Transformative Experience: Are Real-World Experiences As Transformative As We Think?,
2016
Claremont McKenna College
Transformative Experience: Are Real-World Experiences As Transformative As We Think?, Janelle Shiozaki
CMC Senior Theses
This thesis analyzes L.A. Paul’s concept of transformative experience. It specifically analyzes Paul’s criteria for transformative experiences (TEs), which are experiences that are so epistemically (ET) and personally transformative (PT) that an agent can’t know what it’s like to have a TE until having the experience itself. Paul argues that the transformative nature of these experiences prevent us from being able to make a rational choice using our normative way of decision-making. According to Paul, this is especially problematic because some of life’s biggest choices involve TEs. I begin with an overview of Paul’s main thought experiments that illustrate the …
The Numerous Forms Of Occam’S Razor And Their Effect On Philosophy Of Mind,
2016
Claremont McKenna College
The Numerous Forms Of Occam’S Razor And Their Effect On Philosophy Of Mind, Mikayla L. O'Neal
CMC Senior Theses
In the first chapter of this paper I focus on the general overview of Occam's Razor, and develop several interpretations and adaptations of Occam's Razor as a principle of simplicity. In the second chapter I apply these different interpretations in the Physicalism/Dualism debate, and critically assess the validity of these implementations of Occam's Razor in philosophy of mind. In the final chapter I give an overview of my discussion thus far, and make assertions about what my paper means for the usage of Occam's Razor's as a whole.
Intellectual Virtues And The Epistemic Evaluation Of Disagreement,
2016
University of Northern Iowa
Intellectual Virtues And The Epistemic Evaluation Of Disagreement, Hansen Garlington Breitling
Honors Program Theses
This paper will argue that a proper evaluation of the epistemic status of another person in relation to oneself presupposes the possession of the relevant subset of intellectual virtues, referred to as “p-virtues” throughout the rest of the work. A summation of the claim I am making is as follows: If person S believes the claim P and S believes that another person, S1, believes the claim not- P, S knows (or has a justified belief about) the evidential value they have to accord to S1's disagreement "only if" S has p-virtues.
Punk Philosophy As A Path To The Summits Of Ethos,
2016
Chapman University
Punk Philosophy As A Path To The Summits Of Ethos, Vuk Uskoković
Pharmacy Faculty Articles and Research
Elaborated in this discourse is the idea that identifying with a punk persona is a necessary step in the ethical development of an individual. Offered are various ethical corollaries of standing on the punk philosophic grounds, including: (I) abomination of the art of following, (II) appreciation of creative aspirations more than the technique, (III) the necessity for the constant shift of the epistemic grounds on which one stands, (IV) revival of the aesthetics of Speer’s theory of ruin values, (V) revitalization of language via its destruction, and (VI) embracement of anarchic revulsion of the concept of authority as a pathway …
The Object Of Grief,
2016
Carnegie Mellon University
The Object Of Grief, Clark Glymour
Animal Sentience
King’s new book is a wonderful collection of diverse anecdotes illustrating the variety of animal practices that are convincing illustrations of grief. Those who want scientific arguments for that conclusion should, however, read elsewhere.
“If Apprehending Occurs, It Is Not The View” — Sakya Thinkers On The Madhyamaka View Of Freedom From Proliferations,
2016
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
“If Apprehending Occurs, It Is Not The View” — Sakya Thinkers On The Madhyamaka View Of Freedom From Proliferations, Yaroslav Komarovski
Department of Classics and Religious Studies: Faculty Publications
The Sakya thinkers whose views were addressed in this paper are consistently in agreement regarding what freedom from proliferations is, how it is utilized in contemplative practice, and how it is located within the broader universe of non-tantric and tantric Buddhism. Freedom from proliferations is not an object, and transcends all categories of existence, nonexistence, etc. Consequently, it cannot be approached and described in the same way we understand and describe colors, tastes, ideas, etc. Yet, it is also not a nonexistent thing similar to rabbit horns and other types of falsely imagined phenomena. It can be realized, but only …
Mediating Claims Through Critical Anthropomorphism,
2016
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Mediating Claims Through Critical Anthropomorphism, Gordon Burghardt
Animal Sentience
Key’s (2016) discussion of his claim that fish do not feel pain ignores the history of attempts to study the attribution of mental states to other species. Although willing to accept that mammals feel pain, Key claims that fish lack the mammalian neural mechanisms underlying pain and are unconscious of their experiences. Consequently, we do not need to be overly concerned about fishing practices that would otherwise be viewed as painful. Key uses a flawed anthropomorphic lens. All attributions of mental events to organisms other than oneself involve inferences derived from anthropomorphic processes through which we process physiological and behavioral …
Pain And Other Feelings In Humans And Animals,
2016
University of Southern California
Pain And Other Feelings In Humans And Animals, Antonio Damasio, Hanna Damasio
Animal Sentience
Evidence from neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, and neuropsychology suggests that the experience of feelings in humans does not depend exclusively on structures of the cerebral cortex. It does not seem warranted to deny the possibility of feeling in animals on the grounds that their cerebral cortices are not comparable to those of humans.
Where Is Pain In The Brain?,
2016
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Where Is Pain In The Brain?, Marshall Devor
Animal Sentience
Key argues that fish cannot experience pain based on (1) brain imaging in humans, (2) consequences of lesions and (3) direct brain stimulation. Imaging indeed shows that pain-relevant signals reach the cortex, but not that they underlie the subjective experience of pain. Lesions and stimulation data are more to the point, but Key paints an idiosyncratic and misleading picture of their effects. S1 and S2 ablation does not eliminate evoked or spontaneous pain, although there may be up- or down-modulation. Likewise, stimulation of pain-associated cortical areas rarely induces pain, and pain almost never occurs at the onset of epileptic seizures. …
Fish Pain: Would It Change Current Best Practice In The Real World?,
2016
DigsFish Services Pty Ltd
Fish Pain: Would It Change Current Best Practice In The Real World?, B. K. Diggles
Animal Sentience
Much of the “fish pain debate” relates to how high the bar for pain should be set. The close phylogenetic affinities of teleosts with cartilaginous fishes which appear to lack nociceptors suggests caution should be applied by those who seek to lower the bar, especially given the equivocal and conflicting nature of the experimental data currently available for teleosts. Nevertheless, even if we assume fish “feel pain,” it is difficult to see how current best practice in aquaculture would change. This is because of the need to avoid stress at all stages of the rearing process to optimize health, growth …
Falsifying The Null Hypothesis That “Fish Do Not Feel Pain",
2016
WellBeing International
Falsifying The Null Hypothesis That “Fish Do Not Feel Pain", Brian Key
Animal Sentience
The reader of Animal Sentience may surmise that because the weight of the commentaries on my target article, “Why fish do not feel pain,” is leaning towards not supporting my argument, it follows that the premise "fish do not feel pain" is incorrect. However, science does not prevail by popular opinion. History is plagued with numerous (and often widely accepted) examples of biological phenomena being explained by mysterious forces. In the absence of a mechanistic understanding, the many different guises of vitalism (the principle that life involves a vital energy) are often invoked to explain the unknown. Spurious …
A Single Strand Of Argument With Unfounded Conclusion,
2016
Queen’s University, Belfast
A Single Strand Of Argument With Unfounded Conclusion, Robert W. Elwood
Animal Sentience
Key (2016) describes the neural system involved in human pain experience in an excellent fashion but then suggests that only that complete system can generate the experience of pain. Thus animals without all components will not feel pain. This argument has been refuted in the past by analogy to vision where it is clear that a broad range of taxa, vertebrate and invertebrate, have good visual abilities albeit with completely different central nervous systems and receptors. This known counterargument to Key’s main idea is not mentioned in the target article. Further criteria that might indicate pain and studies examining these …
The Transition From The Psychical To The Psychological: An Examination Of William James’ Influence On Henry James’ “The Turn Of The Screw”,
2016
VCU Student
The Transition From The Psychical To The Psychological: An Examination Of William James’ Influence On Henry James’ “The Turn Of The Screw”, Harry A. Jones Iv
Theses and Dissertations
This thesis will show that, in its original form, “The Turn of the Screw” acted as a monument to the intellectual unity shared between Henry James and his brother William. Through evaluating James’ biography, memoirs, and letters with William, this thesis will illustrate the subtle collaborative inspirations that initially helped James write the first twelve-part serial edition of “The Turn of the Screw” for Collier’s Weekly, which ran from January 27, 1898 until April 16, 1898. I will also demonstrate the effect of William’s philosophy and his death on the revisions James’ made to his story as published in the …
Pain In Parallel,
2016
CUNY Graduate Center & University of Sydney
Pain In Parallel, Peter Godfrey-Smith
Animal Sentience
Key's (2016) arguments against the view that fish feel pain can be shown to be fallacious by considering some damage-related behaviors in invertebrates. Pain may have different neural bases in different organisms, so the absence in fish of the cortical structures that might underlie pain in mammals does not settle the question of fish pain.
Nonverbal Indicators Of Pain,
2016
University of Tasmania
Nonverbal Indicators Of Pain, Simon Van Rysewyk
Animal Sentience
In discussing fish pain, Key (2016) privileges pain in humans — “the only species able to directly report on its feelings.” Human experience of pain is not necessarily best reflected by verbal self-report, however. Neural responses to noxious stimuli are influenced by individual differences and by context. Nonverbal pain displays such as facial expressions reflect part of the neural response to noxious stimuli. Most mammals have a specific facial grimace reflecting pain. If fish have a somatic expression of pain, the development of a reliable and accurate somatic pain scale specific to fish could make a contribution to the debate …
Animal Sentience: The Other-Minds Problem,
2016
Université du Québec à Montréal & University of Southampton
Animal Sentience: The Other-Minds Problem, Stevan Harnad
Animal Sentience
The only feelings we can feel are our own. When it comes to the feelings of others, we can only infer them, based on their behavior — unless they tell us. This is the “other-minds problem.” Within our own species, thanks to language, this problem arises only for states in which people cannot speak (infancy, aphasia, sleep, anaesthesia, coma). Our species also has a uniquely powerful empathic or “mind-reading” capacity: We can (sometimes) perceive from the behavior of others when they are in states like our own. Our inferences have also been systematized and operationalized in biobehavioral science …
Why Fish Do Not Feel Pain,
2016
The University of Queensland
Why Fish Do Not Feel Pain, Brian Key
Animal Sentience
Only humans can report feeling pain. In contrast, pain in animals is typically inferred on the basis of nonverbal behaviour. Unfortunately, these behavioural data can be problematic when the reliability and validity of the behavioural tests are questionable. The thesis proposed here is based on the bioengineering principle that structure determines function. Basic functional homologies can be mapped to structural homologies across a broad spectrum of vertebrate species. For example, olfaction depends on olfactory glomeruli in the olfactory bulbs of the forebrain, visual orientation responses depend on the laminated optic tectum in the midbrain, and locomotion depends on pattern generators …
Cognitive Evidence Of Fish Sentience,
2016
Humane Society Institute for Science and Policy
Cognitive Evidence Of Fish Sentience, Jonathan Balcombe
Animal Sentience
I present a little-known example of flexible, opportunistic behavior by a species of fish to undermine Key’s (2016) thesis that fish are unconscious and unable to feel. Lack of a cortex is flimsy grounds for denying pain to fish, for on that criterion we must also then deny it to all non-mammals, including birds, which goes against scientific consensus. Notwithstanding science’s fundamental inability to prove anything, the precautionary principal dictates that we should give the benefit of the doubt to fish, and the state of the oceans dictates that we act on it now.
Why Human Pain Can’T Tell Us Whether Fish Feel Pain,
2016
The Pennsylvania State University
Why Human Pain Can’T Tell Us Whether Fish Feel Pain, Victoria A. Braithwaite, Paula Droege
Animal Sentience
In his target article, Key (2016) reviews the neuroanatomy of human pain and uses what is known about human pain to argue that fish cannot experience pain. We provide three reasons why the conclusions reached by Key are unsupported. They consider (i) why it is not sufficient to conclude that only human neural structures can process conscious pain, (ii) why an understanding of pain in humans and non-human animals needs to be based within a framework of consciousness, and (iii) evidence already exists that fish treated with noxious stimuli lose the ability to perform normal behaviours: This was a behavioral …
No Evidence That Pain Is Painful Neural Process,
2016
IULM University
No Evidence That Pain Is Painful Neural Process, Riccardo Manzotti
Animal Sentience
Key (2016) claims that fish do not feel pain because they lack the neural structures that have a contingent causal role in generating and feeling pain in mammals. I counterargue that no conclusive evidence supports the sufficiency of any mammalian neural structure to produce pain. We cannot move from contingent necessity in mammals to necessity in every organism.
