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Articles 1 - 14 of 14
Full-Text Articles in Law
Caremark And Esg, Perfect Together: A Practical Approach To Implementing An Integrated, Efficient, And Effective Caremark And Eesg Strategy, Leo E. Strine Jr., Kirby M. Smith, Reilly S. Steel
Caremark And Esg, Perfect Together: A Practical Approach To Implementing An Integrated, Efficient, And Effective Caremark And Eesg Strategy, Leo E. Strine Jr., Kirby M. Smith, Reilly S. Steel
Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership
With increased calls from investors, legislators, and academics for corporations to consider employee, environmental, social, and governance factors (“EESG”) when making decisions, boards and managers are struggling to situate EESG within their existing reporting and organizational structures. Building on an emerging literature connecting EESG with corporate compliance, this Essay argues that EESG is best understood as an extension of the board’s duty to implement and monitor a compliance program under Caremark. If a company decides to do more than the legal minimum, it will simultaneously satisfy legitimate demands for strong EESG programs and promote compliance with the law. Building on …
Discharging The Discharge-For-Value Defense, Eric L. Talley
Discharging The Discharge-For-Value Defense, Eric L. Talley
Faculty Scholarship
Despite its massive size, the corporate debt market is often considered a sleepy refuge for the risk-averse. Yet, corporate debt contracts are often mind-numbingly detailed. That complexity – when coupled with the financial stakes in play – can be a recipe for calamity. And in late 2020, calamity struck in the form of an accidental $1 billion payoff sent to Revlon Inc.’s distressed creditors – not by Revlon itself but rather by Citibank, the administrative agent for the loan. When several lenders refused to return the cash, Citibank commenced what many reckoned would be a successful (if embarrassing) lawsuit to …
Looking Back With A Legend: Ira Millstein Reflects On The Impact Of Milton Friedman's Views On Corporate Governance, Eric L. Talley, Ira M. Millstein, Leo E. Strine Jr.
Looking Back With A Legend: Ira Millstein Reflects On The Impact Of Milton Friedman's Views On Corporate Governance, Eric L. Talley, Ira M. Millstein, Leo E. Strine Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
In this discussion, corporate governance legend and frequent The Business Lawyer contributor Ira M. Millstein reflects on the impact of Milton Friedman and his adherents on our corporate governance system and economy generally, as well as the path forward to an economy that functions better for the many. Millstein takes an historical perspective in conversation with former Chief Justice and Chancellor of Delaware, Leo E. Strine, Jr., moderated by Professor Eric Talley of Columbia Law School. Millstein situates the evolution of our corporate governance system, including the effect of Friedman and the Chicago school on it, within the political dynamics …
Corporate Crime And Punishment: An Empirical Study, Dorothy S. Lund, Natasha Sarin
Corporate Crime And Punishment: An Empirical Study, Dorothy S. Lund, Natasha Sarin
Faculty Scholarship
For many years, law and economics scholars, as well as politicians and regulators, have debated whether corporate punishment chills beneficial corporate activity or, in the alternative, lets corporate criminals off too easily. A crucial and yet understudied aspect of this debate is empirical evidence. Unlike most other types of crime, the government does not measure corporate crime rates; therefore, the government and researchers alike cannot easily determine whether disputed policies are effectively deterring future incidents of corporate misconduct. In this Article, we take important first steps in addressing these questions. Specifically, we use three novel sources as proxies for corporate …
Constructing Countervailing Power: Law And Organizing In An Era Of Political Inequality, Kate Andrias
Constructing Countervailing Power: Law And Organizing In An Era Of Political Inequality, Kate Andrias
Faculty Scholarship
This Article proposes an innovative approach to remedying the crisis of political inequality: using law to facilitate organizing by the poor and working class, not only as workers, but also as tenants, debtors, welfare beneficiaries, and others. The piece draws on the social-movements literature, and the successes and failures of labor law, to show how law can supplement the deficient regimes of campaign finance and lobbying reform and enable lower-income groups to build organizations capable of countervailing the political power of the wealthy. As such, the Article offers a new direction forward for the public-law literature on political power and …
The Future Of Disclosure: Esg, Common Ownership, And Systematic Risk, John C. Coffee Jr.
The Future Of Disclosure: Esg, Common Ownership, And Systematic Risk, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
The U.S. securities markets have recently undergone (or are undergoing) three fundamental transitions: (1) institutionalization (with the result that institutional investors now dominate both trading and stock ownership); (2) extraordinary ownership concentration (with the consequence that the three largest U.S. institutional investors now hold 20% and vote 25% of the shares in S&P 500 companies); and (3) the introduction of ESG disclosures (which process has been driven in the U.S. by pressure from large institutional investors). In light of these transitions, how should disclosure policy change? Do institutions and retail investors have the same or different disclosure needs? Why are …
The Coming Shift In Shareholder Activism: From "Firm-Specific" To "Systematic Risk" Proxy Campaigns (And How To Enable Them), John C. Coffee Jr.
The Coming Shift In Shareholder Activism: From "Firm-Specific" To "Systematic Risk" Proxy Campaigns (And How To Enable Them), John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
This article distinguishes two types of shareholder activism: (1) firm-specific activism, which has a long history and focuses on changes at a specific target company, and (2) systematic risk activism, which seeks to reduce the systematic risk in a portfolio and thereby benefit diversified investors. Typically, such a systematic risk campaign may force a portfolio company to internalize negative externalities to benefit the other companies in the portfolio (such as by reducing carbon emissions or undertaking climate risk reforms). But, systematic risk activism faces an inherent difficulty: the party that leads this campaign and invests in the target company may …
Federal Corporate Law And The Business Of Banking, Lev Menand, Morgan Ricks
Federal Corporate Law And The Business Of Banking, Lev Menand, Morgan Ricks
Faculty Scholarship
The only profit-seeking business enterprises chartered by a federal government agency are banks. Yet there is barely any scholarship justifying this exception to state primacy in U.S. corporate law.
This Article addresses that gap. It reinterprets the National Bank Act (NBA) – the organic statute governing national banks, the heavyweights of the financial sector – as a corporation law and recovers the reasons why Congress wrote this law: not to catalyze private wealth creation or to regulate an existing industry, but to solve an economic governance problem. National banks are federal instrumentalities charged with augmenting the money supply – a …
Corporate Finance For Social Good, Dorothy S. Lund
Corporate Finance For Social Good, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
Corporations are under pressure to use their outsized power to benefit society, but this advocacy is unlikely to result in meaningful change because corporate law’s incentive structure rewards fiduciaries who maximize shareholder wealth. Therefore, this Essay proposes a way forward that works within the wealth-maximization framework and yet could result in dramatic social change. The idea is simple: Use private debt markets to provide incentives for public-interested corporate action. Specifically, individuals who value prosocial corporate decisions could finance them by contributing to corporate social responsibility (CSR) bonds that would offset the corporation’s implementation costs. To provide an incentive to depart …
Validation Capital, Alon Brav, Dorothy S. Lund, Edward B. Rock
Validation Capital, Alon Brav, Dorothy S. Lund, Edward B. Rock
Faculty Scholarship
Although it is well understood that activist shareholders challenge management, they can also serve as a shield. This Article describes “validation capital,” which occurs when a bloc holder’s — and generally an activist hedge fund’s — presence protects management from shareholder interference and allows management’s pre-existing strategy to proceed uninterrupted. When a sophisticated bloc holder with a large investment and the ability to threaten management’s control chooses to vouch for management’s strategy after vetting it, this support can send a credible signal to the market that protects management from disruption. By protecting a value-creating management strategy that might otherwise be …
The Corporate Governance Machine, Dorothy S. Lund, Elizabeth Pollman
The Corporate Governance Machine, Dorothy S. Lund, Elizabeth Pollman
Faculty Scholarship
The conventional view of corporate governance is that it is a neutral set of processes and practices that govern how a company is managed. We demonstrate that this view is profoundly mistaken: For public companies in the United States, corporate governance has become a “system” composed of an array of institutional players, with a powerful shareholderist orientation. Our original account of this “corporate governance machine” generates insights about the past, present, and future of corporate governance. As for the past, we show how the concept of corporate governance developed alongside the shareholder primacy movement. This relationship is reflected in the …
Should Human Rights Practice Be Rights-Based?, Sarah Knuckey, Margaret Satterthwaite
Should Human Rights Practice Be Rights-Based?, Sarah Knuckey, Margaret Satterthwaite
Faculty Scholarship
Human rights scholars and organizations often call on governments to adopt ‘human rights-based approaches’ (HRBAs) to many policy areas, from climate change to health policy. HRBAs identify rights and obligations, and advance the principles of participation, accountability, equality, and non-discrimination. This chapter argues that HRBAs have been exported to many fields without ever being sufficiently integrated within human rights advocacy. We find that NGOs often fail to adhere to foundational human rights principles in their own work, reproducing unjust power hierarchies, objectifying victims, and disempowering rights-holders. Were HRBAs adopted by more human rights organizations, the face of human rights advocacy …
Common Ownership: Do Managers Really Compete Less?, Merritt B. Fox, Manesh S. Patel
Common Ownership: Do Managers Really Compete Less?, Merritt B. Fox, Manesh S. Patel
Faculty Scholarship
This Article addresses an important question in modern antitrust: when large investment funds have holdings across an industry, is competition depressed?
The question of the impact of common ownership on competition has gained much attention as the role of institutional shareholding has grown, with the funds of the three largest management companies holding in aggregate approximately 21% of the shares of a typical S&P 500 firm. It is a source of acute disagreement among scholars and policymakers, with some who believe common ownership does depress competition seeking antitrust law reforms that would significantly constrain how investment funds operate. Neglected in …
Cleaning Corporate Governance, Jens Frankenreiter, Cathy Hwang, Yaron Nili, Eric L. Talley
Cleaning Corporate Governance, Jens Frankenreiter, Cathy Hwang, Yaron Nili, Eric L. Talley
Faculty Scholarship
Although empirical scholarship dominates the field of law and finance, much of it shares a common vulnerability: an abiding faith in the accuracy and integrity of a small, specialized collection of corporate governance data. In this paper, we unveil a novel collection of three decades’ worth of corporate charters for thousands of public companies, which shows that this faith is misplaced.
We make three principal contributions to the literature. First, we label our corpus for a variety of firm- and state-level governance features. Doing so reveals significant infirmities within the most well-known corporate governance datasets, including an error rate exceeding …