Law Commons^™

Does Federal Law Ban Mailing Abortion Drugs? A Textual Analysis Of 18 U.S.C. § 1461, Peter Allevato

Pepperdine Law Review

As the regulation of abortion availability returned to the States, many have grappled with so-called trigger laws: dormant laws that were set to take effect to restrict or ensure access to abortion should constitutional protection be revoked. While the federal government has no true trigger law, it does have long-unenforced laws prohibiting the mailing of “[e]very article or thing designed, adapted, or intended for producing abortion.” 18 U.S.C. § 1461 is an old law, and it has not been enforced for at least fifty years. But the law’s potential effect on the growing practice of mail-distribution of chemical abortion pills …

A Textualist Defense Of A New Collateral Order Doctrine, Adam Reed Moore

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

As a general rule, federal appellate courts have jurisdiction over “final decisions.” Though the rule seems simple enough, the Court’s current approach to interpreting “final decisions,” the collateral order doctrine, is anything but straight­forward. That is because the Court has left the statutory text by the wayside. The collateral order doctrine is divorced from statutory text and is instead based on policy considerations.

Commentators (and, at times, the Court) have offered an alternative reading of “final decisions”: the final-judgment rule. This rule would allow appeals from final judgments only. But this alternative is not the product of close textual analysis. …

Who Cares Whether A Monopoly Is Efficient? The Sherman Act Is Supposed To Ban Them All, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Section 2 of the Sherman Act was designed to impose sanctions on all firms that monopolize or attempt to monopolize regardless whether the firm engaged in anticompetitive conductor, and regardless whether the firm is efficient. This conclusion emerges from a textualist analysis of the language of Section 2. This article briefly analyzes contemporaneous dictionaries, legal treatises, and cases, and demonstrates that when the Sherman Act was passed the word “monopolize” simply meant that someone had acquired a monopoly. The term was not limited to monopolies acquired through anticompetitive conduct or monopolies that were inefficient. An attempt to monopolize also had …

Interpreting The Administrative Procedure Act: A Literature Review, Christopher J. Walker, Scott Macguidwin

Law & Economics Working Papers

The modern administrative state has changed substantially since Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946. Yet Congress has done little to modernize the APA in those intervening seventy-seven years. That does not mean the APA has remained unchanged. Federal courts have substantially refashioned the APA’s requirements for administrative procedure and judicial review of agency action. Perhaps unsurprisingly, calls to return to either the statutory text or the original meaning (or both) have intensified in recent years. “APA originalism” projects abound.

As part of the Notre Dame Law Review’s Symposium on the History of the Ad- ministrative Procedure Act …

Textualism As An Ally Of Antitrust Enforcement: Examples From Merger And Monopolization Law, Robert H. Lande

Utah Law Review

This Article will first briefly present an overview of the textualist method of statutory interpretation. It will then briefly engage in a textualist analysis of important portions of two antitrust statutes: Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act. At least in these areas, textualist analysis should, if anything, help re-invigorate antitrust enforcement.

A Response To Professor Choi’S Beyond Purposivism In Tax Law, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

Law & Economics Working Papers

This response to Professor Choi’s excellent article questions whether the proposals made by the article can solve the tax shelter problem, and argues that a better response is to bolster purposivism with a statutory general anti-abuse rule (GAAR).

The Misunderstood History Of Textualism, Tara Leigh Grove

Northwestern University Law Review

This Article challenges widespread assumptions about the history of textualism. Jurists and scholars have sought for decades to distinguish “modern textualism” from the so-called “plain meaning school” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—an approach that both textualists and non-textualists alike have long viewed as improperly “literal” and “wooden.” This Article shows that this conventional historical account is incorrect. Based on a study of statutory cases from 1789 to 1945 that use the term “plain meaning” or similar terms, this Article reveals that, under the actual plain meaning approach, the Supreme Court did not ignore context but looked to …

Forgotten "People": Reviving Textualism In The Fourth Amendment, Peter C. Douglas

San Diego Law Review

For more than a century, the Supreme Court has struggled to develop a coherent and sustainable theory of the Fourth Amendment. Before the ink is dry on a new Fourth Amendment opinion, it is cabined, abrogated, or outright overruled. As one scholar has commented, the “evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine over the past century bears a striking resemblance to Hamlet’s descent into insanity.” While the Court vacillates between “theories” of the Fourth Amendment that might bring clarity to a difficult body of constitutional law, the rights it bespeaks lie vulnerable and unprotected. This Article argues that the problem flows from …

When Judges Were Enjoined: Text And Tradition In The Federal Review Of State Judicial Action, Alexandra Nickerson, Kellen R. Funk

Faculty Scholarship

It is virtually a tenet of modern federal jurisdiction that judges, at least when they are acting as judges, are inappropriate defendants in civil suits. Yet on rare but salient occasions, state judges might be the sole or primary party responsible for violating the constitutional rights of citizens, for instance by imposing excessive bail or by opening their courtrooms to oppressive private suits like those under Texas’s Senate Bill 8 bounty regime. In such cases, injunctive relief against judicial officers may be the only or most effective remedy against constitutional violations, but federal courts from the trial level up to …

Interpreting The Administrative Procedure Act: A Literature Review, Christopher J. Walker

Articles

The modern administrative state has changed substantially since Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946. Yet Congress has done little to modernize the APA in those intervening seventy-seven years. That does not mean the APA has remained unchanged. Federal courts have substantially refashioned the APA’s requirements for administrative procedure and judicial review of agency action. Perhaps unsurprisingly, calls to return to either the statutory text or the original meaning (or both) have intensified in recent years. “APA originalism” projects abound.

As part of the Notre Dame Law Review’s Symposium on the History of the Administrative Procedure Act and …

Ordinary Meaning And Ordinary People, Kevin Tobia, Brian G. Slocum, Victoria Frances Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Article considers the relationship between ordinary meaning and ordinary people in legal interpretation. Many jurists give interpretive weight to the law's ordinary meaning (i.e., general, nontechnical meaning). Modern textualists adopt a strong commitment to ordinary meaning and justify it by alluding to ordinary people: people understand law to communicate ordinary meanings. This Article begins from this textualist premise and empirically examines the meaning that legal texts communicate to the public. Five original empirical studies reveal that ordinary people consider genre carefully, and regularly take phrases in law to communicate technical legal meanings, not only ordinary ones. Building on the …

Textualism In Practice, Anita S. Krishnakumar

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

It is by now axiomatic to note that textualism has won the statutory interpretation wars. But contrary to what textualists long have promised, the widespread embrace of textualism as an interpretive methodology has not resulted in any real clarity or predictability about the interpretive path—or even the specific interpretive tools—that courts will invoke in a particular case. Part of the reason for this lack of predictability is that textualism-in-practice often differs significantly from the approach that textualism-in-theory advertises; and part of the reason is that textualism-in-theory is sometimes in tension with itself. In light of textualism’s ascendance—and now dominance—on the …

Biden V. Nebraska: The New State Standing And The (Old) Purposive Major Questions Doctrine, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Biden v. Nebraska does not sufficiently explain how Missouri has standing under established Article III doctrine, nor how the Court approaches the major questions doctrine as a method of statutory interpretation. Clarification can come from other opinions, even other cases entirely, in which Justice’s counterarguments are suggestive of the real arguments underlying the decisions.

MOHELA may have faced a concrete injury from the student debt waiver, but there was no evidence that Missouri would – and the majority had no answer for how Missouri had standing without an injury. A debate over special state …