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Articles 31 - 60 of 251
Full-Text Articles in Law
When A Statute Comes With A User Manual: Reconciling Textualism And Uniform Acts, Gregory A. Elinson, Robert H. Sitkoff
When A Statute Comes With A User Manual: Reconciling Textualism And Uniform Acts, Gregory A. Elinson, Robert H. Sitkoff
College of Law Faculty Publications
This Article develops an interpretive theory for statutes that originate as Uniform Acts promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission. Although overlooked in the literature on statutory interpretation, state-enacted Uniform Acts are ubiquitous. They shape our life cycles—governing marriage, parentage, divorce, and death—and structure trillions of dollars in daily commercial transactions.
Largely focusing on textualism, today’s dominant form of statutory interpretation, we analyze the interpretive consequences of two unusual features of state-enacted Uniform Acts. First, the text of every Uniform Act directs courts to interpret it to “promote uniformity.” Second, each provision is accompanied by an official explanatory comment, analogous to …
Statutory Interpretation From The Outside, Kevin Tobia, Brian G. Slocum, Victoria Frances Nourse
Statutory Interpretation From The Outside, Kevin Tobia, Brian G. Slocum, Victoria Frances Nourse
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
How should judges decide which linguistic canons to apply in interpreting statutes? One important answer looks to the inside of the legislative process: Follow the canons that lawmakers contemplate. A different answer, based on the “ordinary meaning” doctrine, looks to the outside: Follow the canons that guide an ordinary person’s understanding of the legal text. We offer a novel framework for empirically testing linguistic canons “from the outside,” recruiting 4,500 people from the United States and a sample of law students to evaluate hypothetical scenarios that correspond to each canon’s triggering conditions. The empirical findings provide evidence about which traditional …
Textualism, Judicial Supremacy, And The Independent State Legislature Theory, Leah Litman, Katherine Shaw
Textualism, Judicial Supremacy, And The Independent State Legislature Theory, Leah Litman, Katherine Shaw
Articles
This piece offers an extended critique of one aspect of the so-called “independent state legislature” theory. That theory, in brief, holds that the federal Constitution gives state legislatures, and withholds from any other state entity, the power to regulate federal elections. Proponents ground their theory in two provisions of the federal Constitution: Article I’s Elections Clause, which provides that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof,” and Article II’s Presidential Electors Clause, which provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature …
Rejecting Word Worship: An Integrative Approach To Judicial Construction Of Insurance Policies, Jeffrey W. Stempel, Erik S. Knutsen
Rejecting Word Worship: An Integrative Approach To Judicial Construction Of Insurance Policies, Jeffrey W. Stempel, Erik S. Knutsen
University of Cincinnati Law Review
Insurance coverage litigation is a quest for discerning meaning: Does the insurance policy cover the loss at issue? Construing the insurance policy, courts attempt to give legal effect to what the document purports to command. But what were the intentions and expectations of insurer and insured? Do those intentions even matter? Or is only the written text of the policy relevant to the coverage result? Courts addressing these questions typically frame the interpretative choice as one of strict textualism versus contextual functionalism.
In many, perhaps even most situations, text and context align to create an “easy” case. If a factory …
When Statutory Interpretation Becomes Precedent: Why Individual Rights Advocates Shouldn’T Be So Quick To Praise Bostock, Elena Schiefele
When Statutory Interpretation Becomes Precedent: Why Individual Rights Advocates Shouldn’T Be So Quick To Praise Bostock, Elena Schiefele
Washington and Lee Law Review
Justice Neil Gorsuch’s approach to textualism, which this Note will call “muscular textualism,” is unique. Most notably exemplified in Bostock v. Clayton County, muscular textualism is marked by its rigorous adherence to what Justice Gorsuch perceives to be the “plain language” of the text. Because Justice Gorsuch’s opinions exemplify muscular textualism in a structured and consistent manner, his appointment to the Supreme Court provides the forum from which he can influence the decision-making process of other members of the judiciary when they seek guidance from Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, it is important for both advocates and judges to understand …
Does Justice Have A Syntax?, Steven L. Winter
Does Justice Have A Syntax?, Steven L. Winter
Law Faculty Research Publications
No abstract provided.
The Elastics Of Snap Removal: An Empirical Case Study Of Textualism, Thomas O. Main, Jeffrey W. Stempel, David Mcclure
The Elastics Of Snap Removal: An Empirical Case Study Of Textualism, Thomas O. Main, Jeffrey W. Stempel, David Mcclure
Cleveland State Law Review
This Article reports the findings of an empirical study of textualism as applied by federal judges interpreting the statute that permits removal of diversity cases from state to federal court. The “snap removal” provision in the statute is particularly interesting because its application forces judges into one of two interpretive camps—which are fairly extreme versions of textualism and purposivism, respectively. We studied characteristics of cases and judges to find predictors of textualist outcomes. In this Article, we offer a narrative discussion of key variables, and we detail the results of our logistic regression analysis. The most salient predictive variable was …
Antitrust Antitextualism, Daniel A. Crane
Antitrust Antitextualism, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Judges and scholars frequently describe antitrust as a common-law system predicated on open-textured statutes, but that description fails to capture a historically persistent phenomenon:judicial disregard of the plain meaning of the statutory texts and manifest purposes of Congress. This pattern of judicial nullification is not evenly distributed: when the courts have deviated from the plain meaning or congressional purpose, they have uniformly done so to limit the reach of antitrust liability or curtail the labor exemption to the benefit of industrial interests. This phenomenon cannot be explained solely or even primarily as a tug-of-war between a progressive Congress and conservative …
The Constitution And Democracy In Troubled Times, John M. Greabe
The Constitution And Democracy In Troubled Times, John M. Greabe
Law Faculty Scholarship
Does textualism and originalism approach positively impact democracy?
A Textualist Interpretation Of The Visual Artists Rights Act Of 1990, Brian L. Frye
A Textualist Interpretation Of The Visual Artists Rights Act Of 1990, Brian L. Frye
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles
For numberless generations, jurisprudes waged total war in the
conflict among textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism.
Textualists insisted that courts must interpret statutes based on the
meaning of their text, intentionalists insisted on the intention of the
legislature, and purposivists insisted on the purpose of the statute.
Eventually, textualism prevailed. Courts universally recognize
that they are obligated to interpret statutes in light of their text, or
at least pretend that the text of the statute determined their
interpretation. And the few remaining heretics are swiftly identified
and corrected by their superiors. As Justice Kagan famously
observed, “We’re all textualists now.” Whether …
The Elastics Of Snap Removal: An Empirical Case Study Of Textualism, Thomas O. Main, Jeffrey W. Stempel, David Mcclure
The Elastics Of Snap Removal: An Empirical Case Study Of Textualism, Thomas O. Main, Jeffrey W. Stempel, David Mcclure
Scholarly Works
This article reports the findings of an empirical study of textualism as applied by federal judges interpreting the statute that permits removal of diversity cases from state to federal court. The “snap removal” provision in the statute is particularly interesting because its application forces judges into one of two interpretive camps—which are fairly extreme versions of textualism and purposivism, respectively. We studied characteristics of cases and judges to find predictors of textualist outcomes. In this article we offer a narrative discussion of key variables and we detail the results of our logistic regression analysis. The most salient predictive variable was …
Discretionary Injustice: Limiting Due Process Rights Of Undocumented Immigrants Upon Removal After Re-Entry, Brendan Dauscher
Discretionary Injustice: Limiting Due Process Rights Of Undocumented Immigrants Upon Removal After Re-Entry, Brendan Dauscher
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Proving Discrimination By The Text, Deborah Widiss
Proving Discrimination By The Text, Deborah Widiss
Articles by Maurer Faculty
Employment discrimination laws make the “simple but momentous” declaration that it is illegal to deny employment on the basis of race, sex, religion, or other key aspects of identity. But when employees who have been treated unfairly turn to the courts for relief, courts rarely assess whether their claims meet the statutory standard. Instead, they funnel the evidence through a convoluted body of judge-made law known as McDonnell Douglas burden shifting.
This Article lays bare fundamental inconsistencies between the statutes’ causal language, as definitively interpreted by the Supreme Court in recent cases, and the burden-shifting process. In Bostock v. Clayton …
Bostock Was Bogus: Textualism, Pluralism, And Title Vii, Mitchell N. Berman, Guha Krishnamurthi
Bostock Was Bogus: Textualism, Pluralism, And Title Vii, Mitchell N. Berman, Guha Krishnamurthi
All Faculty Scholarship
In Bostock v. Clayton County, one of the blockbuster cases from its 2019 Term, the Supreme Court held that federal antidiscrimination law prohibits employment discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. Unsurprisingly, the result won wide acclaim in the mainstream legal and popular media. Results aside, however, the reaction to Justice Neil Gorsuch’s majority opinion, which purported to ground the outcome in a textualist approach to statutory interpretation, was more mixed. The great majority of commentators, both liberal and conservative, praised Gorsuch for what they deemed a careful and sophisticated—even “magnificent” and “exemplary”—application of textualist principles, while …
Queering Bostock, Jeremiah A. Ho
Queering Bostock, Jeremiah A. Ho
All Faculty Scholarship
Although the Supreme Court’s 2020 Title VII decision, Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, is a victory for LGBTQ individuals, its doctrinal limitations unavoidably preserve a discriminatory status quo. This Article critically examines how and why Bostock fails to highlight the indignities experienced by queer minorities under decades of employment discrimination. In Bostock, Justice Gorsuch presents a sweeping textualist interpretation of Title VII that protects against sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination. Yet, the decision sparsely recognizes queer lived experiences, compared to prior pro-LGBTQ cases where such recognition contributed to developing an anti-stereotyping framework that confronted some of the heteronormative biases …
The Sacred Fourth Amendment Text, Christopher Slobogin
The Sacred Fourth Amendment Text, Christopher Slobogin
Michigan Law Review Online
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence governing the Fourth Amendment’s “threshold”—a word meant to refer to the types of police actions that trigger the amendment’s warrant and reasonableness requirements—has confounded scholars and students alike since Katz v. United States. Before that 1967 decision, the Court’s decisions on the topic were fairly straightforward, based primarily on whether the police trespassed on the target’s property or property over which the target had control. After that decision—which has come to stand for the proposition that a Fourth Amendment search occurs if police infringe an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as …
How Definitive Is Fourth Amendment Textualism?, Evan H. Caminker
How Definitive Is Fourth Amendment Textualism?, Evan H. Caminker
Michigan Law Review Online
Professor Jeffrey Bellin’s excellent article advances a comprehensive and straightforward textual approach to determining what policing activities constitute “searches” triggering the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Bellin’s thesis is that a text-based approach to interpreting the Amendment is superior to the Supreme Court’s current approach, which ever since Katz v. United States has defined “search” primarily by reference to a non-textual “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard. After soundly criticizing the ungrounded and highly subjective nature of the Katz test, Bellin declares that the Court should instead simply follow where the text leads: the Amendment protects people from a search, meaning …
Natural Law Colloquium Legal Interpretation And Natural Law, Mark Greenberg
Natural Law Colloquium Legal Interpretation And Natural Law, Mark Greenberg
Fordham Law Review
No abstract provided.
Textualism’S Gaze, Matthew L.M. Fletcher
Textualism’S Gaze, Matthew L.M. Fletcher
Michigan Journal of Race and Law
This Article attempts to address why textualism distorts the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Indian law. I start with describing textualism in federal public law. I focus on textualism as described by Justice Scalia, as well as Scalia’s justification for textualism and discussion about the role of the judiciary in interpreting texts. The Court is often subject to challenges to its legitimacy rooted in its role as legal interpreter that textualism is designed to combat.
"Against The Defendant": Plea Rule's Purpose V. Plain Meaning, Nick Bell
"Against The Defendant": Plea Rule's Purpose V. Plain Meaning, Nick Bell
Arkansas Law Review
Rarely is there a proverbial “smoking gun” in criminal prosecutions. Instead, prosecutors and defense attorneys must tell juries competing stories—largely from circumstantial evidence—and allow jurors to determine what happened based on inferences gleaned from argument and testimony. Naturally, this creates substantial uncertainty for both prosecutors and defendants. Instead of rolling the dice at trial, the vast majority of criminal matters are resolved through plea bargaining. Plea bargaining provides both sides with a certainty otherwise unobtainable through a traditional trial. The prosecution guarantees itself a conviction, and the defendant will often receive a lighter sentence than if he or she had …
Immunity From Suit For International Organizations: The Judiciary's New Que Of Separating Lawsuit Sheep From Lawsuit Goats, Ylli Dautaj
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies
I. Introduction
II. Immunity from Suit in Public International Law
(A) Sovereign Immunity
(i) Sources of Sovereign Immunity
(ii) Legal Theory on Sovereign Immunity
(iii) Doctrinal Evolution of Sovereign Immunity
(B) Jurisdictional Immunity for International Organizations
(C) Sovereign Immunity and Immunity for International Organizations
Domestically
III. Jam v. Int'l Finance Corporation:
A New Dawn for International Organizations in the United States
(A) Jam v. Int'l Finance Corporation: Majority View
(B) Jam v. Int'l Finance Corporation: Dissenting Opinion by Justice Breyer
IV. The Exception that Proves but does not Swallow the rule on Virtually
Absolute Immunity: Criticism of the Majority in …
Fight Or Flight: The Ninth Circuit's Advancement Of Textualism During An Era Of Intentionalism In United States V. Lozoya, Zachary Remijas
Fight Or Flight: The Ninth Circuit's Advancement Of Textualism During An Era Of Intentionalism In United States V. Lozoya, Zachary Remijas
Pepperdine Law Review
The modern complexities of global interaction and accessibility have recently forced some federal courts to reconsider standards for determining proper venue for criminal defendants who commit offenses while engaged in transportation, particularly those involving interstate commerce and crimes spanning multiple districts. These courts’ application of two adversarial schools of statutory interpretation—textualism and intentionalism—has driven conflict between textualist jurisdictions adhering to the plain meaning of established constitutional and statutory sources, and intentionalist jurisdictions refraining from the “creeping absurdity” of establishing venue for certain in-transit offenses under the literal meaning of such provisions. This Note endorses the sensibility and superiority of the …
Submission Of Robert H. Lande To House Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee Investigation Of Digital Platforms, Robert H. Lande
Submission Of Robert H. Lande To House Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee Investigation Of Digital Platforms, Robert H. Lande
All Faculty Scholarship
The House Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee asked me to submit suggestions concerning the adequacy of existing antitrust laws, enforcement policies, and enforcement levels insofar as they impact the state of competition in the digital marketplace. My submission recommends the following nine reforms:
1. A textualist analysis of the Sherman Act shows that Section 2 actually is a no-fault monopolization statute. At a minimum Congress should enact a strong presumption that every firm with a 67% market share has violated Section 2. This would move the Sherman Act an important step in the right direction, the direction Congress intended in 1890. My …
The Dilemma Of Interstatutory Interpretation, Anuj C. Desai
The Dilemma Of Interstatutory Interpretation, Anuj C. Desai
Washington and Lee Law Review
Courts engage in interstatutory cross-referencing all the time, relying on one statute to help interpret another. Yet, neither courts nor scholars have ever had a satisfactory theory for determining when it is appropriate. Is it okay to rely on any other statute as an interpretive aid? Or, are there limits to the practice? If so, what are they? To assess when interstatutory cross-referencing is appropriate, I focus on one common form of the technique, the in pari materia doctrine. When a court concludes that two statutes are in pari materia or (translating the Latin) “on the same subject,” the court …
The Sherman Act Is A No-Fault Monopolization Statute: A Textualist Demonstration, Robert H. Lande, Richard O. Zerbe Jr.
The Sherman Act Is A No-Fault Monopolization Statute: A Textualist Demonstration, Robert H. Lande, Richard O. Zerbe Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
The drafters of the Sherman Act originally designed Section 2 to impose
sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to monopolize, regardless whether the
firm had engaged in anticompetitive conduct. This conclusion emerges from the
first ever textualist analysis of the language in the statute, a form of interpretation
originally performed only by Justice Scalia but now increasingly used by the
Supreme Court, including in its recent Bostock decision.
Following Scalia’s methodology, this Article analyzes contemporaneous
dictionaries, legal treatises, and cases and demonstrates that when the Sherman
Act was passed, the word “monopolize” simply meant that someone had acquired
a monopoly. …
Contract Interpretation And The Parol Evidence Rule: Toward Conceptual Clarification, Joshua M. Silverstein
Contract Interpretation And The Parol Evidence Rule: Toward Conceptual Clarification, Joshua M. Silverstein
Faculty Scholarship
Contract interpretation is one of the most important topics in commercial law. Unfortunately, the law of interpretation is extraordinarily convoluted. In essentially every American state, the jurisprudence is riddled with inconsistency and ambiguity. This causes multiple problems. Contracting parties are forced to expend additional resources when negotiating and drafting agreements. Disputes over contractual meaning are more likely to end up in litigation. And courts make a greater number of errors in the interpretive process. Together, these impacts result in significant unfairness and undermine economic efficiency. Efforts to remedy the doctrinal incoherence are thus warranted.
The goal of this Article is …
Complexity, Judgment, And Restraint, Gerard E. Lynch
Complexity, Judgment, And Restraint, Gerard E. Lynch
Faculty Scholarship
I am honored to have been asked to give this year’s James Madison Lecture. I hesitate to single out any of my extraordinary predecessors at this podium – there are too many great judges to list, and too much risk of slighting any. So I will note only that the list includes both judges for whom I clerked more than forty years ago, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., and Chief Judge Wilfred Feinberg, of the court on which I now serve. That long-ago law clerk could not have dreamed of being someday in a position once occupied by those two …
Snap Removal: Concept; Cause; Cacophony; And Cure, Jeffrey W. Stempel, Thomas O. Main, David Mcclure
Snap Removal: Concept; Cause; Cacophony; And Cure, Jeffrey W. Stempel, Thomas O. Main, David Mcclure
Scholarly Works
So-called “snap removal” – removal of a case from state to federal court prior to service on a forum state defendant – has divided federal trial courts for 20 years. Recently, panels of the Second, Third and Fifth Circuits have sided with those supporting the tactic even though it conflicts with the general prohibition on removal when the case includes a forum state defendant, a situation historically viewed as eliminating the need to protect the outsider defendant from possible state court hostility.
Consistent with the public policy underlying diversity jurisdiction – availability of a federal forum to protect against defending …
Backdoor Purposivism, Anita S. Krishnakumar
Backdoor Purposivism, Anita S. Krishnakumar
Faculty Publications
It has become standard among statutory interpretation commentators to declare that, “We are all textualists now.” The comment stems from the observation that in the modern, post-Scalia era, all of the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court pay significant attention to statutory text when construing statutes and, relatedly, that legislative history use by the Court as a whole has declined since its heyday in the 1970s. The account of textualism’s triumph is so prevalent that some scholars have declared purposivism—or at least traditional purposivism—essentially defunct. Two prominent textualist scholars in particular have suggested that there is a “new purposivism” at …
Legitimate Interpretation – Or Legitimate Adjudication?, Thomas W. Merrill
Legitimate Interpretation – Or Legitimate Adjudication?, Thomas W. Merrill
Faculty Scholarship
Current debate about the legitimacy of lawmaking by courts focuses on what constitutes legitimate interpretation. The debate has reached an impasse in that originalism and textualism appear to have the stronger case as a matter of theory while living constitutionalism and dynamic interpretation provide much account of actual practice. This Article argues that if we refocus the debate by asking what constitutes legitimate adjudication, as determined by the social practice of the parties and their lawyers who take part in adjudication, it is possible to develop an account of legitimacy that produces a much better fit between theory and practice. …