Econometrics Commons^™

Bringing A Natural Experiment Into The Laboratory: The Measurement Of Individual Risk Attitudes, Zuzana Brokesova, Cary Deck, Jana Peliova

ESI Working Papers

Controlled laboratory experiments have become a generally accepted method for studying economic behavior, but there are two issues that regularly arise with such work. The first pertains to the ability to generalize experimental results outside the laboratory. While laboratory experiments are typically designed to mimic naturally occurring situations, ceteris paribus comparisons are rare. Using data from a promotional campaign by a bank and a matching laboratory experiment, we find similar patterns of risk taking behavior controlling for gender and age. The second issue pertains to the impact that the payment procedure in an experiment has on observed risk taking behavior. …

The Impact Of Taxes And Wasteful Government Spending On Giving, Roman M. Sheremeta, Neslihan Uler

ESI Working Papers

We examine the impact of taxes and wasteful government spending on charitable giving. In our model, the government collects a flat-rate tax on income net of donations and wastes part of the tax revenue before redistribution. The model provides theoretical predictions which we test in a framed field experiment. The results of the experiment show that the tax rate has a weak and insignificant effect on giving. The degree of waste, however, has a large, negative and significant effect on giving, with the relationship moderated by the curvature in the utility function.

Ambiguity Framed, Mark Schneider, Jonathan W. Leland, Nathaniel Wilcox

ESI Working Papers

In his exposition of subjective expected utility theory, Savage (1954) proposed that the Allais paradox could be reduced if it were recast into a format which made the appeal of the independence axiom of expected utility theory more transparent. Recent studies consistently find support for this prediction. We consider a salience-based choice model which explains this frame-dependence of the Allais paradox and derive the novel prediction that the same type of presentation format which was found to reduce Allais-style violations of expected utility theory will also reduce Ellsberg-style violations of subjective expected utility theory since that format makes the appeal …

Random Expected Utility And Certainty Equivalents: Mimicry Of Probability Weighting Functions, Nathaniel Wilcox

ESI Working Papers

For simple prospects of the kind routinely used for certainty equivalent elicitation, random expected utility preferences imply a conditional expectation function that can mimic deterministic rank dependent preferences. That is, an agent with random expected utility preferences can have mean certainty equivalents that look exactly like rank dependent probability weighting functions of the inverse-s shape discussed by Quiggin (1982) and later advocated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and other scholars. It seems that certainty equivalents cannot nonparametrically identify preferences, at least not in every relevant sense, since their conditional expectation depends on assumptions concerning the source and nature of their …

Axioms For Salience Perception, Jonathan W. Leland, Mark Schneider

ESI Working Papers

Models of salience-based choice have become popular in recent years, although there is still no known set of simple conditions or axioms which implies the existence of a salience function. In this paper, we provide simple and natural axioms that characterize the general class of salience functions. As an application we consider a salience-based model of decision making and show that within that setup the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes is a general property of a salience function and that the properties producing that pattern also account for other anomalies involving risky and intertemporal choice.

Trust And Trustworthiness Under Information Asymmetry And Ambiguity, Irma Clots-Figueras, Roberto Hernán-González, Praveen Kujal

ESI Working Papers

We introduce uncertainty and ambiguity in the standard investment game. In the uncertainty treatment, investors are informed that the return of the investment is drawn from a publicly known distribution function. In the ambiguity treatment, investors are not informed about the distribution function. We find that both trust and trustworthiness are robust to the introduction of these changes.

What Makes A Good Trader? On The Role Of Intuition And Reflection On Trader Performance, Brice Corgnet, Mark Desantis, David Porter

ESI Working Papers

Using simulations and experiments, we pinpoint two main drivers of trader performance: cognitive reflection and theory of mind. Both dimensions facilitate traders’ learning about asset valuation. Cognitive reflection helps traders use market signals to update their beliefs whereas theory of mind offers traders crucial hints on the quality of those signals. We show these skills to be complementary because traders benefit from understanding the quality of market signals only if they are capable of processing them. Cognitive reflection relates to previous Behavioral Finance research as it is the best predictor of a trader’s ability to avoid commonly-observed behavioral biases.

Gender Biases In Delegation, Eleonora Bottino, Teresa García-Muñoz, Praveen Kujal

ESI Working Papers

We explore gender biases towards delegation in a modified (delegation) dictator game. Under compulsory delegation and no (gender) revelation no significant gender differences are observed for choices made by principals. Male agents share little with the recipients, meanwhile, female (agents) are not responsive to the incentive scheme and return less to the dictator. However, a clear dichotomy in female behavior is observed under gender revelation. As principals, females behave similar to their male counterparts and appoint as agents those who return more to them. On the other hand, as agents’ females show greater redistributive concerns relative to their male counterparts …

The Effects Of Experience, Choice Architecture, And Cognitive Reflection In Individual And Strategic Decisions, Mark Schneider, David Porter

ESI Working Papers

Cognitive reflection has been shown to be an important trait which is correlated with the propensity to: take risks, delay gratification, and form accurate beliefs about others’ behavior. However, previous research has not cleanly identified whether reflective thinkers make ‘better’ decisions than intuitive thinkers, since inferences of decision quality are confounded by inferences regarding risk preferences, time preferences, and beliefs. We directly test for differences in decision quality between reflective thinkers and intuitive thinkers in both individual and strategic decisions using a design which makes it possible to objectively rank risky and strategic choices, independent of one’s attitudes toward risk …

Money And The Scale Of Cooperation, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari

ESI Working Papers

This study reveals the existence of a causal link between the availability of money and an expanded scale of interaction. We constructed an experiment where participants chose the group size, either a low-value partnership or a high-value group of strangers, and then faced an intertemporal cooperative task. Theoretically, a monetary system was inessential to achieve cooperation. Empirically, without a working monetary system, participants were reluctant to expand the scale of interaction; and when they did, they ended up destroying surplus compared to partnerships, because cooperation collapsed in large groups. This economic failure was reversed only when participants managed to concurrently …

Tug-Of-War In The Laboratory, Cary Deck, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

Tug-of-war is a multi-battle contest often used to describe extended interactions in economics, management, political science, and other disciplines. While there has been some theoretical work, there is scant empirical evidence regarding behavior in a tug-of-war game. To the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first experimental study of the tug-of-war. The results show notable deviations of behavior from theory. In the first battle of the tug-of-war, subjects exert fewer resources, while in the follow-up battles, they exert more resources than predicted. Also, contrary to the theoretical prediction, resource expenditures tend to increase in the duration of the …

How Does The Stock Market Value The Renewable Energy Sector: A Public Announcement Analysis And Test Of The Efficient Market Hypothesis, Jack Crampton

Journal of Environmental and Resource Economics at Colby

This study analyzes the market reaction to public announcements in the stock market. The efficient market hypothesis is put to test and similar studies are reexamined in the context of the renewable energy sector. Through fixed effects models, we can assess the validity to the efficient market hypothesis and assess how the market values the clean energy sector.

A Royal Problem: Planning Induced Supply Constraints In London, Elizabeth P. Armstrong

Lawrence University Honors Projects

We explore the impact of regulatory supply constraints on house price levels following boom and bust periods in London. We hypothesize that when regulatory restrictiveness increases during a boom period, house prices will be higher in the following year compared to house prices in less restricted areas. We also hypothesize that when regulatory restrictiveness increases during a bust period, house prices will be lower in the following year compared to house prices in less restricted areas. We empirically test our hypothesis using a multilevel mixed-effects model with a panel data set of 32 boroughs of London, ranging from 2001 to …

Public Goods With Punishment & Payment For Relative Rank, Terence C. Burnham

ESI Working Papers

A laboratory experiment designed to investigate the role of relative performance-based payoffs on cooperation in the context of punishment. Subjects play a repeated public goods game with high-powered punishment (50:1) and additional payoffs based on relative performance. Contributions to the public good are nearly maximal. Punishment levels are substantial, higher than the same game without relative rank payoffs, and sufficiently high that total payoffs are negative. The group would make much more money in the same setting without punishment. This study contributes to investigation of the role of altruism in human cooperation.

The Impact Of Offcial Development Assistance On Foreign Direct Investment: Evidence From Vietnam, Hang Pham

Master's Theses

The relationship between Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Official Development Assistance (ODA) has not been fully established, nor has its directionality, as evidenced the disagreement among economists. Using existing literature as starting point, I extend its base by examining key causal variables for ODA and FDI within 64 Vietnamese provinces, covering the span from 1998 to 2012. With the most extensive and newest dataset available, I find that ODA attracts more FDI inflows in intermediate term (5year average) and long term (all year average), but not in the short-term. An important policy implication of these results for developing countries, and …

The Impact Of Migration And Remittances On Children's Education In El Salvador, Philip H. Jakob

Master's Theses

The effect that migrant remittances have on school enrollment is a challenging relationship to empirically define, requiring both an analysis of the circumstances that lead a household member to emigrate from their home and equally, but not always independently, how the family makes investment decisions in the education of one or more of their children. This study presents a new strategy to determine the nature of this relationship for households in El Salvador, using a 2SLS estimation with a wealth-stratified panel constructed from household survey data over a nine-year period. Employing this methodology to estimate the combined effects of both …

A Test Of The Household Separation Hypothesis In Rwanda, James E. Anderson

Master's Theses

How does a farm household in rural Africa react when the government decides crop selection? In developing countries, agricultural households strive to optimize a risk mitigating utility function rather than a traditional agricultural production function. These households are termed “non-separated” as their farming efforts are directed towards family food security rather than maximizing agricultural profits. The lack of integration with labor and commodity markets makes these non-separated households difficult to influence with policy initiatives. Various tests for household separation have been developed.

We use a unique dataset from Rwanda to evaluate these separation tests. The data include households forced into …

Do Footprint-Based Cafe Standards Make Car Models Bigger?, Brianna Marie Jean

Economics

Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards have historically been set equal across all manufacturer fleets of the same type. Concerns about varying costs across firms and safety implications of standards that are set homogeneously across firms and models resulted in a policy shift towards footprint-based standards. Under this type of standard, individual car models face targets based on the size of the area between the wheelbase and wheel track, so that larger models face less stringent standards, and manufacturers who make, on average, larger cars will face a lighter fleet standard. Theoretical models have shown that this type of policy …

Economic Analysis Of Flight Delay, Nathan D. Boettcher

Seaver College Research And Scholarly Achievement Symposium

Our project began as an investigation into the phenomenon of flight delay. We approached this problem with two goals in mind. First, we used mathematical statistics and econometric methods to develop a predictive model of flight delay. An improved forecasting process has obvious benefits for customers, and would additionally shed light on the factors which airports and airlines should seek to change in order to reduce flight delay. Our secondary goal was to complement this predictive research with a theoretical analysis of the incentive structure that consumers and producers face. We limited the scope of this model to delayed flights …

Analyzing Options Market Toxicity And The Black-Scholes Formula In The Presence Of Jump Diffusion As Simulated With Agent-Based Modeling, William D. Elliott

Undergraduate Economic Review

This paper presents new and significant research on the Black-Scholes Formula using the agent-based modeling software NetLogo. The software was used to simulate an options market subject to jump diffusion. Since the widely-used Black-Scholes Formula has at times proven unreliable, this research sought to understand circumstances that render the formula ineffective. It was hypothesized that markets would become difficult to trade in or “toxic” at low price volatility but high jump volatility. Further, it was predicted that kurtosis would alert the presence of toxic markets by accurately and consistently conveying whether jump diffusion was present.

Nonparametric Testing For Anomaly Effects In Empirical Asset Pricing Models, Sainan Jin, Liangjun Su, Yonghui Zhang

Research Collection School Of Economics

In this paper, we propose a class of nonparametric tests for anomaly effects in empirical asset pricing models in the framework of nonparametric panel data models with interactive fixed effects. Our approach has two prominent features: one is the adoption of nonparametric functional form to capture the anomaly effects of some asset-specific characteristics and the other is the flexible treatment of both observed/constructed and unobserved common factors. By estimating the unknown factors, betas, and nonparametric function simultaneously, our setup is robust to misspecification of functional form and common factors and avoids the well-known "error-in-variable" problem associated with the commonly used …

Language And Cooperation In Hominin Scavenging, Bart J. Wilson, Samuel R. Harris

ESI Working Papers

Bickerton (2009, 2014) hypothesizes that language emerged as the solution to a scavenging problem faced by proto‐humans. We design a virtual world to explore how people use words to persuade others to work together for a common end. By gradually reducing the vocabularies that the participants can use, we trace the process of solving the hominin scavenging problem. Our experiment changes the way we think about social dilemmas. Instead of asking how does a group overcome the selfinterest of its constituents, the question becomes, how do constituents persuade one another to work together for a common end that yields a …

Sharing As Risk Pooling In A Social Dilemma Experiment, Todd L. Cherry, E. Lance Howe, James J. Murphy

ESI Working Papers

In rural economies with missing or incomplete markets, idiosyncratic risk is frequently pooled through informal networks. Idiosyncratic shocks, however, are not limited to private goods but can also restrict an individual from partaking in or benefiting from a collective activity. In these situations, a group must decide whether to provide insurance to the affected member. In this paper, we describe results of a laboratory experiment designed to test whether a simple sharing institution can sustain risk pooling in a social dilemma with idiosyncratic risk. We test whether risk can be pooled without a commitment device and, separately, whether effective risk …

Revisiting The Tradeoff Between Risk And Incentives: The Shocking Effect Of Random Shocks, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez

ESI Working Papers

Despite its central role in the theory of incentives, empirical evidence of a tradeoff between risk and incentives remains scarce. We reexamine this empirical puzzle in a controlled laboratory environment so as to isolate possible confounding factors encountered in the field. In line with the principal-agent model, we find that principals increase fixed pay while lowering performance pay when the relationship between effort and output is noisier. Unexpectedly, agents produce substantially more in the noisy environment than in the baseline despite lesser pay for performance. We show that this result can be accounted for by introducing agents’ loss aversion in …

The Cognitive Basis Of Social Behavior: Cognitive Reflection Overrides Antisocial But Not Always Prosocial Motives, Brice Corgnet, Antonio M. Espín, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez

ESI Working Papers

Even though human social behavior has received considerable scientific attention in the last decades, its cognitive underpinnings are still poorly understood. Applying a dual-process framework to the study of social preferences, we show in two studies that individuals with a more reflective/deliberative cognitive style, as measured by scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), are more likely to make choices consistent with “mild” altruism in simple non-strategic decisions. Such choices increase social welfare by increasing the other person’s payoff at very low or no cost for the individual. The choices of less reflective individuals (i.e. those who rely more heavily …

Dynamic Directed Search, Gabriele Camera, Jaehong Kim

ESI Working Papers

The directed search model (Peters, 1984) is static; its dynamic extensions typically restrict strategies, often assuming price or match commitments. We lift such restrictions to study equilibrium when search can be directed over time, without constraints and at no cost. In equilibrium trade frictions arise endogenously, and price commitments, if they do exist, are self-enforcing. In contrast to the typical model, there exists a continuum of equilibria that exhibit trade frictions. These equilibria support any price above the static price, including monopoly pricing in arbitrarily large markets. Dispersion in posted prices can naturally arise as temporary or permanent phenomenon despite …

Generalizations Of The General Lotto And Colonel Blotto Games, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson

ESI Working Papers

In this paper, we generalize the General Lotto game (budget constraints satisfied in expectation) and the Colonel Blotto game (budget constraints hold with probability one) to allow for battlefield valuations that are heterogeneous across battlefields and asymmetric across players, and for the players to have asymmetric resource constraints. We completely characterize Nash equilibrium in the generalized version of the General Lotto game and then show how this characterization can be applied to identify equilibria in the Colonel Blotto version of the game. In both games, we find that there exist sets of non-pathological parameter configurations of positive Lebesgue measure with …

The Impact Of Social Information On The Voluntary Provision Of Public Goods: A Replication Study, James J. Murphy, Nomin Batmunkh, Ben Nilson, Samantha Ray

ESI Working Papers

Shang and Croson (2009) found that providing information about the donation decisions of others can have a positive impact on individual donations to public radio. In this study, we attempted to replicate their results, however, we found no evidence of that social comparisons affected donation decisions. Most of our donors were renewing members, a group which Shang and Croson also found were not influenced by social information.

On The Merit Of Equal Pay: When Influence Activities Interact With Incentive Setting, Brice Corgnet, Ludivine Martin, Peguy Ndodjang, Angela Sutan

ESI Working Papers

Influence costs models predict that organizations should limit managerial discretion to deter organizational members from engaging in wasteful politicking activities. We test this conjecture in a controlled, yet realistic, work environment in which we allow employees to influence managers’ decisions about rewards. We find that influence activities are pervasive and significantly lower organizational performance. Organizational performance suffers because principals offer weaker incentives when influence activities are allowed than when they are not. Importantly, we show that equal pay incentive schemes perform better when influence activities are available than when they are not. Our results thus support the idea that prevalent …

When Income Depends On Performance And Luck: The Effects Of Culture And Information On Giving, Pedro Rey-Biel, Roman M. Sheremeta, Neslihan Uler

ESI Working Papers

We study how giving depends on income and luck, and how culture and information about the determinants of others’ income affect this relationship. Our data come from an experiment conducted in two countries, the US and Spain, which have different beliefs about how income inequality arises. We find no cross-cultural differences in giving when individuals are informed about the determinants of income, but when uninformed, Americans give less than Spanish. Culture and information not only affect individual giving, but also the determinants of giving and the beliefs about how income inequality arises. Beliefs partially moderate cross-cultural differences in giving.