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On Perfect Friendship: An Outline And A Guide To Aristotle's Philosophy Of Friendship, Kristen Psaty 2010 Colby College

On Perfect Friendship: An Outline And A Guide To Aristotle's Philosophy Of Friendship, Kristen Psaty

Honors Theses

Providing insight into such timeless questions as: What is friendship? Are the best friends similar or dissimilar? and Does having friends make you a better person?, the paper addresses the importance of friendship for Aristotle, but also for the modern reader as well. A topic of special philosophical concern, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) considered friendship to be necessary in achieving a virtuous and fulfilling life. Consequently, he wrote more about friendship than any other virtue he presented. This paper lays the foundation for understanding Aristotle’s philosophy of friendship as well as its position within his larger moral schema. The image of …


A Reply To Ruiping Fan, Stephen C. Angle 2009 Wesleyan University

A Reply To Ruiping Fan, Stephen C. Angle

Stephen C. Angle

I have been offered the chance for a brief reply to Professor FAN’s response to my review, and would like to make just two points. In the penultimate paragraph of his response, Professor FAN raises the question of the efficacy of Confucian moral commitments in contemporary China, and suggests that we can get evidence of this efficacy by comparing China with Eastern Europe. I agree that such a comparison may be very helpful, but suggest that it cannot be undertaken in a superficial way. For one thing, the differences between the two regions are more complicated than …


Reason And Desire: The Case Of Affective Desires, Attila Tanyi 2009 University of Liverpool

Reason And Desire: The Case Of Affective Desires, Attila Tanyi

Attila Tanyi

The paper begins with an objection to the Desire-Based Reasons Model. The argument from reason-based desires holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has recently been launched against the first premise of this argument by Ruth Chang. Chang invokes a counterexample: affective desires. The aim of the paper is to see if there is a way to accommodate the counterexample to the first premise. I investigate three strategies. I first deal …


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