Law and Economics Commons^™

Super-Statutory Contracting, Kristelia García

Publications

The conventional wisdom is that property rules induce more—and more efficient—contracting, and that when faced with rigid property rules, intellectual property owners will contract into more flexible liability rules. A series of recent, private copyright deals show some intellectual property owners doing just the opposite: faced with statutory liability rules, they are contracting for more protection than that dictated by law, something this Article calls “super-statutory contracting”—either by opting for a stronger, more tailored liability rule, or by contracting into property rule protection. Through a series of deal analyses, this Article explores this counterintuitive phenomenon, and updates seminal thinking on …

Evolution And Revolution: The Remedial Smorgasbord For Misleading Conduct In Australia, Elise Bant, Jeannie Marie Paterson

FIU Law Review

No abstract provided.

Contractual Arbitrage, Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

Standard-form contracts are likely to be incomplete because they are not tailored to the needs of particular deals. In an attempt to reduce incompleteness, standard-form contracts often contain clauses with vague or ambiguous terms. Terms with indeterminate meaning present opportunities for strategic behavior well after a contract has been executed. This linguistic uncertainty in standard-form commercial contracts creates an opportunity for “contractual arbitrage”: parties may argue ex post that the uncertainties in expression mean something that the contracting parties did not contemplate ex ante. This chapter argues that the scope for contractual arbitrage is a direct function of the techniques …

Stay In The Fight With Civility And Professionalism, David Spratt

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

No abstract provided.

Revising Boilerplate: A Comparison Of Private And Public Company Transactions, Robert E. Scott, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

The phenomenon of “sticky boilerplate” causing inefficient contract terms to persist exists across a variety of commercial contract types. One explanation for this failure to revise suboptimal terms is that the key agents on these transactions, including attorneys and investment bankers, are short sighted; their incentives are to get the deal done rather than ensure that they are using the best terms possible for their clients. Moreover, these agents face a first mover disadvantage that deters unilateral revisions to inefficient terms. If agency costs are indeed driving the stickiness phenomenon, we expect that the pace of revision will vary across …

Revising Boilerplate: A Comparison Of Private And Public Company Transactions, Stephen J. Choi, Robert E. Scott, G. Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

The textbook model of commercial contracts between sophisticated parties holds that terms are proposed, negotiated and ultimately priced by the parties. Parties reach agreement on contract provisions that best suit their transaction with the goal of maximizing the joint surplus from the contract. The reality, of course, is that the majority of the provisions in contemporary commercial contracts are boilerplate terms derived from prior transactions and even the most sophisticated contracting parties pay little attention to these standard terms, focusing instead on the price of the transaction. With standard-form or boilerplate contracts, this dynamic of replicating by rote the terms …

Rule By Data: The End Of Markets?, Katharina Pistor

Faculty Scholarship

This Article explores data as a source and, in their processed variant, as a means of governance that will likely replace both markets and the law. Discussing data not as an object of transactions or an object of governance, but as a tool for governing others on a scale that rivals that of nation states with their law, seems a fitting topic for a special issue that is devoted to the legal construction of markets. Here, I argue that while it may well be the case that law constitutes markets, markets are not the only way in which economic relations …

Anticipating Venezuela's Debt Crisis: Hidden Holdouts And The Problem Of Pricing Collective Action Clauses, Robert E. Scott, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

A creditor who asks for stronger enforcement rights upon its debtor’s default will rationally accept a lower interest rate reflecting the greater expected recovery the exercise of those rights provides. Over a dozen studies, however, have failed to document this basic relationship in the context of the collective action clause, a key provision in sovereign bonds. We conjecture that this failure is because enforcing the rights in question requires collective decision-making among anonymous creditors with different interests, impeding market predictions regarding future price effects. The pricing of rights that require collective enforcement thus turns on whether the market observes an …

Picking The Low-Hanging Fruit: A Short Essay For Michael Klausner, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

The articles that comprise this issue of the Journal of Corporation Law were first presented at a conference held at the Wharton School and co-sponsored by Wharton together with Columbia and Stanford Law Schools. The event was organized by my friend Peter Conti-Brown, to whom I am grateful for both the thought and the effort. Standing alone, the thought that the conference was warranted would have been extremely generous. However, anyone who has organized a conference knows that the idea for such events can be exciting, but what follows is an amount of work that had it been anticipated would …

Innovation Versus Encrustation: Agency Costs In Contract Reproduction, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

This article studies the impact of exogenous legal change on whether and how lawyers across four different deal types revise their contracts’ governing law clauses in order to solve the problem that the legal change created. The governing law clause is present in practically every contract across a wide range of industries and, in particular, it appears in deals as disparate as private equity M&A transactions and sovereign bond issuances. Properly drafted, the clause increases the ex ante economic value of the contract to both parties by reducing uncertainty and litigation risk. We posit that different levels of agency costs …

Some Issues On The Law Of Direct Damages (Us And Uk), Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

When a contract is breached, both U.S. and U.K. law provide that the non-breaching party should be made whole. The Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) provides that “[t]he remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed.” The English version, going back to Robinson v. Harman, is “that where a party sustains a loss by reason of breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with …

Bitcoin: Order Without Law In The Digital Age, John O. Mcginnis, Kyle Roche

Indiana Law Journal

Modern law makes currency a creature of the state and ultimately the value of its currency depends on the public’s trust in that state. While some nations are more capable than others at instilling public trust in the stability of their monetary institutions, it is nonetheless impossible for any legal system to make the pre-commitments necessary to completely isolate the governance of its money supply from political pressure. This proposition is true not only today, where nearly all government institutions manage their money supply in the form of central banking, but also true of past private banking regimes circulating their …

Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review

Seattle University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Malaysia Historical Salvors Revisited:, John P. Given

Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review

No abstract provided.

Online Terms As In Terrorem Devices, Colin P. Marks

Maryland Law Review

Online shopping has quickly replaced the brick-and-mortar experience for a large portion of the consuming public. The online transaction itself is rote: browse items, add them to your cart, and check out. Somewhere along the way, the consumer is likely made aware of (or at least exposed to) the merchant’s terms and conditions, via either a link or a pop-up box. Such terms and conditions have become so ubiquitous that most consumers would be hard-pressed to find a merchant that doesn’t try to impose them somewhere on their website. Though such terms and conditions are pervasive, most consumers do not …

Venezuela Undermines Gold Miner Crystallex's Attempts To Recover On Its Icsid Award, Sam Wesson

Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review

No abstract provided.

Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review

Seattle University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Turning Wisconn Valley Into The Next Silicon Valley: Reforming Wisconsin Non-Compete Law To Attract High-Tech Employers, Kelly Krause

Marquette Law Review

The July 2017 arrival of Taiwanese tech-giant Foxconn and the

establishment of the Wisconn Valley Science and Technology Park in Wisconsin

reflects a larger trend in the United States to reinvent the nation’s

manufacturing economy with high-tech production. High-tech employers have

substantial interests in retaining employees in order to protect their valuable

proprietary information and market share. Non-compete agreements, also

known as restrictive covenants or covenants not to compete, are often the legal

device used to secure these interests. This Comment argues that to attract and

retain employers in the tech industry, Wisconsin should reform its non-compete

law by adopting …

Is There A First-Drafter Advantage In M&A?, Adam B. Badawi, Elisabeth De Fontenay

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Advanced Artificial Intelligence And Contract, John Linarelli

Scholarly Works

The aim of this article is to inquire whether contract law can operate in a state of affairs in which artificial general intelligence (AGI) exists and has the cognitive abilities to interact with humans to exchange promises or otherwise engage in the sorts of exchanges typically governed by contract law. AGI is a long way off but its emergence may be sudden and come in the lifetimes of some people alive today. How might contract law adapt to a situation in which at least one of the contract parties could, from the standpoint of capacity to engage in promising and …

Contractual Incapacity And The Americans With Disabilities Act, Sean M. Scott

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

The doctrine of contractual incapacity allows people with mental disabilities to avoid their contractual liability. Its underlying premise is that the law has an obligation to protect people with such disabilities both from themselves and from unscrupulous people who would take advantage of them; mental incapacity provides this protection by rendering certain contracts unenforceable. The Disability Rights Movement (“DRM”), however, has challenged such protective legal doctrines, as they rest on outmoded concepts about people with mental disabilities.

This essay argues that the mental incapacity doctrine undermines the goals of the DRM and the legislative goals of the Americans with Disabilities …

Moral Diversity And Efficient Breach, Matthew A. Seligman

Michigan Law Review

Most people think it is morally wrong to breach a contract. But sophisticated commercial parties, like large corporations, have no objection to breaching contracts and paying the price in damages when doing so is in their self-interest. The literature has ignored the profound legal, economic, and normative implications of that asymmetry between individuals’ and firms’ approaches to breach. To individuals, a contract is a promise that cannot be broken regardless of the financial stakes. For example, millions of homeowners refused to breach their mortgage contracts in the aftermath of the housing crisis even though doing so could have saved them …

Franchise Regulation For The Fissured Economy, Andrew Elmore

Faculty Scholarship

Franchise stores employ nearly nine million people in the United States. Many franchisors, which own trademarks that they license to franchisees, are among the largest, most sophisticated corporations in the United States. Yet franchise store employees are often paid below the minimum wage and frequently report unsafe workplaces and workplace discrimination.

The thesis of this Article is that widespread employment law noncompliance in franchise stores is symptomatic of the failure of employment law to recognize the measures that franchisors use to protect their brand in franchise stores. Franchisors often develop intensive relationships with franchisees and franchise store employees as representatives …

Take This Job And Shove It: The Pragmatic Philosophy Of Johnny Paycheck And A Prayer For Strict Liability In Appalachia, Eugene "Trey" Moore Iii

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice

Abstract forthcoming

Towards A Distinctive Trademark Law For The 21st Century, David Vaver

Articles & Book Chapters

Canada's Trade Marks Act, when passed in 1953, was probably the best then around, but 65 years later it is ready to be pensioned off. The Act's deficiencies have become more evident as new markets and interests have gained prominence. A broadly-based Committee to reconsider the reform ofall intellectual property laws, with trademark law as one component, should be struck to produce a user-friendly code fit for 21st century commerce.

Tax Compliance In A Decentralizing Economy, Manoj Viswanathan

Georgia State University Law Review

Tax compliance in the United States has long relied on information from centralized intermediaries—the financial institutions,employers, and brokers that help ensure income is reported and taxes are paid. Yet while the IRS remains tied to these centralized entities,consumers and businesses are not. New technologies, such as sharing economy platforms (companies such as Airbnb, Uber, and Instacart)and the blockchain (the platform on which various cryptocurrencies are based) are providing new, decentralized options for exchanging goods and services.

Without legislative and agency intervention, these technologies pose a critical threat to the reporting system underlying domestic and international tax compliance. Until now, legal …

Not So Good: The Classification Of “Smart Goods” Under Ucc Article 2, Chadwick L. Williams

Georgia State University Law Review

Refrigerators can now tweet. Today, almost sixty years after the states widely adopted the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the line between goods and services is more blurred than ever. When the UCC was drafted, a good was the simple opposite of a service. A good was something “movable” and tangible, and a service was not. Article 2 of the UCC, which governs sales, limits its scope to goods.

However, because Article 2 was drafted long before the proliferation of so-called “smart goods,” courts continuously struggle to determine when a smart good falls within Article 2’s scope. Courts have developed different …

Does Contract Law Need Morality?, Kimberly D. Krawiec, Wenhao Liu

William & Mary Business Law Review

In The Dignity of Commerce, Nathan Oman sets out an ambitious market theory of contract, which he argues is a superior normative foundation for contract law than either the moralist or economic justifications that currently dominate contract theory. In doing so, he sets out a robust defense of commerce and the marketplace as contributing to human flourishing that is a refreshing and welcome contribution in an era of market alarmism. But the market theory ultimately falls short as either a normative or prescriptive theory of contract. The extent to which law, public policy, and theory should account for values …

How Well Do We Treat Each Other In Contract?, Aditi Bagchi

William & Mary Business Law Review

One of the important contributions of Nathan Oman’s new book is to draw focus onto the quality of the relationships enabled by contract. He claims that contract, by supporting markets, cultivates certain virtues; helps facilitate cooperation among people with diverse commitments; and produces the wealth that may fuel interpersonal and social justice. These claims are all plausible, though subject to individual challenge. However, there is an alternative story to tell about the kinds of relationships that arise from markets--i.e., a story about domination. The experience of domination is driven in part by the necessity, inequality, and competition enjoined by markets, …

Contract Law And The Common Good, Brian H. Bix

William & Mary Business Law Review

In The Dignity of Commerce, Nathan Oman offers a theory of contract law that is largely descriptive, but also strongly normative. His theory presents contract law’s purpose as supporting robust markets. This Article compares and contrasts Oman’s argument about the proper understanding of contract law with one presented over eighty years earlier by Morris Cohen. Oman’s focus is on the connection between Contract Law and markets; Cohen’s connection had been between Contract Law and the public interest. Oman’s work brings back Cohen’s basic insight, and gives it a more concrete form, as a formidable normative theory with detailed prescriptions.