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Articles 331 - 350 of 350
Full-Text Articles in Cognitive Neuroscience
Should Fish Feel Pain? A Plant Perspective, František Baluška
Should Fish Feel Pain? A Plant Perspective, František Baluška
Animal Sentience
Key (2016) claims fish that fish do not feel pain because they lack the necessary neuronal architecture: their responses to noxious stimuli, according to Key, are executed automatically without any feelings. However, as pointed out by many of his commentators, this conclusion is not convincing. Plants might provide some clues. Plants are not usually thought to be very active behaviorally, but the evidence suggests otherwise. Moreover, in stressful situations, plants produce numerous chemicals that have painkilling and anesthetic properties. Finally, plants, when treated with anesthetics, cannot execute active behaviors such as touch-induced leaf movements or rapid trap closures after localizing …
A Single Strand Of Argument With Unfounded Conclusion, Robert W. Elwood
A Single Strand Of Argument With Unfounded Conclusion, Robert W. Elwood
Animal Sentience
Key (2016) describes the neural system involved in human pain experience in an excellent fashion but then suggests that only that complete system can generate the experience of pain. Thus animals without all components will not feel pain. This argument has been refuted in the past by analogy to vision where it is clear that a broad range of taxa, vertebrate and invertebrate, have good visual abilities albeit with completely different central nervous systems and receptors. This known counterargument to Key’s main idea is not mentioned in the target article. Further criteria that might indicate pain and studies examining these …
Pain And Fish Welfare, Eliane Gonçalves-De-Freitas
Pain And Fish Welfare, Eliane Gonçalves-De-Freitas
Animal Sentience
The evolutionary approach of Key’s (2016) target article, generically comparing humans with fish of all kinds, is simplistic. The author ignores published research on structural and molecular aspects of pain in fish. The target article reads more like a selective polemic against fish welfare than an even-handed analysis.
Brain Processes For “Good” And “Bad” Feelings: How Far Back In Evolution?, Jaak Panksepp
Brain Processes For “Good” And “Bad” Feelings: How Far Back In Evolution?, Jaak Panksepp
Animal Sentience
The question of whether fish can experience pain or any other feelings can only be resolved by neurobiologically targeted experiments. This commentary summarizes why this is essential for resolving scientific debates about consciousness in other animals, and offers specific experiments that need to be done: (i) those that evaluate the rewarding and punishing effects of specific brain regions and systems (for instance, with deep-brain stimulation); (ii) those that evaluate the capacity of animals to regulate their affective states; and (iii) those that have direct implications for human affective feelings, with specific predictions — for instance, the development of new treatments …
Pain In Fish: Weighing The Evidence, James D. Rose
Pain In Fish: Weighing The Evidence, James D. Rose
Animal Sentience
The target article by Key (2016) examines whether fish have brain structures capable of mediating pain perception and consciousness, functions known to depend on the neocortex in humans. He concludes, as others have concluded (Rose 2002, 2007; Rose et al. 2014), that such functions are impossible for fish brains. This conclusion has been met with hypothetical assertions by others to the effect that functions of pain and consciousness may well be possible through unknown alternate neural processes. Key's argument would be bolstered by consideration of other neurological as well as behavioral evidence, which shows that sharks and ray are fishes …
Why Is Fish “Feeling” Pain Controversial?, E. Don Stevens
Why Is Fish “Feeling” Pain Controversial?, E. Don Stevens
Animal Sentience
In his excellent target article, Key (2016) develops a mechanistic argument in an attempt to show why it is unlikely that fish can “feel” pain or for that matter, “feel” anything. The topic is controversial and likely to achieve the goal of getting many hits for the inaugural issue of the new journal, Animal Sentience. In my view, the question is unlikely to be answered, for two reasons. First, because the proponents of the “fish feel pain” controversy are untrained and unskilled in the details and jargon of neurophysiology and/or neuroanatomy, and the opponents of the controversy, like Key, …
Animal Sentience: The Other-Minds Problem, Stevan Harnad
Animal Sentience: The Other-Minds Problem, Stevan Harnad
Animal Sentience
The only feelings we can feel are our own. When it comes to the feelings of others, we can only infer them, based on their behavior — unless they tell us. This is the “other-minds problem.” Within our own species, thanks to language, this problem arises only for states in which people cannot speak (infancy, aphasia, sleep, anaesthesia, coma). Our species also has a uniquely powerful empathic or “mind-reading” capacity: We can (sometimes) perceive from the behavior of others when they are in states like our own. Our inferences have also been systematized and operationalized in biobehavioral science …
End-State Welfarism, Joel Marks
End-State Welfarism, Joel Marks
Animal Sentience
Yew-Kwang Ng’s research is the work of an obviously sincere, intelligent, and conscientious animal advocate. But I am unable to accept his starting assumption that animal welfare is an appropriate basis for animal ethics. More specifically I argue that animal welfare as a means to animal liberation is an issue that can be debated, but animal welfare as the ultimate end or goal of animal advocacy is misguided.
Going Beyond Just-So Stories, Brian Key
Going Beyond Just-So Stories, Brian Key
Animal Sentience
Colloquial arguments for fish feeling pain are deeply rooted in anthropometric tendencies that confuse escape responses to noxious stimuli with evidence for consciousness. More developed arguments often rely on just-so stories of fish displaying complex behaviours as proof of consciousness. In response to commentaries on the idea that fish do not feel pain, I raise the need to go beyond just-so stories and to rigorously analyse the neural circuitry responsible for specific behaviours using new and emerging technologies in neuroscience. By deciphering the causal relationship between neural information processing and conscious behaviour, it should be possible to assess cogently the …
Spinning Our Wheels And Deepening The Divide: Call For An Evidence-Based Approach To The Fish Pain Debate, Steven J. Cooke
Spinning Our Wheels And Deepening The Divide: Call For An Evidence-Based Approach To The Fish Pain Debate, Steven J. Cooke
Animal Sentience
There is vigorous ongoing debate about whether fish feel pain and have the capacity to suffer. The body of literature dedicated to the topic is increasing but what is particularly problematic is that the majority of the contributions represent opinion pieces and thus fall within the realm of advocacy. Many of the empirical research papers purporting that fish do or do not feel pain have problems with cavalier use of definitions, poor experimental design, or statistical/technical issues and tend to include advocacy statements in their interpretations. Rather than continuing to spin our wheels and deepen the divide, I would advocate …
Fish Pain: Would It Change Current Best Practice In The Real World?, B. K. Diggles
Fish Pain: Would It Change Current Best Practice In The Real World?, B. K. Diggles
Animal Sentience
Much of the “fish pain debate” relates to how high the bar for pain should be set. The close phylogenetic affinities of teleosts with cartilaginous fishes which appear to lack nociceptors suggests caution should be applied by those who seek to lower the bar, especially given the equivocal and conflicting nature of the experimental data currently available for teleosts. Nevertheless, even if we assume fish “feel pain,” it is difficult to see how current best practice in aquaculture would change. This is because of the need to avoid stress at all stages of the rearing process to optimize health, growth …
Leaving The Door Open For Fish Pain: Evolutionary Convergence And The Utility Of ‘Just-So Stories’, David B. Edelman
Leaving The Door Open For Fish Pain: Evolutionary Convergence And The Utility Of ‘Just-So Stories’, David B. Edelman
Animal Sentience
Key argues that fish do not experience pain because they lack the necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) brain structures and associated functional circuitry to engender such conscious percepts. I propose that fish pain may be dependent on neuroanatomical regions and pathways that are structurally and/or functionally analogous — but not strictly homologous — to well-characterized mammalian substrates of pain. An example is the convergent appearance of the complex, single-compartment eye across invertebrate and vertebrate phylogeny. Structural-functional convergence is ubiquitous in evolution. Comparative inferences and correlative lines of evidence play an important role in building evolutionary arguments. The dismissal of the …
Pain-Capable Neural Substrates May Be Widely Available In The Animal Kingdom, Edgar T. Walters
Pain-Capable Neural Substrates May Be Widely Available In The Animal Kingdom, Edgar T. Walters
Animal Sentience
Neural and behavioral evidence from diverse species indicates that some forms of pain may be generated by coordinated activity in networks far smaller than the cortical pain matrix in mammals. Studies on responses to injury in squid suggest that simplification of the circuitry necessary for conscious pain might be achieved by restricting awareness to very limited information about a noxious event, possibly only to the fact that injury has occurred, ignoring information that is much less important for survival, such as the location of the injury. Some of the neural properties proposed to be critical for conscious pain in mammals …
How Not To Move The Line Drawn On Pain, Bjorn H. Merker
How Not To Move The Line Drawn On Pain, Bjorn H. Merker
Animal Sentience
In this second commentary I outline the inadequacy of Key's responses to the many peer critiques of his thesis that have so far appeared in Animal Sentience. I illustrate with examples drawn from his response to my first commentary.
Nonverbal Indicators Of Pain, Simon Van Rysewyk
Nonverbal Indicators Of Pain, Simon Van Rysewyk
Animal Sentience
In discussing fish pain, Key (2016) privileges pain in humans — “the only species able to directly report on its feelings.” Human experience of pain is not necessarily best reflected by verbal self-report, however. Neural responses to noxious stimuli are influenced by individual differences and by context. Nonverbal pain displays such as facial expressions reflect part of the neural response to noxious stimuli. Most mammals have a specific facial grimace reflecting pain. If fish have a somatic expression of pain, the development of a reliable and accurate somatic pain scale specific to fish could make a contribution to the debate …
Fish Pain: An Inconvenient Truth, Culum Brown
Fish Pain: An Inconvenient Truth, Culum Brown
Animal Sentience
Whether fish feel pain is a hot political topic. The consequences of our denial are huge given the billions of fish that are slaughtered annually for human consumption. The economic costs of changing our commercial fishery harvest practices are also likely to be great. Key outlines a structure-function analogy of pain in humans, tries to force that template on the rest of the vertebrate kingdom, and fails. His target article has so far elicited 34 commentaries from scientific experts from a broad range of disciplines; only three of these support his position. The broad consensus from the scientific community is …
Decades-Long Social Memory In Bottlenose Dolphins, Jason N. Bruck
Decades-Long Social Memory In Bottlenose Dolphins, Jason N. Bruck
Faculty Publications
Long-term social memory is important, because it is an ecologically relevant test of cognitive capacity, it helps us understand which social relationships are remembered and it relates two seemingly disparate disciplines: cognition and sociality. For dolphins, long-term memory for conspecifics could help assess social threats as well as potential social or hunting alliances in a very fluid and complex fission-fusion social system, yet we have no idea how long dolphins can remember each other. Through a playback study conducted within a multi-institution dolphin breeding consortium (where animals are moved between different facilities), recognition of unfamiliar versus familiar signature whistles of …
Chronic Ethanol Exposure Causes Disinhibited Behavior In Drosophila, Estrella Padilla, Kyung-An Han
Chronic Ethanol Exposure Causes Disinhibited Behavior In Drosophila, Estrella Padilla, Kyung-An Han
COURI Symposium Abstracts, Summer 2012
Ethanol consumption is frequently associated with disinhibited sexual and locomotor behaviors in humans. Dopamine, a major monoamine found in vertebrates and invertebrates, is implicated in these processes since it regulates motivation, reward, motor control, and sexual behaviors. The goal of this study is to elucidate the role of dopamine in ethanol-associated behavioral disinhibition using the genetically tractable model system Drosophila melanogaster. Previous studies have shown a requirement for normal dopamine neurotransmission for ethanol-induced courtship disinhibition. Furthermore, genetic manipulation of the dopamine system revealed that D1 receptor activity is important for disinhibition and D2 for sensitization. The current study focuses …
Characterization Of Neuronal Groups Regulating Sexual And Agonistic Behavior In Male Chicken (Gallus Gallus), Jingjing Xie
Characterization Of Neuronal Groups Regulating Sexual And Agonistic Behavior In Male Chicken (Gallus Gallus), Jingjing Xie
Graduate Theses and Dissertations
The study aimed to understand the neuronal regulation of male sexual and agonistic behavior in broiler breeders. First, brain structures associated with sexual and agonistic behavior were identified by mapping Fos expression. The ventromedial subnucleus of medial portion of bed nucleus of the stria teriminalis (BSTM2) was specifically activated by male courtship behavior. The medial preoptic nucleus (POM) and lateral septum (SL) were associated with both sexual and agonistic behaviors. The bed nucleus of the pallial commissure (NCPa) and the paraventricular nucleus (PVN) were closely related to stress. Second, Fos-ir neurons were phenotyped by double labeling Fos with aromatase (ARO) …
A Songbird Forebrain Area Potentially Involved In Auditory Discrimination And Memory Formation, Raphael Pinaud, Thomas A. Terleph
A Songbird Forebrain Area Potentially Involved In Auditory Discrimination And Memory Formation, Raphael Pinaud, Thomas A. Terleph
Biology Faculty Publications
Songbirds rely on auditory processing of natural communication signals for a number of social behaviors, including mate selection, individual recognition and the rare behavior of vocal learning - the ability to learn vocalizations through imitation of an adult model, rather than by instinct. Like mammals, songbirds possess a set of interconnected ascending and descending auditory brain pathways that process acoustic information and that are presumably involved in the perceptual processing of vocal communication signals. Most auditory areas studied to date are located in the caudomedial forebrain of the songbird and include the thalamo-recipient field L (subfields L1, L2 and L3), …