Law Commons^™

Serious Disagreement: Same-Sex Marriage, Judicial Review, And The Quality Of Debate, Rob Goodman

Rob Goodman

Both defenders and critics of strong judicial review have relied on claims about the quality of debate in courts: the former, such as Ronald Dworkin, have characterized it as more principled than legislative debate, while the later, such as Jeremy Waldron, have called it overly-focused on text and precedent, to the detriment of substantive moral argument. The question can and should be studied empirically. To begin to do so, I compare American legislative and judicial debates, on the federal and state levels, on same-sex marriage. While legislatures and courts often heard similar arguments, the marriage debate in the courts took …

The Art Of Statutory Interpretation: Identifying The Approach Of The Judges Of The United States Court Of Appeals For Veterans' Claims And The United States Court Of Appeals For The Federal Circuit, Linda D. Jellum

Linda D. Jellum

This article explores judicial approaches to statutory interpretation, a topic of interest to scholars, academics, and practitioners. Perhaps more than any other subject, understanding the theory of interpretation is critical to understanding statutory interpretation because theory drives every aspect of statutory interpretation. A judge’s theory of interpretation determines what information a judge will consider when searching for meaning. For example, some judges will not look at legislative history or social context for meaning unless the text of the statute is ambiguous or absurd. Assuming that the legislative history is helpful to their case, lawyers must learn to “talk the talk” …

A Consequential Approach To Interpretation And Interpretive Risk: Rethinking Judicial Intervention From Contracts To The Chrysler Bankruptcy, J. P. Kostritsky

Juliet P Kostritsky

Abstract When contracts remain ambiguous or incomplete, courts and scholars must confront the inevitable question of when intervention in private contracts is justified. To deal with the unresolution or residual uncertainty, the Austrian economists and the new textualists suggest that any intervention would be a fool’s errand. Their position amounts to an unvarying posture that any party asking for an additional term or a broad interpretation will always lose. Recognizing that there is an interpretive risk in all contracts, the court should adopt an interpretive methodology that parties would be willing to adopt and that would enhance the willingness of …

Our Unsettled Ninth Amendment: An Essay On Unenumerated Rights And The Impossibility Of Textualism, Louis Michael Seidman

Louis Michael Seidman

The Ninth Amendment – our resident anarchic and sarcastic “constitutional jester” – mocks the effort of scholars and judges alike to tame and normalize constitutional law. It is not as if the stern disciplinarians haven’t tried. We now have two generations worth of painstaking, erudite, and occasionally brilliant scholarship that attempts to rein it in. Yet the amendment stubbornly resists control. It stands as a paradoxical, textual monument to the impossibility of textualism, an entrenched, settled instantiation of the inevitability of unsettlement. If it did not exist,

This essay has two parts. In Part I, I present a new and, …

Interpretive Risk And Contract Interpretation: A Suggested Approach For Maximizing Value, Juliet P. Kostritsky

Juliet P Kostritsky

• The Article offers a theory of judicial intervention and interpretation in Contracts. It posits that the principal objective of courts interpreting, supplementing, or overriding terms is to ask whether such intervention can serve the broad objective of maximizing gains from trade while minimizing transaction costs and the costs of opportunism, collectively, an interpretive risk. It offers an economic rationale for a broad approach to interpretation and explores several examples from Contract law where courts depart from the parties’ textual choices and follow the theory suggested in this Article. These examples directly challenge the theory of the new formalists.

Interpretive Risk And Contract Interpretation: A Suggested Approach For Maximizing Value, Juliet P. Kostritsky

Juliet P Kostritsky

• The Article offers a theory of judicial intervention and interpretation in Contracts. It posits that the principal objective of courts interpreting, supplementing, or overriding terms is to ask whether such intervention can serve the broad objective of maximizing gains from trade while minimizing transaction costs and the costs of opportunism, collectively, an interpretive risk. It offers an economic rationale for a broad approach to interpretation and explores several examples from Contract law where courts depart from the parties’ textual choices and follow the theory suggested in this Article. These examples directly challenge the theory of the new formalists.

Interpretive Risk And Contract Interpretation: A Suggested Approach For Maximizing Value, Juliet P. Kostritsky

Juliet P Kostritsky

• The Article offers a theory of judicial intervention and interpretation in Contracts. It posits that the principal objective of courts interpreting, supplementing, or overriding terms is to ask whether such intervention can serve the broad objective of maximizing gains from trade while minimizing transaction costs and the costs of opportunism, collectively, an interpretive risk. It offers an economic rationale for a broad approach to interpretation and explores several examples from Contract law where courts depart from the parties’ textual choices and follow the theory suggested in this Article. These examples directly challenge the theory of the new formalists.

Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules Or Predilective Tools, Stephen Durden

Stephen Durden

Justice Scalia proclaims homage to the “dead” Constitution. Justice Brennan honors the “living” Constitution. Others believe in “a partially living and partially dead Constitution.” But, whichever moniker selected, constitutional analysis remains (to the interpreter) personal; however, personal does not necessarily mean irrational or even singular (i.e., that no one else agrees with the interpretation). Rather, personal means that no matter how narrow the interpretational method, an interpreter of the Constitution inevitably makes personal choices when using any interpretational method - choices not required by, or perhaps even inconsistent with, the chosen interpretational method. This Article uses canons of construction to …

Partial Textualism, Stephen Durden

Stephen Durden

This Article seeks to demonstrate that plain meaning textualists do not apply plain meaning textualism to the entire Constitution. Instead, plain meaning textualists indulge their personal predilections and apply the doctrine of “partial textualism,” which selectively applies plain meaning textualism to only part of, rather than the entire, Constitution. Partial textualism destroys any possible fairness value to plain meaning textualism. Indeed, such an approach is entirely inconsistent with the goals of plain language textualism. Through examining the Takings Clause, this Article demonstrates that a plain meaning textualist will commonly apply plain meaning textualism to a part of the Constitution that …

A Consequential Approach To Interpretation And Interpretive Risk: Rethinking Judicial Intervention From Contracts To The Chrysler Bankruptcy, Juliet P. Kostritsky

Juliet P Kostritsky

Abstract When contracts remain ambiguous or incomplete, courts and scholars must confront the inevitable question of when intervention in private contracts is justified. To deal with the unresolution or residual uncertainty, the Austrian economists and the new textualists suggest that any intervention would be a fool’s errand. Their position amounts to an unvarying posture that any party asking for an additional term or a broad interpretation will always lose. Recognizing that there is an interpretive risk in all contracts, the court should adopt an interpretive methodology that parties would be willing to adopt and that would enhance the willingness of …

Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules Or Predilective Tools, Stephen M. Durden

Campbell Law Review

This Article uses canons of construction to demonstrate that textualism, particularly plain language or plain meaning textualism, cannot be applied without the use of non-textual personal choices. But, this Article does not seek to demonstrate that interpreting the Constitution requires ignoring the text of the Constitution; nor does this Article seek to demonstrate that textualist approaches lack relevance or value. Rather, this Article seeks to demonstrate that textualism cannot create rules that avoid personal predilections and does not create neutral principles or eliminate predilective interpretation. In order to accomplish this goal, this Article reviews a variety of canons of construction …

Reviving Employee Rights - Recent And Upcoming Employment Discrimination Legislation: Proceedings Of The 2010 Annual Meeting Of The Association Of American Law Schools Section On Employment Discrimination Law, Scott A. Moss, Sandra Sperino, Robin R. Runge, Charles A. Sullivan

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Eleventh Amendment And The Nature Of The Union, Bradford R. Clark

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Leading theories of the Eleventh Amendment start from the premise that its text makes no sense. These theories regard the Amendment as either under-inclusive, over-inclusive, or an incoherent compromise because it prohibits federal courts from hearing "any suit" against a state by out-of-state citizens, but does not prohibit suits against a state by its own citizens. Two of these theories would either expand or contract the immunity conferred by the text of the Amendment in order to avoid this absurd or anomalous result. This Article suggests that the Eleventh Amendment made sense as written when understood in its full historical …

Substantive Canons And Faithful Agency, Amy Coney Barrett

Journal Articles

Federal courts have long employed substantive canons of construction in the interpretation of statutes. For example, they apply the rule of lenity, which directs that ambiguous criminal statutes be interpreted in favor of the defendant, and the avoidance canon, which directs that statutes be interpreted in a manner that prevents the court from having to address serious constitutional questions. They also apply so-called “clear statement” rules — for example, absent a clear statement from Congress, a federal court will not interpret a statute to abrogate state sovereign immunity. While some commentators have attempted to rationalize these and other substantive canons …