Law and Economics Commons^™

Innovation Versus Encrustation: Agency Costs In Contract Reproduction, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

This article studies the impact of exogenous legal change on whether and how lawyers across four different deal types revise their contracts’ governing law clauses in order to solve the problem that the legal change created. The governing law clause is present in practically every contract across a wide range of industries and, in particular, it appears in deals as disparate as private equity M&A transactions and sovereign bond issuances. Properly drafted, the clause increases the ex ante economic value of the contract to both parties by reducing uncertainty and litigation risk. We posit that different levels of agency costs …

The Lost Volume Seller In English Law, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

If a buyer breaches a contract but the market price has remained unchanged, English courts and the treatises have treated the seller as a “lost volume seller.” The seller, it is argued, could have had two sales, not one, so it lost the profit on the second sale. This paper recognizes that the buyer has an option to terminate and that the contract prices that option. The implicit option price of the lost volume remedy results in an absurd contract, setting the option price high when it should be low and vice versa. The default rule ought to be the …

Why Autonomy Must Be Contract's Ultimate Value, Hanoch Dagan, Michael A. Heller

Faculty Scholarship

In “The Choice Theory of Contracts”, we develop a liberal theory of contract law. One core task of the book was to persuade advocates of economic analysis that they must situate their enterprise within our liberal framework. Autonomy, rightly understood, is the telos of contract.

Oren Bar-Gill pushes back strongly in “Choice Theory and the Economic Analysis of Contracts”. He offers a penetrating – perhaps devastating – critique of our approach. Bar-Gill notes the substantial convergence between choice theory and a welfarist view. If he is right, then what does choice theory add?

Our task in Part I of this …

Consequential Damages And Exclusion Clauses, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

Contracts often include language excluding compensation for consequential damages. However, the boundary between consequential and direct damages is a blurry one. Courts have used concepts like foreseeability, natural result of the breach, and collateral business in their attempts to define the boundary. Those categories, I argue, are not particularly helpful. I consider three classes of cases: wrongful termination, delay, and breach of warranty. This paper argues that lost profits, when referring to the change in value of the contract after a wrongful termination would be direct damages; the hard case involves terminated dealers who had been paid indirectly for retailing …

The Middleman’S Damages Revisited, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

If A promises to sell to B who, in turn, promises to sell to C and either A or C breaches should B receive the gain it expected had both transactions occurred (lost profits) or the larger market/contract differential? Recent case law and commentary argues for the lost profit remedy. The argument is that there is a conflict between awarding market damages and making the nonbreacher whole. This paper argues that there is no conflict. If B were a broker, and C breached, then A would have an action against C for market damages. If B were party to the …

The Lost Volume Seller, R.I.P., Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

If the buyer breaches a sales contract, and if the seller can be characterized as a lost volume seller, courts and commentators have argued that the seller should be made whole by compensation for its lost profits. This paper argues that framing the problem in this way leads to an absurd result. The buyer has a termination option and the remedy should be the implicit option price. The lost profit remedy sets a price on that option, a price that bears no relation to reality. Examination of the case law suggests three conclusions: (a) the remedy often sets an excessive …

A Note On Victoria Laundry, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

In Victoria Laundry v Newman, Asquith LJ claimed that the headnote in Hadley v. Baxendale was “definitely misleading” noting that had it been accurate, the decision would have been decided the other way. In this note, I argue that the headnote was not misleading and, even if it were, his conclusion did not follow. His interpretation lowered the standard for finding liability for consequential damage. Given the facts, Victoria Laundry would have lost, even with his new standard. His solution was simple: alter the facts.

Variation In Boilerplate: Rational Design Or Random Mutation?, Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

Standard contract doctrine presumes that sophisticated parties choose their terminology carefully because they want courts or counterparts to understand what they intended. The implication of this “Rational Design” model of rational behavior is that courts should pay careful attention to the precise phrasing of contracts. Using a study of the sovereign bond market, we examine the Rational Design model as applied to standard-form contracting. In NML v. Argentina, federal courts in New York attached importance to the precise phrasing of the boilerplate contracts at issue. The industry promptly condemned the decision for a supposedly erroneous interpretation of a variant of …

After The Golden Victory: Still Lost At Sea, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

In The Golden Victory the House of Lords held that when determining damages for a repudiatory breach, in a conflict between the compensatory principle and finality, the former trumped. The decision was recently ratified by the Supreme Court in Bunge SA v. Nidera BV. The claim in this paper is that this was a mistake; properly conceived, there is no conflict. The contract should be viewed as an asset and compensation would entail determining the decline in value of that asset at the time of the breach. The value of the contract at that moment would reflect the possible effects …

From British Westinghouse To The New Flamenco: Misunderstanding Mitigation, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

Both the venerable British Westinghouse decision and the current New Flamenco case have been analyzed in terms of mitigation. Properly understood, in neither is mitigation relevant. Although in the former, the House of Lords came to the right result, the replacement of the substandard turbines with new superior ones was not to mitigate damages — the buyer would have installed the new turbines even had the Westinghouse turbines met the contractual specifications. Even if Westinghouse’s failure accelerated the replacement (which it almost certainly did not) it would have been a mistake to compensate the buyer for the cost of the …

Ex Ante Choice Of Jury Waiver Clauses In Mergers, Darius Palia, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

This paper examines empirically why sophisticated parties in some merger and acquisition deals choose to waive their right to jury trials and some do not. We examine merger agreements for a large sample of 276 deals for the 11-year period 2001 to 2011. We exclude private company deals and those where the choice of forum and law is Delaware. First, we find that 48.2% of the deals have jury waiver clauses. Second, we find that deals in which New York is chosen as the governing law and forum state are more likely to include a jury waiver clause. No other …

A Crib Sheet For Contracts Profs, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

Over the last two decades I have been digging into the facts on a number of contracts cases, many of them featured in casebooks. I have collected the material in two books; one appeared in 2006 and the other is hot off the presses. This brief paper provides a roadmap for professors who might want more depth on the cases than is provided in the decisions or the casebooks. A recurring theme in the two books is that parties designing their contractual relationships must deal with change. This shows up in the manner in which they price the option to …

Freedom Of Contracts, Hanoch Dagan, Michael Heller

Faculty Scholarship

“Freedom of contracts” has two components: (1) the familiar freedom to bargain for terms within a contract and (2) the long-neglected freedom to choose from among contract types. Theories built on the first freedom have reached an impasse; attention to the second points toward a long-elusive goal, a liberal and general theory of contract law. This theory is liberal because it develops an appealing conception of contractual autonomy grounded in the actual diversity of contract types. It is general because it explains how contract values – utility, community, and autonomy – properly relate to each other across contract types. Finally, …

Law By Non Sequitur: Norcon V. Niagara Mohawk, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

Under the common law, a contracting party could only demand assurance of performance if the other party was insolvent. If a party had reasonable grounds for insecurity, the UCC §2-609 allowed it demand adequate assurance even if the counterparty were solvent. The Restatement (Second) adopted the same rule for non-goods. In NorCon v. Niagara Mohawk the New York court extended the adequate assurance doctrine for some non-goods contracts. Although the decision seems to imply that there is some relation between the NorCon facts and its conclusion as to the law, there is none. Relying primarily on material available to the …

Lawyers Asleep At The Wheel? The Gm-Fisher Body Contract, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

In the analysis of vertical integration by contract versus ownership one event has dominated the discussion – General Motors' merger with Fisher Body in 1926. The debates have all been premised on the assumption that the ten-year contract between the parties signed in 1919 was a legally enforceable agreement. However, it was not. Because Fisher's promise was illusory the contract lacked consideration. This note suggests that GM's counsel must have known this. It raises a significant question in transactional engineering: what is the function of an agreement that is not legally enforceable.

The Law And Economics Of Contracts, Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz, Richard Craswell

Faculty Scholarship

This paper, which will appear as a chapter in the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics (A.M. Polinsky & S. Shavell, eds.), surveys major issues arising in the economic analysis of contract law. It begins with an introductory discussion of scope and methodology, and then addresses four topic areas that correspond to the major doctrinal divisions of the law of contracts. These areas include freedom of contract (i.e., the scope of private power to create binding obligations), formation of contracts (both the procedural mechanics of exchange, and rules that govern pre-contractual behavior), contract interpretation (what consequences follow when agreements are …

Risk Management In Long-Term Contracts, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

Long-term contracts are designed to manage risk. After a brief discussion of why it is unhelpful to invoke risk aversion for analyzing serious commercial transactions between sophisticated entities, this paper focuses on adaptation to changed circumstances. In particular, it considers the options to abandon and the discretion to change quantity. It then analyzes a poorly designed contract between Alcoa and Essex showing how the parties misframed their problem and designed a long-term contract that was doomed to fail.

Reading Wood V. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon With Help From The Kewpie Dolls, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

In Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, Cardozo found consideration in an apparently illusory contract by implying a reasonable effort obligation. Unbeknownst to Cardozo, Wood had agreed to represent Rose O'Neill, the inventory of the kewpie doll in an earlier exclusive contract. Wood sued O'Neill two months prior to entering into the Lucy arrangement. That contract included an explicit best efforts clause. The failure to include such a clause in this contract was, quite likely, deliberate, suggesting that Wood was trying to avoid making a binding commitment to Lucy. The paper examines both the kewpie doll and Lucy contract in some …

The Methodological Commitments Of Contemporary Contract Theory, Jody S. Kraus

Faculty Scholarship

Autonomy and economic theories of contract seem to provide incompatible accounts of contract law. In this Chapter, I argue that what appear to be first-order disagreements over particular contract doctrines are really implicit second-order disagreements reflecting the divergent methodological commitments of autonomy and economic theories. I argue that autonomy theories accord priority to the normative project of justifying existing contract doctrine, treat contract law as consisting in the plain meaning of doctrine, require contract theory to explain the distinctive character of contract law, and take the ex post perspective in adjudication. In contrast, economic theories accord priority to the positive …

Economic Reasoning And The Framing Of Contract Law: Sale Of An Asset Of Uncertain Value, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

By analyzing two American contract law decisions, the paper illustrates the usefulness of economic analysis in framing the inquiry. The cases have a common feature, unrecognized by the courts: they both deal with the production and transfer of information regarding the sale of an asset of uncertain value. One involves the combination of an option and a lockup to encourage the buyer to produce information. The other involves contingent compensation to convey the seller's assurance of the quality of the assets. Once this is recognized, the outcomes are straightforward.

Trade Secrets And Mutual Investments, Gillian L. Lester, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

This paper employs an optimal contracting framework to study the question of how courts should adjudicate disputes over valuable trade secrets (such as customer lists). We focus principally on contexts where trade secrets are formed endogenously, through specific, non-contractible investments that could potentially come from either employers or employees (or both). Within such contexts, we argue, an "optimal" trade secret law diverges in many important respects from existing doctrine. In particular, an optimal doctrine would (1) expressly consider the parties' relative skills at making value enhancing investments rather than the mere existence of a valuable informational asset; (2) tend to …

Standard Form Contracts, Avery W. Katz

Faculty Scholarship

Among legal commentators, standard form contracts have long been received with distrust, and the rules governing their interpretation have engendered considerable controversy. While economic analysis has little to say regarding the libertarian objection to standard form contracts or their relationship to personal autonomy, it can help evaluate their effects on efficiency and the distribution of the gains from trade. From such a perspective, standard forms should be analyzed like any other productive input, comparable to design, marketing, and technical support. Whether their use raises any special regulatory or policy concerns, therefore, depends on their implications for the standard litany of …

Contract Formation And Interpretation, Avery W. Katz

Faculty Scholarship

Much research in law and economics, following Coase's insight that the effects of a legal rule depend on the ability of those whom it governs to bargain around it, has undertaken to explain how substantive entitlements such as property rights influence the bargaining process. Perhaps more important than any substantive rights or duties in this regard, however, is the extensive body of contract doctrine that governs the procedural mechanics of exchange. The formal rules of contract formation, by attaching consequences to the various acts and omissions that bargainers can choose from in a negotiation, affect the parties' incentives to make …