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Articles 1 - 17 of 17
Full-Text Articles in Other Economics
Bilski And The Information Age A Decade Later, Michael J. Meurer
Bilski And The Information Age A Decade Later, Michael J. Meurer
Faculty Scholarship
In the years from State Street in 1999 to Alice in 2014, legal scholars vigorously debated whether patents should be used to incentivize the invention of business methods. That attention has waned just as economists have produced important new research on the topic, and just as artificial intelligence and cloud computing are changing the nature of business method innovation. This chapter rejoins the debate and concludes that the case for patent protection of business methods is weaker now than it was a decade ago.
Antitrust And Platform Monopoly, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust And Platform Monopoly, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Are large digital platforms that deal directly with consumers “winner take all,” or natural monopoly, firms? That question is surprisingly complex and does not produce the same answer for every platform. The closer one looks at digital platforms the less they seem to be winner-take-all. As a result, competition can be made to work in most of them. Further, antitrust enforcement, with its accommodation of firm variety, is generally superior to any form of statutory regulation that generalizes over large numbers.
Assuming that an antitrust violation is found, what should be the remedy? Breaking up large firms subject to extensive …
Follow-Up Enforcement, Andrew K. Jennings
Follow-Up Enforcement, Andrew K. Jennings
Faculty Articles
Firms sometimes break the law. When they do, a host of government agencies have power to bring enforcement actions against them, which serve to punish past wrongs, compensate victims, disgorge unlawful gains, deter others, and prevent recidivism. Each of these purposes but one—preventing recidivism—is either met or not once the case reaches settlement. Whether recidivism will occur, however, remains uncertain at the time a case is settled. In light of that uncertainty, this Article takes a critical look at how enforcers currently address recidivism prevention—what it dubs the “clawback” approach—under which defendant firms receive penalty credit today in exchange for …
Corporate Law For Good People, Yuval Feldman, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky
Corporate Law For Good People, Yuval Feldman, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky
All Faculty Scholarship
This article offers a novel analysis of the field of corporate governance by viewing it through the lens of behavioral ethics. It calls for both shifting the focus of corporate governance to a new set of loci of potential corporate wrongdoing and adding new tools to the corporate governance arsenal. The behavioral ethics scholarship emphasizes the large share of wrongdoing generated by "good people" whose intention is to act ethically. Their wrongdoing stems from "bounded ethicality" -- various cognitive and motivational processes that lead to biased decisions that seem legitimate. In the legal domain, corporate law provides the most fertile …
Securities Disclosure As Soundbite: The Case Of Ceo Pay Ratios, Steven A. Bank, George S. Georgiev
Securities Disclosure As Soundbite: The Case Of Ceo Pay Ratios, Steven A. Bank, George S. Georgiev
Faculty Articles
This Article analyzes the history, design, and effectiveness of the highly controversial CEO pay ratio disclosure rule, which went into effect in 2018. Based on a regulatory mandate contained in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the rule requires public companies to disclose the ratio between CEO pay and median worker pay as part of their annual filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The seven-year rulemaking process was politically contentious and generated a level of public engagement that was virtually unprecedented in the long history of the SEC disclosure regime. The SEC sought to minimize compliance costs by providing …
How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case Of The Golden Leash, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven Davidoff Solomon
How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case Of The Golden Leash, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven Davidoff Solomon
Steven Davidoff Solomon
This Article presents a case study of a corporate governance innovation—the incentive compensation arrangement for activist-nominated director candidates colloquially known as the “golden leash.” Golden leash compensation arrangements are a potentially valuable tool for activist shareholders in election contests. In response to their use, several issuers adopted bylaw provisions banning incentive compensation arrangements. Investors, in turn, viewed director adoption of golden leash bylaws as problematic and successfully pressured issuers to repeal them. The study demonstrates how corporate governance provisions are developed and deployed, the sequential response of issuers and investors, and the central role played by governance intermediaries—activist investors, institutional …
How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case Of The Golden Leash, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven Davidoff Solomon
How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case Of The Golden Leash, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven Davidoff Solomon
All Faculty Scholarship
This Article presents a case study of a corporate governance innovation—the incentive compensation arrangement for activist-nominated director candidates colloquially known as the “golden leash.” Golden leash compensation arrangements are a potentially valuable tool for activist shareholders in election contests. In response to their use, several issuers adopted bylaw provisions banning incentive compensation arrangements. Investors, in turn, viewed director adoption of golden leash bylaws as problematic and successfully pressured issuers to repeal them.
The study demonstrates how corporate governance provisions are developed and deployed, the sequential response of issuers and investors, and the central role played by governance intermediaries—activist investors, institutional …
The Trouble With Basic: Price Distortion After Halliburton, Jill E. Fisch
The Trouble With Basic: Price Distortion After Halliburton, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
Many commentators credit the Supreme Court’s decision in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, which allowed courts to presume reliance rather than requiring individualized proof, with spawning a vast industry of private securities fraud litigation. Today, the validity of Basic’s holding has come under attack as scholars have raised questions about the extent to which the capital markets are efficient. In truth, both these views are overstated. Basic’s adoption of the Fraud on the Market presumption reflected a retreat from prevailing lower court recognition that the application of a reliance requirement was inappropriate in the context of impersonal public …
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …
The Insignificance Of Proxy Access, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
The Insignificance Of Proxy Access, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Taxing Shared Economies Of Scale, Brad Borden
Taxing Shared Economies Of Scale, Brad Borden
Bradley T. Borden
Economies of scale exist if long-run average costs decline as output rises. All else being equal, the decline in average costs should lead to greater profitability, making economies of scale attractive to businesses. Nobel laureate George Stigler recognized that economies of scale should help determine the optimum size of a firm. To obtain economies of scale and optimum firm size, parties may integrate resources or grant access to resources without integrating. Such arrangements create shared economies of scale. Tax law must consider the effects of shared economies of scale and address them. In particular, the varying degrees of scale-sharing raise …
The Corporate Form As A Solution To A Discursive Dilemma, Edward B. Rock
The Corporate Form As A Solution To A Discursive Dilemma, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
I examine the connection between the discursive dilemma and corporate law. The discursive dilemma (or doctrinal paradox) is a distinctive social choice problem that was first identified by Kornhauser and Sager and later used as the basis for a theory of organizational personality by Pettit. I examine the ways in which the corporate form prevents the emergence of the discursive dilemma in the firm context and the extent to which the presence of the discursive dilemma can provide the foundation for a theory of corporate personality.
Corporate Control Transactions: Introduction, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
Corporate Control Transactions: Introduction, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Meeting By Signals, Playing By Norms: Complementary Accounts Of Non-Legal Cooperation In Institutions, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
Meeting By Signals, Playing By Norms: Complementary Accounts Of Non-Legal Cooperation In Institutions, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Norms & Corporate Law: Introduction, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
Norms & Corporate Law: Introduction, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Islands Of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, And The Self-Governing Corporation, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
Islands Of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, And The Self-Governing Corporation, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Peculiar Role Of The Delaware Courts In The Competition For Corporate Charters, Jill E. Fisch
The Peculiar Role Of The Delaware Courts In The Competition For Corporate Charters, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
From the classic Cary-Winter debate to current legal scholarship, commentators have struggled to explain Delaware's dominance in the market for corporate charters. Although scholars have offered nonsubstantive explanations such as network externalities, interest group dynamics, and Delaware's expert and specialized judiciary, much of the debate focuses on substantive law. This article takes another view. Arguing that a regulator can offer benefits through its lawmaking process, as well as its legal rules, the article suggests a process-oriented analysis of regulatory competition. The article focuses on the unique role of the Delaware judiciary in corporate lawmaking, a role that has received little …