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Process And Mind: Exploring The Relationship Between Process Philosophy And The Nonlinear Dynamical Systems Science Of Cognition, Larry A. Moralez 2016 University of Central Florida

Process And Mind: Exploring The Relationship Between Process Philosophy And The Nonlinear Dynamical Systems Science Of Cognition, Larry A. Moralez

Honors Undergraduate Theses

This work examines the relationship between Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy and the nonlinear dynamical systems framework for studying cognition. I argue that the nonlinear dynamical systems approach to cognitive science presupposes many key elements of his process philosophy. The process philosophical interpretation of nature posits events and the dynamic relations between events as the fundamental substrate of reality, as opposed to static physical substances. I present a brief history of the development of substance thought before describing Whitehead’s characterization of nature as a process. In following, I will examine the both the computational and nonlinear dynamical systems frameworks for …


A Single Strand Of Argument With Unfounded Conclusion, Robert W. Elwood 2016 Queen’s University, Belfast

A Single Strand Of Argument With Unfounded Conclusion, Robert W. Elwood

Animal Sentience

Key (2016) describes the neural system involved in human pain experience in an excellent fashion but then suggests that only that complete system can generate the experience of pain. Thus animals without all components will not feel pain. This argument has been refuted in the past by analogy to vision where it is clear that a broad range of taxa, vertebrate and invertebrate, have good visual abilities albeit with completely different central nervous systems and receptors. This known counterargument to Key’s main idea is not mentioned in the target article. Further criteria that might indicate pain and studies examining these …


Cortex Necessary For Pain — But Not In Sense That Matters, Adam J. Shriver 2016 University of Pennsylvania

Cortex Necessary For Pain — But Not In Sense That Matters, Adam J. Shriver

Animal Sentience

Certain cortical regions are necessary for pain in humans in the sense that, at particular times, they play a direct role in pain. However, it is not true that they are necessary in the more important sense that pain is never possible in humans without them. There are additional details from human lesion studies concerning functional plasticity that undermine Key’s (2016) interpretation. Moreover, no one has yet identified any specific behaviors that mammalian cortical pain regions make possible that are absent in fish.


Transformative Experience: Are Real-World Experiences As Transformative As We Think?, Janelle Shiozaki 2016 Claremont McKenna College

Transformative Experience: Are Real-World Experiences As Transformative As We Think?, Janelle Shiozaki

CMC Senior Theses

This thesis analyzes L.A. Paul’s concept of transformative experience. It specifically analyzes Paul’s criteria for transformative experiences (TEs), which are experiences that are so epistemically (ET) and personally transformative (PT) that an agent can’t know what it’s like to have a TE until having the experience itself. Paul argues that the transformative nature of these experiences prevent us from being able to make a rational choice using our normative way of decision-making. According to Paul, this is especially problematic because some of life’s biggest choices involve TEs. I begin with an overview of Paul’s main thought experiments that illustrate the …


The Numerous Forms Of Occam’S Razor And Their Effect On Philosophy Of Mind, Mikayla L. O'Neal 2016 Claremont McKenna College

The Numerous Forms Of Occam’S Razor And Their Effect On Philosophy Of Mind, Mikayla L. O'Neal

CMC Senior Theses

In the first chapter of this paper I focus on the general overview of Occam's Razor, and develop several interpretations and adaptations of Occam's Razor as a principle of simplicity. In the second chapter I apply these different interpretations in the Physicalism/Dualism debate, and critically assess the validity of these implementations of Occam's Razor in philosophy of mind. In the final chapter I give an overview of my discussion thus far, and make assertions about what my paper means for the usage of Occam's Razor's as a whole.


Intellectual Virtues And The Epistemic Evaluation Of Disagreement, Hansen Garlington Breitling 2016 University of Northern Iowa

Intellectual Virtues And The Epistemic Evaluation Of Disagreement, Hansen Garlington Breitling

Honors Program Theses

This paper will argue that a proper evaluation of the epistemic status of another person in relation to oneself presupposes the possession of the relevant subset of intellectual virtues, referred to as “p-virtues” throughout the rest of the work. A summation of the claim I am making is as follows: If person S believes the claim P and S believes that another person, S1, believes the claim not- P, S knows (or has a justified belief about) the evidential value they have to accord to S1's disagreement "only if" S has p-virtues.


Punk Philosophy As A Path To The Summits Of Ethos, Vuk Uskoković 2016 Chapman University

Punk Philosophy As A Path To The Summits Of Ethos, Vuk Uskoković

Pharmacy Faculty Articles and Research

Elaborated in this discourse is the idea that identifying with a punk persona is a necessary step in the ethical development of an individual. Offered are various ethical corollaries of standing on the punk philosophic grounds, including: (I) abomination of the art of following, (II) appreciation of creative aspirations more than the technique, (III) the necessity for the constant shift of the epistemic grounds on which one stands, (IV) revival of the aesthetics of Speer’s theory of ruin values, (V) revitalization of language via its destruction, and (VI) embracement of anarchic revulsion of the concept of authority as a pathway …


Antithetical Commentaries On X, Y And The Disruption Of Being, Eva Rocha 2016 Virginia Commonwealth University

Antithetical Commentaries On X, Y And The Disruption Of Being, Eva Rocha

Theses and Dissertations

Through discursive essays and poetic narrative, Antithetical Commentaries on X, Y and the Disruption of Being explores the tenuous relationship between modes of measurement and the struggle for human relevance in the post-contemporary digital age. In the introductory essay, “Not the Feather, but the Bird”, I give an overview of the inherent problems of object-oriented ontology, and how it relates to aesthetics and social issues of our times. In the Developmental Overview, I detail how I developed my installation approach and techniques, particularly with regard to the three-way dynamic of the artist:work:viewer relationship and how it can encourage …


Mediating Claims Through Critical Anthropomorphism, Gordon Burghardt 2016 University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Mediating Claims Through Critical Anthropomorphism, Gordon Burghardt

Animal Sentience

Key’s (2016) discussion of his claim that fish do not feel pain ignores the history of attempts to study the attribution of mental states to other species. Although willing to accept that mammals feel pain, Key claims that fish lack the mammalian neural mechanisms underlying pain and are unconscious of their experiences. Consequently, we do not need to be overly concerned about fishing practices that would otherwise be viewed as painful. Key uses a flawed anthropomorphic lens. All attributions of mental events to organisms other than oneself involve inferences derived from anthropomorphic processes through which we process physiological and behavioral …


Pain And Other Feelings In Humans And Animals, Antonio Damasio, Hanna Damasio 2016 University of Southern California

Pain And Other Feelings In Humans And Animals, Antonio Damasio, Hanna Damasio

Animal Sentience

Evidence from neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, and neuropsychology suggests that the experience of feelings in humans does not depend exclusively on structures of the cerebral cortex. It does not seem warranted to deny the possibility of feeling in animals on the grounds that their cerebral cortices are not comparable to those of humans.


Where Is Pain In The Brain?, Marshall Devor 2016 The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Where Is Pain In The Brain?, Marshall Devor

Animal Sentience

Key argues that fish cannot experience pain based on (1) brain imaging in humans, (2) consequences of lesions and (3) direct brain stimulation. Imaging indeed shows that pain-relevant signals reach the cortex, but not that they underlie the subjective experience of pain. Lesions and stimulation data are more to the point, but Key paints an idiosyncratic and misleading picture of their effects. S1 and S2 ablation does not eliminate evoked or spontaneous pain, although there may be up- or down-modulation. Likewise, stimulation of pain-associated cortical areas rarely induces pain, and pain almost never occurs at the onset of epileptic seizures. …


Falsifying The Null Hypothesis That “Fish Do Not Feel Pain", Brian Key 2016 WellBeing International

Falsifying The Null Hypothesis That “Fish Do Not Feel Pain", Brian Key

Animal Sentience

The reader of Animal Sentience may surmise that because the weight of the commentaries on my target article, “Why fish do not feel pain,” is leaning towards not supporting my argument, it follows that the premise "fish do not feel pain" is incorrect. However, science does not prevail by popular opinion. History is plagued with numerous (and often widely accepted) examples of biological phenomena being explained by mysterious forces. In the absence of a mechanistic understanding, the many different guises of vitalism (the principle that life involves a vital energy) are often invoked to explain the unknown. Spurious …


The Transition From The Psychical To The Psychological: An Examination Of William James’ Influence On Henry James’ “The Turn Of The Screw”, Harry A. Jones IV 2016 VCU Student

The Transition From The Psychical To The Psychological: An Examination Of William James’ Influence On Henry James’ “The Turn Of The Screw”, Harry A. Jones Iv

Theses and Dissertations

This thesis will show that, in its original form, “The Turn of the Screw” acted as a monument to the intellectual unity shared between Henry James and his brother William. Through evaluating James’ biography, memoirs, and letters with William, this thesis will illustrate the subtle collaborative inspirations that initially helped James write the first twelve-part serial edition of “The Turn of the Screw” for Collier’s Weekly, which ran from January 27, 1898 until April 16, 1898. I will also demonstrate the effect of William’s philosophy and his death on the revisions James’ made to his story as published in the …


Pain In Parallel, Peter Godfrey-Smith 2016 CUNY Graduate Center & University of Sydney

Pain In Parallel, Peter Godfrey-Smith

Animal Sentience

Key's (2016) arguments against the view that fish feel pain can be shown to be fallacious by considering some damage-related behaviors in invertebrates. Pain may have different neural bases in different organisms, so the absence in fish of the cortical structures that might underlie pain in mammals does not settle the question of fish pain.


Nonverbal Indicators Of Pain, Simon Van Rysewyk 2016 University of Tasmania

Nonverbal Indicators Of Pain, Simon Van Rysewyk

Animal Sentience

In discussing fish pain, Key (2016) privileges pain in humans — “the only species able to directly report on its feelings.” Human experience of pain is not necessarily best reflected by verbal self-report, however. Neural responses to noxious stimuli are influenced by individual differences and by context. Nonverbal pain displays such as facial expressions reflect part of the neural response to noxious stimuli. Most mammals have a specific facial grimace reflecting pain. If fish have a somatic expression of pain, the development of a reliable and accurate somatic pain scale specific to fish could make a contribution to the debate …


Why Human Pain Can’T Tell Us Whether Fish Feel Pain, Victoria A. Braithwaite, Paula Droege 2016 The Pennsylvania State University

Why Human Pain Can’T Tell Us Whether Fish Feel Pain, Victoria A. Braithwaite, Paula Droege

Animal Sentience

In his target article, Key (2016) reviews the neuroanatomy of human pain and uses what is known about human pain to argue that fish cannot experience pain. We provide three reasons why the conclusions reached by Key are unsupported. They consider (i) why it is not sufficient to conclude that only human neural structures can process conscious pain, (ii) why an understanding of pain in humans and non-human animals needs to be based within a framework of consciousness, and (iii) evidence already exists that fish treated with noxious stimuli lose the ability to perform normal behaviours: This was a behavioral …


An Invertebrate Perspective On Pain, Jennifer A. Mather 2016 Psychology, University of Lethbridge

An Invertebrate Perspective On Pain, Jennifer A. Mather

Animal Sentience

Although Key (2016) argues that mammals feel pain and fish do not, from an invertebrate perspective, it is obvious that the pain experience is shared by animals from a number of different animal groups.


Pain In Fish: Weighing The Evidence, James D. Rose 2016 University of Wyoming

Pain In Fish: Weighing The Evidence, James D. Rose

Animal Sentience

The target article by Key (2016) examines whether fish have brain structures capable of mediating pain perception and consciousness, functions known to depend on the neocortex in humans. He concludes, as others have concluded (Rose 2002, 2007; Rose et al. 2014), that such functions are impossible for fish brains. This conclusion has been met with hypothetical assertions by others to the effect that functions of pain and consciousness may well be possible through unknown alternate neural processes. Key's argument would be bolstered by consideration of other neurological as well as behavioral evidence, which shows that sharks and ray are fishes …


Anthropomorphic Denial Of Fish Pain, Lynne U. Sneddon, Matthew C. Leach 2016 University of Liverpool

Anthropomorphic Denial Of Fish Pain, Lynne U. Sneddon, Matthew C. Leach

Animal Sentience

Key (2016) affirms that we do not know how the fish brain processes pain but denies — because fish lack a human-like cortex — that fish can feel pain. He affirms that birds, like fish, have a singly-laminated cortex and that the structure of the bird brain is quite different from that of the human brain, yet he does not deny that birds can feel pain. In this commentary we describe how Key cites studies that substantiate mammalian pain but discounts the same kind of data as evidence of fish pain. We suggest that Key's interpretations are illogical, do not …


Why Is Fish “Feeling” Pain Controversial?, E. Don Stevens 2016 [email protected]

Why Is Fish “Feeling” Pain Controversial?, E. Don Stevens

Animal Sentience

In his excellent target article, Key (2016) develops a mechanistic argument in an attempt to show why it is unlikely that fish can “feel” pain or for that matter, “feel” anything. The topic is controversial and likely to achieve the goal of getting many hits for the inaugural issue of the new journal, Animal Sentience. In my view, the question is unlikely to be answered, for two reasons. First, because the proponents of the “fish feel pain” controversy are untrained and unskilled in the details and jargon of neurophysiology and/or neuroanatomy, and the opponents of the controversy, like Key, …


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