Consciousness In Teleosts: There Is Something It Feels Like To Be A Fish,
2017
East Tennessee State University
Consciousness In Teleosts: There Is Something It Feels Like To Be A Fish, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
Ray-finned fish are often excluded from the group of non-human animals considered to have phenomenal consciousness. This is generally done on the grounds that the fish pallium lacks a sufficiently expansive gross parcellation, as well as even minimally sufficient neuronal organization, intrinsic connectivity, and reciprocal extrinsic connections with the thalamus to support the subjective experience of qualia. It is also argued that fish do not exhibit the level of behavioral flexibility indicative of consciousness. A review of neuroanatomical, neurophysiological and behavioral studies is presented which leads to the conclusion that fish do have neurobiological correlates and behavioral flexibility of sufficient …
Consciousness, Evidence, And Moral Standing,
2017
Washington University in St. Louis
Consciousness, Evidence, And Moral Standing, Irina Mikhalevich
Animal Sentience
Woodruff (2017) claims to have identified the neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness (“p-consciousness”) in fishes, and argues that these neurological data, along with behavioral evidence, suggest that teleost fishes are in all probability sentient organisms. Woodruff’s case may be strengthened by challenging key assumptions behind a common criticism of accounts such as his: that fishes cannot be p-conscious because they lack the cortical structures necessary for p-consciousness. A more serious objection to Woodruff’s proposal would be that his evidence for p-consciousness establishes only that fishes are “access-conscious” (“a-conscious”), where a-conscious states are cognitive representations that are made available to cognitive …
Battlefish Contention,
2017
Florida Int'l University
Battlefish Contention, Sean Allen-Hermanson
Animal Sentience
Contrary to Woodruff’s suggestion, investigations into possible reasoning capacities of cichlid fighting fish and trace memory in goldfish do not support claims about sentience. This is disputed by research results about learning and implicit processing, sleep, vegetative states, amnesia, semantic priming, artificial network modeling, and even insects. A novel, deflationary, interpretation of Grosenick et al.'s experiments on A. burtoni is also offered.
Sentience In Living Tissue,
2017
São Paulo State University (UNESP)
Sentience In Living Tissue, Alfredo Pereira Jr.
Animal Sentience
I agree with Woodruff’s concept of sentience but must disagree about what he proposes as the biological correlates of feeling. Based on the interpretation of brain function originally presented by Camilo Golgi, I assume that feelings are instantiated by hydro-ionic waves in living tissue. From this viewpoint, the anatomical, physiological and behavioural criteria of Woodruff would not be necessary to argue for sentience in fish.
Nagel-Ing Worries About Fish Sentience,
2017
University of South Florida St. Petersburg
Nagel-Ing Worries About Fish Sentience, Hugh Lafollette
Animal Sentience
Woodruff (2017) argues that teleosts’ more sophisticated behaviors make sense only if they are sentient. Moreover, their neuroanatomy, although different from mammalian, is sufficiently complex to support sentience. I answer some potential objections to Woodruff’s argument, and try to trace its moral significance. In so doing, I briefly address Birch’s (2017) target article as well.
Of Cortex And Consciousness: “Phenomenal,” “Access,” Or Otherwise,
2017
The University of Tampa
Of Cortex And Consciousness: “Phenomenal,” “Access,” Or Otherwise, Scott A. Husband
Animal Sentience
From the perspective of a comparative neuroanatomist studying the avian pallium, Woodruff’s (2017) claims about the behavioral and electrophysiological evidence for teleost sentience blur the lines between phenomenal and access consciousness (Block, 1995). I discuss the bias that complex cognition can only arise in the cortical layering typical of the mammalian pallium and conclude that Woodruff makes a good case that the tecto-pallial connections in teleosts are sufficiently complex to support something like sentience.
Learning, Memory, Cognition, And The Question Of Sentience In Fish,
2017
University of Toronto Mississauga
Learning, Memory, Cognition, And The Question Of Sentience In Fish, Robert Gerlai
Animal Sentience
Evolutionarily conserved features have been demonstrated at many levels of biological organization across a variety of species. Evolutionary conservation may apply to complex behavioral phenomena too. It is thus not inconceivable that a form of sentience does exist even in the lowest order vertebrate taxon, the teleosts. How similar it is to human sentience in its level of complexity or in its multidimensional features is a difficult question, especially from an experimental standpoint, given that even the definition of human sentience is debated. Woodruff attempts a Turing-like test of fish sentience, and lists numerous neuroanatomic, neurophysiological and behavioral similarities between …
Mental Representations Are Not Necessary For Fish Consciousness,
2017
University of Central Florida
Mental Representations Are Not Necessary For Fish Consciousness, Luis H. Favela
Animal Sentience
Woodruff (2017) argues that teleost fishes are capable of phenomenal consciousness. Central to his argument is the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is representational in nature. I think the commitment to a representational theory of consciousness undermines Woodruff’s case for teleost phenomenal consciousness. The reason is that organisms do not need to perceive the world indirectly via mental images/representations in order to have phenomenological experiences. My argument is based on considerations of ecological psychology and comparative ethology.
Animal Models, Agendas And Sentience,
2017
Scripps Florida
Animal Models, Agendas And Sentience, Thomas Creson
Animal Sentience
Woodruff’s target article on teleost consciousness is a well-organized logical argument for considering the fish as a sentient being. This becomes more important for animal ethical discussion as the fish becomes a more important and legitimate animal model for investigating animal states and traits associated with higher levels of behavior such as learning and memory.
The Emotional Brain Of Fish,
2017
University of Stirling
The Emotional Brain Of Fish, Sonia Rey Planellas
Animal Sentience
Woodruff (2017) analyzes structural homologies and functional equivalences between the brains of mammals and fish to understand where sentience and social cognition might reside in teleosts. He compares neuroanatomical, neurophysiological and behavioural correlates. I discuss current advances in the study of fish cognitive abilities and emotions, and advocate an evolutionary approach to the underlying basis of sentience in teleosts.
Fish Sentience: A Hypothesis Worth Pursuing,
2017
University of Guadalajara
Fish Sentience: A Hypothesis Worth Pursuing, José E. Burgos
Animal Sentience
Woodruff’s case for fish sentience is intriguing. Though far from ready for final acceptance, it is worth pursuing. The case is philosophically uncontroversial under functionalism and reductive materialism. It is also highly heuristic, as it raises interesting issues for further investigation, such as the neural causation of behavior, the role of Mauthner cells in conditioned avoidance, and whether operant conditioning is constitutive of fish sentience.
We Still Need A Theory,
2017
Pennsylvania State University - Main Campus
We Still Need A Theory, Paula Droege
Animal Sentience
Woodruff (2017) has compiled a convincing array of data to support his contention that teleost fish feel pain. However, in the absence of an explanatory theory about the nature and function of consciousness, a checklist of criteria is insufficient to allay skeptical concerns. I offer a theory that can explain why features like selective attention and behavioral flexibility indicate consciousness. Consciousness represents the present moment in order to allow dynamic changes in actions or goals in response to situational demands.
Can Unconscious Brain Processes Indicate Sentience?,
2017
University of California, Los Angeles
Can Unconscious Brain Processes Indicate Sentience?, Vincent Taschereau-Dumouchel, Piercesare Grimaldi, Hakwan Lau
Animal Sentience
We disagree with Woodruff that we have good neurobiological reasons to think fishes are sentient, because mechanisms for consciousness are controversial even in humans. To the extent that there are consensuses in that literature, they do not support Woodruff's claims.
To Identify All The Relevant Factors Is To Explain Feeling,
2017
University of British Columbia
To Identify All The Relevant Factors Is To Explain Feeling, Arthur S. Reber
Animal Sentience
Several additional comments on Reber (2016a) have appeared. Like those addressed in Reber (2016b), they reflect points of agreement and disagreement on various elements of my Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC) model. Some, however, seem to have missed key points. I'm willing to take some responsibility for this. Perhaps I was not clear about some of the more radical points of the model. Hopefully the case-by-case review here will help.
Consciousness Is Not Inherent In But Emergent From Life,
2017
University of Idaho
Consciousness Is Not Inherent In But Emergent From Life, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Animal Sentience
Reber’s theory of the cellular basis of consciousness (CBC) is right to emphasize that we should study consciousness (sentience) in its simplest form, taking its evolution into account. However, not enough evidence is presented to support CBC’s unorthodox claim that even simple, one-celled organisms are conscious. As pointed out by other commentators, the CBC seems to be based on outdated ideas about evolution and does not acknowledge that consciousness could be an evolutionary novel feature. Such emergent features are abundant in living organisms. We review our own emergentist solution, in which consciousness evolved in the elaborating nervous systems of the …
What Can Research On Nonhumans Tell Us About Human Dissonance?,
2017
Oakland University
What Can Research On Nonhumans Tell Us About Human Dissonance?, Jennifer Vonk
Animal Sentience
Zentall’s thoughtful review of the literature on cognitive dissonance in nonhumans helps to highlight the common finding that similar outcomes in humans and nonhumans can be attributed to different underlying mechanisms. I advocate a more fully comparative approach to the underlying mechanisms, avoiding the assumption of shared processes in humans and nonhumans.
Establishing That Contrast Is Cognitive Dissonance,
2017
Georgia State University
Establishing That Contrast Is Cognitive Dissonance, Travis R. Smith
Animal Sentience
Zentall suggests that the same mechanism underlies cognitive dissonance in humans and the within-trial contrast effect in pigeons (and humans). The contrast effect has face validity in explaining cognitive dissonance, but more research is needed to establish construct validity. To determine whether both phenomena share the same mechanism, future research should test (1) whether both share physiological processes, (2) whether individuals who show sensitivity to one are also sensitive to the other, and (3) whether both phenomena are affected by the same changes in an independent variable.
Raising The Moral Consciousness Of Science,
2017
WellBeing International
Raising The Moral Consciousness Of Science, Bernard Rollin
Animal Sentience
Precaution on behalf of sentient animals should not be tempered by the questionable principle of the amorality of science.
Support For The Precautionary Principle,
2017
Psychology, University of Lethbridge
Support For The Precautionary Principle, Jennifer Mather
Animal Sentience
The precautionary principle gives the animal the benefit of the doubt when its sentient status is not known. This is necessary for advanced invertebrates such as cephalopods because research and evidence concerning the criteria for sentience are scattered and often insufficient to give us the background for the decision.
The Precautionary Principle: A Cautionary Note,
2017
California State University - Chico
The Precautionary Principle: A Cautionary Note, Robert C. Jones
Animal Sentience
The precautionary principle regarding animal sentience is often used in decision-making about human actions that may cause harm to nonhuman animals. Birch (2017) develops an account of the precautionary principle requiring two pragmatic rules for its implementation. I support Birch's proposal but offer a cautionary note about relying on precautionary principles if one's ultimate goal is to emancipate animals from human domination.
