Modulation Of Behavior In Communicating Emotion,
2016
Brown University
Modulation Of Behavior In Communicating Emotion, Martin Gardiner
Animal Sentience
King discusses many examples where two animals, as they bond, behave in ways we interpret as expressing love for one another. If one of the bonded animals then dies, signs of loving are replaced by signs we interpret as expressing grief by the animal who remains. I propose a pathway for emotional communication between an animal and an observer that can have a central role in these and other observations by King and in our overall ability to interpret observed behavior in relation to emotion. This pathway provides evidence of emotion in an observed animal by communicating evidence of emotion’s …
Leaving The Door Open For Fish Pain: Evolutionary Convergence And The Utility Of ‘Just-So Stories’,
2016
University of San Diego
Leaving The Door Open For Fish Pain: Evolutionary Convergence And The Utility Of ‘Just-So Stories’, David B. Edelman
Animal Sentience
Key argues that fish do not experience pain because they lack the necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) brain structures and associated functional circuitry to engender such conscious percepts. I propose that fish pain may be dependent on neuroanatomical regions and pathways that are structurally and/or functionally analogous — but not strictly homologous — to well-characterized mammalian substrates of pain. An example is the convergent appearance of the complex, single-compartment eye across invertebrate and vertebrate phylogeny. Structural-functional convergence is ubiquitous in evolution. Comparative inferences and correlative lines of evidence play an important role in building evolutionary arguments. The dismissal of the …
Spinning Our Wheels And Deepening The Divide: Call For An Evidence-Based Approach To The Fish Pain Debate,
2016
Carleton University
Spinning Our Wheels And Deepening The Divide: Call For An Evidence-Based Approach To The Fish Pain Debate, Steven J. Cooke
Animal Sentience
There is vigorous ongoing debate about whether fish feel pain and have the capacity to suffer. The body of literature dedicated to the topic is increasing but what is particularly problematic is that the majority of the contributions represent opinion pieces and thus fall within the realm of advocacy. Many of the empirical research papers purporting that fish do or do not feel pain have problems with cavalier use of definitions, poor experimental design, or statistical/technical issues and tend to include advocacy statements in their interpretations. Rather than continuing to spin our wheels and deepen the divide, I would advocate …
How Welfare Biology And Commonsense May Help To Reduce Animal Suffering,
2016
Nanyang Technological University
How Welfare Biology And Commonsense May Help To Reduce Animal Suffering, Yew-Kwang Ng
Animal Sentience
Welfare biology is the study of the welfare of living things. Welfare is net happiness (enjoyment minus suffering). Since this necessarily involves feelings, Dawkins (2014) has suggested that animal welfare science may face a paradox, because feelings are very difficult to study. The following paper provides an explanation for how welfare biology could help to reduce this paradox by answering some difficult questions regarding animal welfare. Simple means based on commonsense could reduce animal suffering enormously at low or even negative costs to humans. Ways to increase the influence of animal welfare advocates are also discussed, focusing initially on farmed …
End-State Welfarism,
2016
University of New Haven
End-State Welfarism, Joel Marks
Animal Sentience
Yew-Kwang Ng’s research is the work of an obviously sincere, intelligent, and conscientious animal advocate. But I am unable to accept his starting assumption that animal welfare is an appropriate basis for animal ethics. More specifically I argue that animal welfare as a means to animal liberation is an issue that can be debated, but animal welfare as the ultimate end or goal of animal advocacy is misguided.
Animal Suffering Calls For More Than A Bigger Cage,
2016
Independent researcher
Animal Suffering Calls For More Than A Bigger Cage, Simon R. B. Leadbeater
Animal Sentience
Ng (2016) argues for incremental welfare biology partly because it would be impossible to demonstrate conclusively that animals are sentient. He argues that low cost changes in industrial practices and working collaboratively may be more effective in advancing animal welfare than more adversarial approaches. There is merit in some of Ng’s recommendations but a number of his arguments are, in my view, misdirected. The fact that nonhuman animals feel has already been adequately demonstrated. Cruelty to animals is intrinsic to some industries, so the only way to oppose it is to oppose the industry.
Antithetical Commentaries On X, Y And The Disruption Of Being,
2016
Virginia Commonwealth University
Antithetical Commentaries On X, Y And The Disruption Of Being, Eva Rocha
Theses and Dissertations
Through discursive essays and poetic narrative, Antithetical Commentaries on X, Y and the Disruption of Being explores the tenuous relationship between modes of measurement and the struggle for human relevance in the post-contemporary digital age. In the introductory essay, “Not the Feather, but the Bird”, I give an overview of the inherent problems of object-oriented ontology, and how it relates to aesthetics and social issues of our times. In the Developmental Overview, I detail how I developed my installation approach and techniques, particularly with regard to the three-way dynamic of the artist:work:viewer relationship and how it can encourage …
Considering Animals’ Feelings: Précis Of Sentience And Animal Welfare (Broom 2014),
2016
University of Cambridge
Considering Animals’ Feelings: Précis Of Sentience And Animal Welfare (Broom 2014), Donald M. Broom
Animal Sentience
The concept of sentience concerns the capacity to have feelings. There is evidence for sophisticated cognitive concepts and for both positive and negative feelings in a wide range of nonhuman animals. All vertebrates, including fish, as well as some molluscs and decapod crustaceans have pain systems. Most people today consider that their moral obligations extend to many animal species. Moral decisions about abortion, euthanasia, and the various ways we protect animals should take into account the research findings about sentience. In addition, all animal life should be respected and studies of the welfare of even the simplest invertebrate animals should …
Sentience And Animal Welfare: Affirming The Science And Addressing The Skepticism,
2016
World Animal Protection
Sentience And Animal Welfare: Affirming The Science And Addressing The Skepticism, Nancy Clarke
Animal Sentience
Broom’s (2014) book is a well-researched and thoroughly written exploration and evaluation of the journey from the origins of animal welfare science to what we can say we now know and need to consider in relation to animal sentience and welfare. This book will help to counter any skepticism among academics and policy makers.
Is Sentience Only A Nonessential Component Of Animal Welfare?,
2016
[email protected]
Is Sentience Only A Nonessential Component Of Animal Welfare?, Ian J.H. Duncan
Animal Sentience
According to Broom (2014), animal welfare is a concept that can be applied to all animals, including single-celled organisms that are obviously not sentient. Such a stance makes it difficult to draw a connection between welfare and sentience, and that is the book’s downfall. Some excellent points are made about sentience and there are very good discussions on animal welfare. However, unless sentience is considered the essential component of welfare, any attempt to link the two phenomena will be unsuccessful — and that, indeed, is the case with this book.
Sentience And Animal Welfare: New Thoughts And Controversies,
2016
University of Cambridge
Sentience And Animal Welfare: New Thoughts And Controversies, Donald M. Broom
Animal Sentience
Sentience involves having some degree of awareness but awareness of self is not as complex as some people believe. Fully functioning vertebrate animals, and some invertebrates, are sentient but neither humans nor non-humans are sentient early in development or if brain-damaged. Feelings are valuable adaptive mechanisms and an important part of welfare but are not all of welfare so the term welfare refers to all animals, not just to sentient animals. We have much to learn about what non-human animals want from us, the functioning of the more complex aspects of their brains and of our brains and how we …
Pain And Fish Welfare,
2016
Universidade Estadual Paulista – UNESP (São Paulo, Brazil)
Pain And Fish Welfare, Eliane Gonçalves-De-Freitas
Animal Sentience
The evolutionary approach of Key’s (2016) target article, generically comparing humans with fish of all kinds, is simplistic. The author ignores published research on structural and molecular aspects of pain in fish. The target article reads more like a selective polemic against fish welfare than an even-handed analysis.
Brain Processes For “Good” And “Bad” Feelings: How Far Back In Evolution?,
2016
University of Washington
Brain Processes For “Good” And “Bad” Feelings: How Far Back In Evolution?, Jaak Panksepp
Animal Sentience
The question of whether fish can experience pain or any other feelings can only be resolved by neurobiologically targeted experiments. This commentary summarizes why this is essential for resolving scientific debates about consciousness in other animals, and offers specific experiments that need to be done: (i) those that evaluate the rewarding and punishing effects of specific brain regions and systems (for instance, with deep-brain stimulation); (ii) those that evaluate the capacity of animals to regulate their affective states; and (iii) those that have direct implications for human affective feelings, with specific predictions — for instance, the development of new treatments …
Archival Enactment, Retelling 'The Big Book': Alison Knowles, Something Else Press And Fluxus,
2015
CUNY Hunter College
Archival Enactment, Retelling 'The Big Book': Alison Knowles, Something Else Press And Fluxus, Meghan A. Dellacrosse
Theses and Dissertations
"Archival Enactment, Retelling 'The Big Book': Alison Knowles, Something Else Press and Fluxus," positions Knowles’ Big Book (1966) as a case study of historical methodology and interdisciplinary artistic practice in the post-war period. This comprehensive analysis of Big Book, a work of art no longer extant, contextualizes its publisher, Something Else Press through Dick Higgins’ concept of “intermedia,” and important lesser-known junctures relevant to Fluxus and the group’s leader George Maciunas are illuminated. Knowles' early and lesser-known silkscreen paintings are also examined.
Vol 7 No 1 Contents Page,
2015
San Jose State University
Vol 7 No 1 Information Page,
2015
San Jose State University
Vol 7 No 1 Cover Page,
2015
San Jose State University
When Is It Mental?,
2015
Butler University
When Is It Mental?, Stuart Glennan
Scholarship and Professional Work - LAS
Most philosophical debate over mental causation has been concerned with reconciling commonsense intuitions that there are causal interactions between the mental and the physical with philosophical theories of the nature of the mental that seem to suggest otherwise. My concern is with a different and more practical problem. We often confront some cognitive, affective, or bodily phenomenon, and wonder about its source – its etiology or its underlying causal basis. For instance, you might wonder whether your queasiness due to something you ate, or whether it is just nervousness, or whether your aunt’s memory loss is a neurological problem or …
Do Predictive Brain Implants Threaten Patient Autonomy Or Authenticity?,
2015
CUNY Borough of Manhattan Community College
Do Predictive Brain Implants Threaten Patient Autonomy Or Authenticity?, Eldar Sarajlic
Publications and Research
In this commentary, I discuss this Frederic Gilbert's claim that predictive brain implants (PBIs) threaten persons’ autonomy by diminishing their postoperative experience of self-control. Contrary to Gilbert, I suggest that PBIs do not pose a significant threat to patient’s autonomy, as self-control, but rather to his or her sense of authenticity. My claim is that the language of authenticity, already introduced in the recent bioethical literature, may offer a better way to voice some of the concerns with PBIs that Gilbert recognized.
Rewiring The Brain For Happiness: The Neuroscience Of Happiness, Part 2,
2015
Calvin College
Rewiring The Brain For Happiness: The Neuroscience Of Happiness, Part 2, Kevin Corcoran
University Faculty Publications and Creative Works
No abstract provided.
