Law and Economics Commons^™

Incomplete Contracts In A Complete Contract World, Scott A. Baker, Kimberly D. Krawiec

ExpressO

This paper considers the role that contract doctrine should play in facilitating optimal investment in contractual relationships. All contracts are incomplete in the sense that they do not specify the optimal actions for the buyer and seller in every future contingency. This incompleteness can lead to both under and over-investment in resources specifically targeted to the needs of the other contracting party. To solve these investment problems, economists and legal scholars have looked to complicated contractual solutions and the ownership of assets.

This Article offers another solution: contract doctrine. Specifically, we propose a contractual default rule applicable to all contract …

Commodification And Contract Formation: Placing The Consideration Doctrine On Stronger Foundations, David S. Gamage

ExpressO

Under the traditional consideration doctrine, a promise is only legally enforceable if it is made in exchange for something of value. This doctrine lies at the heart of contract law, yet it lacks a sound theoretical justification – a fact that has confounded generations of scholars and created a mess of case law.

This paper argues that the failure of traditional justifications for the doctrine comes from two mistaken assumptions. First, previous scholars have assumed that anyone can back a promise with nominal consideration if they wish to do so. We show how social norms against commodification limit the availability …

Overvalued Equity And The Case For An Asymmetric Insider Trading Regime, Thomas A. Lambert

ExpressO

The forty-year debate over whether insider trading should be regulated has generally proceeded in all-or-nothing terms: Either all insider trading should be permitted (subject only to private restrictions imposed by issuers themselves), or none should. This Article argues for an asymmetric insider trading policy under which insider trading that decreases the price of an overvalued stock is generally permitted, but insider trading that increases the price of an undervalued stock is generally prohibited. Concluding that the net investor benefits of price-decreasing insider trading exceed those of price-enhancing insider trading, the Article argues that an asymmetric insider trading regime likely represents …

One-Sided Contracts In Competitive Consumer Markets, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Richard A. Posner

Michigan Law Review

The usual assumption in economic analysis of law is that in a competitive market without informational asymmetries, the terms of contracts between sellers and buyers will be optimal-that is, that any deviation from these terms would impose expected costs on one party that exceed benefits to the other. But could there be cases in which "one-sided" contracts containing terms that impose a greater expected cost on one side than benefit on the other-would be found in competitive markets even in the absence of fraud, prohibitive information costs, or other market imperfections? That is the possibility we explore in this Article.

The Role Of Nonprofits In The Production Of Boilerplate, Kevin E. Davis

Michigan Law Review

Drafting contracts-by which I really mean the documents that embody contracts-requires investments of time, experience, and ingenuity. Those investments may yield significant returns because the quality of contractual terms can be an important determinant of the gains that parties realize from trade. This in tum suggests that, from an economic perspective, it is important to understand how contracts are produced. It seems particularly important to examine the production of contracts or individual contractual terms that are widely used-that is to say, "boilerplate." In a market oriented society, boilerplate is the predominant feature of the network of legal obligations that provides …

Modularity In Contracts: Boilerplate And Information Flow, Henry E. Smith

Michigan Law Review

Contractual boilerplate is a little like property. Such a statement might seem like a category mistake. After all, contractual boilerplate language is part of contracts, which, unlike property, are freely customizable by the parties. Contracts create rights between those parties, not against the world at large. Nor do people who devise new boilerplate terms usually have intellectual property in the provisions themselves. I will argue that, in an interesting and overlooked way, boilerplate is the first way station on the road from contract to property. In particular, boilerplate, like all legal communication, is the result of striking a trade-off between …

The Secret Is Out: Patent Law Preempts Mass Market License Terms Barring Reverse Engineering For Interoperability Purposes, Daniel Laster

ExpressO

As patent protection has emerged to protect software, courts and commentators have mistakenly focused on copyright law and overlooked the centrality of patent preemption to limit contract law where a mass market license which prohibits reverse engineering (RE) for purposes of developing interoperable products leads to patent-like protection. Review of copyright fair use cases on RE and Congress’s policy favoring RE for interoperability purposes in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act reinforce the case for patent preemption. Also, the fundamental freedom to RE embodied in state trade secret law, coupled with federal patent and copyright law and policies, cumulatively should override …

“It’S The [Tort System], Stupid:” Consumer Deductibles; How To More Equitably Distribute The Risks Of Medical Malpractice And Adequately Compensate Victims Without Statutory Damage Caps., Bradford Luke Ledbetter

ExpressO

No abstract provided.

Regulating Contract Formation: Precontractual Reliance, Sunk Costs, And Market Structure, Ofer Grosskopf, Barak Medina

ExpressO

This Article challenges the plausibility of the prospect of underinvestment in precontractual reliance (PCR). We argue that a negotiating party is motivated to invest in PCR not only through her expectation to extract the benefits that the investment yields (Added-Value Motivation), but also through the effect of the investment on her position vis-à-vis her competitors (Competition-Based Motivation). We demonstrate that under plausible assumptions, when a negotiating party operates in a relatively competitive market, the Competition-Based Motivation is frequently sufficient to induce optimal PCR, even without appropriate contractual provisions or legal intervention.

We suggest several normative implications. First, legal intervention that …

Choice, Consent, And Cycling: The Hidden Limitations Of Consent, Leo Katz

Michigan Law Review

Most legal scholars assume that if V consents to allow D to do something to him, such consent makes D's actions legally and morally acceptable. To be sure, they are willing to make an exception when consent is given under a specified list of conditions: Force, fraud, incompetence, third-party effects, unequal bargaining power, commodification, paternalism - all of these may be grounds for rejecting the validity of V's consent. We might call scholars who take this view of consent quasi-libertarians. In this Article, I argue against the quasi-libertarian view of consent. My central claim is that the validity of consent …

It’S Not About The Money: The Role Of Preferences, Cognitive Biases And Heuristics Among Professional Athletes, Michael Mccann

Law Faculty Scholarship

Professional athletes are often regarded as selfish, greedy, and out-of-touch with regular people. They hire agents who are vilified for negotiating employment contracts that occasionally yield compensation in excess of national gross domestic products. Professional athletes are thus commonly assumed to most value economic remuneration, rather than the love of the game or some other intangible, romanticized inclination.

Lending credibility to this intuition is the rational actor model, a law and economic precept which presupposes that when individuals are presented with a set of choices, they rationally weigh costs and benefits, and select the course of action that maximizes their …

Penalty Defaults In Family Law: The Case Of Child Custody, Margaret F. Brinig

Journal Articles

This paper considers whether an amendment to state divorce laws that strengthens its joint custody preference operates as a traditional default rule, specifying what most divorcing couples would choose or as a penalty default rule the parties will attempt to contract around.

While the Oregon statutes that frame our discussion here, like most state laws, do not state an explicit preference for joint custody, shared custody is certainly encouraged by Section 107.179, which refers cases in which the parties cannot agree on joint custody to mediation and by Section 107.105, which requires the court to consider awarding custody jointly. In …

The Law And Economics Of Contracts, Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz, Richard Craswell

Faculty Scholarship

This paper, which will appear as a chapter in the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics (A.M. Polinsky & S. Shavell, eds.), surveys major issues arising in the economic analysis of contract law. It begins with an introductory discussion of scope and methodology, and then addresses four topic areas that correspond to the major doctrinal divisions of the law of contracts. These areas include freedom of contract (i.e., the scope of private power to create binding obligations), formation of contracts (both the procedural mechanics of exchange, and rules that govern pre-contractual behavior), contract interpretation (what consequences follow when agreements are …

Boilerplate Today: The Rise Of Modularity And The Waning Of Consent, Margaret Jane Radin

Michigan Law Review

Thanks to the vision of Omri Ben-Shahar and the excellence of the scholars contributing to this symposium, students of the law of commercial exchange transactions will now understand how important and interesting, and indeed exciting, boilerplate really is. The various presentations are so rich that my assigned task of commentary cannot approach an adequate summation. Instead of attempting such a task, therefore, I will take up a slightly different one. My commentary will relate some of the ideas presented in the symposium to two themes that I think are significant for the groundwork of contract today: the growing modularity of …

The Law And Sociology Of Boilerplate, Todd D. Rakoff

Michigan Law Review

In my view, the scholarship presented at this symposium demonstrates that, in order to analyze form contracts and boilerplate successfully, one must carry out a set of operations that embodies an approach I will call law and sociology. But I presume I was invited to be a commentator at this conference on boilerplate not because the article I wrote on one branch of the subject awhile back exemplified this methodological approach, but because it took a rather strong substantive position. And so I think I ought first to say a brief word about that. The article in question concerned contracts …

Boilerplate And Economic Power In Auto Manufacturing Contracts, Omri Ben-Shahar, James J. White

Articles

This Article is structured as follows. Part I compares the terms and conditions in the purchase orders of the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and highlights important differences in the substance of these boilerplate provisions. It argues that these differences cannot be easily reconciled with the prediction that sophisticated parties draft the most efficient boilerplate terms. Part II examines how these forms are drafted, how their terms are negotiated, and how the OEMs guard their terms from erosion. It provides some insight on how tailoring occurs and how the internal organization of a party to a deal affects the terms that …

Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Breaking The Bank: Revisiting Central Bank Of Denver After Enron And Sarbanes-Oxley, Celia Taylor

ExpressO

No abstract provided.

Is Forum-Shopping Corrupting America's Bankruptcy Courts? Review Of Lynn M. Lopucki, "Courting Failure: How Competition For Big Cases Is Corrupting The Bankruptcy Courts", Todd J. Zywicki

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

In his new book, Courting Failure: How Competition for Big Cases is Corrupting the Bankruptcy Courts, Professor Lynn LoPucki’s book argues that that current bankruptcy venue rules have spawned an improper “competition for big cases” that has “corrupted” America’s bankruptcy courts. LoPucki argues that this competition has harmed the bankruptcy system and the economy, transferring wealth from creditors and employees to incumbent management and bankruptcy professionals. He also argues that the competition that has corrupted the American bankruptcy system is being replicated internationally, resulting in a similar competition and similar harm on the global stage.

This essay reviews LoPucki’s book …

The Comparative Law And Economics Of Pure Economic Loss, Francesco Parisi, Vernon Valentine Palmer, Mauro Bussani

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

Law and economics shows that a key factor in determining the optimal economic loss rule is found in the relationship between pure economic loss and social loss. Economic loss should be compensable in torts only to the extent that it corresponds to a socially relevant loss. In this paper we undertake a comparative evaluation of the economic loss rule to verify whether modern legal systems, although not formally adopting the economic criterion, define the exclusionary rule in light of efficiency considerations. The comparative analysis reveals that the substantive applications of the economic loss rule in European jurisdictions are consistent with …

Unity And Pluralism In Contract Law, Nathan Oman

Michigan Law Review

It is a cliché of contemporary legal scholarship that, in the last few decades, the study of law has witnessed a vast proliferation of competing theoretical approaches. The old faith in the careful honing of doctrinal concepts and the essential usefulness of legal analysis has given way to a cacophony of competing theoretical sects. Economists, moral philosophers, sociologists, historians, and others have stepped forward to offer the insights of this or that discipline as a new and superior path to legal enlightenment. Perhaps nowhere has this cliché been truer than in the realm of contracts scholarship, where, for a generation, …

Price, Path & Pride: Third-Party Closing Opinion Practice Among U.S. Lawyers (A Preliminary Investigation), Jonathan C. Lipson

ExpressO

This article presents the first in-depth exploration of third-party closing opinions, a common but curious – and potentially troubling -- feature of U.S. business law practice. Third-party closing opinions are letters delivered at the closing of most large transactions by the attorney for one party (e.g., the borrower) to the other party (e.g., the lender) offering limited assurance that the transaction will have legal force and effect.

Hundreds, if not thousands, of legal opinions are delivered every week. Yet, lawyers often complain that they create needless risk and cost, and produce little benefit. Closing opinions thus pose a basic question: …

Institutions, Incentives, And Consumer Bankruptcy Reform, Todd Zywicki

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

Consumer bankruptcy filing rates have soared during the past 25 years. From 225,000 filings in 1979, consumer bankruptcies topped 1.5 million during 2004. This relentless upward trend is striking in light of the generally high prosperity, low interest rates, and low unemployment during that period. This anomaly of ever-upward bankruptcy filing rates during a period of economic prosperity had spurred calls to reform the Bankruptcy Code to place new conditions on bankruptcy relief. Although bankruptcy reform has drawn broad bipartisan support on Capitol Hill, these proposals have proven controversial within the academy. Critics have argued that these reforms are unnecessary …

The Missing Preferred Return, Victor Fleischer

ExpressO

Managers of buyout funds typically offer their investors an 8% preferred return on their investment before they take a share of any additional profits. Venture capitalists, on the other hand, rarely offer a preferred return. Instead, VCs take their cut from the first dollar of nominal profits. This disparity between venture funds and buyout funds is especially striking because the contracts that determine fund organization and compensation are otherwise very similar. The missing preferred return might suggest that agency costs pose a larger problem in venture capital than previously thought. Is the missing preferred return evidence, perhaps, that VCs are …

An Alternative Paradigm For Valuing Breach Of Registration Rights And Loss Of Liquidity, Royce De R. Barondes

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Risk Management In Long-Term Contracts, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

Long-term contracts are designed to manage risk. After a brief discussion of why it is unhelpful to invoke risk aversion for analyzing serious commercial transactions between sophisticated entities, this paper focuses on adaptation to changed circumstances. In particular, it considers the options to abandon and the discretion to change quantity. It then analyzes a poorly designed contract between Alcoa and Essex showing how the parties misframed their problem and designed a long-term contract that was doomed to fail.

Reading Wood V. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon With Help From The Kewpie Dolls, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

In Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, Cardozo found consideration in an apparently illusory contract by implying a reasonable effort obligation. Unbeknownst to Cardozo, Wood had agreed to represent Rose O'Neill, the inventory of the kewpie doll in an earlier exclusive contract. Wood sued O'Neill two months prior to entering into the Lucy arrangement. That contract included an explicit best efforts clause. The failure to include such a clause in this contract was, quite likely, deliberate, suggesting that Wood was trying to avoid making a binding commitment to Lucy. The paper examines both the kewpie doll and Lucy contract in some …

Lawyers' Bargaining Ethics, Contract, And Collaboration: The End Of The Legal Profession And The Beginning Of Professional Pluralism, Scott R. Peppet

Publications

This Article combines contractarian economics and traditional ethical theory to argue for a radical revision of the legal profession's codes of ethics. That revision would end the legal profession as we know it-one profession, regulated by one set of ethical rules that apply to all lawyers regardless of circumstance. It would replace the existing uniform conception of the lawyer's role with a more heterogeneous profession in which lawyers and clients could contractually choose the ethical obligations under which they wanted to operate. This "contract model" of legal ethics, in which lawyers could opt in and out of various ethical constraints, …

An Ex-Ante View Of The Battle Of The Forms: Inducing Parties To Draft Reasonable Terms, Omri Ben-Shahar

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

This paper focuses on one type of ex-ante effect of the battle of the forms: the incentive to draft reasonable boilerplate terms. It argues that the experience with the battle-of-the-forms rule under the CISG reinforces what we already know, that existing legal solutions do not provide any incentive for the parties to draft reasonable forms. The paper suggests that the goal of inducing parties to draft reasonable terms can be significantly promoted by a third rule, a variant of the “best-shot” rule proposed by Victor Goldberg. Under the version labeled the “reasonable-shot” rule, the court would resolve the battle of …

Small Business And The False Dichotomies Of Contract Law, Larry Garvin

The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law Working Paper Series

The article explores the classic consumer- merchant dichotomy from the vantage of small businesses. Using empirical data and the psychology, economics, and management literature, it shows that small businesses, treated like large businesses throughout most of contract and commercial law, in fact behave more like consumers. Small businesses lack the financial strength of large businesses. They generally lack the information gathering ability of large businesses. Finally, they generally are more prey to cognitive errors than are large businesses. As a result, small businesses lose in two ways. When they deal with consumers, they are presumed to have the power, information, …