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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Economics
Double Bubbles In Assets Markets With Multiple Generations, Cary Deck, David Porter, Vernon Smith
Double Bubbles In Assets Markets With Multiple Generations, Cary Deck, David Porter, Vernon Smith
ESI Working Papers
We construct an asset market in a finite horizon overlapping-generations environment. Subjects are tested for comprehension of their fundamental value exchange environment, and then reminded during each of 25 periods of its declining new value. We observe price bubbles forming when new generations enter the market with additional liquidity and bursting as old generations exit the market and withdrawing cash. The entry and exit of traders in the market creates an M shaped double bubble price path over the life of the traded asset. This finding is significant in documenting that bubbles can reoccur within one extended trading horizon and, …
Transparency, Efficiency And The Distribution Of Economic Welfare In Pass-Through Investment Trust Games, Thomas A. Rietz, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields, Vernon Smith
Transparency, Efficiency And The Distribution Of Economic Welfare In Pass-Through Investment Trust Games, Thomas A. Rietz, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields, Vernon Smith
ESI Working Papers
We design an experiment to examine welfare and behavior in a multi-level trust game representing a pass through investment in an intermediated market. In a repeated game, an Investor invests via an Intermediary who lends to a Borrower. A pre-experiment one-shot version of the game serves as a baseline and to type each subject. We alter the transparency of exchanges between non-adjacent parties. We find transparency of the exchanges between the investor and intermediary does not significantly affect welfare. However, transparency regarding exchanges between the intermediary and borrower promotes trust on the part of the investor, increasing welfare. Further, this …
Don’T Ask Me If You Will Not Listen: The Dilemma Of Participative Decision Making, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez
Don’T Ask Me If You Will Not Listen: The Dilemma Of Participative Decision Making, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez
ESI Working Papers
We study the effect of participative decision making in an experimental principalagent game, where the principal can consult the agent’s preferred option regarding the task to be undertaken in the final stage of the game. We show that consulting the agent was beneficial to principals as long as they followed the agent’s choice. Ignoring the agent’s choice was detrimental to the principal as it engendered negative emotions and low levels of transfers. Nevertheless, the majority of principals were reluctant to change their mind and adopt the agent’s proposal. Our results suggest that the ability to change one’s own mind is …
Strategic Behavior In Schelling Dynamics: A New Result And Experimental Evidence, Juan Miguel Benito, Pablo Brañas-Garza, Penélope Hern´Andez, Juan A. Sanchis
Strategic Behavior In Schelling Dynamics: A New Result And Experimental Evidence, Juan Miguel Benito, Pablo Brañas-Garza, Penélope Hern´Andez, Juan A. Sanchis
ESI Working Papers
In this paper we experimentally test Schelling’s (1971) segregation model and confirm the striking result of segregation. In addition, we extend Schelling’s model theoretically by adding strategic behavior and moving costs. We obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which rational agents facing moving costs may find it optimal not to move (anticipating other participants’ movements). This equilibrium is far for full segregation. We run experiments for this extended Schelling model. We find that the percentage of strategic players dramatically increases with the cost of moving and that the degree of segregation depends on the distribution of rational subjects.
Cognitive Effort In The Beauty Contest Game, Pablo Brañas-Garza, Teresa García-Muñoz
Cognitive Effort In The Beauty Contest Game, Pablo Brañas-Garza, Teresa García-Muñoz
ESI Working Papers
This paper analyzes cognitive effort in 6 different one-shot p-beauty games. We use both Raven and Cognitive Reáection tests to identify subjects' abilities. We find that the Raven test does not provide any insight on beauty contest game playing but CRT does: subjects with higher scores on this test are more prone to play dominant strategies.