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Full-Text Articles in Law
Does Federal Law Ban Mailing Abortion Drugs? A Textual Analysis Of 18 U.S.C. § 1461, Peter Allevato
Does Federal Law Ban Mailing Abortion Drugs? A Textual Analysis Of 18 U.S.C. § 1461, Peter Allevato
Pepperdine Law Review
As the regulation of abortion availability returned to the States, many have grappled with so-called trigger laws: dormant laws that were set to take effect to restrict or ensure access to abortion should constitutional protection be revoked. While the federal government has no true trigger law, it does have long-unenforced laws prohibiting the mailing of “[e]very article or thing designed, adapted, or intended for producing abortion.” 18 U.S.C. § 1461 is an old law, and it has not been enforced for at least fifty years. But the law’s potential effect on the growing practice of mail-distribution of chemical abortion pills …
Whither The Lofty Goals Of The Environmental Laws?: Can Statutory Directives Restore Purposivism When We Are All Textualists Now?, Stephen M. Johnson
Whither The Lofty Goals Of The Environmental Laws?: Can Statutory Directives Restore Purposivism When We Are All Textualists Now?, Stephen M. Johnson
Pepperdine Law Review
Congress set ambitious goals to protect public health and the environment when it enacted the federal environmental laws through bipartisan efforts in the 1970s. For many years, the federal courts interpreted the environmental laws to carry out those enacted purposes. Over time, however, courts greatly reduced their focus on the environmental and public health purposes of the environmental laws when interpreting those statutes due to the rise in textualism, the declining influence of the Chevron doctrine, and the increasing willingness of courts to defer to agency underenforcement of statutory responsibilities across all regulatory statutes. In 2020, the Environmental Protection Network, …
The "Unfairness" Proof: Exposing The Fatal Flaw Hidden In The Rule Governing The Use Of Criminal Convictions To Impeach Character For Truthfulness, Robert Steinbuch
The "Unfairness" Proof: Exposing The Fatal Flaw Hidden In The Rule Governing The Use Of Criminal Convictions To Impeach Character For Truthfulness, Robert Steinbuch
Pepperdine Law Review
Federal Rule of Evidence 609 (adopted by various states as well) allows for the introduction of certain convictions at trial to impeach the credibility— i.e., character for truthfulness—of any witness. The rule bifurcates its requirements between those that apply to criminal defendants—who, in theory, are afforded greater protection throughout the law than are all other participants in trials—and all remaining witnesses. The most important distinction between the standards that apply to these two classes of witnesses is that for prior crimes of criminal defendants to be introduced to impeach their credibility, those wrongdoings must survive a special balancing test spelled …
Fight Or Flight: The Ninth Circuit's Advancement Of Textualism During An Era Of Intentionalism In United States V. Lozoya, Zachary Remijas
Fight Or Flight: The Ninth Circuit's Advancement Of Textualism During An Era Of Intentionalism In United States V. Lozoya, Zachary Remijas
Pepperdine Law Review
The modern complexities of global interaction and accessibility have recently forced some federal courts to reconsider standards for determining proper venue for criminal defendants who commit offenses while engaged in transportation, particularly those involving interstate commerce and crimes spanning multiple districts. These courts’ application of two adversarial schools of statutory interpretation—textualism and intentionalism—has driven conflict between textualist jurisdictions adhering to the plain meaning of established constitutional and statutory sources, and intentionalist jurisdictions refraining from the “creeping absurdity” of establishing venue for certain in-transit offenses under the literal meaning of such provisions. This Note endorses the sensibility and superiority of the …
Digital Realty, Legislative History, And Textualism After Scalia, Michael Francus
Digital Realty, Legislative History, And Textualism After Scalia, Michael Francus
Pepperdine Law Review
There is a shift afoot in textualism. The New Textualism of Justice Scalia is evolving in response to a new wave of criticism. That criticism presses on the tension between Justice Scalia’s commitment to faithful agency (effecting the legislature’s will) and his rejection of legislative history in the name of ordinary meaning (which ignores legislative will). And it has caused some textualists to shift away from faithful agency, even to the point of abandoning it as textualism’s grounding principle. But this shift has gone unnoticed. It has yet to be identified or described, let alone defended, even as academic and …
Is The Chief Justice A Tax Lawyer?, Stephanie Hoffer, Christopher J. Walker
Is The Chief Justice A Tax Lawyer?, Stephanie Hoffer, Christopher J. Walker
Pepperdine Law Review
In our contribution to this symposium on King v. Burwell, we explore two aspects of the Chief Justice’s opinion where it is hard to ignore the fingerprints of a tax lawyer. First, in the Chief’s approach to statutory interpretation one sees a tax lawyer as interpreter with an approach that tracks tax law’s substance-over-form doctrine. Second, as to King’s sweeping administrative law holding, the Chief crafts a new major questions doctrine that could significantly cut back on federal agency lawmaking authority. Yet he seems to develop this doctrine against the backdrop of tax exceptionalism, and thus this development may have …
Executive Action And The First Amendment's First Word, Daniel J. Hemel
Executive Action And The First Amendment's First Word, Daniel J. Hemel
Pepperdine Law Review
In recent years, textualist scholars have advanced the argument that the First Amendment only applies to legislative action, and thus that executive authority is unencumbered by the First Amendment’s prohibitions. According to this argument, the words “Congress shall make no law” cannot be construed to limit the powers of the executive branch. Upon first glance, it might seem that a textualist reading of the First Amendment’s first word would give the executive branch carte blanche in the regulation of religion, expression, and association. Yet as this Article seeks to show, a textualist reading of the First Amendment’s first word does …