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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Legal Theory
The Psychological Foundations Of Behavioral Law And Economics, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
The Psychological Foundations Of Behavioral Law And Economics, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Over the past decade, psychological research has enjoyed a rapidly expanding influence on legal scholarship. This expansion has established a new field—“Behavioral Law and Economics” (BLE). BLE’s principal insight is that human behavior commonly deviates from the predictions of rational choice theory in the marketplace, the election booth, and the courtroom. Because these deviations are predictable, and often harmful, legal rules can be crafted to reduce their undesirable influence. Ironically, BLE seldom recognizes that its intellectual origins lie with psychology more so than economics. This failure leaves BLE open to criticisms that can be answered only by embracing the underlying …
The Uncertain Psychological Case For Paternalism, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
The Uncertain Psychological Case For Paternalism, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories Of Social Norms And The Pragmatics Of Explanation, W. Bradley Wendel
Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories Of Social Norms And The Pragmatics Of Explanation, W. Bradley Wendel
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
The question of how societies secure cooperation and order in the absence of state enforced sanctions has long vexed law and economics scholars. Recently the concept of social norms--informally enforced rules of behavior--has occupied the attention of a large number of these theorists, who are concerned with understanding why economically rational actors would bother to follow rules whose costs seem to outweigh their benefits. Because of the prestige (or at least trendiness) of law and economics, it seems that now everyone in the legal academy is talking about social norms. This burgeoning scholarship is closely related to a wider concern …