Can A Dog Be Jealous?,
2018
University of Pennsylvania
Can A Dog Be Jealous?, Yaoguang Jiang, Annamarie W. Huttunen, Michael L. Platt
Animal Sentience
Whether humans alone experience complex emotions like jealousy or envy remains hotly debated, partly because of the difficulty of measuring them without a verbal report. Cook, Berns and colleagues use functional brain imaging to identify in dogs neural responses very similar to those evoked by jealousy in humans. When dogs see their caregiver reward a facsimile dog, their amygdala is activated and the strength of this response predicts aggressive behavior — just as jealousy leads to aggression in humans. The authors conclude that dogs feel something very similar to human jealousy. This novel and creative study tackles one of the …
What Would We Like To Know By Imaging The Brains Of Dogs?,
2018
California Institute of Technology
What Would We Like To Know By Imaging The Brains Of Dogs?, Ralph Adolphs
Animal Sentience
Using fMRI to study emotions in animals is important, fascinating, and fraught with methodological and conceptual problems. Cook et al. are doing it, and there is no question that they and others will be doing it better and better as time goes on. Where will this lead us? What could fMRI in principle tell us about the minds of nonhuman animals?
A Philosophical Analysis Of Otherness In Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra,
2018
Bucknell University
A Philosophical Analysis Of Otherness In Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Max W. Fathauer
Honors Theses
Bertrand Russell infamously characterizes Nietzsche as a philosopher concerned solely with the flourishing individual. Several crucial passages of Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, however, outline rich encounters Zarathustra has with the Other. In this paper, I argue that Russell’s characterization of Nietzsche is egregiously reductive. In order to demonstrate this, I offer an in-depth analysis of otherness in Thus Spoke Zarathustra by examining the many different kinds of relationships the individual can have with the Other. I then turn towards other works of Nietzsche to furnish the compelling, yet imprecise insight concerning otherness that Zarathustra gives us. Finally, I compare my …
Learning To Live And Love Virtuously,
2018
Claremont Colleges
Learning To Live And Love Virtuously, Henry Deruff
CMC Senior Theses
John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant authored two of the most famous pieces of work in ethical theory (Utilitarianism and Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, respectively), yet both fail for various reasons to give us direction by way of living good lives. This thesis begins by outlining those shortcomings, before offering Aristotelian virtue ethics as the solution. Virtue ethics, as conceived by Aristotle, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Julia Annas, delineates a process – grounded in our real lives – by which we may improve as people and therefore flourish, or live good, moral lives: the habituation of the …
Sentience, The Final Frontier....,
2018
Dalhousie University
Sentience, The Final Frontier...., Shelley Adamo
Animal Sentience
Arguments for fish sentience have difficulty with the philosophical zombie problem. Progress in AI has shown that complex learning, pain behavior, and pain as a motivational drive can be emulated by robots without any internal subjective experience. Therefore, demonstrating these abilities in fish does not necessarily demonstrate that fish are sentient. Further evidence for fish sentience may come from optogenetic studies of neural networks in zebrafish. Such studies may show that zebrafish have neural network patterns similar to those that correlate with sentience in humans. Given the present uncertainty regarding sentience in fish, caution should be applied regarding the precautionary …
Sentience: All Or None Or Matter Of Degree?,
2018
University of Toronto
Sentience: All Or None Or Matter Of Degree?, Loren Martin, Robert Gerlai
Animal Sentience
The question of whether fish feel pain is muddied by anthropomorphic thinking. Comparing biological phenomena in two species should be informed by the criteria for good animal models: face validity, construct validity and predictive validity. Viewed through this lens, we argue that fish do feel pain and may possess some level of sentience. Evolutionary relatedness, hence similarities and differences between species (fish and humans in this case), are not about black vs. white but about shades of grey.
Fish Sentience, Consciousness, And Ai,
2018
independent ethologist
Fish Sentience, Consciousness, And Ai, Ila France Porcher
Animal Sentience
The systematic criticism of articles providing evidence that fish and invertebrates can feel pain is discussed. Beliefs are known to be stronger than evidence in the human mind, and could generate this outcry, while from another perspective, the criticisms appear as a territorial move by fishermen against a perceived threat to their domain. The scientific inconsistency in which consciousness is granted to machines but not to fish and invertebrates, purely due to political bias, is pointed out. No basis exists for denying sentience to any life form as long as science is ignorant of the nature and source of consciousness.
The Human Nervous System Is Not The Gold Standard For Pain,
2018
IULM University
The Human Nervous System Is Not The Gold Standard For Pain, Riccardo Manzotti
Animal Sentience
The basis of pain could be the causal nexus between one’s phylogenetic/ontogenetic history and one’s behavior. It might turn out that the neural implementation is immaterial to the instantiation of pain. Widely different neural structures may token the same pain-type, and nearly identical neural structures may token different types.
Time To (Finally) Acknowledge That Fish Have Emotionality And Pain,
2018
Saint-Petersburg State University
Time To (Finally) Acknowledge That Fish Have Emotionality And Pain, Konstantin A. Demin, Anton M. Lakstygal, Allan V. Kalueff
Animal Sentience
The increasing work using fish as a model organism calls for a better understanding of their sentience. While growing evidence suggests that pain and emotionality exist in zebrafish, many deniers continue to ignore the evidence. Here we revisit the main conceptual breakthroughs in the field that argue clearly for pain and emotionality. We call for an end to denial and a focus on studying the mechanisms of fish pain and emotionality, and their translational relevance to human conditions.
Human And Nonhuman Animals: Equals In Uniqueness,
2018
Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich
Human And Nonhuman Animals: Equals In Uniqueness, Uta Maria Juergens
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman attack the idea that humans are unique and therefore superior to nonhuman beings. They call on humankind to use their “intellect to change [their] actions.” I am in full accord with their line of thought, which differentiates uniqueness from superiority and enjoins humans to take responsible action. I suggest, however, that humans are unique with regard to cognitive fluidity. The same conclusions can be reached via another argument based on human uniqueness.
Can They Suffer?,
2018
Oakland University
Can They Suffer?, Todd K. Shackelford
Animal Sentience
We should treat sentient nonhuman animals as worthy of moral consideration, not because we share an evolutionary history with them, but because they can suffer. As Chapman & Huffman (2018) argue, humans are not uniquely disconnected from other species. We should minimize the suffering we inflict on sentient beings — whether human or nonhuman — not because they, too, are tool-makers or have sophisticated communication systems, but because they, too, can suffer, and suffering is bad.
We Don’T Want To Know What We Know,
2018
Messerli Research Institute, University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna
We Don’T Want To Know What We Know, Judith Benz-Schwarzburg
Animal Sentience
Why are humans so ignorant with regard to the fundamental gap between ethical claims and the status quo of the human-animal relationship? To answer this, we should include more psychological and sociological perspectives in our discussions.
Is Superiority A Necessary Aspect Of Cruelty?,
2018
University of Birmingham, UK
Is Superiority A Necessary Aspect Of Cruelty?, William H. Edmondson
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman argue that humans inflict cruelty without apparent concern because of their categorization of the victims as inferior. The supposed inferiority of non-human animals can be argued against on the basis of documentation and analysis of behaviour. Humans continue to inflict cruelty on their own and other species. It is not obvious that a sense of superiority is a necessary aspect of cruel behaviour. Nor is it obvious that further enlightenment regarding the cognitive status of non-humans will diminish cruelty.
Researchers, Not Dogs, Lack Control In An Experiment On Jealousy,
2018
Oakland University
Researchers, Not Dogs, Lack Control In An Experiment On Jealousy, Jennifer Vonk
Animal Sentience
Cook and colleagues (2018) have developed a clever method to measure fMRI in awake dogs in response to a number of interesting stimuli. As a result, they are able to determine neural correlates of observable behavior. They report that dogs may experience something akin to jealousy because they show greater amygdala activation in response to food being given to a fake dog versus food being placed in a bucket. However, several critical controls are missing which prevent the authors from being able to speak of jealousy.
Fill-In-The-Blank-Emotion In Dogs? Evidence From Brain Imaging,
2018
Barnard College
Fill-In-The-Blank-Emotion In Dogs? Evidence From Brain Imaging, Alexandra Horowitz, Becca Franks, Jeff Sebo
Animal Sentience
What is needed to make meaningful claims about an animal’s capacity for subjective experience? Cook et al. (2018) attempt to study jealousy in dogs by placing them in a particular context and then seeing whether they display a particular brain state. We argue that this approach to studying jealousy falls short for two related reasons. First, the relationship between jealousy and the selected context is unclear. Second, the relationship between jealousy and the selected brain state (indeed, any single brain state) is unclear. These and other issues seriously limit what this study can show. It is important not to see …
Fish Sentience Denial: Muddy Moral Water,
2018
California State University - Chico
Fish Sentience Denial: Muddy Moral Water, Robert C. Jones
Animal Sentience
Sneddon et al. (2018) authoritatively summarize the compelling and overwhelming evidence for fish sentience, while methodically dismantling one rather emblematic research paper (Diggles et al. 2017) intended to discount solid evidence of fish sentience (Lopez-Luna et al. 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, & 2017d). I explore the larger practical moral contexts within which these debates take place and argue that denials of animal sentience are really moral canards.
Defining Pain And Painful Sentience In Animals,
2018
University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston
Defining Pain And Painful Sentience In Animals, Edgar T. Walters
Animal Sentience
Sentience is essential to most definitions of pain, including a detailed definition invoked by Sneddon et al. to argue that adult and perhaps larval fish feel pain. Because proving painful sentience in non-human animals is not feasible, multiple lines of indirect evidence are needed to implicate pain. This commentary examines the list of 17 criteria used by Sneddon et al. to conclude that fish have conscious pain. The criteria include tests of nociceptive, motivational, and cognitive properties useful for revealing pain-like states that can be understood biologically and be related evolutionarily to human pain. However, additional research is needed to …
Two Fallacies In Comparisons Between Humans And Non-Humans,
2018
University College Cork; University of Cape Town; Georgia State University
Two Fallacies In Comparisons Between Humans And Non-Humans, Don Ross
Animal Sentience
The hypothesis that humans are superior to non-humans by virtue of higher cognitive powers is often supported by two recurrent fallacies: (1) that any competence shown by humans but not by our closest living relatives (apes) must be unique to humans; and (2) that grades of intelligence can be inferred from behavior without regard to motivational structures.
Fish Consciousness,
2018
Middlesex University, U.K.
Fish Consciousness, David Gamez
Animal Sentience
Woodruff makes two arguments to support his claim that ray-finned fish are conscious: (1) Fish neuroanatomy has similarities with the structures in the human brain that support consciousness. (2) The complexity and flexibility of fish behaviour suggest that they are conscious. This commentary will argue that neither the neuroanatomical nor the behavioural argument can provide conclusive evidence for consciousness in fish. We should suspend judgement until we have discovered mathematical theories of consciousness that can reliably map between states of consciousness and states of the physical world.
What Sets Us Apart Could Be Our Salvation,
2018
University of Sydney, Australia
What Sets Us Apart Could Be Our Salvation, Anne Fawcett, Paul Mcgreevy
Animal Sentience
We agree with Chapman & Huffman that human capacities are often assumed to be unique — or attempts are made to demonstrate uniqueness scientifically — in order to justify the exploitation of animals and ecosystems. To extend the argument that human exceptionalism is against our interests, we recommend adopting the One Welfare framework, according to which animal welfare, environmental sustainability and human wellbeing are inseparably linked. Let us distinguish ourselves from other animals by resisting our short- and mid-term Darwinian inclinations, consuming less, reproducing less, and striving for a much longer-term biological fitness for us all.
