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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Economics
Religious Identity And The Provision Of Public Goods: Evidence From The Indian Princely States, Latika Chaudhary, Jared Rubin
Religious Identity And The Provision Of Public Goods: Evidence From The Indian Princely States, Latika Chaudhary, Jared Rubin
ESI Working Papers
Religious identity affects preferences and can consequently affect policy. We propose two mechanisms through which a ruler's religious identity can affect public good provision: i) greater provision of goods in regions where more subjects are the ruler's co-religionists, and ii) lower provision of goods where private markets provide a substitute to the ruler's co-religionists. Empirically, identifying the causal effect of religious identity on policy is often impossible, since the religious identity of rulers rarely changes over time and place. We address this problem by exploiting the variation in the religion of rulers in the Indian Princely States in the early …
Recalibrational Emotions And The Regulation Of Trust-Based Behaviors, Eric Schniter, Timothy W. Shields
Recalibrational Emotions And The Regulation Of Trust-Based Behaviors, Eric Schniter, Timothy W. Shields
ESI Working Papers
Though individuals differ in the degree to which they are predisposed to trust or act trustworthy, we theorize that trust-based behaviors are universally determined by the calibration of conflicting short- and long-sighted behavior regulation programs, and that these programs are calibrated by emotions experienced personally and interpersonally. In this chapter we review both the main-stream and evolutionary theories of emotions that philosophers, psychologists, and behavioral economists have based their work on and which can inform our understanding of trust-based behavior regulation. The standard paradigm for understanding emotions is based on mapping their positive and negative affect valence. While Valence Models …
The Impact Of Competition On Prices With Numerous Firms, Xavier Gabaix, David Laibson, Deyuan Li, Hongyi Li
The Impact Of Competition On Prices With Numerous Firms, Xavier Gabaix, David Laibson, Deyuan Li, Hongyi Li
ESI Working Papers
We use extreme value theory (EVT) to develop insights about price theory. Our analysis reveals detail-independent equilibrium properties that characterize a large family of models. We derive a formula relating equilibrium prices to the level of competition. When the number of rms is large, markups are proportional to 1= (nF' [F^-1 (1- 1/n)], where F is the random utility noise distribution and n is the number of rms. This implies prices are pinned down by the tail properties of the noise distribution and that prices are independent of many other institutional details. The elasticity of the markup with respect to …
Prediction Markets In The Laboratory, Cary Deck, David Porter
Prediction Markets In The Laboratory, Cary Deck, David Porter
ESI Working Papers
"The idea that there is wisdom from the collective has been forcefully described in “The Wisdom of the Crowds” by James Surowiecki, who argues that the aggregation of information in groups results in better decisions than those that are afforded by any single member of the group. Markets, like opinion polls, are one mechanism for aggregating disparate pieces of information. The aggregation properties of prices were first noted by Hayek (1945) and were formally examined by Muth (1961). In particular, Hayek argues that market prices serve the purpose of sharing and coordinating local and personal knowledge, while Muth shows that …
Commitment Problems In Conflict Resolution, Erik O. Kimbrough, Jared Rubin, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields
Commitment Problems In Conflict Resolution, Erik O. Kimbrough, Jared Rubin, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields
ESI Working Papers
Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by committing to the outcome of a conflict resolution mechanism. Commitment problems are mitigated to a greater extent for groups who opt-in to the conflict resolution mechanism, but only when opting-in is costly. Although conflict rates are higher when opting-in is costly than when it is free or exogenously imposed, commitment problems are greatly reduced amongst those groups who choose to opt-in.
When Parity Promotes Peace: Resolving Conflict Between Asymmetric Agents, Erik O. Kimbrough, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields
When Parity Promotes Peace: Resolving Conflict Between Asymmetric Agents, Erik O. Kimbrough, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields
ESI Working Papers
Due to the high costs of conflict both in theory and practice, we examine and experimentally test the conditions under which conflict between asymmetric agents can be resolved. We model conflict as a two-agent rent-seeking contest for an indivisible prize. Before conflict arises, both agents may agree to allocate the prize by fair coin flip to avoid the costs of conflict. The model predicts that “parity promotes peace”: in the pure-strategy equilibrium, agents with relatively symmetric conflict capabilities agree to resolve the conflict by using a random device; however, with sufficiently asymmetric capabilities, conflicts are unavoidable because the stronger agent …
Cheap Talk With Two Audiences: An Experiment, Mikhail Drugov, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez, Praveen Kujal, Marta Troya Martinez
Cheap Talk With Two Audiences: An Experiment, Mikhail Drugov, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez, Praveen Kujal, Marta Troya Martinez
ESI Working Papers
In this paper we experimentally test strategic information transmission between one informed and two uninformed agents in a cheap-talk game. We find evidence of the "disciplining" effect of public communication as compared to private; however, it is much weaker than predicted by the theory. Adding a second receiver naturally increases the complexity of strategic thinking when communication is public. Using the level-k model, we exploit the within subject design to show how individuals decrease their level-k in public communication. Surprisingly, we find that individuals become more sophisticated when they communicate privately with two receivers rather than one.
Do Prediction Markets Aid Defenders In A Weak‐Link Contest?, Cary Deck, Li Hao, David Porter
Do Prediction Markets Aid Defenders In A Weak‐Link Contest?, Cary Deck, Li Hao, David Porter
ESI Working Papers
Laboratory experiments have demonstrated that prediction market prices weakly aggregate the disparate information of the traders about states (moves) of nature. However, in many practical applications one might want to predict the move of a strategic participant. This is particularly important in aggressor‐defender contests. This paper reports a set of such experiments where the defender may have the advantage of observing a prediction market on the aggressor’s action. The results of the experiments indicate that: the use of prediction markets does not increase the defender’s win rate; prediction markets contain reliable information regarding aggressors’ decisions, namely excess bid information, that …