V.1 2016-2017 Supplement,
2016
Rhode Island School of Design
V.1 2016-2017 Supplement, Center For Arts & Language, Students Of Risd, Risd Archives
All Student Newspapers
v.1 is a publishing platform for the ongoing work, ideas, discussions, debates, and aspirations of students at the Rhode Island School of Design. The 2016-2017 Supplement issue contains handwritten answers on post-its to the question "What feels urgent to you in your studio? In your life? In the world?" These post-its were written at a grad-student gathering on the day after the 2016 US Presidential election, scanned and printed as a zine the next day, and distributed at open studios the day after that.
Hermes In The Anthropocene: A Dogologue,
2016
Theater Three Collaborative, Inc.
Hermes In The Anthropocene: A Dogologue, Karen Malpede
Animal Sentience
In this dogologue, a writer and the dog who sits near her desk as she works speak. The dog is concerned about the fate of the world in the hands of humans. His urgent questions send the writer into the world of her own memories when she was a child alone with a horse in nature.
El Nuevo Pacto Protestante: La Influencia De La Teología Protestante En El Derecho De Bienes Y Contratos,
2016
University of Oklahoma
El Nuevo Pacto Protestante: La Influencia De La Teología Protestante En El Derecho De Bienes Y Contratos, Brian Mccall
Faculty Books and Book Chapters
Es imposible disociar la moral (o la ética) de la doctrina teológica. Como Richard Weaver explicó en el pasado siglo, las ideas tienen consecuencias. Por lo tanto, un cambio de doctrina teológica irá inevitablemente acompañado por un cambio en las normas que gobiernan la conducta. Dado que la ley humana es relativa a los usos y costumbres de la comunidad para la cual se dicta y se desarrolla a la luz de aquéllos, tales cambios terminarán abriéndose paso en las leyes. Después de quinientos años, las nuevas doctrinas del protestantismo han producido sus efectos sobre la moral y el derecho. …
Proto-Postmodernism: Constructing Postmodern Ethics Through Cold War Literature And Theory,
2016
Hamline University
Proto-Postmodernism: Constructing Postmodern Ethics Through Cold War Literature And Theory, Rock Lamanna
Departmental Honors Projects
While postmodern theory and literature is typically viewed as either “anti-humanist” or a rejection of Humanism, this essay reconsiders these assumptions by exploring ethical questions in early postmodern novels and theory, referred to as “proto-postmodernism.” For proto-postmodernists such as Hannah Arendt, Albert Camus, Ralph Ellison, Joseph Heller, and Kurt Vonnegut, Humanism—the ethical framework that asserts a centered “self” and a collective “metanarrative” of human progress—causes and legitimates violence, yet in their theories and literature, they promote the humanist value of dignity in their critiques of modern ethics and politics. To examine this hybrid stance toward Humanism, the first section situates …
Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Perspectives,
2016
University of North Florida
Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Perspectives, Tyrome Clark
UNF Graduate Theses and Dissertations
This thesis addresses primary concepts in the humanitarian intervention debates. I argue that humanitarian intervention is a perfect duty. The global community has a moral obligation to act decisively in the face of extreme human rights abuses. There are two contrasting theoretical perspectives regarding international relations and humanitarian intervention: statism and cosmopolitanism. These contrasting perspectives contest the relative value of state sovereignty and human rights. Some of the most prominent ethicists in the debate have determined states have a “right” to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of other states to halt severe human rights abuses but there is no …
Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense,
2016
Swarthmore College
Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense, Peter Baumann
Philosophy Faculty Works
This book develops and defends a version of epistemic contextualism, that is, of the view that the truth conditions or the meaning of knowledge attributions of the form “S knows that p” can vary with the context of the attributor. The first part of the book is about arguments for contextualism and develops a particular version of it. The first chapter deals with the argument from cases and ordinary usage. More weight, however, is put on more “theoretical” arguments: arguments from reliability (Chapter 2) and from luck (Chapter 3). The second part of the book discusses problems contextualism faces and …
Non-Optional Projects: Mathematical And Ethical,
2016
Swarthmore College
Non-Optional Projects: Mathematical And Ethical, Alan Richard Baker
Philosophy Faculty Works
This chapter examines how the general framework for indispensability arguments developed by Enoch in the metaethical context plays out in its ancestral home, the philosophy of mathematics. Enoch’s framework is inspired by the Quine–Putnam type of indispensability argument in mathematics and is liable to inherit the latter’s holism. But once this holism is expunged from Enoch’s framework it turns out that Enoch’s indispensability argument is stronger in the moral than in the mathematical case, since it is more plausible that normative entities are indispensible to all projects of practical deliberation than it is that mathematical entities are indispensible to all …
The Question Of Truth In Literature: Die Poetische Auffassung Der Welt,
2016
Swarthmore College
The Question Of Truth In Literature: Die Poetische Auffassung Der Welt, Richard Thomas Eldridge
Philosophy Faculty Works
This chapter starts with the question of truth in literature, noting that this question has several interrelated senses: can literature present (significant) truths at all?; what does its presentation of truths (if it exists) have to do with its manner of presentation (with literary language)?; and is the presentation of truth a central aim of literary art? The chapter surveys a variety of neo-Fregean (Lamarque and Olsen, Walton) views that reject the very possibility of literary truth as well as a variety of anti-Fregean views (Goodman, Heidegger) that endorse it. But those endorsements often do not say enough about literary …
How Welfare Biology And Commonsense May Help To Reduce Animal Suffering,
2016
Nanyang Technological University
How Welfare Biology And Commonsense May Help To Reduce Animal Suffering, Yew-Kwang Ng
Animal Sentience
Welfare biology is the study of the welfare of living things. Welfare is net happiness (enjoyment minus suffering). Since this necessarily involves feelings, Dawkins (2014) has suggested that animal welfare science may face a paradox, because feelings are very difficult to study. The following paper provides an explanation for how welfare biology could help to reduce this paradox by answering some difficult questions regarding animal welfare. Simple means based on commonsense could reduce animal suffering enormously at low or even negative costs to humans. Ways to increase the influence of animal welfare advocates are also discussed, focusing initially on farmed …
Animal Welfare Cannot Adequately Protect Nonhuman Animals: The Need For A Science Of Animal Well-Being,
2016
University of Colorado, Boulder
Animal Welfare Cannot Adequately Protect Nonhuman Animals: The Need For A Science Of Animal Well-Being, Marc Bekoff, Jessica Pierce
Animal Sentience
A focus on animal welfare in the use of nonhuman animals in the service of human economic and scientific interests does not and cannot adequately protect (nonhuman) animals. It presupposes that using other animals for human ends is acceptable as long as we try our best to improve the welfare of the animals we use. We argue instead for a “science of animal well-being” in which the protection of animal needs is not subordinated to human economic or scientific interests.
End-State Welfarism,
2016
University of New Haven
End-State Welfarism, Joel Marks
Animal Sentience
Yew-Kwang Ng’s research is the work of an obviously sincere, intelligent, and conscientious animal advocate. But I am unable to accept his starting assumption that animal welfare is an appropriate basis for animal ethics. More specifically I argue that animal welfare as a means to animal liberation is an issue that can be debated, but animal welfare as the ultimate end or goal of animal advocacy is misguided.
Animal Sentience: The Other-Minds Problem,
2016
Université du Québec à Montréal & University of Southampton
Animal Sentience: The Other-Minds Problem, Stevan Harnad
Animal Sentience
The only feelings we can feel are our own. When it comes to the feelings of others, we can only infer them, based on their behavior — unless they tell us. This is the “other-minds problem.” Within our own species, thanks to language, this problem arises only for states in which people cannot speak (infancy, aphasia, sleep, anaesthesia, coma). Our species also has a uniquely powerful empathic or “mind-reading” capacity: We can (sometimes) perceive from the behavior of others when they are in states like our own. Our inferences have also been systematized and operationalized in biobehavioral science …
Nonhuman Mind-Reading Ability,
2016
Centre d’Eco-Etho Recherche et Education
Nonhuman Mind-Reading Ability, Marthe Kiley-Worthington
Animal Sentience
Harnad (2016) is mistaken that humans are better at mind-reading than other species. Humans have context-independent language, but nonhuman species, especially mammals, have context-dependent nonverbal skills – perceptual, communicative and social -- that can be much keener than our own.
Why Human Pain Can’T Tell Us Whether Fish Feel Pain,
2016
The Pennsylvania State University
Why Human Pain Can’T Tell Us Whether Fish Feel Pain, Victoria A. Braithwaite, Paula Droege
Animal Sentience
In his target article, Key (2016) reviews the neuroanatomy of human pain and uses what is known about human pain to argue that fish cannot experience pain. We provide three reasons why the conclusions reached by Key are unsupported. They consider (i) why it is not sufficient to conclude that only human neural structures can process conscious pain, (ii) why an understanding of pain in humans and non-human animals needs to be based within a framework of consciousness, and (iii) evidence already exists that fish treated with noxious stimuli lose the ability to perform normal behaviours: This was a behavioral …
Could Fish Feel Pain? A Wider Perspective,
2016
Nanyang Technological University
Could Fish Feel Pain? A Wider Perspective, Yew-Kwang Ng
Animal Sentience
Key’s (2016) target article provides some strong arguments but also makes some logical mistakes. The arguments are not sufficient to support a definite conclusion that fish cannot feel pain. A multi-faceted perspective taking into account brain structure, chemical secretion in brain, animal behavior, and evolutionary biology may be useful and appears, at least in some aspects, to suggest the opposite conclusion from that of the target article.
Pain And Fish Welfare,
2016
Universidade Estadual Paulista – UNESP (São Paulo, Brazil)
Pain And Fish Welfare, Eliane Gonçalves-De-Freitas
Animal Sentience
The evolutionary approach of Key’s (2016) target article, generically comparing humans with fish of all kinds, is simplistic. The author ignores published research on structural and molecular aspects of pain in fish. The target article reads more like a selective polemic against fish welfare than an even-handed analysis.
Why Babies Do Not Feel Pain, Or: How Structure-Derived Functional Interpretations Can Go Wrong,
2016
University of Berne
Why Babies Do Not Feel Pain, Or: How Structure-Derived Functional Interpretations Can Go Wrong, Helmut Segner
Animal Sentience
The response to pain involves a non-conscious, reflexive action and a conscious perception. According to Key (2016), consciousness — and thus pain perception — depends on a neuronal correlate that has a “unique neural architecture” as realized in the human cortex. On the basis of the “bioengineering principle that structure determines function,” Key (2016) concludes that animal species such as fish, which lack the requisite cortex-like neuroanatomical structure, are unable to feel pain. This commentary argues that the relationship between brain structure and brain function is less straightforward than suggested in Key’s target article.
Anthropomorphic Denial Of Fish Pain,
2016
University of Liverpool
Anthropomorphic Denial Of Fish Pain, Lynne U. Sneddon, Matthew C. Leach
Animal Sentience
Key (2016) affirms that we do not know how the fish brain processes pain but denies — because fish lack a human-like cortex — that fish can feel pain. He affirms that birds, like fish, have a singly-laminated cortex and that the structure of the bird brain is quite different from that of the human brain, yet he does not deny that birds can feel pain. In this commentary we describe how Key cites studies that substantiate mammalian pain but discounts the same kind of data as evidence of fish pain. We suggest that Key's interpretations are illogical, do not …
Leaving The Door Open For Fish Pain: Evolutionary Convergence And The Utility Of ‘Just-So Stories’,
2016
University of San Diego
Leaving The Door Open For Fish Pain: Evolutionary Convergence And The Utility Of ‘Just-So Stories’, David B. Edelman
Animal Sentience
Key argues that fish do not experience pain because they lack the necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) brain structures and associated functional circuitry to engender such conscious percepts. I propose that fish pain may be dependent on neuroanatomical regions and pathways that are structurally and/or functionally analogous — but not strictly homologous — to well-characterized mammalian substrates of pain. An example is the convergent appearance of the complex, single-compartment eye across invertebrate and vertebrate phylogeny. Structural-functional convergence is ubiquitous in evolution. Comparative inferences and correlative lines of evidence play an important role in building evolutionary arguments. The dismissal of the …
Fish Pain: A Painful Topic,
2016
Stony Brook University
Fish Pain: A Painful Topic, Carl Safina
Animal Sentience
If fish cannot feel pain, why do stingrays have purely defensive tail spines that deliver venom? Stingrays’ ancestral predators are fish. And why do many fishes possess defensive fin spines, some also with venom that produces pain in humans? These things did not evolve just in case sentient humans would evolve millions of years later and then invent scuba. If fish react purely unconsciously to “noxious” stimuli, why aren’t sharp jabbing spines enough? Why also stinging venom?
