Law Commons^™

Corporate Finance For Social Good, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

Corporations are under pressure to use their outsized power to benefit society, but this advocacy is unlikely to result in meaningful change because corporate law’s incentive structure rewards fiduciaries who maximize shareholder wealth. Therefore, this Essay proposes a way forward that works within the wealth-maximization framework and yet could result in dramatic social change. The idea is simple: Use private debt markets to provide incentives for public-interested corporate action. Specifically, individuals who value prosocial corporate decisions could finance them by contributing to corporate social responsibility (CSR) bonds that would offset the corporation’s implementation costs. To provide an incentive to depart …

Greater Expectations: Strategies For Effective Board Meeting Preparation, Jonathan Kim, Marcel Bucsescu

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

Directors face an increasingly complex environment in which their businesses operate. That complexity can present opportunities for corporations that adapt, and also places new pressures on boards to respond effectively. One strategy for directors to consider is to adapt their approaches to preparing for board meetings by focusing not just on company specific reporting and decisions, but also by acting as the “eyes and ears” for management on key issues for the company. This article makes practical suggestions for directors to consider as they approach their board meeting preparation with this broader view in mind.

Pay, Risk And Stewardship: Private Sector Architecture For Future Capital Markets, Mariana Pargendler

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

The recent financial crisis revealed a massive failure of institutions that populate the world’s capital markets. Banks, investors, ratings agencies, regulators and numerous other players demonstrated that confidence in market responses was misplaced. The loss of faith in capital market institutions has represented a significant hurdle to recovery as financial institutions continue to be wary of one another, and the public is wary of all of them.

Restoring trust in the system requires two distinct pillars of reform. The first pillar, reform of the financial regulatory system, both nationally and globally, has received most of the attention so far. Many …

"Say On Pay": Cautionary Notes On The U.K. Experience And The Case For Shareholder Opt-In, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

Shareholder and public dissatisfaction with executive compensation has led to calls for an annual shareholder advisory vote on firms’ compensation practices and policies, so-called “say on pay.” Proposed federal legislation would mandate “say on pay” generally for U.S. public companies. This Article assesses the case for such a mandatory federal rule in light of the U.K. experience with a similar regime adopted in 2002. The best argument for a mandatory rule is that it would destabilize pay practices that have produced excessive compensation and that would not yield to firm-by-firm pressure. This has not been the U.K. experience; pay continues …

Does "Say On Pay" Work? Lessons On Making Ceo Compensation Accountable, Stephen Davis

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

Based on a review of UK experience, advisory shareowner votes on executive compensation policies (“say on pay”) appear practical for adaptation in North America and other markets. They represent a lever that could strengthen both boards and shareholders in the quest to better align top corporate pay with performance. But they are hardly a panacea on their own. They are likely to spur dialogue between boards and shareholders. However, market parties in the UK—which pioneered the advisory vote concept — remain concerned that boards and investors are each falling short of success in tethering pay to performance. US players may …

Unregulable Defenses And The Perils Of Shareholder Choice, Jennifer Arlen, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

A significant debate rages within corporate law scholarship as to whether shareholders or managers should be granted authority over the tender offer process once a bid is imminent. Both sides generally agree that the issue depends on whether shareholders are capable of exercising informed choice over takeover bids. Supporters of managerial veto power contend that the arguments favoring professional management of publicly held firms carry over into the tender offer context. Proponents of shareholder choice, on the other hand, argue that shareholders can act on their own behalf in the special circumstances surrounding contests for corporate control.

This Article challenges …

Pathways To Corporate Convergence? Two Steps On The Road To Shareholder Capitalism In Germany, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

One of the most interesting current debates in corporate law is whether worldwide corporate governance will ultimately converge on a single model in light of the increasing globalization of capital markets, and if so, whether it will be an Anglo-American model whose features are shaped by the shareholder primacy norm. Convergence skeptics have focused on the embeddedness of governance systems in national political structures that tend to protect both entrenched insider interests and non-shareholder constituencies against the incursions of Anglo-American governance agendas. Convergence optimists have focused on the evolutionary pressures of competitive international capital markets and on the tendency of …