Macroeconomics Commons^™

Malaysia: Government Deposit Guarantee, Ezekiel Vergara

Journal of Financial Crises

On October 16, 2008, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers and regional expansions of deposit insurance, Malaysia announced its Government Deposit Guarantee (GDG), an unlimited guarantee of deposits held at eligible institutions. Given the “soundness and strong capitalization” of the banking sector, the preemptive program was meant “to maintain the stability of the Malaysian financial system.” Prior to the crisis, the Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malaysia (PIDM), Malaysia’s deposit-insurance agency, guaranteed up to MYR 60,000 (USD 17,291) per depositor per insured institution. The PIDM was tasked with administering the GDG. Under the GDG, the PIDM insured all ringgit and foreign-currency deposits. …

New Zealand: Crown Retail Deposit Guarantee Scheme, Ezekiel Vergara

Journal of Financial Crises

The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 led to a global financial crisis. Leaders of the G-7 countries agreed on October 10, 2008, to five principles for addressing the crisis, including the need for sound deposit insurance. On October 12, Australia’s prime minister announced a deposit insurance program that his government had first publicly vetted in June. Anticipating Australia’s announcement, New Zealand’s prime minister announced its own deposit guarantee scheme on the same afternoon. The government launched the Crown Retail Deposit Guarantee Scheme (the Scheme) “to ensure ongoing retail depositor confidence in New Zealand’s financial system, given turbulence in the …

Association For The Guarantee Of Deposits Luxembourg, Ezekiel Vergara

Journal of Financial Crises

During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Luxembourgish officials in October 2008 announced plans to raise the country’s deposit-insurance cap to EUR 100,000 (USD 134,000) and eliminate co-insurance. Prior to the GFC, Luxembourg’s deposit-insurance system covered 90% of deposits in eligible accounts up to EUR 22,222, with depositors responsible for the remaining 10%. On December 19, 2008, the legislature increased the cap to EUR 100,000 and removed the co-insurance, effective January 1, 2009. The Association Pour la Garantie des Dépôts Luxembourg (AGDL), a private deposit-insurance body, administered these changes. All deposit-taking institutions and approved investment firms, except branches of foreign banks, …

Kuwait: Unlimited Deposit Guarantee, Sharon M. Nunn

Journal of Financial Crises

On October 26, 2008, at the height of the Global Financial Crisis, the Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK) announced that it would support Gulf Bank, the country’s third-largest bank, which had sustained losses on clients’ derivatives trades. In the same announcement, it said it would ask the government to guarantee all banking deposits to shore up confidence in banks and to keep Kuwait’s banking system competitive with those of other countries, including neighboring Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which had already announced unlimited deposit guarantees. The legislature passed an unlimited deposit guarantee bill eight days later. Kuwait did …

Latvia: Deposit Guarantee Fund, Ezekiel Vergara

Journal of Financial Crises

During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Latvian authorities raised the country’s deposit-insurance cap from EUR 20,000 to EUR 50,000 (USD 26,800 to USD 67,000) in response to international calls to bolster deposit-insurance systems. They passed the measure on October 16, 2008, and it came into effect two days later. The Financial and Capital Market Commission (FCMC), Latvia’s prudential supervisor and existing deposit administrator, oversaw the guarantee. The FCMC covered most types of deposit accounts and insured all Latvian-registered deposit-taking institutions, including some foreign-bank branches operating in Latvia. The FCMC charged quarterly premiums on insured accounts and could levy additional fees …

Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation, Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

To address the risk of capital flight to neighboring countries during the Global Financial Crisis, the Indonesian government raised the limit on insured deposits 20-fold from IDR 100 million to IDR 2 billion per account (about USD 200,000). The President issued two government regulations on October 13, 2008. The first was an emergency decree that authorized the government, in consultation with the Indonesian Parliament, to alter the limit in times of systemic financial distress. The second was a government regulation enacting the actual increase, which has remained in effect since the crisis. All banks operating within Indonesia, including branches of …

Hungary: National Deposit Insurance Fund, Zijin (Phoebe) Lei, Ezekiel Vergara

Journal of Financial Crises

At the height of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Hungary announced changes to its deposit-insurance system on October 8, 2008. The government said that it would increase the deposit-insurance cap from HUF 6 million to HUF 13 million (about USD 31,000 to about USD 68,000), the equivalent of roughly EUR 50,000 (about USD 68,000), in line with a European Union (EU) recommendation. Hungary’s finance minister also announced that the state would temporarily provide an unlimited deposit guarantee, following the actions of several European countries. The unlimited guarantee was political, meaning it was not implemented through official legislation. It was effective …

Iceland: Depositors’ And Investors’ Guarantee Fund, Adam Kulam

Journal of Financial Crises

Leading up to the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, Iceland’s three largest banks accumulated assets totaling several times the size of Iceland’s GDP and financed their growth through foreign borrowing. As wholesale funding dried up in 2007, they replaced this borrowing by rapidly gathering deposits through foreign branches and subsidiaries located in the European Union, primarily in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. In the summer and fall of 2008, international credit markets froze and the Icelandic banks were unable to roll over their maturing liabilities. On October 6, Prime Minister Geir Haarde announced a full guarantee of domestic deposits. …

Greece: Hellenic Deposit Guarantee Fund, Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

Responding to general financial and economic volatility during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the Greek government in November 2008 sought to shore up public confidence in the banking system by raising the deposit-insurance limit from EUR 20,000 to EUR 100,000 (127,000 USD) per depositor for three years. The Hellenic Deposit Guarantee Fund (HDGF) was responsible for administering this adjustment, which was accompanied by a fivefold increase in the percentages used for calculating member institutions’ annual contributions. All credit institutions that were authorized to operate in Greece, including branches of foreign banks without their own coverage, were required to participate in …

Hong Kong Sar: Full Deposit Guarantee, Ezekiel Vergara, Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

Following a run on Hong Kong’s fifth-biggest bank in September 2008, the Hong Kong government announced that it would use its Exchange Fund to extend full insurance temporarily to depositors at approved banks. The existing Deposit Protection Scheme (DPS) would continue to insure the first 100,000 Hong Kong dollars (HKD; about USD 13,000) per depositor at each bank; the new program would cover the rest. It also covered a broader set of institutions. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) administered the program, overseen by the Hong Kong Deposit Protection Board (HKDPB); the HKMA was also responsible for managing the Exchange …

France: Deposit Guarantee Fund, Ezekiel Vergara

Journal of Financial Crises

In October 2008, during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), European Union (EU) officials urged member states to raise their minimum deposit-insurance coverage to at least EUR 50,000 (USD 68,000) to promote confidence in banks. France did not need to increase its deposit-insurance cap to meet this target, as it already guaranteed EUR 70,000. The following year, EU officials passed a directive that required all member states to permanently increase their minimum deposit-insurance coverage to EUR 100,000 by December 31, 2010. French authorities complied with the EU’s directive on September 29, 2010. The Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts (FGD), a private …

Brazil: Time Deposits With Special Guarantee, Sharon M. Nunn

Journal of Financial Crises

Uncertainty from the Global Financial Crisis spread to the Brazilian financial system in 2008, triggering a flight to quality toward assets with explicit or implicit government guarantees. In the Brazilian context, this meant depositors pulled funds from small and medium-size banks and parked them in larger banks that investors believed the government was more likely to backstop. The National Monetary Council (CMN) created the Time Deposits with Special Guarantee program (DPGE) in March 2009 to bolster liquidity in small and medium-size banks. The CMN put the country’s existing deposit insurer, the Credit Guarantee Fund (FGC), in charge of administering the …

Belgium: Protection Fund/Special Protection Fund, Adam Kulam

Journal of Financial Crises

At the height of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in fall 2008, the Belgian government increased the coverage limits of its deposit guarantee to restore faith in its banking system, protect savers and depositors, and safeguard financial stability. Belgium joined the European Union’s (EU) efforts to strengthen deposit guarantee systems. The measures complemented the Belgian government’s other efforts to secure domestic banks. The government implemented the emergency measures in October and November 2008 through royal decrees, which Parliament later incorporated into law. In a five-week span, Belgian authorities increased the deposit guarantee from EUR 20,000 to EUR 100,000 (USD 26,820 …

Austria: Unlimited Deposit Guarantee, Sharon M. Nunn

Journal of Financial Crises

After Germany and Ireland implemented unlimited deposit guarantees, Austrian officials passed a law on October 26, 2008, that removed deposit-insurance limits for individual depositors, fearing that Austrians would move their money to countries with higher deposit coverage. The government established the program using the country’s existing, mandatory deposit-insurance system (DIS), which was private, ex post funded, and segmented into sectoral schemes that covered different kinds of financial institutions. During payouts, the schemes covered the first EUR 50,000 (USD 67,000) of guaranteed funds to a given depositor, and the government the government covered the rest. The government required all financial institutions …

Broad-Based Emergency Liquidity Programs, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Sean Fulmer, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In this paper, we analyze broad-based emergency liquidity (BBEL) programs. Our main purpose is to assist policymakers who are considering establishing a BBEL program in designing the most effective program possible as efficiently as possible. Our insights are derived from 33 case studies the Yale Program on Financial Stability produced and existing literature on the topic.

Liquidity provision is a long-established mandate of central banks and was a function that private entities performed even before the establishment of central banks. We survey a sampling of cases from the 19th through 21st centuries, drawn from 10 countries and regions, to distill …

Australia: Financial Claims Scheme, Ezekiel Vergara

Journal of Financial Crises

Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, the Australian government intervened in its own banking system, both to support domestic depositors and to keep its banking system competitive with those in countries whose regulators had already intervened. On October 12, 2008, the Australian government announced the Financial Claims Scheme (FCS) to insure bank depositors. The deposit guarantee automatically insured depositors at all authorized deposit-taking institutions and covered a range of deposit accounts. As initially announced, the FCS would provide a blanket guarantee to all depositors with no fee for participation. This blanket guarantee, however, prompted a migration …

Market Support Programs: Covid-19 Crisis, June Rhee, Lily S. Engbith, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

This paper is an analysis of important considerations for policymakers seeking to establish a market support program (MSP). Our main purpose is to assist policymakers who have already made the decision to use an MSP in designing the most effective program possible. Our insights derive from 23 case studies the Yale Program on Financial Stability produced and existing literature on the topic.

By the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), market-based finance and traditional banking systems were significantly intertwined, and the panic in market-based finance threatened to spread quickly to both traditional banks and the real economy. In response, …

Dividends And Bank Capital In The Global Financial Crisis Of 2007–2009, Viral V. Acharya, Irvind Gujral, Nirupama Kulkarni, Hyun Song Shin

Journal of Financial Crises

The headline numbers appear to show that even as banks and financial intermediaries suffered large credit losses in the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, they raised substantial amounts of new capital, both from private investors and from government-funded capital injections. However, on closer inspection, the composition of bank capital shifted radically from one based on common equity to that based on debt-like hybrid claims such as preferred equity and subordinated debt. The erosion of common equity was exacerbated by large-scale payments of dividends, in spite of widely anticipated credit losses. Dividend payments represent a transfer from creditors (and potentially taxpayers) …

Account Guarantee Survey, Christian M. Mcnamara, Adam Kulam, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

This paper surveys 27 account guarantee (AG) programs across 14 Key Design Decisions. The main themes that emerge are: (a) the importance of considering the effects of AG programs on other parts of the financial system or other jurisdictions, (b) the ability to address moral hazard through heightened supervision, which removes a potential obstacle to adopting AG programs in response to the acute phase of crises, (c) the necessity of developing guarantees that are credible and timely, and (d) the need to design standing AG programs with an eye toward how they will function during crises.

‘Vox Populi?:’ Assessing Nato Popularity Relative To Political And Economic Indicators In Selected Member Nations, Zachary W. Cheek

Undergraduate Economic Review

This paper seeks to identify the impact of political and economic conditions on a nation’s popularity/favorability ratings towards North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the world’s most powerful military alliance. It is found that in random-effect models there exists a significant positive relationship between a country’s democratic strength and favorability, as well as a negative relationship regarding unemployment. In fixed-effect models, however, there is slight evidence of a positive relationship with per-capita GDP, as well as negative relationships with the unemployment rate and the trade index. Overall, differences in member-nations largely account for whether democratic or macroeconomic conditions influence support.

Financial Inclusion And Monetary Policy - Investigating The Relationship Between Financial Inclusion And Monetary Policy: The Case Of Egypt, Salma Maher

Theses and Dissertations

In the past decade, financial inclusion has become an issue of increasing importance to developing nations. This is due to its perceived effects on poverty alleviation, sustainable growth and enhancing monetary policy effectiveness. Unfortunately, there is little empirical research on the effects of financial inclusion. The thesis hopes to contribute to the literature by inspecting the relationship between financial utilization indices and monetary policy in Egypt. The thesis utilizes quarterly data on outstanding deposits and loans from 2004 to 2020 as well as a VAR model – supplemented with an ARDL model – to test the aforementioned relationship. The thesis …

Climate Trailblazer Or Corporate Giveaway: An Economic And Political Evaluation Of Cap-And-Trade In California, Benjamin Reicher

Pomona Senior Theses

In this thesis, I conduct an economic and political analysis of California’s cap-and-trade program, the leading national (and international) example of a market-based strategy to reduce climate-warming greenhouse gas emissions. I evaluate the program on several economic and political measures of success, especially as contrasted with the performance of various regulatory policies that California also relies on to meet its emissions reduction targets. These regulations exemplify a command and control approach to emissions mitigation as opposed to a market-based approach, and indeed tend to be favored by grassroots activists who may be skeptical about market-friendly policies; my thesis seeks to …

Investigating The Impacts Of Monetary Policy On Income Inequality In Developed Nations: Case Study Of The Euro Area, Japan And The United States, Hector Martinez Garcia

Masters Theses

This paper tries to evaluate the effect that unconventional monetary policy has had on income inequality for the set of Eurozone countries, the United States and Japan using an unbalanced panel data model over the period from 1980 to 2021, first jointly and then individually, using different regressions for each case. Based on the regression model analyzed, the study attempts to analyze the relationship between money supply and income inequality as measured by the Gini index using fixed effects and random effects for our panel data model. The study reveals the importance of the money supply variable in reducing inequality …

Lessons Learned: Lewis "Lee" Sachs, Yasemin Esmen

Journal of Financial Crises

Lewis “Lee” Sachs was counselor to Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner and head of the Obama administration’s Financial Crisis Response Team in the US Department of the Treasury. Mr. Sachs led the development and coordination of the Obama administration’s Financial Stability Plan to stabilize the financial system during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09 (GFC). He was tasked with continued coordination with the outgoing Bush administration, as well as putting together a team to develop further restructuring plans and oversee their execution. This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview with Mr. Sachs.

Lessons Learned: William Nelson, Sandra Ward

Journal of Financial Crises

William Nelson was deputy director, Division of Monetary Affairs, at the Federal Reserve Board during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09 (GFC). As the nation’s central bank, chief financial regulator, and lender of last resort, the Federal Reserve Board took the lead in setting monetary policy and stabilizing the financial system during the crisis.

Nelson’s responsibilities at the Fed during the crisis included analysis of monetary policy and discount window policy as well as financial institution supervision, and he regularly briefed the board and the Federal Open Market Committee. He developed special expertise in designing liquidity facilities and was a …

Lessons Learned: Timothy Massad, Yasemin Esmen

Journal of Financial Crises

Timothy Massad was assistant secretary for financial stability at the US Department of the Treasury between 2009 and 2014. He oversaw the $700 billion Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), which was passed by Congress in October 2008 to enable the Treasury to buy assets of and invest in banks and companies to stem the financial crisis. Massad was involved in the implementation of TARP as well as its winding down; it ultimately invested $439 billion. This “Lessons Learned” is based on a phone interview with Mr. Massad.

Lessons Learned: Andreas Lehnert, Mercedes Cardona

Journal of Financial Crises

Andreas Lehnert was chief of the Federal Reserve’s Household and Real Estate Finance Section at the onset of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09 (GFC) and played a key role in implementing the Fed’s research and policy agenda on financial stability. He developed and helped run the Fed’s first regulatory bank stress tests in 2009, and in 2010 played a role in launching the Office of Financial Stability Policy and Research, which became the Division of Financial Stability. This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview with Mr. Lehnert.

The Effect Of A Financial Crisis On Household Finances: A Case Study Of Iceland’S Financial Crisis, Axel Hall, Andri S. Scheving, Gylfi Zoega

Journal of Financial Crises

Iceland experienced a financial crisis in 2008–2009 when its banking system collapsed, the currency lost half its value, most businesses became technically insolvent, house prices fell, and household debt increased due to indexation to foreign currencies or the price level. This paper tells the story of the crisis and maps the losses to households using a dataset from tax returns that includes all taxpayers in the country and contains the value of housing, mortgage debt, disposable income, and net worth. For relative losses in net worth, the results show that families with children, especially those with parents aged between 24 …

Inflations And Its Uncertainty In Some Ecowas Member States: Transfer Entropy Approach, Otoakhia Eric I.

CBN Journal of Applied Statistics (JAS)

This study examines the information flow between inflation and inflation uncertainty (IU) and intrastate inflationary trend among some ECOWAS member states. IU is measured using GARCH models and stochastic volatility model (SV). Transfer entropy was adopted to quantify the extent of information flow. The result showed information flow exists from inflation to the GARCH measure of IU. On the reverse flow from inflation uncertainty to inflation, there is no information flow except for Burkina Faso and Gambia which have asymmetric bidirectional flow between inflation and IU. Adopting SV measure for IU, there are no support for causality from inflation to …

Lessons Learned: James Wigand, Sandra Ward

Journal of Financial Crises

A finance specialist and longtime Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) executive, James Wigand served as Deputy Director, Franchise and Asset Marketing, at the FDIC from 1997 to 2010, a period encompassing the global financial crisis of 2007-09. Wigand oversaw the resolution of all insured-depository institutions during the crisis, arranging acquisitions of troubled banks or liquidating them. He also acted as liaison between the chairman and board of directors of the FDIC. In 2010, in the aftermath of the crisis, Wigand was named director of the newly created Office of Complex Financial Institutions at the FDIC, an office formed under the …