intuitive force, the fair notice argument for textualism is vulnerable to two challenges. The first challenge is to the notion that fair notice requires congruence between ordinary and legal meaning. There is no normative gauge for determining the time and expense people ought to spend learning their legal …

Vesting, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." The Executive Vesting Clause is one of three originalist pillars for the unitary executive theory, the idea that the President possesses executive powers like removal without congressional limitations (that is, the powers are indefeasible). An underlying assumption is that "vest" connotes a formalist approach to separation of powers rather than a more functional system of Madisonian checks and balances. Assumptions about "vesting" for official powers are likely the result of semantic drift from property rights and ahistoric projections back from the later Marshall Court doctrine …

Bridges Of Law, Ideology, And Commitment, Steven L. Winter Walter S. Gibbs Distinguished Professor Of Constitutional Law

Law Faculty Research Publications

Law has a distinctive temporal structure—an ontology—that defines it as a social institution. Law knits together past, present, purpose, and projected future into a demand for action. Robert Cover captures this dynamic in his metaphor of law as a bridge to an imagined future. Law’s orientation to the future necessarily poses the question of commitment or complicity. For law can shape the future only when people act to make it real. Cover’s bridge metaphor provides a lens through which to explore the complexities of law’s ontology and the pathologies that arise from its neglect or misuse. A bridge carries us …

Whither The Lofty Goals Of The Environmental Laws?: Can Statutory Directives Restore Purposivism When We Are All Textualists Now?, Stephen M. Johnson

Pepperdine Law Review

Congress set ambitious goals to protect public health and the environment when it enacted the federal environmental laws through bipartisan efforts in the 1970s. For many years, the federal courts interpreted the environmental laws to carry out those enacted purposes. Over time, however, courts greatly reduced their focus on the environmental and public health purposes of the environmental laws when interpreting those statutes due to the rise in textualism, the declining influence of the Chevron doctrine, and the increasing willingness of courts to defer to agency underenforcement of statutory responsibilities across all regulatory statutes. In 2020, the Environmental Protection Network, …

The "Unfairness" Proof: Exposing The Fatal Flaw Hidden In The Rule Governing The Use Of Criminal Convictions To Impeach Character For Truthfulness, Robert Steinbuch

Pepperdine Law Review

Federal Rule of Evidence 609 (adopted by various states as well) allows for the introduction of certain convictions at trial to impeach the credibility— i.e., character for truthfulness—of any witness. The rule bifurcates its requirements between those that apply to criminal defendants—who, in theory, are afforded greater protection throughout the law than are all other participants in trials—and all remaining witnesses. The most important distinction between the standards that apply to these two classes of witnesses is that for prior crimes of criminal defendants to be introduced to impeach their credibility, those wrongdoings must survive a special balancing test spelled …

Muskrat Textualism, Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Northwestern University Law Review

The Supreme Court decision McGirt v. Oklahoma, confirming the boundaries of the Creek Reservation in Oklahoma, was a truly rare case in which the Court turned back arguments by federal and state governments in favor of American Indian and tribal interests. For more than a century, Oklahomans had assumed that the reservation had been terminated and acted accordingly. But only Congress can terminate an Indian reservation, and it simply had never done so in the case of the Creek Reservation. Both the majority and dissenting opinions attempted to claim the mantle of textualism, but their respective analyses led to …

Textualism And The Modern Explanatory Statute, Adam Crews

Saint Louis University Law Journal

The explanatory statute is a largely forgotten legislative tool. Once common, the explanatory statute was a retrospective act that identified an ambiguity or erroneous interpretation of a prior law and then directed the legislature’s view of the correct interpretation.

Although now rare, the explanatory statute is not dead. Just a few years ago, Congress enacted an amendment to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act—a now hotly contested topic—with the hallmarks of an explanatory statute. In the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 (“FOSTA”), Congress concluded that courts had over-extended Section 230 immunity to …

Back To The Sources? What’S Clear And Not So Clear About The Original Intent Of The First Amendment, John Witte Jr.

Faculty Articles

This Article peels through these layers of founding documents before exploring the final sixteen words of the First Amendment religion clauses. Part I explores the founding generation’s main teachings on religious freedom, identifying the major principles that they held in common. Part II sets out a few representative state constitutional provisions on religious freedom created from 1776 to 1784. Part III reviews briefly the actions by the Continental Congress on religion and religious freedom issued between 1774 and 1789. Part IV touches on the deprecated place of religious freedom in the drafting of the 1787 United States Constitution. Part V …