Economic Theory Commons^™

Strategic Delay In Bargaining With Two-Sided Uncertainty, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

The role of strategic delay is analyzed in an infinite-horizon alternating-offer model of bargaining. A buyer and seller are engaged in the trade of a single object. Both bargainers have private information about their own preferences and are impatient in that delaying agreement is costly. An equilibrium is constructed in which the bargainers signal the strength of their bargaining positions by delaying prior to making an offer. A bargainer expecting large gains from trade is more impatient than one expecting small gains, and hence makes concessions earlier on. Trade occurs whenever gains from trade exist, but due to the private …

The Economic Structure Of The Post-Contractual Corporation, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Dynamic Bargaining With Transaction Costs, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

A buyer and seller alternate making offers until an offer is accepted or someone terminates negotiations. The seller's valuation is common knowledge, but the buyer's valuation is known only by the buyer. Impatience to reach an agreement comes from two sources: the traders discount future payoffs and there are transaction costs of bargaining. Equilibrium behavior involves either immediate trade, delayed trade, or immediate termination, depending on the size of the gains from trade and the relative bargaining costs. This contrasts with the pure discounting model where termination never occurs, and the pure transaction cost model where delayed trade never occurs.

Shrewd Bargaining On The Moral Frontier: Toward A Theory Of Morality In Practice, Peter Cramton, J Gregory Dees

Peter Cramton

From a traditional moral point of view, business practitioners often seem overly concerned about the behavior of their peers in deciding how they ought to act. We propose to account for this concern by introducing a mutual trust perspective, where moral obligations are grounded in a sense of trust that others will abide by the same rules. When grounds for trust are absent, the obligation is weakened. We illustrate this perspective by examining the widespread ambivalence with regard to deception about one’s settlement preferences in negotiation. On an abstract level, such deception generally seems undesirable, though in many individual cases …

Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics And Psychology, Vernon L. Smith

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Rational Choice--the published record of a conference on economics and psychology--frames the issues as a contest between economic theory and the falsifying evidence from psychology. According to a third perspective, that of experimental economics, most standard theory provides a correct first approximation in predicting motivated behavior in laboratory experimental markets, but the theory is incomplete, particularly in articulating convergence processes in time and in ignoring decision cost. This view has roots in the work of Herbert Simon and Sidney Siegel, but it is not plainly represented in contemporary research in economic pyschology.

Using Auction Theory To Inform Takeover Regulation, Peter Cramton, Alan Schwartz

Peter Cramton

This paper focuses on certain mechanisms that govern the sale of corporate assets. Under Delaware law, when a potential acquirer makes a serious bid for a target, the target’s Board of Directors is required to act as would "auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stock-holders at a sale of the company.’’ The Delaware courts’ preference for auctions follows from two premises. First, a firm’s managers should maximize the value of their shareholders’ investment in the company. Second, auctions maximize shareholder returns. The two premises together imply that a target’s board should conduct an auction when at least …

Cartel Enforcement With Uncertainty About Costs, Peter Cramton, Thomas R. Palfrey

Peter Cramton

What cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs? For private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements that can be supported, recognizing incentive and participation constraints. If defection results in either Cournot or Bertrand competition, the incentive problem in large cartels is severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome. However, if the cartel agreement requires less than unanimous ratification by the member firms, then the incentive problem can be overcome in large cartels. With common cost uncertainty, perfect collusion is possible in large cartels, regardless of the ratification rule.

Nonrandom Mixing Models Of Hiv Transmission, Peter Cramton, Edward H. Kaplan, A. David Paltiel

Peter Cramton

Models of HIV transmission and the AIDS epidemic generally assume random mixing among those infected with HIV and those who are not. For sexually transmitted HIV, this implies that individuals select sex partners without regard to attributes such as familiarity, attractiveness, or risk of infection. This paper formulates a model for examining the impact of nonrandom mixing on HIV transmission. We present threshold conditions that determine when HIV epidemics can occur within the framework of this model. Nonrandom mixing is introduced by assuming that sexually active individuals select sex partners to minimize the risk of infection. In addition to variability …

Government Financial Policy And Capital, Dean D. Croushore

Economics Faculty Publications

Economists have long been concerned about the best way to finance government deficits. Finding the proper fiscal policy and monetary policy mix is a crucial decision. When government debt grows too fast, interest rates rise and capital is crowded out. If the money growth rate is excessive, inflation occurs.

The study of this issue at the theoretical level requires a model which incorporates the following features: (1) modeling money and bonds as endogenous financial assets, whose rates of return are determined in general equilibrium, (2) examination of the utility maxi mization decisions of individuals, so that welfare analysis of alternative …

Dissolving A Partnership Efficiently, Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons, Paul Klemperer

Peter Cramton

Several partners jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner has a valuation for the asset; the valuations are known privately and drawn independently from a common probability distribution. We characterize the set of all incentive-compatible and interim-individually-rational trading mechanisms, and give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for such mechanisms to dissolve the partnership ex post efficiently. A bidding game is constructed that achieves such dissolution whenever it is possible. Despite incomplete information about the valuation of the asset, a partnership can be dissolved ex post efficiently provided no single partner owns too large a …

The Evolution Of Financial Institutions And The Performance Of The Economy, Hyman P. Minsky Ph.D.

Hyman P. Minsky Archive

No abstract provided.

Sequential Bargaining Mechanisms, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

The introductory discussion presented in this chapter considers the simplest type of sequential bargaining games in which the players’ time preferences are described by known and fixed discount rates. I begin by characterizing the class of perfect bargaining mechanisms, which satisfy the desirable properties of incentive compatibility (i.e., each player reports his type truthfully), individual rationality (i.e., every potential player wishes to play the game), and sequential rationality (i.e., it is never common knowledge that the mechanism induced over time is dominated by an alternative mechanism). It is shown that ex post efficiency is unobtainable by any incentive-compatible and individually …

Bargaining With Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model With Two-Sided Uncertainty, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

The resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement and the information each agent has about the others’ preferences. This paper explores, within the context of an infinite-horizon bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty, how timing and information affect the rational behavior of agents when commitment is not possible. Since the bargainers are uncertain about whether trade is desirable, they must communicate some of their private information before an agreement can be reached. This need for learning, due to incomplete information about preferences, results in bargaining inefficiencies: trade often occurs after costly …

Inflation And Taxable Capacity: Some Recent Evidence, Barbara Allison Haney-Powell

Masters Theses

Colin Clark's theory of inflation has had a profound effect on present-day economic theory concerning taxation policy. While his belief that inflation occurred when all tax revenues exceeded 25 percent of national income was rejected by his contemporaries in the 1940's, supply-side economists incorporate Clark's theory into their proposals for curing the unemployment and inflation of the 1970's and 1980's. These proposals gained popular support and resulted in the election of President Ronald Reagan who implemented such proposals. The purpose of this study is to determine the veracity of Clark's theory.

Clark's theory was tested in this study with the …

Core Size, Pricing, And Cost Structure, William K. Edwards

Economics Theses & Dissertations

This thesis presents a proof of an inverse limit theorem of the core of an economy. The implication of the theorem is that a larger core can be obtained by the formation of coalitions. A large core contains multiple Pareto optimal allocations from which society may select in order to maximize its welfare. Furthermore, this paper places an emphasis on pricing schemes that guarantee a core allocation under increasing returns to scale. Two pricing models are introduced that guarantee a non-empty core under increasing returns to scale.

Income Velocity In The United States, 1961-1968, William F. Kennedy

Economics Theses & Dissertations

No abstract provided.

Policy And Poverty, Part 1, Hyman P. Minsky Ph.D.

Hyman P. Minsky Archive

This is the first draft of the first chapter of a possible book Hyman P. Minsky was writing on Policy and Poverty. In this chapter he discusses poverty and income distribution programs in the case of rich countries, where poverty is measured in a relative sense and income in terms of total satisfaction that a household acquires through its provision of private and public goods. Minsky stresses that a successful poverty alleviation program should first, work with and not against economic forces, second, have realistic goals and effective policy instruments and third, have recognizable benefits for the well-off too. Specifically, …

Policy And Poverty, Part 3, Hyman P. Minsky Ph.D.

Hyman P. Minsky Archive

Part 3 of an unfinished book.

Policy And Poverty, Part 2, Hyman P. Minsky Ph.D.

Hyman P. Minsky Archive

Part 2 of an unfinished book.