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Articles 1 - 15 of 15
Full-Text Articles in Economic Theory
Simulation Of The Colombian Firm Energy Market, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft
Simulation Of The Colombian Firm Energy Market, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft
Peter Cramton
We present a simulation analysis of the proposed Colombian firm energy market. The main purpose of the simulation is to assess the risk to suppliers of participation in the market. We also are able to consider variations in the market design, and assess the impact of alternative auction parameters. Three simulation models are developed and analyzed. The first model (Model 1) uses historical price data from October 1995 through May 2006 to assess the performance risk of hypothetical thermal and hydro generating units. The second model (Model 2) uses historical price and operating data to assess performance risk of the …
Assessment Of Capital Returns And Economics Of Investment In Khartoum Stock Exchange Market, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed
Assessment Of Capital Returns And Economics Of Investment In Khartoum Stock Exchange Market, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed
Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed
Financial markets in a country are parts of modern economic systems and have definite impacts of its economic performance. However, in an underdeveloped economic structure there can be other targets o hidden activities for them. Such assumptions are provoked under totalitarian economic systems that impose cartel monopolies in a autocratic compradorism that own most of the companies and their stocks. The institutional structure of the prevailing economic system avails negative cost/benefits dealings to continue unaffected as the main profits have to come from other resources, e.g., money laundry. The private sector has to be monopolized in order to sustain the …
New England’S Forward Capacity Auction, Peter Cramton
New England’S Forward Capacity Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
This note provides a brief description of New England’s Forward Capacity Auction (FCA) for the procurement of electricity capacity. The description is based on the 6 March 2006 Settlement Agreement. The description here presents a simpler description of the auction mechanics, and limits the presentation to the key elements relevant to someone providing software and other support to implement the primary auction. In addition, some motivation for the approach is given. The description here is not a software specification, but rather a high-level description of the auction. Many implementation details are yet to be resolved. These details will be resolved …
The Convergence Of Market Designs For Adequate Generating Capacity, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft
The Convergence Of Market Designs For Adequate Generating Capacity, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft
Peter Cramton
This paper compares market designs intended to solve the resource adequacy (RA) problem, and finds that, in spite of rivalrous claims, the most advanced designs have nearly converged. The original dichotomy between approaches based on long-term energy contracts and those based on short-term capacity markets spawned two design tracks. Long-term contracts led to call-option obligations which provide market-power control and the ability to strengthen performance incentives, but this approach fails to replace the missing money at the root of the adequacy problem. Hogan’s energy-only market fills this gap. On the other track, the short-term capacity markets (ICAP) spawned long-term capacity …
Assessment Of Capital Returns And Economics Of Investment In Khartoum Stock Exchange Market, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed
Assessment Of Capital Returns And Economics Of Investment In Khartoum Stock Exchange Market, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed
Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed
Financial markets in a country are parts of modern economic systems and have definite impacts of its economic performance. However, in an underdeveloped economic structure there can be other targets o hidden activities for them. Such assumptions are provoked under totalitarian economic systems that impose cartel monopolies in a autocratic compradorism that own most of the companies and their stocks. The institutional structure of the prevailing economic system avails negative cost/benefits dealings to continue unaffected as the main profits have to come from other resources, e.g., money laundry. The private sector has to be monopolized in order to sustain the …
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Affidavit in support of the settlement agreement defining the New England Forward Capacity Market. For ISO New England.
Ex Parte Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Ex Parte Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Ex parte communication on various auction rules for the AWS auction.
Declaration Of Peter Cramton On The Aws Auction, Peter Cramton
Declaration Of Peter Cramton On The Aws Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Declaration on various auction rules for the AWS auction. On behalf of T-Mobile US.
Reply Declaration Of Peter Cramton On The Aws Auction, Peter Cramton
Reply Declaration Of Peter Cramton On The Aws Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Reply declaration on various auction rules for the AWS auction. On behalf of T-Mobile US.
The Micro-Foundations Of Intertemporal Price Discrimination, Winston T. H. Koh
The Micro-Foundations Of Intertemporal Price Discrimination, Winston T. H. Koh
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper investigates the optimality of intertemporal price discrimination for a durable-good monopoly in a model where infinitely-lived households face an intertemporal budget constraint, and consume both durable goods and non-durable goods. We prove that the optimal price of the durable good is not constant, and may decrease or increase over time. Some households may choose to purchase the durable good at a later date, and pay lower or higher prices, since the gain in discounted utility of consuming more of the non-durable good more than compensates for the loss in utility from delaying the consumption of the durable good. …
Introduction To Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Introduction To Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Peter Cramton
Combinatorial auctions are those auctions in which bidders can place bids on combinations of items, called “packages,” rather than just individual items. The study of combinatorial auctions is inherently interdisciplinary. Combinatorial auctions are in the first place auctions, a topic extensively studied by economists. Package bidding brings in operations research, especially techniques from combinatorial optimization and mathematical programming. Similarly, computer science is concerned with expressiveness of various bidding languages, and algorithmic aspects of the combinatorial problem. The study of combinatorial auctions thus lies at the intersection of economics, operations research, and computer science. In this book, we look at combinatorial …
The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Paul Milgrom
The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Paul Milgrom
Peter Cramton
We propose the clock-proxy auction as a practical means for auctioning many related items. A clock auction phase is followed by a last-and-final proxy round. The approach combines the simple and transparent price discovery of the clock auction with the efficiency of the proxy auction. Linear pricing is maintained as long as possible, but then is abandoned in the proxy round to improve efficiency and enhance seller revenues. The approach has many advantages over the simultaneous ascending auction. In particular, the clock-proxy auction has no exposure problem, eliminates incentives for demand reduction, and prevents most collusive bidding strategies.
Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Peter Cramton
A comprehensive book on combinatorial auctions―auctions in which bidders can bid on packages of items. The book consists of original material intended for researchers, students, and practitioners of auction design. It includes a foreword by Vernon Smith, an introduction to combinatorial auctions, and twenty-three cross-referenced chapters in five parts. Part I covers mechanisms, such as the Vickrey auction and the ascending proxy auction. Part II is on bidding and efficiency issues. Part III examines computational issues and algorithmic considerations, especially the winner determination problem―how to identify the (tentative) winning set of bids that maximizes revenue. Part IV discusses implementation and …
Dynamic Auctions In Procurement, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Dynamic Auctions In Procurement, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Peter Cramton
We study the theory and practical implementation of dynamic procurement auctions. We consider the procurement of many related items. With many related items, price discovery is important not only to reduce the winner’s curse, but more importantly, to simplify the bidder’s decision problem and to facilitate the revelation of preferences in the bids. Three auction formats are considered: simultaneous descending auctions are preferred if the items are not divisible, simultaneous clock auctions are desirable for procuring many divisible goods, and the clock-proxy auction is best if complementarities among items are strong and varied across the suppliers. We examine the properties …
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Peter Cramton
The simultaneous ascending auction has proved to be a successful method of auctioning many related items. Simultaneous sale and ascending bids enable price discovery, which helps bidders build desirable packages of items. Although package bids are not allowed, the auction format does handle mild complementarities well. I examine the auction design and its performance in practice.