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Articles 31 - 60 of 72
Full-Text Articles in Public Economics
Germany: Ikb Deutsche Industriebank Capital Injection, 2008, Lakshimi Swaminathan, Rishi Vala
Germany: Ikb Deutsche Industriebank Capital Injection, 2008, Lakshimi Swaminathan, Rishi Vala
Journal of Financial Crises
In July 2007, investors rapidly pulled their funding from asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) programs that held US subprime mortgage-linked securities. According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC), German bank IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG (IKB) was the “first big casualty” of that run on ABCP. It had directly and indirectly guaranteed to provide EUR 9.3 billion in liquidity to its off-balance-sheet vehicle, Rhineland Funding Capital Corporation. German authorities and the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), a state-owned German development bank, quickly took over those obligations on July 30 to keep IKB solvent and prevent it from closing. KfW also agreed to …
Germany: Hsh Nordbank Capital Injection, 2009, Anmol Makhija
Germany: Hsh Nordbank Capital Injection, 2009, Anmol Makhija
Journal of Financial Crises
State-controlled HSH Nordbank AG (HSH) lost EUR 2.8 billion in 2008, mainly because of impairments to its holdings of US structured credit securities. On April 29, 2009, the German bank regulator informed HSH that it would close HSH if the owners did not recapitalize the bank to the 8% total capital ratio requirement. In June 2009, the state governments of Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein injected EUR 3 billion (USD 3.8 billion) of capital in ordinary shares with voting rights and provided a EUR 10 billion asset guarantee, called a “risk shield,” for a 7.85% annual fee. Over the next few years, …
Cyprus: Laiki Bank Capital Injection, 2012, Stella Schaefer-Brown
Cyprus: Laiki Bank Capital Injection, 2012, Stella Schaefer-Brown
Journal of Financial Crises
In 2011, Cyprus’s second-largest bank, Marfin Popular Bank—later renamed Cyprus Popular Bank, but commonly known as Laiki Bank—lost billions of euros when the Greek government restructured its sovereign debt, decimating its equity capital and shutting its access to market liquidity. In late 2011, supervisors estimated the bank’s capital shortfall at EUR 3.1 billion. In January 2012, the bank submitted a plan to the central bank that included EUR 1.8 billion of capital raised from private investors and EUR 1 billion of capital increases through debt-to-equity swaps and deleveraging. However, Laiki Bank was unable to raise private capital and asked the …
France: Bank Of France Capital Injection, 1805, Ayodeji George
France: Bank Of France Capital Injection, 1805, Ayodeji George
Journal of Financial Crises
After receiving the exclusive right to issue bank notes in Paris in 1803, the Bank of France became a significant source of funding for the French government in early 1805, as Napoleon prepared for a key battle of the Napoleonic Wars. In the first half of 1805, the French treasury paid back loans with notes with later maturities rather than metallic money, draining the metallic liquidity reserves of the Bank of France far below levels that bankers at the time considered prudent. After the circulation of an unfounded rumor that Napoleon himself had raided the metallic reserves for the war …
Belgium: Fortis Group Capital Injection, 2008, Ayodeji George
Belgium: Fortis Group Capital Injection, 2008, Ayodeji George
Journal of Financial Crises
In September 2008, in the wake of the freezing of credit markets caused by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Fortis Group, a financial conglomerate incorporated in Belgium and the Netherlands, faced depositor runs and share price deterioration. These negative consequences were a result of its exposures to US subprime mortgage-related assets and other losses from its 2007 acquisition of ABN AMRO, a large Dutch bank. Over the weekend of September 27–29, authorities from Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the European Central Bank (ECB) held emergency talks, resulting in the announcement of EUR 11.2 billion (USD 14.3 billion) in capital injections …
Belgium And France: Dexia Group Capital Injection, 2008, Ayodeji George
Belgium And France: Dexia Group Capital Injection, 2008, Ayodeji George
Journal of Financial Crises
Dexia Group (Dexia, or the Group) was a banking and insurance conglomerate that specialized in public financing with major operations in Belgium, France, and Luxembourg. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008, Dexia faced a liquidity crunch as wholesale funding markets froze. Faced with insolvency concerns, authorities from the bank’s three primary markets, Belgium, France, and Luxembourg, conducted overnight negotiations to agree on capital injection terms. On September 30, 2008, authorities and the bank’s board of directors announced a EUR 6.4 billion (eventually EUR 6 billion) capital injection intended to restore Dexia’s solvency and maintain systemwide stability. The …
Austria And Germany: Hypo Alpe Adria Capital Injections, 2008, Bailey Decker
Austria And Germany: Hypo Alpe Adria Capital Injections, 2008, Bailey Decker
Journal of Financial Crises
Hypo Alpe Adria (HAA) was Austria’s sixth-largest bank at the time of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 (GFC), with EUR 41.2 billion (USD 29.2 billion) in total assets as of June 30, 2008. HAA pursued a growth strategy in Southeastern Europe in the years preceding the GFC, which proved troublesome for HAA’s loan portfolio and led to large write-downs in autumn 2008. HAA’s majority shareholder was a German landesbank, Bayerische Landesbank (BayernLB). On October 26, 2008, the Austrian Parliament passed a EUR 100 billion support scheme in response to the GFC, with EUR 15 billion allocated for troubled banks. …
Survey Of Ad Hoc Capital Injections, June Rhee, Benjamin Hoffner, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick
Survey Of Ad Hoc Capital Injections, June Rhee, Benjamin Hoffner, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
Government recapitalizations of systemic banking organizations can be costly and unpopular but are sometimes necessary to protect depositors and prevent financial contagion. This paper surveys 23 Yale Program on Financial Stability case studies of ad hoc capital injection programs, defined as programs that provide capital to a single institution or a clearly defined minority of institutions. We saw a marked increase in capital injection programs in the past 50 years, more than half of which were ad hoc. Authorities designing ad hoc capital injections face difficult decisions—when to deploy them rather than let a bank fail; whether to impose losses …
Lessons Learned: Paul Boothe, Mary Anne Chute Lynch
Lessons Learned: Paul Boothe, Mary Anne Chute Lynch
Journal of Financial Crises
Paul Boothe served as Canada’s senior associate deputy minister of industry during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007–2009. Boothe led the Canadian federal government’s negotiation team during the restructuring talks with Chrysler and General Motors (GM). He also negotiated with the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW), a union that included Tier 1 auto parts suppliers for all the major auto manufacturers worldwide. Canada aligned with the United States government to rescue the auto manufacturers and provided 20% of the funding to rescue the corporations and suppliers. From 2004 to 2005, Boothe served as the associate deputy minister of finance and …
Lessons Learned: Bo Lundgren, Maryann Haggerty
Lessons Learned: Bo Lundgren, Maryann Haggerty
Journal of Financial Crises
Bo Lundgren was Sweden’s cabinet minister for fiscal and financial affairs from 1991 to 1994, making him a key leader in managing the nation’s severe financial crisis during those years. Lundgren had a decades-long political career as a member of the Swedish Parliament from 1975 to 2004, was leader of the Moderate Party (1999–2003), and vice president of the European People’s Party in the European Union. He also served from 2004 to 2013 as director general of the Swedish National Debt Office, the country’s central financial agency. Drawing on his experiences in the Swedish crisis, Lundgren has shared his views …
India: Yes Bank Restructuring, 2020, Salil Gupta
India: Yes Bank Restructuring, 2020, Salil Gupta
Journal of Financial Crises
Yes Bank was suffering from liquidity outflows in the second half of 2019 owing to a combination of deposit withdrawals, invocation of pledged shares, losses from extraordinary credit provisions, and overexposure to stressed sectors like power and infrastructure. In December 2019, Yes Bank reported a Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio at 0.6%, far below the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) mandated levels, and a quarterly loss of 185 billion Indian rupees (INR; USD 2.5 billion). In early March 2020, the RBI and the Ministry of Finance announced a restructuring plan for India’s fourth-largest private bank, Yes Bank, to prevent …
Lessons Learned: Neel Kashkari, Yasemin Esmen
Lessons Learned: Neel Kashkari, Yasemin Esmen
Journal of Financial Crises
Neel Kashkari was the Interim Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Financial Stability between October 2008 and May 2009. He oversaw the architecture and administration of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) during this time. This “Lessons Learned” is based on a phone interview with Mr. Kashkari.
Lessons Learned: Phillip Swagel, Yasemin Esmen
Lessons Learned: Phillip Swagel, Yasemin Esmen
Journal of Financial Crises
Phillip Swagel was Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy at the U.S. Treasury between 2006 and 2009. During this time, he advised Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson as his chief economist, served as a member of the TARP Investment Committee, and played an important part in the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This “Lessons Learned” is based on a phone interview with Mr. Swagel.
Lessons Learned: Arthur Murton, Sandra Ward
Lessons Learned: Arthur Murton, Sandra Ward
Journal of Financial Crises
Arthur Murton joined the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. in 1986 as a financial economist and rose through the ranks to become Director of the Division of Insurance and Research, a post he held from 1995 to 2013 and which he steered through the financial crisis of 2007-09. Murton participated in the important interagency discussions held on Columbus Day weekend in 2008 that led to the establishment of breakthrough programs that proved critical in stabilizing financial markets. This “Lessons Learned” summary is based on an interview with Mr. Murton about his crisis experience.
Lessons Learned: Diane Ellis, Sandra Ward
Lessons Learned: Diane Ellis, Sandra Ward
Journal of Financial Crises
Diane Ellis served as Deputy Director, Insurance and Research, at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. during the financial crisis of 2007-09. The FDIC played a critical role in stabilizing financial conditions and establishing confidence in the financial markets by guaranteeing newly issued debt on a temporary basis for banks and thrifts as well as financial holding companies and eligible bank affiliates. The agency also fully guaranteed certain non-interest-bearing transaction deposit accounts. Ellis played an important role in implementing the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program that proved so critical in stemming the crisis. This “Lessons Learned” is based on a phone interview …
National Asset Management Agency (Nama), Alexander Nye
National Asset Management Agency (Nama), Alexander Nye
Journal of Financial Crises
After the Irish property boom peaked in 2007, Ireland’s banks faced declining share prices and increasing liquidity pressures. When in the aftermath of the September 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers, Ireland’s banks lost access to liquidity from abroad, it triggered a banking crisis in the country. In spite of various responses by the Irish government, the financial viability of Ireland’s banks (as well as the government’s fiscal position) continued to deteriorate in early 2009. The Irish government attributed the problem to impaired real estate assets sitting on bank balance sheets, which made it difficult for markets to believe that government’s …
Ghana Non-Performing Asset Recovery Trust (Npart), Riki Matsumoto
Ghana Non-Performing Asset Recovery Trust (Npart), Riki Matsumoto
Journal of Financial Crises
The Ghanaian financial sector was in severe distress in 1985 after a decade of high and variable rates of inflation, low economic growth, and financial policies ill-suited to the country’s goals. Ghana, with World Bank support, implemented a Financial Sector Adjustment Program (FINSAP) between 1988-1997. To comply with the FINSAP, the Government established the Non-Performing Assets Recovery Trust (NPART) as a temporary public asset management company under Provisional National Defence Council Law 242 on February 28, 1990, with an initial 6-year statutory life, for the purpose of: 1) facilitating the restructuring and recapitalization of major state-owned banks; 2) expediting the …
Us Resolution Trust Corporation, Aidan Lawson, Lily S. Engbith
Us Resolution Trust Corporation, Aidan Lawson, Lily S. Engbith
Journal of Financial Crises
The savings and loan (S&L) industry experienced a period of turbulence at the end of the 1970s as sharply increasing interest rates caused much of the value of the industry’s net worth to evaporate due to its focus on long-term, fixed-rate mortgages. As a result, a period of rapid deregulation followed, and S&Ls, also called thrifts, engaged in increasingly risky behavior despite many being clearly insolvent. This trend of yield-seeking growth on the part of zombie thrifts forced the government’s hand as huge losses rendered the insurance fund backing the industry, called the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), …
Uruguayan Non-Performing Portfolio Purchase Scheme, Sean Fulmer
Uruguayan Non-Performing Portfolio Purchase Scheme, Sean Fulmer
Journal of Financial Crises
As the Latin American sovereign debt crisis spread through the continent during the early 1980s, foreign investors began to abandon Uruguay out of fear that it would devalue its currency like Argentina did in March 1981. Five small- to medium-sized commercial banks in Uruguay faced solvency crises as a result. Although the Central Bank of Uruguay (CBU) decided that a full, direct intervention into the failed banks was not necessary due to their size, the CBU arranged for the sale of the banks to foreign financial institutions, while assuming the non-performing portfolios of the failed banks to facilitate the transaction. …
Lessons Learned: Eric Dinallo, Maryann Haggerty
Lessons Learned: Eric Dinallo, Maryann Haggerty
Journal of Financial Crises
Eric Dinallo was New York State Superintendent of Insurance from January 2007 through July 2009. In New York, as throughout the United States, insurance companies are regulated at the state level. In his position as Superintendent, Dinallo oversaw the insurance operating companies of American International Group (AIG) within New York. AIG’s holding company, however, was supervised at the federal level. Much of AIG’s problems came from its non-insurance subsidiary AIG Financial Products (AIGFP), which was a major presence in the market for credit default swaps (CDS), a type of derivative that was a factor behind the 2007-09 financial crisis. This …
The Rescue Of American International Group Module Z: Overview, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Aidan Lawson, Steven Kelly, Lily S. Engbith, Andrew Metrick
The Rescue Of American International Group Module Z: Overview, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Aidan Lawson, Steven Kelly, Lily S. Engbith, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
In September 2008, in the midst of the broader financial crisis, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors used its emergency authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to authorize the largest loan in its history, a $85 billion collateralized credit line to American International Group (AIG), a $1 trillion insurance and financial company that was experiencing severe liquidity strains. In connection with the loan, the government received an equity interest representing 79.9% of the company’s ownership. AIG continued to experience a depressed stock price, asset devaluations, and the risk of ratings downgrades leading to questions about its solvency. …
The Rescue Of American International Group Module C: Aig Investment Program, Alec Buchholtz, Aidan Lawson
The Rescue Of American International Group Module C: Aig Investment Program, Alec Buchholtz, Aidan Lawson
Journal of Financial Crises
In September 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) extended an $85 billion credit line to AIG to address its liquidity stresses, but AIG’s balance sheet remained under pressure. The insurance giant was projected to report large third-quarter losses and was at risk of being downgraded by major credit rating agencies. For these reasons, in early November 2008, the US Treasury invested $40 billion of Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) funds into AIG in exchange for 4 million shares of AIG Series D preferred stock and a warrant to purchase AIG common stock. The investment helped repay a …
Lessons Learned: Ron Borzekowski, Mercedes Cardona, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Lessons Learned: Ron Borzekowski, Mercedes Cardona, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Journal of Financial Crises
Ron Borzekowski was a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Board when he was detailed to join the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) as a senior researcher and later became deputy to research director Greg Feldberg. The 10-member bipartisan commission, charged with investigating and determining the causes of the crisis, held more than 19 hearings, and interviewed more than 700 people from September 2009 to Jan. 2011. It issued a 662-page report explaining why the crisis came about and the roles of financial institutions, government, and the public. This Lessons Learned is based on an interview with Mr.Borzekowski.
Lessons Learned: Christopher Seefer, Mercedes Cardona
Lessons Learned: Christopher Seefer, Mercedes Cardona
Journal of Financial Crises
Christopher Seefer was recruited to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) to serve as the commission’s director of investigations. The 10-member bipartisan commission wascharged with investigating and determining the cause of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 (GFC). The commission held over 19 hearings and interviewed more than 700 people from September 2010 to January 2011 and produced a662-page report that attempted to explain why the crisis came about and the roles of government and private enterprises in the crisis.This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview with Mr. Seefer.
Lessons Learned: Gary Cohen, Sandra Ward
Lessons Learned: Gary Cohen, Sandra Ward
Journal of Financial Crises
Gary Cohen joined the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) in December 2009 to serve as its general counsel at the request of commission chairman Phil Angelides. The FCIC was a 10-member bipartisan group convened by Congress to investigate the causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-09. Cohen had a wide-ranging and ad hoc position that included advising commissioners and staffers on administrative matters and protocols. In addition, he assisted in document requests and compelling witnesses to testify and, on occasion, in conducting interviews and public hearings. He played an instrumental role in editing the commission’s final report. This “Lessons …
Lessons Learned: Wendy Edelberg, Sandra Ward
Lessons Learned: Wendy Edelberg, Sandra Ward
Journal of Financial Crises
Wendy Edelberg served initially as Director of Research at the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) before eventually being named Executive Director. Established in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-09, the FCIC was a bipartisan panel of six Democrats and four Republicans charged with determining the causes of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Edelberg built the organization from the ground up, hiring staff, instituting operating procedures, establishing guidelines, managing communications, and reporting to the commissioners. This "Lesson Learned" is based on an interview with Ms. Edelberg.
The Dutch Credit Guarantee Scheme (Netherlands Gfc), Lily Engbith
The Dutch Credit Guarantee Scheme (Netherlands Gfc), Lily Engbith
Journal of Financial Crises
As fallout from the global financial crisis intensified in October 2008, governments around the world sought to implement stabilization measures in order to calm and protect their domestic markets. While not directly exposed to the subprime mortgage crisis, the Kingdom of the Netherlands announced the creation of the Dutch Credit Guarantee Scheme (the Guarantee Scheme) on October 13, 2008, to boost confidence in interbank lending markets and to ensure the flow of credit to Dutch households and companies. In establishing this program, the Dutch State Treasury Agency of the Ministry of Finance (DSTA) committed €200 billion to support the issuance …
The State Guarantee Of External Debt Of Korean Banks (South Korea Gfc), Lily S. Engbith
The State Guarantee Of External Debt Of Korean Banks (South Korea Gfc), Lily S. Engbith
Journal of Financial Crises
Following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy of September 15, 2008, a number of foreign governments enacted stabilization measures in order to bolster their currencies and inject much-needed liquidity into domestic markets. As part of its effort, the Korean Ministry of Strategy and Finance announced a series of government interventions that included a three-year guarantee of foreign debt issued (including extensions of maturity) by domestic banks between October 20, 2008, and June 30, 2009. This opt-in program was introduced as a preemptive step in ensuring that Korean financial institutions would retain competitive access to external funding in the wake of the global …
The Italian Guarantee Scheme (Italy Gfc), Lily Engbith
The Italian Guarantee Scheme (Italy Gfc), Lily Engbith
Journal of Financial Crises
The collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, and its severe impact on global credit markets impelled governments around the world to enact stabilization measures to calm and protect their domestic economies. The Italian Republic, while not directly affected by the US subprime mortgage crisis, preemptively implemented emergency procedures and programs to ensure the stability of their banking system. Announced with the passage of Decree-Law No. 157 on October 13, 2008, and legally enforced under Law 190/2008 of December 4, 2008, the Italian Guarantee Scheme (the Guarantee Scheme) was aimed at protecting institutions whose interbank lending abilities had the …
The Guarantee Scheme For Bank Funding In Finland (Finland Gfc), Lily Engbith
The Guarantee Scheme For Bank Funding In Finland (Finland Gfc), Lily Engbith
Journal of Financial Crises
As the global financial crisis raged in October 2008, its severe impact on global credit markets impelled governments to enact stabilization measures to calm and protect their domestic economies. The Republic of Finland, though not directly affected, designed preemptive interventions to mitigate disruption to its financial system. Among them was the Guarantee Scheme for Bank Funding in Finland (the Guarantee Scheme), announced on October 22, 2008, and implemented on February 12, 2009, which aimed to support banks and mortgage institutions with their short- and medium-term financing needs. Under the program, the Finnish State Treasury made up to €50 billion available …