Macroeconomics Commons^™

Lessons Learned: Kieran J. Fallon, Matthew A. Lieber

Journal of Financial Crises

Presently the senior deputy general counsel for regulation and government affairs at PNC Fi-nancial Services Group, Kieran Fallon completed a 16-year tenure in the legal division of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in 2011. As associate general counsel dur-ing the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), he helped design the Federal Reserve’s Commercial Pa-per Funding Facility, restructure American International Group (AIG), and implement the Dodd-Frank Act. Relatedly, Fallon also served as general counsel for the Financial Stability Oversight Board from 2008 to 2011. This Lessons Learned is based on an interview conducted with Fallon on August 13, 2020.

Lessons Learned: Seth Carpenter, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

Seth Carpenter was a senior staff member of the Division of Monetary Affairs at the Federal Reserve Board during the 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), meaning he was part of the team that advised the Board of Governors and members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) in setting monetary policy. He led the Board team that worked daily with the Open Market Trading Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to implement policy. He left the Federal Reserve System as deputy director of monetary affairs in 2014 to work at the US Department of the Treasury, where …

Lessons Learned: Tim Clark, Lynnley Browning

Journal of Financial Crises

During the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09, Tim Clark was senior adviser in the Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Clark was a chief architect of the Federal Reserve’s capital and liquidity stress tests that helped to stabilize the banks. He was also one of the leaders behind the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act and other reforms at the Federal Reserve, and ultimately served as deputy director of the Division for Supervision and Regulation. This abstract is based on an interview with Clark that occurred on December 13, 2019.

The Internal Capital Markets Of Global Dealer Banks, Arun Gupta

Journal of Financial Crises

This study uncovers the existence of a trillion-dollar internal capital market that played a central role in the financing of dealer banks during the 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis. Hand-collecting a novel set of dealer microdata at the subsidiary level, I present a unique set of facts on the evolution of inter-affiliate loans between US primary dealers and their (primarily foreign) siblings. First, the aggregate size of these dealer internal capital markets quadrupled from $335 billion in 2001 to $1.2 trillion by 2007. Second, 25 percent of total repurchase agreements and 62 percent of total securities lending reported on US primary …

Lessons Learned: John Bovenzi, Sandra Ward

Journal of Financial Crises

As a deputy to the chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and in his role as chief operating officer of the agency, John Bovenzi provided policy advice and oversaw the agency’s operations, including business lines, bank supervision, bank closings, deposit insurance, and administrative affairs. Bovenzi’s most notable role during the Global Financial Crisis was manning the helm of mortgage lender IndyMac after the FDIC took it over in July 2008 to position it for a sale. This abstract is based on an interview with Bovenzi conducted on December 2, 2020

Managing External Volatility: Policy Frameworks In Non-Reserve-Issuing Economies, Hélène Poirson, Nathan Porter, Ghada Fayad, Itai Agur, Ran Bi, Jiaqian Chen, Johannes Eugster, Stefan Laseen, Jeta Menkulasi, Kenji Moriyama, Céline Rochon, Katsiaryna Svirydzenka, Camilo Tovar, Zhongxia Zhang, Aleksandra Zdzienicka

Journal of Financial Crises

Since the Global Financial Crisis, non-reserve-issuing economies (NREs) have been highly sensitive to episodes of external pressures. With monetary policy independence constrained by this sensitivity, many NREs have utilized other policy instruments. This paper confirms the vulnerability of NREs to external shocks and finds that, in some circumstances, managing such shocks with multiple instruments can both lessen the policy response required from any one policy tool to financial and external shocks and increase the effectiveness of policies in stabilizing macrofinancial conditions. Effectiveness, however, does not always imply appropriateness, which rests on an evaluation of potential trade-offs and unintended consequences.

From Lost Turnover To Nonperforming Loans: The Impact Of The Covid-19 Pandemic On The Economy And On The Financial System, Antonio Sánchez Serrano

Journal of Financial Crises

The COVID-19 pandemic created an unprecedented economic shock across the world. As a result of the coronavirus outbreak and the related health measures, nonfinancial corporations providing nonessential goods or services that cannot be consumed remotely have experienced a large decrease in their turnover. Using balance sheets and flows statements, we are able to quantify the impact of the pandemic on nonfinancial corporations and households, according to several scenarios for the pandemic over 2021. The impact is largely heterogeneous across sectors and amounts to up to 20% of the turnover for euro area nonfinancial corporations. Stress in these corporations and households …

Financial Crises And Legislation, Peter Conti-Brown, Michael Ohlrogge

Journal of Financial Crises

Scholars frequently assert that financial legislation in the United States is primarily crisis driven. This “crisis-legislation hypothesis” is often cited as an explanation for various supposed shortcomings of US financial legislation, including that it is poorly conceived and inadequate to the problems it aims to address. Other scholars embrace the hypothesis, but from the perspective that crises are the needed impetus to prompt constructive reforms. Despite the prevalence of this hypothesis, however, its threshold assumption—that Congress passes major financial legislation only when financial crises arise—has never been analyzed empirically. This article provides that analysis. We first devise a new system …

Essays In Asset Pricing, Muhammed Yonac

Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

This dissertation consists of three essays in asset pricing with the common theme of return predictability.

Chapter 1: This chapter introduces the motivation, results, and structure of the dissertation.

Chapter 2: I examine the relation between the social ties between firms' headquarters locations and co-movements between their fundamentals and stock returns. The evidence indicates that firms in the same industry with socially connected locations exhibit co-movement in fundamentals and stock returns that exceed those without socially connected locations. However, the stock returns reflect the location information with a lag. To exploit this lagged relationship, we form portfolios that buy (sell) …

Lessons Learned: Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

Zeti Akhtar Aziz, a Malaysian economist, was governor of Bank Negara Malaysia, her nation’s central bank, from 2000 to 2016; prior to that, she was acting governor and deputy governor. Dr. Zeti was a key leader in Malaysia’s response to the Asian financial crisis of 1997¬-98, as well as the financial sector restructuring that followed. This “Lessons Learned” summary is based on a 2022 interview with Dr. Zeti. At the time of the interview, she was co-chair of the board of governors of the Asia School of Business in Kuala Lumpur, which is a partnership between Bank Negara and the …

Lessons Learned: Mark Van Der Weide, Matthew A. Lieber

Journal of Financial Crises

With more than two decades of continuing service at the Federal Reserve Board, Mark Van Der Weide brings a unique insider perspective on central bank policymaking before, during, and after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), including the Fed’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. From 1998 to 2009, Van Der Weide served in the Fed’s legal division. De-tailed to the Treasury Department in 2009, he helped draft the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-form and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Back at the Fed in 2010, Van Der Weide served for eight years in the Division of Supervision and Regulation, where …

Lessons Learned: David Wilcox, Mercedes Cardona

Journal of Financial Crises

David Wilcox was the deputy director of the Division of Research and Statistics of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-¬09. He assisted in developing the Federal Reserve policy response that ultimately stabilized the economy by providing insight into the economic and financial outlook to the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) prior to each of its policy-setting meetings. Wilcox became director of the division in 2011 and served in that role through 2018, acting as the division’s chief economist, manager, and the senior adviser to three Fed chairs. After leaving the Fed, he joined …

Lessons Learned: Brooksley Born, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

Brooksley Born, a lawyer with decades of experience in derivatives law, served as chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) from 1996 to 1999. At the CFTC, she advocated for federal regulation of the over-the-counter derivatives (OTC) market, but legislation failed to pass. The OTC derivatives market had a central role in the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-09. Born, who returned to private practice after her CFTC term, served as a commissioner on the US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, which investigated the causes of the crisis and issued its report in January 2011. This “Lessons Learned” is based on …

Lessons Learned: Michael Silva, Mercedes Cardona

Journal of Financial Crises

Michael Silva was chief of staff to then-President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) Timothy Geithner from 2006 to 2009, including the early stages of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). As such, Silva was critical in the coordination of personnel and information during the GFC, specifically during the period when the FRBNY was addressing liquidity stresses in the bank sector, including the bailout of Bear Stearns, the failure of Lehman Brothers, and the rescue of American International Group. When Geithner became President Barack Obama’s Treasury Secretary in 2009, Silva became chief of staff to his successor at …

United States: Main Street Lending Program, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

In March 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic caused slowdowns and disruptions to economic activity, businesses faced disruptions to their revenues and experienced increased demand for credit. Yet, as the pandemic worsened the economic outlook, banks tightened credit. Starting on March 17, the Federal Reserve rolled out several emergency programs aimed at capital markets. Most of these programs tended to benefit relatively large companies. On March 23, the Fed said it would introduce a program targeting small and mid-sized companies. On April 9, 2020, the Federal Reserve announced its first design iteration of the novel Main Street Lending Program (MSLP). The …

Lessons Learned: Scott G. Alvarez, Esq., Part 2, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

Scott G. Alvarez was general counsel of the Federal Reserve Board during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). He met with the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) to discuss a litany of legal aspects related to the Fed’s interventions under its emergency liquidity provision authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. We summarize some highlights from our interview with Mr. Alvarez. The transcript of this interview, conducted in April 2022, and one from an earlier Lessons Learned interview, in December 2018

United States: Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, the US Congress passed and funded the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) to help small businesses facing business disruptions keep workers on their payrolls and meet other expenses. The PPP, signed into law on March 27, 2020, provided a mechanism for authorized lenders to extend concessionary, forgivable loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (SBA). Lenders ultimately extended approximately $800 billion in PPP loans. The SBA distributed the funds when the loan either defaulted or met the law's terms for SBA forgiveness. To buttress lenders' ability to fund PPP loans, the Federal Reserve …

United States: Municipal Liquidity Facility, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

In March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic caused severe financial stress for state and local municipalities. Municipalities' public health responses led to material increases in expenditures. At the same time, many municipalities faced revenue delays and declines due to extended tax deadlines and disruptions in taxable economic activity. Institutional investors also put heavy selling pressure on municipal bonds. In response to stresses in the municipal financing market, the Federal Reserve invoked its Section 13(3) emergency lending authority and created the Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF). The Fed created the facility to backstop municipal entities' access to capital markets to help them manage …

United States: Primary Dealer Credit Facility, Carey K. Mott

Journal of Financial Crises

In March 2020, the uncertain outlook for the United States in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic prompted extremely high demand for cash and near-cash assets. Amid intense selling pressure from investors, securities dealers were unable to fully absorb the high volume of trade orders into their inventory due to balance sheet capacity and funding constraints. As dealer capacity declined and demand for liquidity continued rising, volatility spread to the critical and normally highly liquid market for US Treasury securities, prompting the Federal Reserve to increase open market operations (March 12) and begin historically large purchases of US Treasuries (March …

United States: Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, Carey K. Mott, Mallory Dreyer

Journal of Financial Crises

At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, prime and tax-exempt money market funds (MMFs) faced increased demands for redemption. Meeting redemptions required MMFs to sell assets into increasingly illiquid markets. Using the emergency authority outlined in Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve established the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF), a facility similar in structure and purpose to a program that the Fed implemented in 2008 amidst the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The MMLF extended nonrecourse loans to banks and their affiliates for the purchase from some …

United States: Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility Ii, Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 caused widespread economic uncertainty, prompting government officials to act swiftly to combat potentially severe fallout. On March 23, 2020, the Federal Reserve announced a series of monetary policy measures and established several emergency lending facilities to assist the US economy. Among these, the Fed revived the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), a Global Financial Crisis (GFC)-era facility that used a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to encourage the issuance of asset-backed securities (ABS). Its main purpose was to restore the flow of credit to households and businesses. TALF II made $100 …

United States: Commercial Paper Funding Facility Ii, Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 caused widespread economic uncertainty, prompting government officials to act swiftly to combat potentially severe fallout. On March 17, 2020, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve announced the revival of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), a program that the government had utilized during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) to provide a liquidity backstop to domestic issuers of commercial paper (CP). As with the first iteration of the program, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) funded a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to purchase highly rated, US dollar-denominated CP, …

United States: Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility And Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility, Natalie Leonard

Journal of Financial Crises

The COVID-19 pandemic reached a critical stage in early 2020 causing severe distress and disruption in financial markets, and the United States government declared a federal state of emergency in the second week of March. As institutional investors including mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies withdrew from corporate bond markets and funding options for large US businesses dried up, the Federal Reserve became concerned that solvent businesses might have difficulty financing their operations. On March 23, the Federal Reserve Board invoked Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, creating two novel emergency lending facilities to support the corporate bond …

United Kingdom: Covid Corporate Financing Facility, Adam Kulam

Journal of Financial Crises

During the COVID-19 crisis, sterling-denominated money markets froze, and otherwise-healthy companies were shut out of short-term, wholesale funding markets. To unfreeze these markets, the UK government announced a series of corporate funding measures. One of the measures was the Covid Corporate Financing Facility (CCFF), which enabled the Bank of England (BoE), acting on behalf of Her Majesty's Treasury's, to purchase commercial paper (CP) on primary and secondary markets from eligible dealers. The purpose of the CCFF was to provide stopgap wholesale funding to large, financially healthy firms while preserving British banks' capacity to serve small and medium-sized companies. Under the …

United Kingdom: Asset Purchase Facility, Adam Kulam

Journal of Financial Crises

The global outbreak of COVID-19 spurred investors to sell the British gilt in a synchronized fashion, which caused dysfunction in primary and secondary gilt markets. Yield spreads spiked, and primary dealers temporarily stepped back from dealing in gilts during a trading session on March 19, 2020. Liquidity premia were also high in non-gilt, fixed-income markets. That same day, the Bank of England (BoE) announced GBP 200 billion (USD 234 billion) of asset purchases through the Asset Purchase Facility (APF) to preserve liquidity in both gilt and corporate bond markets as part of larger efforts to prevent an undesirable tightening of …

Thailand: Bond Stabilization Fund, Corey N. Runkel

Journal of Financial Crises

Early in the COVID-19 crisis, non-financial businesses grew concerned that they would be unable to roll over their maturing bonds. To calm corporate debt markets, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) announced the Bond Stabilization Fund (BSF) on March 22, 2020. The BSF planned to purchase newly issued commercial paper from viable companies that could not roll over their maturing bonds. However, the program was not used. The BOT, seeking to avoid public criticism for directly supporting large corporations, imposed restrictions that made the program less attractive to borrowers. The main deterrent to participation was the requirement that borrowers must have …

Sweden: Corporate Bond Purchases, Carey K. Mott

Journal of Financial Crises

In the spring of 2020, corporate revenues in Sweden felt the direct effects of the coronavirus pandemic and the resulting public health measures. With future cash flows in question, many investors sold corporate debt for safe assets. Sweden's corporate bond market-particularly vulnerable to stress due to its heterogeneity, fragmentation, and lack of transparency-saw diminished liquidity. On March 19, 2020, the Sveriges Riksbank (Riksbank) announced it would purchase commercial paper and corporate bonds as part of a much larger bond-buying scheme, announced three days earlier, that included Swedish government, municipal, and covered bonds. It authorized the program under Chapter 6, Article …

South Korea: Corporate Liquidity Support Organization, Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

The spread of the COVID-19 pandemic in the early months of 2020 strained liquidity in short-term corporate funding markets around the world. In response, the Korean government enacted a variety of direct and indirect measures to promote the smooth flow of credit to households and businesses. Most of these measures focused on highly rated companies. Recognizing the need to extend assistance to lower-rated issuers, the Bank of Korea (BoK) invoked its authority under Article 80 of the Bank of Korea Act to establish and fund the Corporate Liquidity Support Organization, Co., Ltd., a special-purpose vehicle (SPV) authorized to purchase up …

Sweden: Commercial Paper Purchases, Carey K. Mott

Journal of Financial Crises

In March 2020, governments took measures to curb the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic that significantly impacted corporate revenues. The uncertainty surrounding the pandemic drove investors out of corporate securities and into safe assets, complicating the ability of Swedish nonfinancial corporations to finance their operations. As the volume of commercial paper issuance dropped, the Sveriges Riksbank (Riksbank) announced on March 19, 2020, it would purchase commercial paper and corporate bonds as part of a much larger bond-buying scheme that included Swedish government, municipal, and covered bonds. It authorized the program under Chapter 6, Article 5 of the Sveriges Riksbank Act. …

Israel: Corporate Bond Purchase Program, Natalie Leonard

Journal of Financial Crises

By March 2020, the quickly spreading novel coronavirus began disrupting business activity and industry, generating uncertainty throughout the global economy. As financial panic spread, Israeli investors fled to liquidity, impacting equities, corporate bonds, and even Israeli treasury securities. As short-term horizon mutual funds experienced high withdrawals in the first few weeks of March, they were forced to sell corporate bonds. This increase in supply pushed corporate bond prices down, and yields spiked. Between March and May, domestic rating agencies downgraded 23 companies (12% of all rated companies), and by July 2020, yields remained in the double-digits for 23% of corporate …