Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
- Keyword
-
- Economics (2)
- Law and Economics (2)
- Activist investors (1)
- Activist-nominated directors (1)
- Arrow Theorem (1)
-
- Collective irrationality (1)
- Condorcet cycling (1)
- Constitutional Law (1)
- Corporate governance (1)
- Corporation law (1)
- Democractic decisionmaking (1)
- Director compensation (1)
- Event study (1)
- General Law (1)
- Golden leash (1)
- Governance innovations (1)
- Impossibility Theorem (1)
- Institutional investors (1)
- Interpersonal Comparison of Utilities (1)
- Joint-profit motive (1)
- Jurisprudence (1)
- Justice (1)
- Kenneth J. Arrow (1)
- Law and Society (1)
- Partnership taxation (1)
- Partnerships (1)
- Politics (1)
- Public Law and Legal Theory (1)
- Share pricing (1)
- Shareholder activism (1)
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Other Economics
How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case Of The Golden Leash, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven Davidoff Solomon
How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case Of The Golden Leash, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven Davidoff Solomon
Steven Davidoff Solomon
This Article presents a case study of a corporate governance innovation—the incentive compensation arrangement for activist-nominated director candidates colloquially known as the “golden leash.” Golden leash compensation arrangements are a potentially valuable tool for activist shareholders in election contests. In response to their use, several issuers adopted bylaw provisions banning incentive compensation arrangements. Investors, in turn, viewed director adoption of golden leash bylaws as problematic and successfully pressured issuers to repeal them. The study demonstrates how corporate governance provisions are developed and deployed, the sequential response of issuers and investors, and the central role played by governance intermediaries—activist investors, institutional …
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …
Taxing Shared Economies Of Scale, Brad Borden
Taxing Shared Economies Of Scale, Brad Borden
Bradley T. Borden
Economies of scale exist if long-run average costs decline as output rises. All else being equal, the decline in average costs should lead to greater profitability, making economies of scale attractive to businesses. Nobel laureate George Stigler recognized that economies of scale should help determine the optimum size of a firm. To obtain economies of scale and optimum firm size, parties may integrate resources or grant access to resources without integrating. Such arrangements create shared economies of scale. Tax law must consider the effects of shared economies of scale and address them. In particular, the varying degrees of scale-sharing raise …