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Active Firms And Active Shareholders: Corporate Political Activity And Shareholder Proposals, Geeyoung Min, Hye Young You
Active Firms And Active Shareholders: Corporate Political Activity And Shareholder Proposals, Geeyoung Min, Hye Young You
Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership
This article reveals the positions of corporations not only as active players in politics but also as targets of activist shareholders with opposing political preferences. We examine whether a firm’s political orientation, as measured by its political spending, serves as a driver of shareholder proposal submissions, one manifestation of shareholder activism. Using data on S&P 500 companies for 1997–2014, we find that the divergence in political orientation between shareholders and corporate management is strongly associated with the number of submissions of shareholder proposals on environmental or social issues. Firms that contribute more to the Republican Party are more likely to …
Stock Market Futurism, Merritt B. Fox, Gabriel Rauterberg
Stock Market Futurism, Merritt B. Fox, Gabriel Rauterberg
Faculty Scholarship
The U.S. stock market is undergoing extraordinary upheaval. The approval of the application of the Investors Exchange (IEX) to become the nation’s newest stock exchange, including its famous “speed bump,” was one of the SEC’s most controversial decisions in decades. Other exchanges have proposed a raft of new innovations in its wake. This evolving equity market is a critical piece of national infrastructure, but the regulatory scheme for its institutions is increasingly frayed. In particular, current regulation draws sharp distinctions among different kinds of markets for trading stocks, treating stock exchanges as self-regulatory organizations immune from private civil litigation, while …
Time To Amend The Delaware Takeover Law, Stephen M. Shapiro, Dorothy S. Lund
Time To Amend The Delaware Takeover Law, Stephen M. Shapiro, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
As Professor Subramanian demonstrates with cogent statistical evidence, now is the time for the courts to put Section 203 in the dock and examine its constitutional merits. Better still, the Delaware legislature should clean house and amend this provision's criteria. In practical effect, it forbids a competitive tender offer, injuring shareholders who benefit from tender offer premiums, and the national economy, which benefits from the gravitation of industrial resources to their highest-valued uses.
Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp., which invalidated an Illinois takeover statute, the federal district court in Delaware routinely enjoined application of …
Governance Failures Of The Enron Board And The New Information Order Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Governance Failures Of The Enron Board And The New Information Order Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
Analysis of the corporate governance crisis that manifested itself in the United States at the turn of the millennium requires separating its various strands. The Enron Corporation ("Enron") debacle and the dot corn bubble and collapse, for example, share some common elements but in other ways they are quite different. In both cases investors became aggressively enamored of an unsustainable business model. In the dot com case it was the belief that an innovator in a rapidly growing market could attain powerful first mover advantages that would produce an eventual cascade of profits, so that a current and increasing stream …
Understanding Enron: "It's About Gatekeepers, Stupid", John C. Coffee Jr.
Understanding Enron: "It's About Gatekeepers, Stupid", John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
What do we know after Enron's implosion that we did not know before it? The conventional wisdom is that the Enron debacle reveals basic weaknesses in our contemporary system of corporate governance. Perhaps, this is so, but where is the weakness located? Under what circumstances will critical systems fail? Major debacles of historical dimensions – and Enron is surely that – tend to produce an excess of explanations. In Enron's case, the firm's strange failure is becoming a virtual Rorschach test in which each commentator can see evidence confirming what he or she already believed.
The Future As History: The Prospects For Global Convergence In Corporate Governance And Its Implications, John C. Coffee Jr.
The Future As History: The Prospects For Global Convergence In Corporate Governance And Its Implications, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
What forces explain corporate structure and shareholder behavior? For decades this question has gone unasked, as both corporate law scholars and practitioners tacitly accepted the answer given in 1932 by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means that the separation of ownership and control stemming from ownership fragmentation explained and assured shareholder passivity. Over this decade, however, corporate law scholars have recognized that this standard answer begs an essential prior question: if ownership fragmentation explains shareholder passivity, what explains ownership fragmentation? Although the Berle and Means model assumed that large-scale enterprises could raise sufficient capital to conduct their operations only by attracting …
The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change The Outcome Of Corporate Control Contests?, John C. Coffee Jr.
The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change The Outcome Of Corporate Control Contests?, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
What, if anything, can institutional investors do to influence the course and outcome of corporate control contests? The traditional answer was relatively little. To be sure, institutions could tender their shares in a tender offer or vote in a proxy contest to oust the incumbent board, but such a role was essentially reactive and contingent. It required that an offer actually be made before institutions could respond on an after-the-fact basis. Similarly, institutions have occasionally conducted precatory proxy campaigns calling upon the board to redeem its poison pill, but management was free to ignore these requests (and has done so).
Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance Of Organizational Structure In Financial And Securities Regulation, John C. Coffee Jr.
Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance Of Organizational Structure In Financial And Securities Regulation, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
It's as predictable as the swallows' return to Capistrano. At the outset of each new Administration, a Presidential Task Force proposes a restructuring of the federal administrative agencies. New developments in rapidly evolving markets, it is argued, require a consolidation of agencies to generate a broader perspective, to create a "level playing field," and to end the possibility of a "race to the bottom" (to the extent that market participants can opt for one regulatory system over another). The proposal draws little overt criticism, but turf-conscious agencies quietly mobilize their constituencies to oppose the reform. The first sign of trouble …
Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory Of Section 16(B), Merritt B. Fox
Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory Of Section 16(B), Merritt B. Fox
Faculty Scholarship
Part I of this article assesses the social costs of a crude rule of thumb. Because section 16(b) applies to a given class of paired transactions, it deters both transactions based on inside information and transactions not so based. Each time section 16(b) is stretched to include a class of paired transactions, it deters some additional innocent transactions. This side effect will take the form of officers' and directors' purchasing fewer shares in their own companies and refusing to accept as large a portion of their compensation in a form based on share price. There are strong theoretical and empirical …
Corporate Takeovers: Who Wins; Who Loses; Who Should Regulate, John C. Coffee Jr., Joseph A. Grundfest, Roberta Romano, Murray L. Weidenbaum
Corporate Takeovers: Who Wins; Who Loses; Who Should Regulate, John C. Coffee Jr., Joseph A. Grundfest, Roberta Romano, Murray L. Weidenbaum
Faculty Scholarship
On December 3, 1987, during its 11th Annual Policy Conference in Washington, DC, the American Enterprise Institute convened a panel discussion on "Corporate Takeovers and Insider Trading: Who Should Regulate?" The panelists were John C. Coffee, Jr., professor of law at Columbia University; Joseph A. Grundfest, commissioner at the Securities and Exchange Commission; Roberta Romano, professor of law at Yale Law School; and Murray L. Weidenbaum, Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor and director of the Center for the Study of American Business at Washington University. The panel was moderated by Christopher C. DeMuth, president of AEI. The following discussion is drawn …
Regulating The Market For Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment Of The Tender Offer's Role In Corporate Governance, John C. Coffee Jr.
Regulating The Market For Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment Of The Tender Offer's Role In Corporate Governance, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
Better answers often await better questions. In the wake of a recent series of provocative articles dealing with contested tender offers, several questions have been vigorously debated:
(1) Should management of the target company be allowed to resist a hostile tender offer in order to remain an independent company? Which, if any, of the various "shark repellent" measures by which a potential target can make itself unattractive to a bidder are justified?;
(2) If defensive tactics were generally forbidden, should the target company's management still be permitted to encourage competing bids thereby creating an auction?; and
(3) Do hostile takeovers …
Rebuttal: The Individual Or The Firm? Focusing The Threat Of Criminal Liability, John C. Coffee Jr.
Rebuttal: The Individual Or The Firm? Focusing The Threat Of Criminal Liability, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
I cannot disagree with much of what Mr. Crane has said in his very articulate presentation. One must be careful about trying to prove too much. I have not argued against individual criminal liability, but I do not believe we can rely on it exclusively. Let me therefore confine my reply to this question and to Mr. Crane's criticisms of my equity fine proposal.
Making The Punishment Fit The Corporation: The Problem Of Finding An Optimal Corporation Criminal Sanction, John C. Coffee Jr.
Making The Punishment Fit The Corporation: The Problem Of Finding An Optimal Corporation Criminal Sanction, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
To be "present at the creation," in Dean Acheson's felicitous phrase, is always an honor. In addition, to be present at the commencement of what I expect will be a sustained and fruitful tradition at this law school, namely, the Governor Thompson Lectureship, is a second honor. Finally, let me express my thanks to Dean Bainbridge for a third honor: the compliment implicit in the 2 to 1 odds he has arranged today. Both Norval Morris and Mark Crane are men with distinguished careers in quite different fields of the law. If I am confident of one thing today, it …