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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Elastics Of Snap Removal: An Empirical Case Study Of Textualism, Thomas O. Main, Jeffrey W. Stempel, David Mcclure Mar 2021

The Elastics Of Snap Removal: An Empirical Case Study Of Textualism, Thomas O. Main, Jeffrey W. Stempel, David Mcclure

Cleveland State Law Review

This Article reports the findings of an empirical study of textualism as applied by federal judges interpreting the statute that permits removal of diversity cases from state to federal court. The “snap removal” provision in the statute is particularly interesting because its application forces judges into one of two interpretive camps—which are fairly extreme versions of textualism and purposivism, respectively. We studied characteristics of cases and judges to find predictors of textualist outcomes. In this Article, we offer a narrative discussion of key variables, and we detail the results of our logistic regression analysis. The most salient predictive variable was …


Statutory Realism: The Jurisprudential Ambivalence Of Interpretive Theory, Abigail R. Moncrieff Oct 2019

Statutory Realism: The Jurisprudential Ambivalence Of Interpretive Theory, Abigail R. Moncrieff

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

In the renaissance of statutory interpretation theory, a division has emerged between "new purposivists," who argue that statutes should be interpreted dynamically, and "new textualists," who argue that statutes should be interpreted according to their ordinary semantic meanings. Both camps, however, rest their theories on jurisprudentially ambivalent commitments. Purposivists are jurisprudential realists when they make arguments about statutory meaning, but they are jurisprudential formalists in their views of the judicial power to engage in dynamic interpretation. Textualists are the inverse; they are formalistic in their understandings of statutory meaning but realistic in their arguments about judicial power. The relative triumph …


King, Chevron, And The Age Of Textualism, Abigail R. Moncrieff Jan 2015

King, Chevron, And The Age Of Textualism, Abigail R. Moncrieff

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

In the King v. Burwell oral arguments, Chief Justice John Roberts—usually one of the more active members of the Court—asked only one substantive question, addressed to the Solicitor General: "If you're right about Chevron [deference applying to this case], that would indicate that a subsequent administration could change [your] interpretation?" As it turns out, that question was crucial to Roberts's thinking and to the 6-3 opinion he authored, but almost all commentators either undervalued or misunderstood the question's import (myself included). The result of Roberts's actual thinking was an unfortunate outcome for Chevron—and potentially for the rule of law—despite …


Saving The Press Clause From Ruin: The Customary Origins Of A 'Free Press' As Interface To The Present And Future, Kevin F. O'Neill, Patrick J. Charles Jan 2012

Saving The Press Clause From Ruin: The Customary Origins Of A 'Free Press' As Interface To The Present And Future, Kevin F. O'Neill, Patrick J. Charles

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

Based on a close reading of original sources dating back to America's early colonial period, this article offers a fresh look at the origins of the Press Clause. Then, applying those historical findings, the article critiques recent scholarship in the field and reassesses the Press Clause jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. Finally, the article describes the likely impact of its historical findings if ever employed by the Court in interpreting the Press Clause.


I Am Textualism , Stephen Durden Jan 2011

I Am Textualism , Stephen Durden

Cleveland State Law Review

Until every person seeking to interpret the Constitution recognizes that constitutional interpretation is a quintessentially human endeavor, based on human assumptions and human reasoning, I will remain to protect those who seek to hide their predilections, their personal choices. I will continue to change as time passes. My form will continue to change to meet the needs of those who seek my cloak of objectivity and seek to redefine and improve me. I am a human invention created to pretend that constitutional interpretation is not a human endeavor. I am what each disciple wants. I am what each disciple needs. …


Limited Powers In The Looking-Glass: Otiose Textualism, And An Empirical Analysis Of Other Approaches, When Activists In Private Shopping Centers Claim State Constitutional Liberties, Richard J. Peltz Jan 2005

Limited Powers In The Looking-Glass: Otiose Textualism, And An Empirical Analysis Of Other Approaches, When Activists In Private Shopping Centers Claim State Constitutional Liberties, Richard J. Peltz

Cleveland State Law Review

This Article examines closely a narrow range of highly factually analogous cases, in which state constitutional rights are asserted despite a clear lack of entitlement to assert any federal constitutional claim. Specifically, the cases selected are those in which private persons assert a right to conduct expressive activity, including electoral activity, in private shopping centers during hours when the properties are held open to the general public. These cases may be referred to colloquially as “the mall cases.” Selected here are only those cases that were decided after the federal question became clear. The Article first inquires into the role …


Commentary: Textualism And Tax Cases, Deborah A. Geier Jan 1993

Commentary: Textualism And Tax Cases, Deborah A. Geier

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

This 1993 article uses tax cases to explore the rhetoric surrounding "textualism" in statutory interpretation.