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Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics

Property Rights In Children, Barry E. Adler, Alexis A. Alvarez May 2020

Property Rights In Children, Barry E. Adler, Alexis A. Alvarez

Notre Dame Law Review

In 1978, Dr. Elisabeth Landes and then-Professor, later-Judge Richard Posner, published The Economics of the Baby Shortage. The article openly discussed how economic analysis can address the allocation of babies available for adoption. The ideas expressed in the article were widely denounced as an inhumane commodification of children, something tolerable only in the twisted minds of academic authors. Despite the backlash, an odd thing happened in the more than four decades since Landes and Posner wrote on this topic: their ideas began to take hold. Today, almost all states in the United States permit, in some form, the contractual …


Comment: On Contractual Defaults And Experimental Law And Economics, Avishalom Tor Jan 2007

Comment: On Contractual Defaults And Experimental Law And Economics, Avishalom Tor

Journal Articles

It is possible that contract default rules, whose relevance is contingent upon parties' agreement to contract, differ from other default states. Parties therefore might not perceive contingent contractual defaults as relevant reference points. Ironically, however, Sloof, Oosterbeek and Sonnemans' (SOS) "default contract" applied inevitably whenever proposed and whenever Respondents rejected a non-default proposal, bearing greater resemblance to a legal right than to a contractual default. Thus, the contingency of typical contractual defaults cannot account for the No Bias Finding. Other aspects of the SOS experimental design, on the other hand, may explain the No Bias Finding.


Penalty Defaults In Family Law: The Case Of Child Custody, Margaret F. Brinig Jan 2006

Penalty Defaults In Family Law: The Case Of Child Custody, Margaret F. Brinig

Journal Articles

This paper considers whether an amendment to state divorce laws that strengthens its joint custody preference operates as a traditional default rule, specifying what most divorcing couples would choose or as a penalty default rule the parties will attempt to contract around.

While the Oregon statutes that frame our discussion here, like most state laws, do not state an explicit preference for joint custody, shared custody is certainly encouraged by Section 107.179, which refers cases in which the parties cannot agree on joint custody to mediation and by Section 107.105, which requires the court to consider awarding custody jointly. In …


"Money Can't Buy Me Love": A Contrast Between Damages In Family Law And Contract, Margaret F. Brinig Jan 2002

"Money Can't Buy Me Love": A Contrast Between Damages In Family Law And Contract, Margaret F. Brinig

Journal Articles

As my contribution to this symposium in David's honor, I submit the law and economics section of the damages chapter of our joint enterprise, Understanding Contracts. Because of David's failing health, my own involvement with the publisher never reached contract stage. The chapter concludes with a problem that illustrates some of the intricacies of mixing family law and contract. David and I grappled for some time with the answer to the problem, coming at it from our different points of view. On one occasion, David, with a twinkle, told me there was only one place where I was "absolutely wrong." …


Co-Operative Marketing--Statutes Providing Penalty Against Third Persons Who Induce Breach Of Marketing Contracts, Thomas F. Broden Jan 1947

Co-Operative Marketing--Statutes Providing Penalty Against Third Persons Who Induce Breach Of Marketing Contracts, Thomas F. Broden

Journal Articles

Capitalism is most prudent in accepting into its legal system measures of governmental regulation which apply to economic relations generally and contract relations particularly. Efforts of the executive, legislative or judicial branches of either British or American governments to directly control phases of contractual relationships have generally met staunch and rigid opposition. The spirit of the sacredness and inviolability of the contract relation was a logical outgrowth of the capitalistic system in its inception. At that time freedom was a passion, self-sufficiency a goal. From an era thus shrouded and bedecked with individualism, it is little wonder that measures affecting, …