Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- Uniform Commercial Code (6)
- Boilerplate: Foundations of Market Contracts Symposium (5)
- Section 2-207 (5)
- Empiricism (4)
- Letter of credit (4)
-
- Cross-border transaction (3)
- Efficiency (3)
- Obligations (3)
- Payment-assurance (3)
- Waiver (3)
- Authenticity (2)
- Book transaction system (2)
- Breach (2)
- Clearinghouse requirement (2)
- Commercial self-regulation (2)
- Commodity (2)
- Consent (2)
- Consumers (2)
- Context (2)
- Contract terms (2)
- Corporations (2)
- Currency (2)
- Derivative (2)
- Disclosure (2)
- Discrepancy (2)
- Documentary-collection (2)
- Dojima Rice Exchange (2)
- Federalism (2)
- Feudalism (2)
- Future contract (2)
Articles 1 - 30 of 40
Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics
Moral Diversity And Efficient Breach, Matthew A. Seligman
Moral Diversity And Efficient Breach, Matthew A. Seligman
Michigan Law Review
Most people think it is morally wrong to breach a contract. But sophisticated commercial parties, like large corporations, have no objection to breaching contracts and paying the price in damages when doing so is in their self-interest. The literature has ignored the profound legal, economic, and normative implications of that asymmetry between individuals’ and firms’ approaches to breach. To individuals, a contract is a promise that cannot be broken regardless of the financial stakes. For example, millions of homeowners refused to breach their mortgage contracts in the aftermath of the housing crisis even though doing so could have saved them …
Rationality's Reach, Adam B. Badawi
Rationality's Reach, Adam B. Badawi
Michigan Law Review
Economic analysis and the rational actor model have dominated contracts scholarship for at least a generation. In the past fifteen years or so, however, a group of behaviorists has challenged the ability of the rational choice model to account for consumer behavior. These behaviorists are not trying to dismantle the entire enterprise. They generally accept the fundamentals of economic analysis but argue that the rational actor model can be improved by incorporating evidence of decisionmaking flaws that people exhibit. Oren Bar-Gill has been one of the foremost and influential proponents of a behaviorist take on contracts, and his recent book, …
Efficient Breach Of International Law: Optimal Remedies, 'Legalized Noncompliance,' And Related Issues, Eric A. Posner, Alan O. Sykes
Efficient Breach Of International Law: Optimal Remedies, 'Legalized Noncompliance,' And Related Issues, Eric A. Posner, Alan O. Sykes
Michigan Law Review
In much of the scholarly literature on international law, there is a tendency to condemn violations of the law and to leave it at that. If all violations of international law were indeed undesirable, this tendency would be unobjectionable. We argue in this Article, however that a variety of circumstances arise under which violations of international law are desirable from an economic standpoint. The reasons why are much the same as the reasons why nonperformance of private contracts is sometimes desirable- the concept of "efficient breach," familiar to modern students of contract law, has direct applicability to international law. As …
Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan
Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan
Michigan Law Review
This Article offers experimental evidence that parties are more willing to exploit efficient-breach opportunities when the contract in question includes a liquidated-damages clause. Economists claim that the theory of efficient breach allows us to predict when parties will choose to breach a contract if the legal remedy for breach is expectation damages. However, the economic assumption of rational wealth-maximizing actors fails to capture important, shared, nonmonetary values and incentives that shape behavior in predictable ways. When interpersonal obligations are informal or underspecified, people act in accordance with shared community norms, like the moral norm of keeping promises. However, when sanctions …
The Fault Principle As The Chameleon Of Contract Law: A Market Function Approach, Stefan Grundmann
The Fault Principle As The Chameleon Of Contract Law: A Market Function Approach, Stefan Grundmann
Michigan Law Review
This Article begins with a comparative law survey showing that all legal systems do not opt exclusively for fault liability or strict liability in contract law, but often adopt a more nuanced approach. This approach includes intermediate solutions such as reversing the burden of proof, using a market ("objective") standard of care, distinguishing between different types of contracts, and providing a "second chance" to breaching parties. Taking this starting point seriously and arguing that it is highly unlikely that all legal systems err, this Article argues that the core question is how and when each liability regime should prevail or …
Has Corporate Law Failed? Addressing Proposals For Reform, Antony Page
Has Corporate Law Failed? Addressing Proposals For Reform, Antony Page
Michigan Law Review
Part I of this Review discusses the modem "nexus of contracts" approach to corporations and highlights how Greenfield's views differ. Part II examines corporate goals and purposes, suggesting that Greenfield overstates the impact of the shareholder-primacy norm and does not offer a preferable alternative. Part III critiques the means to the ends--Greenfield's proposals for changing the mechanics of corporate governance. Although several of his proposals are intriguing, they seem unlikely to achieve their pro-social aims. This Review remains skeptical, in part because-even given its problems-the U.S. "director-centric governance structure has created the most successful economy the world has ever seen." …
One-Sided Contracts In Competitive Consumer Markets, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Richard A. Posner
One-Sided Contracts In Competitive Consumer Markets, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Richard A. Posner
Michigan Law Review
The usual assumption in economic analysis of law is that in a competitive market without informational asymmetries, the terms of contracts between sellers and buyers will be optimal-that is, that any deviation from these terms would impose expected costs on one party that exceed benefits to the other. But could there be cases in which "one-sided" contracts containing terms that impose a greater expected cost on one side than benefit on the other-would be found in competitive markets even in the absence of fraud, prohibitive information costs, or other market imperfections? That is the possibility we explore in this Article.
Modularity In Contracts: Boilerplate And Information Flow, Henry E. Smith
Modularity In Contracts: Boilerplate And Information Flow, Henry E. Smith
Michigan Law Review
Contractual boilerplate is a little like property. Such a statement might seem like a category mistake. After all, contractual boilerplate language is part of contracts, which, unlike property, are freely customizable by the parties. Contracts create rights between those parties, not against the world at large. Nor do people who devise new boilerplate terms usually have intellectual property in the provisions themselves. I will argue that, in an interesting and overlooked way, boilerplate is the first way station on the road from contract to property. In particular, boilerplate, like all legal communication, is the result of striking a trade-off between …
The Role Of Nonprofits In The Production Of Boilerplate, Kevin E. Davis
The Role Of Nonprofits In The Production Of Boilerplate, Kevin E. Davis
Michigan Law Review
Drafting contracts-by which I really mean the documents that embody contracts-requires investments of time, experience, and ingenuity. Those investments may yield significant returns because the quality of contractual terms can be an important determinant of the gains that parties realize from trade. This in tum suggests that, from an economic perspective, it is important to understand how contracts are produced. It seems particularly important to examine the production of contracts or individual contractual terms that are widely used-that is to say, "boilerplate." In a market oriented society, boilerplate is the predominant feature of the network of legal obligations that provides …
Choice, Consent, And Cycling: The Hidden Limitations Of Consent, Leo Katz
Choice, Consent, And Cycling: The Hidden Limitations Of Consent, Leo Katz
Michigan Law Review
Most legal scholars assume that if V consents to allow D to do something to him, such consent makes D's actions legally and morally acceptable. To be sure, they are willing to make an exception when consent is given under a specified list of conditions: Force, fraud, incompetence, third-party effects, unequal bargaining power, commodification, paternalism - all of these may be grounds for rejecting the validity of V's consent. We might call scholars who take this view of consent quasi-libertarians. In this Article, I argue against the quasi-libertarian view of consent. My central claim is that the validity of consent …
Boilerplate Today: The Rise Of Modularity And The Waning Of Consent, Margaret Jane Radin
Boilerplate Today: The Rise Of Modularity And The Waning Of Consent, Margaret Jane Radin
Michigan Law Review
Thanks to the vision of Omri Ben-Shahar and the excellence of the scholars contributing to this symposium, students of the law of commercial exchange transactions will now understand how important and interesting, and indeed exciting, boilerplate really is. The various presentations are so rich that my assigned task of commentary cannot approach an adequate summation. Instead of attempting such a task, therefore, I will take up a slightly different one. My commentary will relate some of the ideas presented in the symposium to two themes that I think are significant for the groundwork of contract today: the growing modularity of …
The Law And Sociology Of Boilerplate, Todd D. Rakoff
The Law And Sociology Of Boilerplate, Todd D. Rakoff
Michigan Law Review
In my view, the scholarship presented at this symposium demonstrates that, in order to analyze form contracts and boilerplate successfully, one must carry out a set of operations that embodies an approach I will call law and sociology. But I presume I was invited to be a commentator at this conference on boilerplate not because the article I wrote on one branch of the subject awhile back exemplified this methodological approach, but because it took a rather strong substantive position. And so I think I ought first to say a brief word about that. The article in question concerned contracts …
Unity And Pluralism In Contract Law, Nathan Oman
Unity And Pluralism In Contract Law, Nathan Oman
Michigan Law Review
It is a cliché of contemporary legal scholarship that, in the last few decades, the study of law has witnessed a vast proliferation of competing theoretical approaches. The old faith in the careful honing of doctrinal concepts and the essential usefulness of legal analysis has given way to a cacophony of competing theoretical sects. Economists, moral philosophers, sociologists, historians, and others have stepped forward to offer the insights of this or that discipline as a new and superior path to legal enlightenment. Perhaps nowhere has this cliché been truer than in the realm of contracts scholarship, where, for a generation, …
Venture Capital On The Downside: Preferred Stock And Corporate Control, William W. Bratton
Venture Capital On The Downside: Preferred Stock And Corporate Control, William W. Bratton
Michigan Law Review
When stock indices drop precipitously, when the startup companies fizzle out, and when it stops raining money on places like Wall Street and Silicon Valley, attention turns to downside contracting. Law and business lawyers, sitting in the back seat as mere facilitators on the upside, move up to the front and sometimes even take the wheel. The job is the same on both the upside and downside: to maximize the value of going concern assets. But what comes easily on the upside can be dirty work on the down, where assets need to be separated from dysfunctional teams of business …
Exploring The Battle Of The Forms In Action, Daniel Keating
Exploring The Battle Of The Forms In Action, Daniel Keating
Michigan Law Review
Like many commercial law professors, I have long been fascinated with the workings of the Uniform Commercial Code's section 2-207, the "battle of the forms" provision. There are two features of that section, one internal and one external, that make it such an intriguing statute to ponder. The internal source of fascination with section 2-207 is that it provides a classic model for teaching students about the intricacies of statutory construction. There is probably no other provision within U.C.C. Article 2 that provides more confusion to law students and more challenge to the instructor than does section 2-207. There is …
Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order, John Mcmillan, Christopher Woodruff
Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order, John Mcmillan, Christopher Woodruff
Michigan Law Review
Businesspeople need contractual assurance. Most transactions are less straightforward than a cash sale of an easily identifiable item. Buyers need assurance of the quality of what they are purchasing, and sellers need assurance that bills will be paid. The legal system may not always be available to provide contractual assurance - and when the law is dysfunctional, private order might arise in its place. Many developing and transition economies have dysfunctional legal systems, either because the laws do not exist or because the machinery for enforcing them is inadequate. In such countries, bilateral relationships, communal norms, trade associations, or market …
A Public Choice Approach To Private Ordering: Rent-Seeking At The World's First Futures Exchange: Comments On Mark West's 'Private Ordering At The World's First Futures Exchange', Omri Yadlin
Michigan Law Review
The literature on private ordering systems has expanded exponentially over the last decade. Yet, very few scholars have actually attempted to define the term "private ordering" - a failure that sometimes leads to confusion. Some scholars identify private ordering with non-state ordering. According to this view, the private legal systems Robert Ellickson, Lisa Bernstein, McMillan & Woodruff, Mark West, and others have investigated are "private" simply because their norms are not manufactured or enforced by the state. The alternative view emphasizes the decentralized feature of private ordering systems. Robert Ellickson, for example, studied "how people manage to interact to mutual …
Empirical Insight And Some Thoughts On Future(S) Investigation: Comments On Mark West's 'Private Ordering At The World's First Futures Exchange', A.W. Brian Simpson
Empirical Insight And Some Thoughts On Future(S) Investigation: Comments On Mark West's 'Private Ordering At The World's First Futures Exchange', A.W. Brian Simpson
Michigan Law Review
Some considerable number of years ago, when I was in Chicago, I had a plan to undertake a general study of the origins of futures markets. They fascinated me for a variety of reasons, one being their bizarre nature: traders meeting together, usually in some form of ring, in order to sell, on a huge scale, quantities of commodities which they neither possess, nor intend to possess, to other traders, who have not the least wish to receive such commodities, and nowhere to put them if they did. At first sight it appears a weird perversion of the institution of …
Enforcing Contracts In Dysfunctional Legal Systems: The Close Relationship Between Public And Private Orders: A Repy To Mcmillan And Woodruff, Ariel Porat
Michigan Law Review
When the public order is dysfunctional, a private order for enforcing contracts will develop. In the absence of courts, transactors will seek ways to secure performance without recourse to legal sanctions. Social and economic sanctions imposed on the party in breach, whether by the aggrieved party or by the economic and social community in which both parties operate, replace legal sanctions. These sanctions sometimes arise within a private order functioning spontaneously, as when ongoing contractual relationships prevail between the parties, or when a close-knit economic or social community exists in which information concerning breaches of contract flows freely. In other …
The Role Of Letters Of Credit In Payment Transactions, Ronald J. Mann
The Role Of Letters Of Credit In Payment Transactions, Ronald J. Mann
Michigan Law Review
Common justifications for the use of the letter of credit fail to explain its widespread use. The classic explanation claims that the letter of credit provides an effective assurance of payment from a financially responsible third party. In that story, the seller - a Taiwanese clothing manufacturer, for example - fears that the overseas buyer - Wal-Mart - will refuse to pay once the goods have been shipped. Cross-border transactions magnify the concern, because the difficulties of litigating in a distant forum will hinder the manufacturer's efforts to force the distant buyer to pay. The manufacturer-seller solves that problem by …
Letters Of Credit As Signals: Comments On Ronald Mann's 'The Role Of Letters Of Credit In Payment Transactions', Clayton P. Gillette
Letters Of Credit As Signals: Comments On Ronald Mann's 'The Role Of Letters Of Credit In Payment Transactions', Clayton P. Gillette
Michigan Law Review
Why would buyers and sellers transact with each other through a third party that charges a significant fee for its services and that typically is authorized to make payment notwithstanding noncompliance with the very prerequisites that it has been engaged to monitor? This is the puzzle that Ronald Mann's provocative and nuanced article purports to explain. Under the traditional story about the esoteric world of letters of credit, these transactions allow distant buyers and sellers to circumvent obstacles that would otherwise frustrate long-distance transactions. The traditional story explains that these credits induce buyers to approve payment prior to receiving conforming …
Reconciling The Old Theory And The New Evidence: Comments On Ronald Mann's 'The Role Of Letters Of Credit In Payment Transactions', Jacob I. Corré
Reconciling The Old Theory And The New Evidence: Comments On Ronald Mann's 'The Role Of Letters Of Credit In Payment Transactions', Jacob I. Corré
Michigan Law Review
Ronald Mann's thorough research and rigorous analysis provide compelling evidence that the commercial letter of credit does not further the fundamental purpose traditionally associated with it. Equally persuasive are his hypotheses about the functions that letters of credit actually serve in the real world. The objective statistics are startling. An overwhelming majority of letter of credit seller-beneficiaries make at least initial presentations to issuing or correspondent banks that by the express terms of the letter of credit do not entitle the seller to payment. Without a waiver from its customer, the issuing bank is legally entitled to, and surely will …
Informality As A Bilateral Assurance Mechanism: Comments On Ronald Mann's 'The Role Of Letters Of Credit In Payment Transactions', Avery Wiener Katz
Informality As A Bilateral Assurance Mechanism: Comments On Ronald Mann's 'The Role Of Letters Of Credit In Payment Transactions', Avery Wiener Katz
Michigan Law Review
Ronald Mann's study of documentary defects in the presentation of commercial letters of credit is a valuable contribution to the commercial law literature in at least three respects. First, it offers a detailed and thorough empirical survey of an important though specialized aspect of commercial practice. Mann collected and coded a data sample of 500 randomly selected letter-of-credit transactions, personally evaluating each transaction to determine whether the documentary presentation by the beneficiary of the letter of credit (i.e., the seller) complied with the letter's formal terms. Then, for each case in which he found one or more documentary defects, Mann …
Commercial Norms And The Fine Art Of The Small Con: Comments On Daniel Keating's 'Exploring The Battle Of The Forms In Action', Douglas G. Baird
Commercial Norms And The Fine Art Of The Small Con: Comments On Daniel Keating's 'Exploring The Battle Of The Forms In Action', Douglas G. Baird
Michigan Law Review
The standard battle-of-the-forms story, often rehearsed in the classroom, is one in which merchants try to take advantage of their contracting opposites. A seller wants to escape the obligations that come with implied terms and seeks to disclaim them in its acknowledgment form. Its buyers do not realize they have been had until after the goods fail. Only then do they read the seller's form and discover that they are without remedy. Conspicuously absent in Dan Keating's fine article, however, is any evidence that supports this story. Some of his merchants talk about putting favorable terms in their forms, but …
The Sound Of One Form Battling: Comments On Daniel Keating's 'Exploring The Battle Of The Forms In Action', Richard Craswell
The Sound Of One Form Battling: Comments On Daniel Keating's 'Exploring The Battle Of The Forms In Action', Richard Craswell
Michigan Law Review
Daniel Keating has provided a thoughtful and useful study of the way that businesses form contracts. In particular, he has given us a good deal of data concerning the problem known as the "battle of the forms." Commercial lawyers have, of course, been wrangling over this problem for decades, so it is no small accomplishment to be able to offer a useful contribution. In Part I below, I describe more precisely just what Keating's data does and does not illuminate. Parts II and III then focus on a particular contracting practice that Keating has identified: the practice of getting both …
The Limits Of Empiricism: What Facts Tell Us: Comments On Daniel Keating's 'Exploring The Battle Of The Forms In Action', Dennis Patterson
The Limits Of Empiricism: What Facts Tell Us: Comments On Daniel Keating's 'Exploring The Battle Of The Forms In Action', Dennis Patterson
Michigan Law Review
The conventional legal academic wisdom about empiricism is that empirical information is by-and-large a good thing, that we need more of it, and that empirical analysis is preferable to many scholarly alternatives now on offer in the law review literature. I do not dispute the proposition that, all things considered, empirical information is a good thing. What I question is the notion that empirical information necessarily leads to knowledge. Put differently, it is one thing to marshal the facts, and another to know what to make of the facts. I shall raise these points both in a general way and …
On The Use Of Practitioner Surveys In Commercial Law Research: Comments On Daniel Keating's 'Exploring The Battle Of The Forms In Action', Avery Wiener Katz
On The Use Of Practitioner Surveys In Commercial Law Research: Comments On Daniel Keating's 'Exploring The Battle Of The Forms In Action', Avery Wiener Katz
Michigan Law Review
As Daniel Keating's principal article attests, the literature on U.C.C. section 2-207 and the "battle of the forms" is both vast and intricate. 1 That fact, together with the distinguished array of commentators assembled here, makes it unlikely that I will be able to say anything substantially original on that subject. Accordingly, in the spirit of this overall symposium, I will focus the bulk of my remarks not on the substantive issues raised by Keating's article, but on his methodology. In particular, I will suggest that Keating's empirical method - the free-form, oral interview conducted personally by the principal researcher …
Private Ordering At The World's First Futures Exchange, Mark D. West
Private Ordering At The World's First Futures Exchange, Mark D. West
Michigan Law Review
Modern derivative securities - financial instruments whose value is linked to or "derived" from some other asset - are often sophisticated, complex, and subject to a variety of rules and regulations. The same is true of the derivative instruments traded at the world's first organized futures exchange, the Dojima Rice Exchange in Osaka, Japan, where trade flourished for nearly 300 years, from the late seventeenth century until shortly before World War II. This Article analyzes Dojima's organization, efficiency, and amalgam of legal and extralegal rules. In doing so, it contributes to a growing body of literature on commercial self-regulation while …
Lawyers, Law, And Contract Formation: Comments On Daniel Keating's 'Exploring The Battle Of The Forms In Action', Robert K. Rasumssen
Lawyers, Law, And Contract Formation: Comments On Daniel Keating's 'Exploring The Battle Of The Forms In Action', Robert K. Rasumssen
Michigan Law Review
Attempting to infuse the austerity of theory with a dose of reality, an intrepid group of legal scholars has left the security of the office and ventured into the work-a-day world of commercial practices. The information that they have gathered and are sharing with the rest of us is furthering our understanding of the interaction between commercial law and commercial practice. Embedded in much of the research they have generated is the not-so-flattering conclusion that law professors suffer from a self-serving bias. Those of us in the academy engage in the assumption, often unstated or even unacknowledged, that the law …
Antitrust Balancing In A (Near) Coasean World: The Case Of Franchise Tying Contracts, Alan J. Meese
Antitrust Balancing In A (Near) Coasean World: The Case Of Franchise Tying Contracts, Alan J. Meese
Michigan Law Review
Antitrust law has largely succumbed to the hegemony of balancing. Courts applying the rule of reason are told to balance a restraint's procompetitive effects against its anticompetitive impact. Mergers once deemed anticompetitive solely because they facilitated the exercise of market power are now evaluated by weighing the anticompetitive effects of such increased power against any efficiencies created by the transaction. Finally, some activities once deemed per se illegal are now subject to a balancing approach, either by explicit application of the rule of reason, or by recognition of certain affirmative defenses to otherwise per se violations. Unlike many other balancing …