Law and Economics | Open Access Articles | Digital Commons Network™

Contract Law’S Transferability Bias, Paul Macmahon Apr 2020

Contract Law’S Transferability Bias, Paul Macmahon

Indiana Law Journal

When A makes a contract with B, it comes as no surprise that she is liable to B. If B can transfer her contractual rights to C, A is now liable to C. Parties in A’s position often have strong reasons to avoid being liable to suit by C. Contract law, however, seems determined to minimize and override these concerns. Under current doctrine on the assignment of contractual rights—the focus of this Article—the law often imposes its own preference for transferability on the parties. The law generally assumes that contractual rights are assignable, construes exceptions to that general rule narrowly, …

Go to article

Bitcoin: Order Without Law In The Digital Age, John O. Mcginnis, Kyle Roche Oct 2019

Bitcoin: Order Without Law In The Digital Age, John O. Mcginnis, Kyle Roche

Indiana Law Journal

Modern law makes currency a creature of the state and ultimately the value of its currency depends on the public’s trust in that state. While some nations are more capable than others at instilling public trust in the stability of their monetary institutions, it is nonetheless impossible for any legal system to make the pre-commitments necessary to completely isolate the governance of its money supply from political pressure. This proposition is true not only today, where nearly all government institutions manage their money supply in the form of central banking, but also true of past private banking regimes circulating their …

Go to article

Collapsing Illusions: Standards For Setting Efficient Contract And Other Defaults, Steven J. Burton Apr 2016

Collapsing Illusions: Standards For Setting Efficient Contract And Other Defaults, Steven J. Burton

Indiana Law Journal

In this Essay, Professor Burton analyzes and evaluates four commonly used standards for setting efficient default rules and standards. Based on two theoretical insights, he shows that three of them collapse upon analysis into the fourth, a Coasian standard that turns out to be a dead end. The theoretical upshot is that the Coase Theorem often is a good reason to use defaults rather than mandatory rules or standards. But neither the theorem nor reference to a transaction-costless world sustains particular defaults. To set an efficient default, the law should guide courts toward supplying terms that parties should have adopted …

Go to article

Goodwill U: School Name Change & Trademark Law, Alexandra J. Roberts Apr 2013