Law Commons^™

Are They All Textualists Now?, Austin Peters

Northwestern University Law Review

Recent developments at the U.S. Supreme Court have rekindled debates over textualism. Missing from the conversation is a discussion of the courts that decide the vast majority of statutory interpretation cases in the United States—state courts. This Article uses supervised machine learning to conduct the first-ever empirical study of the statutory interpretation methods used by state supreme courts. In total, this study analyzes over 44,000 opinions from all fifty states from 1980 to 2019.

This Article establishes several key descriptive findings. First, since the 1980s, textualism has risen rapidly in state supreme court opinions. Second, this rise is primarily attributable …

The Problem Of Extravagant Inferences, Cass Sunstein

Georgia Law Review

Judges and lawyers sometimes act as if a constitutional or statutory term must, as a matter of semantics, be understood to have a particular meaning, when it could easily be understood to have another meaning, or several other meanings. When judges and lawyers act as if a legal term has a unique semantic meaning, even though it does not, they should be seen to be drawing extravagant inferences. Some constitutional provisions are treated this way; consider the idea that the vesting of executive power in a President of the United States necessarily includes the power to remove, at will, a …

Does Federal Law Ban Mailing Abortion Drugs? A Textual Analysis Of 18 U.S.C. § 1461, Peter Allevato

Pepperdine Law Review

As the regulation of abortion availability returned to the States, many have grappled with so-called trigger laws: dormant laws that were set to take effect to restrict or ensure access to abortion should constitutional protection be revoked. While the federal government has no true trigger law, it does have long-unenforced laws prohibiting the mailing of “[e]very article or thing designed, adapted, or intended for producing abortion.” 18 U.S.C. § 1461 is an old law, and it has not been enforced for at least fifty years. But the law’s potential effect on the growing practice of mail-distribution of chemical abortion pills …

A Textualist Defense Of A New Collateral Order Doctrine, Adam Reed Moore

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

As a general rule, federal appellate courts have jurisdiction over “final decisions.” Though the rule seems simple enough, the Court’s current approach to interpreting “final decisions,” the collateral order doctrine, is anything but straight­forward. That is because the Court has left the statutory text by the wayside. The collateral order doctrine is divorced from statutory text and is instead based on policy considerations.

Commentators (and, at times, the Court) have offered an alternative reading of “final decisions”: the final-judgment rule. This rule would allow appeals from final judgments only. But this alternative is not the product of close textual analysis. …

Textualism As An Ally Of Antitrust Enforcement: Examples From Merger And Monopolization Law, Robert H. Lande

Utah Law Review

This Article will first briefly present an overview of the textualist method of statutory interpretation. It will then briefly engage in a textualist analysis of important portions of two antitrust statutes: Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act. At least in these areas, textualist analysis should, if anything, help re-invigorate antitrust enforcement.

The Misunderstood History Of Textualism, Tara Leigh Grove

Northwestern University Law Review

This Article challenges widespread assumptions about the history of textualism. Jurists and scholars have sought for decades to distinguish “modern textualism” from the so-called “plain meaning school” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—an approach that both textualists and non-textualists alike have long viewed as improperly “literal” and “wooden.” This Article shows that this conventional historical account is incorrect. Based on a study of statutory cases from 1789 to 1945 that use the term “plain meaning” or similar terms, this Article reveals that, under the actual plain meaning approach, the Supreme Court did not ignore context but looked to …

Forgotten "People": Reviving Textualism In The Fourth Amendment, Peter C. Douglas

San Diego Law Review

For more than a century, the Supreme Court has struggled to develop a coherent and sustainable theory of the Fourth Amendment. Before the ink is dry on a new Fourth Amendment opinion, it is cabined, abrogated, or outright overruled. As one scholar has commented, the “evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine over the past century bears a striking resemblance to Hamlet’s descent into insanity.” While the Court vacillates between “theories” of the Fourth Amendment that might bring clarity to a difficult body of constitutional law, the rights it bespeaks lie vulnerable and unprotected. This Article argues that the problem flows from …

Textualism's Immigration Problem: Stabilizing Interpretive Rules On Noncitizens' Rights And Remedies, Peter Margulies

Hofstra Law Review

The article focuses on textualism immigration problem as the U.S. Supreme Court has applied textualist methodology in immigration cases and misread the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). It mentions application of linguistic canons occurs in a comparative, probabilistic assessment to resolve conflicts and analysis of statutory interpretation generally and immigration law in particular. It also mentions discusses inconsistencies in multi-member tribunals, such as appellate courts.

Textualism Today: Scalia’S Legacy And His Lasting Philosophy, Chase Wathen

University of Miami Law Review

Appointed to the Supreme Court in 1986 by President Reagan, Justice Antonin Scalia redefined the philosophy of textualism. Although methods like the plain meaning rule had been around for over a century, the textualist philosophy of today was not mainstream. While Scalia’s textualism is thought to be a conservative philosophy, Scalia consistently maintained that it was judicial restraint rather than conservatism at the heart of his method. The key tenant of Scalia’s new textualism was an outright rejection of legislative history, which he often brought up in opinions only to mock and dismiss as irrelevant. Starting with the hypothesis that …

Disentangling Textualism And Originalism, Katie Eyer

ConLawNOW

Textualism and originalism are not the same interpretive theory. Textualism commands adherence to the text. Originalism, in contrast, commands adherence to history. It should be self-evident that these are not—put simply—the same thing. While textualism and originalism may in some circumstances be harnessed to work in tandem—or may in some circumstances lead to the same result—they are different inquiries, and command fidelity to different ultimate guiding principles.

In this Essay, I argue that disentangling textualism and originalism is critical to the future vibrancy and legitimacy of textualism as an interpretive methodology. When conflated with originalism, textualism holds almost endless opportunities …

Textualism As Fair Notice?, Benjamin Minhao Chen

Washington Law Review

The opportunity to know the law is one of the bedrocks of legality. It is also a powerful and attractive reason for giving statutory language the meaning it has in everyday discourse. To do otherwise would be to hide the law from those it governs.

Or so the argument goes. Despite its intuitive force, the fair notice argument for textualism is vulnerable to two challenges. The first challenge is to the notion that fair notice requires congruence between ordinary and legal meaning. There is no normative gauge for determining the time and expense people ought to spend learning their legal …

Whither The Lofty Goals Of The Environmental Laws?: Can Statutory Directives Restore Purposivism When We Are All Textualists Now?, Stephen M. Johnson

Pepperdine Law Review

Congress set ambitious goals to protect public health and the environment when it enacted the federal environmental laws through bipartisan efforts in the 1970s. For many years, the federal courts interpreted the environmental laws to carry out those enacted purposes. Over time, however, courts greatly reduced their focus on the environmental and public health purposes of the environmental laws when interpreting those statutes due to the rise in textualism, the declining influence of the Chevron doctrine, and the increasing willingness of courts to defer to agency underenforcement of statutory responsibilities across all regulatory statutes. In 2020, the Environmental Protection Network, …

The "Unfairness" Proof: Exposing The Fatal Flaw Hidden In The Rule Governing The Use Of Criminal Convictions To Impeach Character For Truthfulness, Robert Steinbuch

Pepperdine Law Review

Federal Rule of Evidence 609 (adopted by various states as well) allows for the introduction of certain convictions at trial to impeach the credibility— i.e., character for truthfulness—of any witness. The rule bifurcates its requirements between those that apply to criminal defendants—who, in theory, are afforded greater protection throughout the law than are all other participants in trials—and all remaining witnesses. The most important distinction between the standards that apply to these two classes of witnesses is that for prior crimes of criminal defendants to be introduced to impeach their credibility, those wrongdoings must survive a special balancing test spelled …

Muskrat Textualism, Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Northwestern University Law Review

The Supreme Court decision McGirt v. Oklahoma, confirming the boundaries of the Creek Reservation in Oklahoma, was a truly rare case in which the Court turned back arguments by federal and state governments in favor of American Indian and tribal interests. For more than a century, Oklahomans had assumed that the reservation had been terminated and acted accordingly. But only Congress can terminate an Indian reservation, and it simply had never done so in the case of the Creek Reservation. Both the majority and dissenting opinions attempted to claim the mantle of textualism, but their respective analyses led to …

Textualism And The Modern Explanatory Statute, Adam Crews

Saint Louis University Law Journal

The explanatory statute is a largely forgotten legislative tool. Once common, the explanatory statute was a retrospective act that identified an ambiguity or erroneous interpretation of a prior law and then directed the legislature’s view of the correct interpretation.

Although now rare, the explanatory statute is not dead. Just a few years ago, Congress enacted an amendment to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act—a now hotly contested topic—with the hallmarks of an explanatory statute. In the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 (“FOSTA”), Congress concluded that courts had over-extended Section 230 immunity to …

Rejecting Word Worship: An Integrative Approach To Judicial Construction Of Insurance Policies, Jeffrey W. Stempel, Erik S. Knutsen

University of Cincinnati Law Review

Insurance coverage litigation is a quest for discerning meaning: Does the insurance policy cover the loss at issue? Construing the insurance policy, courts attempt to give legal effect to what the document purports to command. But what were the intentions and expectations of insurer and insured? Do those intentions even matter? Or is only the written text of the policy relevant to the coverage result? Courts addressing these questions typically frame the interpretative choice as one of strict textualism versus contextual functionalism.

In many, perhaps even most situations, text and context align to create an “easy” case. If a factory …

When Statutory Interpretation Becomes Precedent: Why Individual Rights Advocates Shouldn’T Be So Quick To Praise Bostock, Elena Schiefele

Washington and Lee Law Review

Justice Neil Gorsuch’s approach to textualism, which this Note will call “muscular textualism,” is unique. Most notably exemplified in Bostock v. Clayton County, muscular textualism is marked by its rigorous adherence to what Justice Gorsuch perceives to be the “plain language” of the text. Because Justice Gorsuch’s opinions exemplify muscular textualism in a structured and consistent manner, his appointment to the Supreme Court provides the forum from which he can influence the decision-making process of other members of the judiciary when they seek guidance from Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, it is important for both advocates and judges to understand …

The Elastics Of Snap Removal: An Empirical Case Study Of Textualism, Thomas O. Main, Jeffrey W. Stempel, David Mcclure

Cleveland State Law Review

This Article reports the findings of an empirical study of textualism as applied by federal judges interpreting the statute that permits removal of diversity cases from state to federal court. The “snap removal” provision in the statute is particularly interesting because its application forces judges into one of two interpretive camps—which are fairly extreme versions of textualism and purposivism, respectively. We studied characteristics of cases and judges to find predictors of textualist outcomes. In this Article, we offer a narrative discussion of key variables, and we detail the results of our logistic regression analysis. The most salient predictive variable was …

Discretionary Injustice: Limiting Due Process Rights Of Undocumented Immigrants Upon Removal After Re-Entry, Brendan Dauscher

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Sacred Fourth Amendment Text, Christopher Slobogin

Michigan Law Review Online

The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence governing the Fourth Amendment’s “threshold”—a word meant to refer to the types of police actions that trigger the amendment’s warrant and reasonableness requirements—has confounded scholars and students alike since Katz v. United States. Before that 1967 decision, the Court’s decisions on the topic were fairly straightforward, based primarily on whether the police trespassed on the target’s property or property over which the target had control. After that decision—which has come to stand for the proposition that a Fourth Amendment search occurs if police infringe an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as …

How Definitive Is Fourth Amendment Textualism?, Evan H. Caminker

Michigan Law Review Online

Professor Jeffrey Bellin’s excellent article advances a comprehensive and straightforward textual approach to determining what policing activities constitute “searches” triggering the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Bellin’s thesis is that a text-based approach to interpreting the Amendment is superior to the Supreme Court’s current approach, which ever since Katz v. United States has defined “search” primarily by reference to a non-textual “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard. After soundly criticizing the ungrounded and highly subjective nature of the Katz test, Bellin declares that the Court should instead simply follow where the text leads: the Amendment protects people from a search, meaning …

Natural Law Colloquium Legal Interpretation And Natural Law, Mark Greenberg

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Textualism’S Gaze, Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

This Article attempts to address why textualism distorts the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Indian law. I start with describing textualism in federal public law. I focus on textualism as described by Justice Scalia, as well as Scalia’s justification for textualism and discussion about the role of the judiciary in interpreting texts. The Court is often subject to challenges to its legitimacy rooted in its role as legal interpreter that textualism is designed to combat.

"Against The Defendant": Plea Rule's Purpose V. Plain Meaning, Nick Bell

Arkansas Law Review

Rarely is there a proverbial “smoking gun” in criminal prosecutions. Instead, prosecutors and defense attorneys must tell juries competing stories—largely from circumstantial evidence—and allow jurors to determine what happened based on inferences gleaned from argument and testimony. Naturally, this creates substantial uncertainty for both prosecutors and defendants. Instead of rolling the dice at trial, the vast majority of criminal matters are resolved through plea bargaining. Plea bargaining provides both sides with a certainty otherwise unobtainable through a traditional trial. The prosecution guarantees itself a conviction, and the defendant will often receive a lighter sentence than if he or she had …

Immunity From Suit For International Organizations: The Judiciary's New Que Of Separating Lawsuit Sheep From Lawsuit Goats, Ylli Dautaj

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

I. Introduction

II. Immunity from Suit in Public International Law

(A) Sovereign Immunity

(i) Sources of Sovereign Immunity

(ii) Legal Theory on Sovereign Immunity

(iii) Doctrinal Evolution of Sovereign Immunity

(B) Jurisdictional Immunity for International Organizations

(C) Sovereign Immunity and Immunity for International Organizations

Domestically

III. Jam v. Int'l Finance Corporation:

A New Dawn for International Organizations in the United States

(A) Jam v. Int'l Finance Corporation: Majority View

(B) Jam v. Int'l Finance Corporation: Dissenting Opinion by Justice Breyer

IV. The Exception that Proves but does not Swallow the rule on Virtually

Absolute Immunity: Criticism of the Majority in …

Fight Or Flight: The Ninth Circuit's Advancement Of Textualism During An Era Of Intentionalism In United States V. Lozoya, Zachary Remijas

Pepperdine Law Review

The modern complexities of global interaction and accessibility have recently forced some federal courts to reconsider standards for determining proper venue for criminal defendants who commit offenses while engaged in transportation, particularly those involving interstate commerce and crimes spanning multiple districts. These courts’ application of two adversarial schools of statutory interpretation—textualism and intentionalism—has driven conflict between textualist jurisdictions adhering to the plain meaning of established constitutional and statutory sources, and intentionalist jurisdictions refraining from the “creeping absurdity” of establishing venue for certain in-transit offenses under the literal meaning of such provisions. This Note endorses the sensibility and superiority of the …

The Dilemma Of Interstatutory Interpretation, Anuj C. Desai

Washington and Lee Law Review

Courts engage in interstatutory cross-referencing all the time, relying on one statute to help interpret another. Yet, neither courts nor scholars have ever had a satisfactory theory for determining when it is appropriate. Is it okay to rely on any other statute as an interpretive aid? Or, are there limits to the practice? If so, what are they? To assess when interstatutory cross-referencing is appropriate, I focus on one common form of the technique, the in pari materia doctrine. When a court concludes that two statutes are in pari materia or (translating the Latin) “on the same subject,” the court …

Progressive Textualism In Administrative Law, Kathryn E. Kovacs

Michigan Law Review Online

Nicholas Bagley’s article The Procedure Fetish is destined to be a classic. In it, Bagley systematically dismantles administrative law’s obsession with procedure. He decimates the arguments that procedure is necessary to legit-imize the administrative state and avoid agency capture. He nullifies the con-tention that administrative law is neutral by showing how proceduralism inhibits regulation and “favors a libertarian agenda over a progressive one.” Bagley urges progressives to abandon “gauzy claims about legitimacy and accountability” and approach procedure with skepticism.

The Procedure Fetish addresses the normative question of what adminis-trative law ought to require. Bagley writes about how progressives should solve …

The Statutory Interpretation Muddle, Richard H. Fallon, Jr.

Northwestern University Law Review

Debates about statutory interpretation typically proceed on the assumption that statutes have linguistic meanings that we can identify in the same way that we identify the meaning of utterances in ordinary conversation. But that premise is false. We identify the meaning of conversational utterances largely based on inferences about what the speaker intended to communicate. With legislatures, as now is widely recognized, there is no unitary speaker with the sort of communicative intentions that speakers in ordinary conversation possess. One might expect this recognition to trigger abandonment of the model of conversational interpretation as a framework for interpreting statutes. Instead, …

Digital Realty, Legislative History, And Textualism After Scalia, Michael Francus

Pepperdine Law Review

There is a shift afoot in textualism. The New Textualism of Justice Scalia is evolving in response to a new wave of criticism. That criticism presses on the tension between Justice Scalia’s commitment to faithful agency (effecting the legislature’s will) and his rejection of legislative history in the name of ordinary meaning (which ignores legislative will). And it has caused some textualists to shift away from faithful agency, even to the point of abandoning it as textualism’s grounding principle. But this shift has gone unnoticed. It has yet to be identified or described, let alone defended, even as academic and …