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Articles 31 - 60 of 279
Full-Text Articles in Economics
Historical Political Economy: What Is It?, Jeffrey Jenkins, Jared Rubin
Historical Political Economy: What Is It?, Jeffrey Jenkins, Jared Rubin
ESI Working Papers
In this chapter, we define what historical political economy (HPE) is and is not, classify the major themes in the literature, assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of the literature, and point to future directions. We view HPE as social scientific inquiry which highlights political causes or consequences of historical issues. HPE is different from conventional political economy in the emphasis placed on historical processes and context. While we view HPE in the most inclusive manner reasonable, we define it to exclude works that are either solely of contemporary importance or use historical data without any historical context (e.g., long-run …
United We Stand: On The Benefits Of Coordinated Punishment, Vicente Calabuig, Natalia Jiménez, Gonzalo Olcina, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara
United We Stand: On The Benefits Of Coordinated Punishment, Vicente Calabuig, Natalia Jiménez, Gonzalo Olcina, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara
ESI Working Papers
Coordinated punishment occurs when punishment decisions are complements; i.e., this punishment device requires a specific number of punishers to be effective; otherwise, no damage will be inflicted on the target. While societies often rely on this punishment device, its benefits are unclear compared with uncoordinated punishment, where punishment decisions are substitutes. We argue that coordinated punishment can prevent the free-riding of punishers and show, both theoretically and experimentally, that this may be beneficial for cooperation in a team investment game, compared with uncoordinated punishment.
Nobel And Novice: Author Prominence Affects Peer Review, Jürgen Huber, Sabiou M. Inoua, Rudolf Kerschbamer, Christian König-Kersting, Stefan Palan, Vernon L. Smith
Nobel And Novice: Author Prominence Affects Peer Review, Jürgen Huber, Sabiou M. Inoua, Rudolf Kerschbamer, Christian König-Kersting, Stefan Palan, Vernon L. Smith
ESI Working Papers
Peer-review is a well-established cornerstone of the scientific process, yet it is not immune to status bias. Merton identified the problem as one in which prominent researchers get disproportionately great credit for their contribution while relatively unknown researchers get disproportionately little credit.1 We measure the extent of this effect in the peer-review process through a pre-registered field experiment. We invite more than 3,300 researchers to review a paper jointly written by a prominent author – a Nobel laureate – and by a relatively unknown author – an early-career research associate –, varying whether reviewers see the prominent author’s name, …
Introducing New Forms Of Digital Money: Evidence From The Laboratory, Gabriele Camera
Introducing New Forms Of Digital Money: Evidence From The Laboratory, Gabriele Camera
ESI Working Papers
Central banks may soon issue currencies that are entirely digital (CBDCs) and possibly interest-bearing. A strategic analytical framework is used to investigate this innovation in the laboratory, contrasting a traditional “plain” tokens baseline to treatments with “sophisticated” interest-bearing tokens. In the experiment, this theoretically beneficial innovation precluded the emergence of a stable monetary system, reducing trade and welfare. Similar problems emerged when sophisticated tokens complemented or replaced plain tokens. This evidence underscores the advantages of combining theoretical with experimental investigation to provide insights for payments systems innovation and policy design.
The Doors Of Perception: Theory And Evidence Of Frame-Dependent Rationalizability, Gary Charness, Alessandro Sontuoso
The Doors Of Perception: Theory And Evidence Of Frame-Dependent Rationalizability, Gary Charness, Alessandro Sontuoso
ESI Working Papers
We investigate how strategic behavior is affected by the set of notions (frames) used when thinking about the game. In our games, the action set consists of visual objects: each player must privately choose one, trying to match the counterpart’s choice. We propose a model where different player-types are aware of different attributes of the action set (hence, different frames). One of the novelties is an epistemic structure that allows players to think about new frames, after initial unawareness of some attributes. To test the model, our experimental design brings about multiple frames by varying subjects’ awareness of several attributes.
Political Legitimacy In Historical Political Economy, Avner Greif, Jared Rubin
Political Legitimacy In Historical Political Economy, Avner Greif, Jared Rubin
ESI Working Papers
Political legitimacy has long been recognized in the social sciences as an integral component of governance. It encourages obedience without the threat of force, thus lowering governing costs and improving the efficacy of policies. This chapter begins by overviewing the extensive literature on political legitimacy, classifying studies by whether they are based on the beliefs (regarding the legitimacy of the authority) or effectiveness (good governance is legitimate governance). Among the studies focusing on beliefs, most take legitimacy as an exogenous element of political authority. We develop a conceptual framework to study how beliefs regarding political legitimacy form endogenously and impact …
300 Anniversary Of Smith’ Birth, Vernon L. Smith
300 Anniversary Of Smith’ Birth, Vernon L. Smith
ESI Working Papers
Thousand-word brief on key quotes from Adam Smith’s two books (TMS, WN) modelling Society and Economy.
How Do Reward Versus Penalty Framed Incentives Affect Diagnostic Performance In Auditing?, Bright (Yue) Hong, Timothy W. Shields
How Do Reward Versus Penalty Framed Incentives Affect Diagnostic Performance In Auditing?, Bright (Yue) Hong, Timothy W. Shields
ESI Working Papers
Prior research examines how rewards versus economically equivalent penalties affect effort. However, accountants perform various diagnostic analyses that involve more than exerting effort. For example, auditors often need to identify whether a material misstatement is the underlying cause of a phenomenon among the possible causes. Testing helps identify the cause, but testing is costly. When participants are incentivized to test accurately (rather than test more) and objectively (unbiased between testing and not testing), we find that framing the incentives as rewards versus equivalent penalties increases testing by lowering the subjective testing criterion and by increasing the assessed risk of material …
Motives For Cooperation In The One-Shot Prisoner’S Dilemma, Mark Schneider, Timothy W. Shields
Motives For Cooperation In The One-Shot Prisoner’S Dilemma, Mark Schneider, Timothy W. Shields
ESI Working Papers
We investigate the motives for cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). A prior study finds that cooperation rates in one-shot PD games can be ranked empirically by the social surplus from cooperation. That study employs symmetric payoffs from cooperation in simultaneous PD games. Hence, in that setting, it is not possible to discern the motives for cooperation since three prominent social welfare criteria, social surplus (efficiency) preferences, Rawlsian maximin preferences, and inequity aversion make the same predictions. In the present paper, we conduct an experiment to identify which of these social preferences best explains differences in cooperation rates and …
On The Generalizability Of Using Mobile Devices To Conduct Economic Experiments, Yiting Guo, Jason Shachat, Matthew J. Walker, Lijia Wei
On The Generalizability Of Using Mobile Devices To Conduct Economic Experiments, Yiting Guo, Jason Shachat, Matthew J. Walker, Lijia Wei
ESI Working Papers
Recent technological advances enable the implementation of online, field and hybrid experiments using mobile devices. Mobile devices enable sampling of incentivized decisions in more representative samples, consequently increasing the generalizability of results. Generalizability might be compromised, however, if the device is a relevant behavioural confound. This paper reports on a battery of common economic games and decision-making tasks in which we systematically randomize the decision-making device (computer versus mobile phone) and the laboratory setup (physical versus online). The results offer broad support for conducting decision experiments using mobile devices. For six out of eight tasks, we find robust null results …
Who Withdraws First? Line Formation During Bank Runs, Hubert János Kiss, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, Alfonso Rosa-Garcia
Who Withdraws First? Line Formation During Bank Runs, Hubert János Kiss, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, Alfonso Rosa-Garcia
ESI Working Papers
We study how lines form in front of banks. In our model, depositors choose first the level of effort to arrive early at the bank and then whether or not to withdraw their deposit. We argue that the informational environment (i.e., the possibility of observing the action of others) affects the emergence of bank runs and should, therefore, influence the line formation. We test this prediction experimentally. While the informational environment has no effect on the line formation when we look at the average level of effort, our findings suggest that the reasons to arrive early at the bank varies …
Agency, Benevolence And Justice, Prithvijit Mukherjee, J. Dustin Tracy
Agency, Benevolence And Justice, Prithvijit Mukherjee, J. Dustin Tracy
ESI Working Papers
We test for social norms regarding how Agents should select between risky prospects for Principals, including norms consistent with observations by Adam Smith. We elicit norms from subjects serving as ``impartial spectator[s]" about the choice of risky prospects selected by the Agents. We find strong evidence for the existence of norms, consistent with Smith's observations. Furthermore, we find that Agents are more likely to select more normative options. In contrast, we find that Principals' allocation for bonuses depends on the realization of the risky prospect rather than whether the Agents' choice was consistent with the norm.
The No-Arbitrage Hypothesis And Inertia In Forward Markets, José Luis Ferreira, Praveen Kujal, Stephen Rassenti
The No-Arbitrage Hypothesis And Inertia In Forward Markets, José Luis Ferreira, Praveen Kujal, Stephen Rassenti
ESI Working Papers
Allaz (1992) showed that the no-arbitrage condition in forward markets is obtained as a feature of the equilibrium if the model allows for strategic behavior on the part of the buyers. He showed that having active buyers is equivalent to passive buyers plus the no-arbitrage hypothesis. We test this experimentally in a forward market by allowing for active buyer’s under exogenously or endogenously determined market closure. We further test an inertia hypothesis that looks at whether past participation in a spot-market results in quantities being limited in the forward market stage. Importantly, the no-arbitrage condition can only be tested with …
Perishable Goods Versus Re-Tradable Assets: A Theoretical Reappraisal Of A Fundamental Dichotomy, Sabiou M. Inoua, Vernon L. Smith
Perishable Goods Versus Re-Tradable Assets: A Theoretical Reappraisal Of A Fundamental Dichotomy, Sabiou M. Inoua, Vernon L. Smith
ESI Working Papers
Although various typologies of goods are commonly adopted in economics, one stood out in market experiment results contrasting market stability and efficiency with market instability: non-durable, or perishable, goods (Smith, 1962) versus durable re-tradable assets (Smith et al., 1988; Dickhaut et al., 2012; S. D. Gjerstad et al., 2015). This dichotomy of goods also proved central for understanding macroeconomic instability more broadly: about 75% of consumer spending is bought for final consumption, and is a rock of stability; instability arises from the other 25% re-tradable goods, most prominently, houses (S. D. Gjerstad & Smith, 2014). In this chapter, we revisit …
A Reassessment Of The Potential For Loss-Framed Incentive Contracts To Increase Productivity: A Meta-Analysis And A Real-Effort Experiment, Paul J. Ferraro, J. Dustin Tracy
A Reassessment Of The Potential For Loss-Framed Incentive Contracts To Increase Productivity: A Meta-Analysis And A Real-Effort Experiment, Paul J. Ferraro, J. Dustin Tracy
ESI Working Papers
Substantial productivity increases have been reported when incentives are framed as losses rather than gains. Loss-framed contracts have also been reported to be preferred by workers. The results from our meta-analysis and real-effort experiment challenge these claims. The meta-analysis' summary effect size of loss framing is a 0.16 SD increase in productivity. Whereas the summary effect size in laboratory experiments is a 0.33 SD, the summary effect size from field experiments is 0.02 SD. We detect evidence of publication biases among laboratory experiments. In a new laboratory experiment that addresses prior design weaknesses, we estimate an effect size of 0.12 …
Beware The Gini Index! A New Inequality Measure, Sabiou M. Inoua
Beware The Gini Index! A New Inequality Measure, Sabiou M. Inoua
ESI Working Papers
The Gini index underestimates inequality for heavy-tailed distributions: for example, a Pareto distribution with exponent 1.5 (which has infinite variance) has the same Gini index as any exponential distribution (a mere 0.5). This is because the Gini index is relatively robust to extreme observations; while a statistic’s robustness to extremes is desirable for data potentially distorted by outliers, it is misleading for heavy-tailed distributions, which inherently exhibit extremes. We propose an alternative inequality index: the variance normalized by the second moment. This ratio is more stable (hence more reliable) for large samples from an infinite-variance distribution than the Gini index …
Dynamic Resource Allocation With Cost Externality, Hao Zhao, David Porter
Dynamic Resource Allocation With Cost Externality, Hao Zhao, David Porter
ESI Working Papers
The inter-temporal resource allocation efficiency of a property rights-based common-pool resource system is challenged by a cost externality when one user’s extraction raises the extraction cost for others. This paper builds a dynamic resource allocation model to illustrate the efficiency loss from a standard property rights market. We then create a novel inter-temporal allocation mechanism that preserves dynamic efficiency. Our dynamic resource allocation mechanism includes an optimal planning stage where the agents collectively determine a binding extraction target for each period and a market stage where agents can exchange their extraction rights assigned within each period. The theoretical model demonstrates …
Conflict In The Pool: A Field Experiment, Loukas Balafoutas, Marco Faravelli, Roman Sheremeta
Conflict In The Pool: A Field Experiment, Loukas Balafoutas, Marco Faravelli, Roman Sheremeta
ESI Working Papers
We conduct a field experiment on conflict in swimming pools. When all lanes are occupied, an actor joins the least crowded lane and asks one of the swimmers to move to another lane. The lane represents a contested scarce resource. We vary the actor’s valuation (high and low) for the good through the message they deliver. Also, we take advantage of the natural variation in the number of swimmers to proxy for their valuation. Consistent with theoretical predictions, a swimmer’s propensity to engage in conflict increases in scarcity (incentive effect) and decreases in the actor’s valuation (discouragement effect). We complement …
Uncertainty And Reputation Effects In Credence Goods Markets, Eric Schniter, J. Dustin Tracy, Vojtěch Zíka
Uncertainty And Reputation Effects In Credence Goods Markets, Eric Schniter, J. Dustin Tracy, Vojtěch Zíka
ESI Working Papers
Credence-goods experiments have focused on stylized settings in which experts can perfectly identify the buyer’s best option and that option works without fail. However, in nature, credence goods involve uncertainties that complicate assessing the quality of service and advice. We introduce two sources of uncertainty. The first is diagnostic uncertainty; experts receive a noisy signal of buyer type so might make an ‘honest’ mistake when advising what is in buyers’ best interests. The second is service uncertainty; the services available to the buyers do not always work. Both sources of uncertainty make detection of expert dishonesty more difficult, so are …
Keeping A Clean Reputation: More Evidence On The Perverse Effects Of Disclosure, Cary Deck, J. Dustin Tracy
Keeping A Clean Reputation: More Evidence On The Perverse Effects Of Disclosure, Cary Deck, J. Dustin Tracy
ESI Working Papers
When a principal relies on an agent, a conflict of interest can encourage the agent to provide biased advice. Conventional wisdom suggests that such behavior can be reduced through disclosure requirements. However, disclosure has been shown to exacerbate self-serving bias and can actually lead to greater harm for the principal in one-shot interactions. But in many naturally occurring settings, agents form reputations, a mechanism that could diminish the incentive to provide biased advice. We test for bias in the advice agents provide when faced with reputation concerns, and examine the impact of disclosure in such an environment. In controlled laboratory …
The Economic Impact Of Lockdowns: A Theoretical Assessment, Gabriele Camera, Alessandro Gioffré
The Economic Impact Of Lockdowns: A Theoretical Assessment, Gabriele Camera, Alessandro Gioffré
ESI Working Papers
The sudden appearance of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic triggered extreme and open-ended “lockdowns” to manage the disease. Should these drastic interventions be the blueprint for future epidemics? We construct an analytical framework, based on the theory of random matching, which makes explicit how epidemics spread through economic activity. Imposing lockdowns by assumption prevents contagion and reduces healthcare costs, but also disrupts income-generation processes. We characterize how lockdowns impact the contagion process and social welfare. Numerical analysis suggests that protracted, open-ended lockdowns are generally suboptimal, bringing into question the policy responses seen in many countries.
Making It Public: The Effect Of (Private And Public) Wage Proposals On Efficiency And Income Distribution, Lara Ezquerra, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres, Natalia Jiminez, Praveen Kujal
Making It Public: The Effect Of (Private And Public) Wage Proposals On Efficiency And Income Distribution, Lara Ezquerra, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres, Natalia Jiminez, Praveen Kujal
ESI Working Papers
The implications of (public or private) pre-play communication and information revelation in a labour relationship is not well understood. We address these implications theoretically and experimentally. In our baseline experiments, the employer offers a wage to the worker who may then accept or reject it. In the public and private treatment, workers, moving first, make a non-binding private or public wage proposal. Our theoretical model assumes that wage proposals convey information about a worker’s minimum acceptable wage and are misreported with a certain probability. It predicts that, on average, wage proposals lead to higher wage offers and acceptance rates, with …
An Experimental Study Of Within- And Cross-Cultural Cooperation: Chinese And American Play In The Prisoner’S Dilemma Game, Michael Kuroda, Jieran Li, Jason Shachat, Lijia Wei, Bochen Zhu
An Experimental Study Of Within- And Cross-Cultural Cooperation: Chinese And American Play In The Prisoner’S Dilemma Game, Michael Kuroda, Jieran Li, Jason Shachat, Lijia Wei, Bochen Zhu
ESI Working Papers
We study whether cross- and within-culture groups have different cooperation rates in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. In an experiment, university students in China and America engage in a single iteration of the game, complete belief elicitation tasks regarding their opponents’ play and take a survey including attitudinal measurements regarding their in- and out-group attitudes. Cooperation rates are higher across the two countries are higher in both cross-culture and in within-culture interactions, although not significantly. We also find that Chinese participants cooperate less than American ones. Further, female Chinese participants are more cooperative than Chinese male ones. In the cross-culture treatment, …
Economics Of Majoritarian Identity Politics, Rohit Ticku, Raghul S. Venkatesh
Economics Of Majoritarian Identity Politics, Rohit Ticku, Raghul S. Venkatesh
ESI Working Papers
Majoritarian identity politics has become salient in representative democracies. Why do parties engage in identity politics and what are its consequences? We present a model of electoral competition in which parties capture voter groups based on their identity, and compete over an economic policy platform for the support of non-partisan voters. In addition, the party that caters to majoritarian interests makes a costly investment in polarizing identity. The investment provides subsequent payoffs to voters who have a preference for identity. When voter preferences over policy platforms are idiosyncratic in nature, greater investment in polarizing identity (i) increases both parties’ rents …
Group-Identity And Long-Run Cooperation: An Experiment, Gabriele Camera, Lukas Hohl
Group-Identity And Long-Run Cooperation: An Experiment, Gabriele Camera, Lukas Hohl
ESI Working Papers
We stress-test the limits of the power of group identity in the context of cooperation by constructing laboratory economies where participants confront an indefinitely repeated social dilemma as strangers. Group identity is artificially induced by random assignment to color-coded groups, and reinforced by an initial cooperation task played in-group and in fixed pairs. Subsequently subjects interact in-group and out-group in large economies, as strangers. Indefinite repetition guarantees full cooperation is an equilibrium. Decision-makers can discriminate based on group affiliation, but cannot observe past behaviors. We find no evidence of group biases. This suggests that group effects are less likely to …
Classical Theory Of Competitive Market Price Formation, Sabiou M. Inoua, Vernon L. Smith
Classical Theory Of Competitive Market Price Formation, Sabiou M. Inoua, Vernon L. Smith
ESI Working Papers
We offer an information theory of market price formation, formalizing and elaborating on an old, implicit, classical tradition of supply and demand based on buyers’ and sellers’ mone-tary valuations of commodities (formally their reservation prices) and competition as a multilat-eral higgling and bargaining process. The early laboratory market experiments, as it turns out with hindsight, established the remarkable stability, efficiency, and robustness of the old view of competitive price discovery, and not the neoclassical price theory (based on individual utility and profit maximization for given prices). Herein, we present a partial-equilibrium version of the the-ory in which wealth is implicitly …
Trustors’ Disregard For Trustees Deciding Intuitively Or Reflectively: Three Experiments On Time Constraints, Antonio Cabrales, Antonio M. Espín, Praveen Kujal, Stephen Rassenti
Trustors’ Disregard For Trustees Deciding Intuitively Or Reflectively: Three Experiments On Time Constraints, Antonio Cabrales, Antonio M. Espín, Praveen Kujal, Stephen Rassenti
ESI Working Papers
Human decisions in the social domain are modulated by the interaction between intuitive and reflective processes. Requiring individuals to decide quickly or slowly triggers these processes and is thus likely to elicit different social behaviors. Meanwhile, time pressure has been associated with inefficiency in market settings and market regulation often requires individuals to delay their decisions via cooling-off periods. Yet, recent research suggests that people who make reflective decisions are met with distrust. If this extends to external time constraints, then forcing individuals to delay their decisions may be counterproductive in scenarios where trust considerations are important. In three Trust …
Standard Vs Random Dictator Games: On The Effects Of Role Uncertainty And Framing On Generosity, Ernesto Mesa-Vázquez, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, Amparo Urbano
Standard Vs Random Dictator Games: On The Effects Of Role Uncertainty And Framing On Generosity, Ernesto Mesa-Vázquez, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, Amparo Urbano
ESI Working Papers
We show that generosity is affected when we vary the level of role uncertainty, i.e., the probability that the dictator’s decision will be implemented. We also show that framing matters for generosity in that subjects are less generous when they are told that their choices will be implemented with a certain probability, compared with a setting in which they are told that their choices will not be implemented with certain probability.
Legalized Same-Sex Marriage And Coming Out In America: Evidence From Catholic Seminaries, Avner Seror, Rohit Ticku
Legalized Same-Sex Marriage And Coming Out In America: Evidence From Catholic Seminaries, Avner Seror, Rohit Ticku
ESI Working Papers
We study the effect of legalization of same-sex marriage on coming out in the United States. We overcome data limitations by inferring coming out decisions through a revealed preference mechanism. We exploit data on enrollment in seminary studies for the Catholic priesthood, hypothesizing that Catholic priests' vow of celibacy may lead gay men to self-select as a way to avoid a heterosexual lifestyle. Using a differences-in-differences design that exploits variation in the timing of legalization across states, we find that city-level enrollment in priestly studies fell by about 15% exclusively in states adopting the reform. The celibacy norm appears to …
The Influence Of Food Recommendations: Evidence From A Randomized Field Experiment, Kamal Bookwala, Caleb Gallemore, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres
The Influence Of Food Recommendations: Evidence From A Randomized Field Experiment, Kamal Bookwala, Caleb Gallemore, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres
ESI Working Papers
We report results from a randomized field experiment conducted at two food festivals. Our primary aim is to assess the impact of two types of recommendations commonly observed in food settings: most popular and chef’s choice. Subjects select a cupcake from a binary menu. The two options, offered by the same bakery, are the best seller in the bakery and the baker’s recommended cupcake. Our treatments manipulate whether the recommendation is disclosed in tandem with the cupcakes in the menu. We find that the most popular is the only recommendation that statistically significantly increased consumers’ demand relative to …