Law Commons^™

Corporate Takeovers: Who Wins; Who Loses; Who Should Regulate, John C. Coffee Jr., Joseph A. Grundfest, Roberta Romano, Murray L. Weidenbaum

Faculty Scholarship

On December 3, 1987, during its 11th Annual Policy Conference in Washington, DC, the American Enterprise Institute convened a panel discussion on "Corporate Takeovers and Insider Trading: Who Should Regulate?" The panelists were John C. Coffee, Jr., professor of law at Columbia University; Joseph A. Grundfest, commissioner at the Securities and Exchange Commission; Roberta Romano, professor of law at Yale Law School; and Murray L. Weidenbaum, Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor and director of the Center for the Study of American Business at Washington University. The panel was moderated by Christopher C. DeMuth, president of AEI. The following discussion is drawn …

No Exit?: Opting Out, The Contractual Theory Of The Corporation, And The Special Case Of Remedies, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Aloof and insular as corporate law often seems, it cannot remain uninfluenced for very long by developments in the mainstream of American civil law. In that mainstream, there is today flowing a strong, swift current called "tort reform." As currents go, this one is remarkably broad and perhaps a little shallow, but on it floats a number of diverse legislative proposals – ceilings on liability, restrictions on attorneys' fees, greater reliance on alternative methods of dispute resolution, restrictions on joint and several liability and contribution, and the curtailment of punitive damages. All of these proposals flow from the same wellspring: …

The Uncertain Case For Takeover Reform: An Essay On Stockholders, Stakeholders And Bust-Ups, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

In this Article, Professor John Coffee considers under what circumstances there could be a legitimate role for state regulation of tender offers. Professor Coffee suggests that state anti-takeover laws could (but do not) function to protect other stakeholders, including corporate management, in the target corporation where the implicit contract between the corporation and these stakeholders has broken down. He advances a model of corporate directors as mediators between shareholders and stakeholders in order to protect the expectations embodied in a web of implicit and explicit contracts.

Professor Coffee suggests that takeovers would be more palatable if the interests of stakeholders …

The Future Of Corporate Federalism: State Competition And The New Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

What sensible compromise can be struck between Bill Cary's and Ralph Winter's views of the competition among states for corporate charters? This is the relevant question to ask in response to Professor Romano's stimulating paper, because if one ends in an intermediate position between Cary and Winter (as she does and as I do), then one needs to focus on the protections shareholders should be accorded both to protect them from exploitation at the hands of a state pursuing tax revenues and from excessive regulation by a state whose regulatory efforts are intended in fact to realize ulterior objectives unrelated …

Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance Of Substitutes, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

The proposal of the New York Stock Exchange to end its prohibition on listing the securities of companies with dual classes of common stock has focused public policy debate over this evolution in capital structure both too broadly and too narrowly.

The debate has been too broad because it has encompassed one situation – an initial public offering by a company with a capital structure containing dual class common stock – that should not be controversial at all. Whatever may have originally prompted the New York Stock Exchange's longstanding prohibition against listing non-voting common stock or common stock with voting …

Introduction To The Edwin S. Cohen Tax Symposium: An Overview Of Business Taxation, Michael J. Graetz

Faculty Scholarship

It is an honor and pleasure for me to be here today to launch this symposium on current tax reform topics in honor of Edwin S. Cohen on the occasion of his retirement from the University of Virginia as Professor of Law. This is the second occasion I have been asked to speak honoring Ed Cohen on his retirement and, knowing him well, I look forward to many more of his retirements in years ahead.

My assignment today is to provide a brief overview of issues in business taxation. I was tempted simply to repeat the program for this symposium, …

Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment On Two Models, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lewis A. Kornhauser

Faculty Scholarship

One of the most important debates of current corporate law practice and scholarship is about the appropriate role of target management confronted with a takeover bid. The controversy turns on the identification of a criterion for evaluating takeovers and target management defensive tactics. An influential body of opinion contends that maximization of shareholder wealth is the appropriate criterion because, first, traditional notions of fiduciary duty generally require managers to act in the shareholders' interest, and, second, shareholder wealth maximization is seen as the best available proxy for social wealth maximization. On this view, takeovers are desirable because they can increase …

Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain In The Corporate Web, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

"We have entered the era of the two-tier, front-end loaded, bootstrap, bust-up, junk-bond takeover." —Martin Lipton

Until recently, takeovers typically involved larger firms digesting smaller firms, a process that most theorists have assumed was driven by the pursuit of synergistic gains. Lately, however, this dynamic has dramatically reversed itself. To a considerable extent, the large conglomerate is now the target, and such prototypical conglomerate firms as General Foods, Richardson-Vicks, Beatrice, Revlon, SCM, CBS,USX, and Anderson, Clayton and Co. have either been acquired or forced to restructure themselves within the last three years alone. The new bidder in turn tends to …

Sharing Among The Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry Into The Corporate Law Firm And How Partners Split Profits, Ronald J. Gilson, Robert H. Mnookin

Faculty Scholarship

Large corporate law firms seem to be in a state of extraordinary flux. Success and failure are both on the rise. Large firms appear to supply a substantial and growing proportion of the legal services consumed by American business enterprises and to hire a significant fraction of the graduating classes of elite American law schools. Moreover, the last twenty years have witnessed a remarkable expansion in both the number of large firms and the absolute size of the biggest. But accompanying this striking success, there are also signs of serious institutional instability. During the last few years, several previously successful …

Price Adjustment In Long-Term Contracts, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

After parties enter into a contract, changed circumstance might result in one of them being dissatisfied with the price. Anticipating this, the parties could include a price adjustment mechanism in the agreement. If the mechanism is imperfect, some dissatisfaction will remain. This dissatisfaction may result in litigation with the dissatisfied party asking the court either to excuse performance or revise the contract price. For example, large changes in fuel prices since 1973 generated considerable litigation.

In this paper, I suggest a framework for analyzing price adjustment in private contracts. Contrary to most economists and lawyers, I argue that price adjustment …

The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff As Monitor In Shareholder Litigation, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

When the legal history of the 1970's is written, it will note a significant shift in the way courts perceived shareholder litigation. Only a generation ago, the Supreme Court described the derivative action as "the chief regulator of corporate management." Even into the 1960's, those issues involving shareholder litigation that percolated up to the Supreme Court were typically resolved so as to extend the availability of a litigation remedy by removing arbitrary or overbroad barriers to the plaintiff.

Regulating The Market For Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment Of The Tender Offer's Role In Corporate Governance, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Better answers often await better questions. In the wake of a recent series of provocative articles dealing with contested tender offers, several questions have been vigorously debated:

(1) Should management of the target company be allowed to resist a hostile tender offer in order to remain an independent company? Which, if any, of the various "shark repellent" measures by which a potential target can make itself unattractive to a bidder are justified?;

(2) If defensive tactics were generally forbidden, should the target company's management still be permitted to encourage competing bids thereby creating an auction?; and

(3) Do hostile takeovers …

Value Creation By Business Lawyers: Legal Skills And Asset Pricing, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

What do business lawyers really do? Embarrassingly enough, at a time when lawyers are criticized with increasing frequency as nonproductive actors in the economy, there seems to be no coherent answer. That is not, of course, to say that answers have not been offered; there are a number of familiar responses that we have all heard or, what is worse, that we have all offered at one time or another without really thinking very hard about them. The problem is that, for surprisingly similar reasons, none of them is very helpful.

Resale Price Maintenance And The Ftc: The Magnavox Investigation, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

Franchise agreements between a manufacturer and a distributor or retail dealer of the manufacturer's products often impose conditions on the dealer regarding items such as price, dealer location, service, and advertising. These vertical restrictions, whether price or nonprice, may violate the Sherman Act, which prohibits every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade. Whereas vertical price restrictions historically have been held per se invalid, nonprice vertical restrictions have been permitted, subject to a rule of reason. In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., however, the Supreme Court articulated a per se rule of illegality for nonprice vertical restrictions, …

The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural Limitations On The Enabling Concept, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

The tactical history of the tender offer movement resembles an unrestrained arms race. Faced with offeror assaults in the form of Saturday night specials, various types of bear-hugs, godfather offers, and block purchases, target management responded with equally intriguing defensive tactics: the black book, reverse bear-hug, sandbag, show stopper, white knight, and, drawing directly on military jargon, the scorched earth. But however varied the labels given particular defensive strategies, they share the common characteristic of being responsive: They are available only after an offer is made and the battle for the target's independence joined. From the target's perspective, what was …

Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity In Tender Offer Defense, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

Responding to my comments in the Stanford Law Review, and to those of Lucian Bebchuk in the Harvard Law Review, Professors Easterbrook and Fischel have reiterated their preference for a rule of pure passivity by target management in response to a tender offer. Unlike my more limited rule barring defensive tactics designed to prevent the offer but not barring the facilitation of competitive bids, Easterbrook and Fischel would prohibit both. Because their response to the points that Bebchuk and I raised goes beyond their initial treatment of the subject, it is appropriate that I respond here by extending …

The Survival Of The Derivative Suit: An Evaluation And A Proposal For Legislative Reform, John C. Coffee Jr., Donald E. Schwartz

Faculty Scholarship

The shareholder derivative suit today faces extinction. Long considered the "chief regulator of corporate management," and a recognized form of litigation in American courts at least since 1855, it now confronts the second great challenge of its history. Thirty-odd years ago, commentators foresaw the derivative suit's demise when state legislatures began adopting security-for-expenses statutes to curb the abuses of "strike suit" litigation. These reports of its death proved exaggerated, however, as plaintiffs discovered various tactics by which to outflank these statutes. As a result, by the late 1960's, the crisis was past, and a revival in the action's popularity was …

A Structural Approach To Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics In Tender Offers, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

Tender offers present an obvious and inherent conflict of interest between management and shareholders. On the one hand, an offer provides shareholders with the opportunity to sell their shares for a substantial premium over market price. On the other hand, the tender offer is the principal mechanism by which management can be forcibly unseated from control. It should thus come as no surprise that management often resists outsiders' efforts to direct tender offers at its shareholders. The form of that resistance, however, is somewhat surprising. Because the tender offer is the only form of corporate acquisition addressed directly to the …

Rebuttal: The Individual Or The Firm? Focusing The Threat Of Criminal Liability, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

I cannot disagree with much of what Mr. Crane has said in his very articulate presentation. One must be careful about trying to prove too much. I have not argued against individual criminal liability, but I do not believe we can rely on it exclusively. Let me therefore confine my reply to this question and to Mr. Crane's criticisms of my equity fine proposal.

Making The Punishment Fit The Corporation: The Problem Of Finding An Optimal Corporation Criminal Sanction, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

To be "present at the creation," in Dean Acheson's felicitous phrase, is always an honor. In addition, to be present at the commencement of what I expect will be a sustained and fruitful tradition at this law school, namely, the Governor Thompson Lectureship, is a second honor. Finally, let me express my thanks to Dean Bainbridge for a third honor: the compliment implicit in the 2 to 1 odds he has arranged today. Both Norval Morris and Mark Crane are men with distinguished careers in quite different fields of the law. If I am confident of one thing today, it …

Beyond The Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward A Theoretical View Of Corporate Misconduct And An Effective Legal Response, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Like hard cases, festering scandals make bad law. As public perceptions shift so that conduct once tolerated becomes seen as illicit, political pressures develop that can result in hastily improvised responses by the legal system to fill the newly perceived vacuum. This generalization is advanced to question neither the inalienable right of the public to be scandalized, nor the need for corporate reform, but to approach a highly problematic dilemma: hurried, moralistic responses to a perceived evil often prove not only ineffective, but even counterproductive. The serious student of complex organizations may recognize this assertion as a slightly altered variant …

Liquidated Damages, Penalties And The Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes On An Enforcement Model And A Theory Of Efficient Breach, Charles J. Goetz, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

For more than five centuries, strict judicial scrutiny has been applied to contractual provisions which specify an agreed amount of damages upon breach of a base obligation. Although the standards determining the enforceability of liquidated damage clauses have developed novel and labyrinthine permutations, their motivating principle has remained essentially immutable. For an executory agreement fixing damages in case of breach to be enforceable, it must constitute a reasonable forecast of the provable injury resulting from breach; otherwise, the clause will be unenforceable as a penalty and the non-breaching party will be limited to conventional damage measures.

The historical genesis of …

Marginal Cost Pricing, Investment Theory And Catv, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

In his article, Marginal Cost Pricing, Investment Theory and CATV, James Ohls makes a number of erroneous assertions concerning the optimum pricing of CATV. Most of his problems stem from a failure to properly define the environment in which the optimum price is to be set and the role that an optimum price should play. If one alters Ohls' implicit (and sometimes contradictory) assumptions and if one keeps in mind the purpose prices should serve in an economic system, a number of Ohls' conclusions are altered.