Legal Theory Commons^™

Much Obliged? Moral Psychology And The Social Obligation Of Property: An Essay In Honor Of Gregory Alexander, Nestor M. Davidson

Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy

Few scholars have argued as eloquently as Gregory Alexander for the normative force of social obligation in American property law and for a broader understanding of property as inherently relational. The idea that mutual regard for the ability of each person to have meaningful life choices means that ownership entails duties to others has always seemed to me-perhaps not surprisingly given my own moral intuitive priors-deeply compelling. But it is clear that other moral intuitions lead people to value just as deeply and just as intuitively property's ability to establish individual sanctuary within strong, clear boundaries. I don't have the …

It's Not Personal: Social Obligations In The Office Of Ownership, Larissa Katz

Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy

In November 2016, the City of Vancouver passed its "Vacancy Tax By-law." The law requires homeowners to submit a property status declaration each year to the City, revealing the uses they are making of their property. An owner whose property is not rented or in use for at least 6 months a year is subject to a vacancy tax. The stated purpose of the law is to address the affordable housing crisis in Vancouver, a city where the official rental vacancy rate is less than 1%. By penalizing absentee owners, the law is intended to increase supply and to deter …

Liberalism And The Commons, Hanoch Dagan

Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy

It is a real privilege for me to participate in the celebration of Greg Alexander's enormous contribution to the scholarship and jurisprudence on property, which has enhanced our understanding of property in numerous ways. Alexander utilized almost every tool in a legal theorist's kit-notably: history, comparative law, and philosophical investigation-to study property and developed an innovative and nuanced theory of property. Property, for Alexander, has a core role in fostering human flourishing. A proper conception of property, he claims, must acknowledge that obligations and not just rights, and communities and not only individuals, take center stage.

The Psychological Foundations Of Behavioral Law And Economics, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Over the past decade, psychological research has enjoyed a rapidly expanding influence on legal scholarship. This expansion has established a new field—“Behavioral Law and Economics” (BLE). BLE’s principal insight is that human behavior commonly deviates from the predictions of rational choice theory in the marketplace, the election booth, and the courtroom. Because these deviations are predictable, and often harmful, legal rules can be crafted to reduce their undesirable influence. Ironically, BLE seldom recognizes that its intellectual origins lie with psychology more so than economics. This failure leaves BLE open to criticisms that can be answered only by embracing the underlying …

The Uncertain Psychological Case For Paternalism, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The Cognitive Components Of Punishment, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Forest Jourden

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories Of Social Norms And The Pragmatics Of Explanation, W. Bradley Wendel

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The question of how societies secure cooperation and order in the absence of state enforced sanctions has long vexed law and economics scholars. Recently the concept of social norms--informally enforced rules of behavior--has occupied the attention of a large number of these theorists, who are concerned with understanding why economically rational actors would bother to follow rules whose costs seem to outweigh their benefits. Because of the prestige (or at least trendiness) of law and economics, it seems that now everyone in the legal academy is talking about social norms. This burgeoning scholarship is closely related to a wider concern …

Is Evolutionary Analysis Of Law Science Or Storytelling?, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In recent years, some legal scholars have argued that legal scholarship could benefit from a greater reliance on theories of human behavior that arise from biological evolution. These scholars contend that reliance on biological evolution would successfully combine the rigor of economics with the scientific aspects of psychology. Complex legal systems, however, are uniquely human. Law has always been the product of cognitive processes that are unique to humans and that developed as a response to an environment that no longer exists. Consequently, the evolutionary development of the cognitive mechanisms upon which law depends cannot be rigorously modeled or studied …

Legal Rules And Social Reform, Emily Sherwin

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

An Essay On Private Remedies, Emily Sherwin

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.