Cultured Meat Could Prevent The Next Pandemic,
2020
University of Pennsylvania
Cultured Meat Could Prevent The Next Pandemic, Jonathan Anomaly
Animal Sentience
Wiebers & Feigin identify intensive agriculture and trade in exotic animals as the main sources of novel zoonotic viral infections. They recommend a transition away from meat. I would add that we would do well to invest in the mass production of cultured meat, derived from stem cells, as a radical alternative to animal agriculture.
Minds Without Spines: Evolutionarily Inclusive Animal Ethics,
2020
Rochester Institute of Technology
Minds Without Spines: Evolutionarily Inclusive Animal Ethics, Irina Mikhalevich, Russell Powell
Animal Sentience
Invertebrate animals are frequently lumped into a single category and denied welfare protections despite their considerable cognitive, behavioral, and evolutionary diversity. Some ethical and policy inroads have been made for cephalopod molluscs and crustaceans, but the vast majority of arthropods, including the insects, remain excluded from moral consideration. We argue that this exclusion is unwarranted given the existing evidence. Anachronistic readings of evolution, which view invertebrates as lower in the scala naturae, continue to influence public policy and common morality. The assumption that small brains are unlikely to support cognition or sentience likewise persists, despite growing evidence that arthropods …
Problems With Basing Insect Ethics On Individuals’ Welfare,
2020
Messerli Research Institute, University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna
Problems With Basing Insect Ethics On Individuals’ Welfare, Susana Monsó, Antonio J. Osuna-Mascaró
Animal Sentience
In their target article, Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) argue that we should extend moral protection to arthropods. In this commentary, we show that there are some unforeseen obstacles to applying the sort of individualistic welfare-based ethics that M&P have in mind to certain arthropods, namely, insects. These obstacles have to do with the fact that there are often many more individuals involved in our dealings with insects than our ethical theories anticipate, and also with the fact that, in some sense, some insects count as more than an individual and, in another sense, they sometimes count as less than an …
Sentience In Evolutionary Context,
2020
University of Idaho
Sentience In Evolutionary Context, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Animal Sentience
We appreciate the goals of Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) and largely agree with their conclusions but we differ on some of their definitions and terms. Affects (emotional feelings) should be part of sentience. Although the evidence presented for insect sentience is strong, we list some of the counterevidence that should be considered. Our own research supports M&P’s choice of arthropods, cephalopods, and vertebrates as the only sentient organisms with moral status.
Ethical Considerations For Invertebrates,
2020
Deakin University
Ethical Considerations For Invertebrates, Scarlett R. Howard, Matthew R.E. Symonds
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) have built on the discussion about which species deserve inclusion in animal ethics and welfare considerations. Here, we raise questions concerning the assessment criteria. We ask how to assess different species for their ability to fulfill the criteria, which criteria are most important, how we quantify them (absolute or on a continuum), and how non-animals such as fungi and plants fit into this paradigm.
Affective Sentience And Moral Protection,
2020
Boston University
Affective Sentience And Moral Protection, Russell Powell, Irina Mikhalevich
Animal Sentience
We have structured our response according to five questions arising from the commentaries: (i) What is sentience? (ii) Is sentience a necessary or sufficient condition for moral standing? (iii) What methods should guide comparative cognitive research in general, and specifically in studying invertebrates? (iv) How should we balance scientific uncertainty and moral risk? (v) What practical strategies can help reduce biases and morally dismissive attitudes toward invertebrates?
Does Sentience Come In Degrees?,
2020
Australian National University
Does Sentience Come In Degrees?, Andrew Y. Lee
Animal Sentience
This commentary is about whether sentience, or what philosophers call “phenomenal consciousness,” comes in degrees.
Relationship Between Cognition And Moral Status Needs Overhaul,
2020
University of Iowa
Relationship Between Cognition And Moral Status Needs Overhaul, Carrie Figdor
Animal Sentience
I commend Mikhalevich & Powell for extending the discussion of cognition and its relation to moral status with their well researched and argued target article on invertebrate cognition. I have two small criticisms: that the scala naturae still retains its appeal to some in biology as well as psychology, and that drawing the line at invertebrates requires a bit more defense given the larger comparative cognitive-scientific context.
No Room For Speciesism In Welfare Considerations,
2020
Oakland University
No Room For Speciesism In Welfare Considerations, Jennifer Vonk
Animal Sentience
Speciesism should play no role in determining welfare outcomes. Cognition may vary within species as well as between species, but broad classifications such as invertebrates are functionally meaningless in this context. Cognition should relate to welfare only to the extent that it relates to the capacity to suffer or to experience pleasure.
On The Possibility Of Invertebrate Sentience,
2020
George Washington University
On The Possibility Of Invertebrate Sentience, David Degrazia
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) set up the basic criteria for according moral status equitably, including the capacity for affect. They argue persuasively against assuming that all invertebrates are insentient and hence ineligible for moral consideration. In addition to the relatively clear case of cephalopods, various arthropods may prove to be sentient. We should be aware of various sources of prejudice that M&P discuss and not assume that it would be absurd to attribute sentience and moral status to certain invertebrates.
Whether Invertebrates Are Sentient Matters To Bioethics And Science Policy,
2020
East Tennessee State University
Whether Invertebrates Are Sentient Matters To Bioethics And Science Policy, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell provide convincing empirical evidence that at least some invertebrates are sentient and hence should be granted moral status. I agree and argue that functional markers should be the primary indicators of sentience. Neuroanatomical homologies provide only secondary evidence. Consensus regarding the validity of these functional markers will be difficult to achieve. To be effective in practice, functional markers of sentience will have to be tested and accepted species by species to overcome the implicit biases against extending moral status to invertebrates.
Radical Botany: Plants And Speculative Fiction [Table Of Contents],
2019
Fordham University
Radical Botany: Plants And Speculative Fiction [Table Of Contents], Natania Meeker, Antónia Szabari
Literature
No abstract provided.
On Unifying Declarative Memory,
2019
University of Missouri-St. Louis
On Unifying Declarative Memory, Thomas Ames
Theses
The distinction between episodic and semantic declarative memory systems, as introduced by Tulving (1972, updated in 1984, 1991), was a revolutionary approach to human memory. While the distinction is now widely endorsed in the study of memory, there are debates about what constitutes each system’s domain, how each system is used, how each system functions, and the phenomenal experiences associated with the functioning of each system. On the basis of clinical studies and insights from conditions affecting memory, this paper argues that the episodic/semantic distinction can be reframed as a result of a unified declarative memory system. In this view, …
A New Catechism For The Digital Age,
2019
Seattle Pacific University
A New Catechism For The Digital Age, Bruce D. Baker
SPU Works
Preaching and teaching in our digital age demands theological reflection to answer challenging questions raised by exponential technologies. Can an AI become conscious? Is AI intelligent, really? Can a robot sin? Can we program morality? Can we upload our minds? Is transhumanism a technical possibility? Do we need to rethink eschatology? In this paper I hope to contribute to a constructive dialog. I suggest this catechism format as a means to support the need of the Church to teach sound theological doctrine with respect to these challenging questions. By no means do I wish to imply that this catechism is …
The Next Page Of Yoga Anatomy: An Anatomical Lens On Selected Yoga Asanas,
2019
SIT Study Abroad
The Next Page Of Yoga Anatomy: An Anatomical Lens On Selected Yoga Asanas, Viana Chau
Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection
Yoga has become a widely-recognized form of physical activity as well as an effective therapeutic intervention. It is a self-discipling way of life, taking advantage of the powerful effects from the combination of breathing exercises (pranayama), physical postures (asanas), and meditation on calming the nervous system and balancing the mind, body, and spirit. However, over time, the contemporary definition of yoga, especially in the United States, has decreased the emphasis on the religious spirituality component and increased the emphasis on physical activity. Although one may argue that this is not the traditional yoga, this change not only breaks down the …
The Reliable Revisionist,
2019
Augustana College, Rock Island Illinois
The Reliable Revisionist, Caitlyn Schaffer
Philosophy: Student Scholarship & Creative Works
The present text explores how the topic of head and heart is much more complicated than one would expect, according to Paul Henne and Walter Sinnot-Armstrong, contributors of Neuroexistentialism. “Does Neuroscience Undermine Morality” aims at figuring out the problem of which moral judgments we can trust, judgments from one’s head (revisionism) or judgments from one’s heart (conservatism). My hypothesis suggests the opposite of the authors, I believe that if you are a revisionist, your first order intuitions are reliable. After setting the framework, I make three main arguments. (A.) If you are able to self-correct then you can identify errors …
Some Non-Human Languages Of Thought,
2019
CUNY Graduate Center
Some Non-Human Languages Of Thought, Nicolas J. Porot
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
What might we learn if we take seriously the possibility of non-human Languages of Thought (LoT)? A LoT is a combinatorial set of mental representations. And, since mental representations and rules of combination vary in kind, there are many possible LoTs. Simple LoTs might lack familiar features of the putative human LoT, such as object representations, recursively defined rules of combination, sentential connectives, or predicate-argument structure. The most familiar arguments for the existence of LoTs, such as those from productivity, systematicity, concept learning, and perceptual computation, all fail when applied to non-human animals. But recent empirical evidence motivates attributing LoTs …
Mentality And Fundamentality,
2019
CUNY Graduate Center
Mentality And Fundamentality, Christopher D. Brown
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
Extant well-considered problems with physicalism primarily come from two sources: philosophers of mind arguing that subjective experience does not fit into a physicalist world-picture, and metaphysicians trying to figure out the particular commitments of the view. I examine the thesis of physicalism in order to produce a clearer notion of the physical and to help straighten out physicalism’s entailments, while simultaneously providing a strategy for physicalists to sidestep well known anti-physicalist arguments concerning consciousness. This involves both a critical and a positive effort: on the critical side, I expose an issue with a popular way of understanding physicalism called “via …
Theorizing About The Self In Panpsychism And The Extended Mind Using The Dao De Jing (道德經) And Zhuangzi (莊子),
2019
Western Michigan University
Theorizing About The Self In Panpsychism And The Extended Mind Using The Dao De Jing (道德經) And Zhuangzi (莊子), Ryan Lemasters
The Hilltop Review
In this paper, I begin by briefly showing how the problem of self has been understood and approached historically in Western philosophy. I follow this by focusing on some of the recent literature in the philosophy of mind that suggests that the self is extended, meaning it is not solely located within the boundaries of the brain (Clark and Chalmers 1998). It will be evident that this is in conflict with the traditional Western understanding of the self. Since it seems to be the case that there are strong arguments for endorsing the view that the self is extended (to …
Normative Pragmatic Selfhood: A Pragmatist Conception Of Value For Marginal Cases,
2019
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
Normative Pragmatic Selfhood: A Pragmatist Conception Of Value For Marginal Cases, Sam Noel Johnson
Graduate Theses and Dissertations
I develop a theory of personal ontology called normative pragmatic selfhood (NPS) to explain what persons are and how they are morally valuable. I also demonstrate the applicability of NPS theory by using it to assess the moral status of marginal cases in bioethical dilemmas. I begin by discussing the concept of intrinsic value and why it is problematic when it comes to persons. I then draw upon John Dewey’s theory of value, specifically the concept of growth, and Kant’s concept of humanity to show that persons are objectively yet extrinsically valuable. Next, I discuss and argue how the psychological …
