Macroeconomics Commons^™

The Hungarian Loan Consolidation Program, Mallory Dreyer

Journal of Financial Crises

After spinning off the commercial banking functions that the central bank had performed for many years into three new banks, post-Communist Hungary faced a severe recession in 1992. The recession led to a high level of nonperforming loans (NPLs) in the banking system. In 1992, the Hungarian government announced a Loan Consolidation Program (LCP) to remove bad debt from the balance sheets of banks on a voluntary basis. Depending on the date when a loan was classified as “bad,” the government paid 50%, 80%, or 100% of book value. In 1992, banks transferred bad debt with a book value of …

Bureau De Recouvrement Des Crédits Du Burkina (Brcb), Mallory Dreyer

Journal of Financial Crises

In Burkina Faso, the pre-1990s banking system was characterized by a high level of government involvement and ownership, which led to government-induced lending rather than lending based on creditworthiness. Nonperforming loans in the Burkinabe banking system grew to 10 percent of total loans in 1991. In order to address the banking crisis in 1991, the Burkinabe government entered into a Structural Adjustment Facility with the IMF and other multilateral organizations which prioritized the privatization of government-owned enterprises and included rehabilitation of the financial system. As part of this restructuring, the government established the Bureau de Recouvrement des Crédits du Burkina …

Ghana Non-Performing Asset Recovery Trust (Npart), Riki Matsumoto

Journal of Financial Crises

The Ghanaian financial sector was in severe distress in 1985 after a decade of high and variable rates of inflation, low economic growth, and financial policies ill-suited to the country’s goals. Ghana, with World Bank support, implemented a Financial Sector Adjustment Program (FINSAP) between 1988-1997. To comply with the FINSAP, the Government established the Non-Performing Assets Recovery Trust (NPART) as a temporary public asset management company under Provisional National Defence Council Law 242 on February 28, 1990, with an initial 6-year statutory life, for the purpose of: 1) facilitating the restructuring and recapitalization of major state-owned banks; 2) expediting the …

Us Resolution Trust Corporation, Aidan Lawson, Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

The savings and loan (S&L) industry experienced a period of turbulence at the end of the 1970s as sharply increasing interest rates caused much of the value of the industry’s net worth to evaporate due to its focus on long-term, fixed-rate mortgages. As a result, a period of rapid deregulation followed, and S&Ls, also called thrifts, engaged in increasingly risky behavior despite many being clearly insolvent. This trend of yield-seeking growth on the part of zombie thrifts forced the government’s hand as huge losses rendered the insurance fund backing the industry, called the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), …

Senegal Société Nationale De Recouvrement (Snr), Corey N. Runkel

Journal of Financial Crises

In the late 1980s, Senegal embarked on a comprehensive set of reforms to its banking sector. The reforms comprised changes to management, supervision, and lending standards after loose central bank refinancing standards had let the nonperforming loans (NPLs) caused by drought and public enterprise mismanagement linger on bank balance sheets. In the process, the country attempted to recover NPLs worth hundreds of billions of francs. Senegal closed several state-controlled banks, transferring bad assets and certain liabilities to a new asset management company, the Société Nationale de Recouvrement (SNR). The SNR’s debt recoveries would reimburse depositors in the liquidated banks and …

Uruguayan Non-Performing Portfolio Purchase Scheme, Sean Fulmer

Journal of Financial Crises

As the Latin American sovereign debt crisis spread through the continent during the early 1980s, foreign investors began to abandon Uruguay out of fear that it would devalue its currency like Argentina did in March 1981. Five small- to medium-sized commercial banks in Uruguay faced solvency crises as a result. Although the Central Bank of Uruguay (CBU) decided that a full, direct intervention into the failed banks was not necessary due to their size, the CBU arranged for the sale of the banks to foreign financial institutions, while assuming the non-performing portfolios of the failed banks to facilitate the transaction. …

Spain: Deposit Guarantee Fund Asset Management, Manuel León Hoyos

Journal of Financial Crises

The global oil shock in 1973-74 occurred at a time when Spain was embarking on a liberalization of its financial system that resulted in many new entrants, particularly small- and medium-sized institutions. The banking crisis that followed from 1977-85 affected 52 of the country’s 110 banks, most of them of small- and medium-sized, that comprised over 20% of bank deposits. Spain established the Deposit Guarantee Fund in November 1977 to provide limited deposit insurance, and, in March 1978, established a Banking Corporation to take control of and reorganize troubled banks. However, because the Banking Corporation lacked the legal authority to …

Broad-Based Asset Management Programs, Christian M. Mcnamara, Greg Feldberg, Mallory Dreyer, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

Dealing with high levels of nonperforming assets (NPAs) on bank balance sheets is one of the most challenging aspects of financial crisis management. High levels of NPAs can interfere with both bank profitability and general economic growth by increasing uncertainty about bank solvency and therefore funding costs, tying up resources and attention, and inhibiting new lending. One potential solution to the NPA problem is a centralized, government-driven effort to remove these assets from troubled institutions and then manage and sell them. Though such broad-based asset management (BBAM) programs existed even earlier in history, they appear to have become more common …

Revisiting Subprime Pricing Irrationality During The Global Financial Crisis, Rasheed Saleuddin, Walter Jansson

Journal of Financial Crises

During the depths of the global financial crisis of 2008-09, many holders of subprime mortgage securitizations and related derivatives were forced to mark their investments to fair values based on observable prices in mortgage index credit default swap markets. Research has generally claimed that crisis pricing of such indices cannot be explained by fundamental analysis of the underlying markets, while marking portfolios to such “irrational” benchmarks may have contributed to severe distress in the financial sector. This paper econometrically demonstrates significant fundamentally-driven components in subprime mortgage index returns throughout the crisis. Our findings suggest that such benchmarks must be considered …

Lessons Learned: Alejandro Latorre, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

At the time of the 2007-09 global financial crisis, Alejandro Latorre was an assistant vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY). He was active in the bailout of American International Group (AIG) from its inception to the end, when AIG repaid its outstanding obligations to both the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury. This Lessons Learned summary is based on a Feb. 26, 2020, interview. He emphasized that the views discussed here are his own, not the views of anyone else currently or previously within the Federal Reserve System or the views of his current employer.

Lessons Learned: Sarah Dahlgren, Alec Buchholtz, Rosalind Z. Wiggins

Journal of Financial Crises

Sarah Dahlgren was the Executive Vice President and head of the Financial Institution Supervision Group at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) during the crisis and instrumental in the rescue of American International Group (AIG). This Lessons Learned summary is drawn from a March 22, 2018, interview in which she gave her take on how central bankers can prepare for future crises.

Lessons Learned: Chester B. Feldberg, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

Chester B. Feldberg worked for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) for 36 years in a variety of roles. In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, he served as a trustee for the AIG Credit Trust Facility (2009-2011). The trust was established in early 2009 to hold the equity stock of American International Group Inc. (AIG) that the U.S. government had received as a result of the 2008 AIG bailout. The three trustees were responsible for voting the stock, ensuring satisfactory corporate governance at AIG, and eventually disposing of the stock.

When he was named as a …

Lessons Learned: Eric Dinallo, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

Eric Dinallo was New York State Superintendent of Insurance from January 2007 through July 2009. In New York, as throughout the United States, insurance companies are regulated at the state level. In his position as Superintendent, Dinallo oversaw the insurance operating companies of American International Group (AIG) within New York. AIG’s holding company, however, was supervised at the federal level. Much of AIG’s problems came from its non-insurance subsidiary AIG Financial Products (AIGFP), which was a major presence in the market for credit default swaps (CDS), a type of derivative that was a factor behind the 2007-09 financial crisis. This …

The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac – Module Z: Overview, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Ben Henken, Adam Kulam, Daniel Thompson, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In September 2008, as the financial crisis that had begun the previous year escalated, the US government appointed a conservator for two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), that dominated the secondary mortgage market and were among the largest participants in the global capital markets. The conservatorships were the hallmark of a multipart rescue plan intended to save the firms from insolvency and a disorderly collapse and required the combined and coordinated efforts of several government agencies and instrumentalities. Ultimately, the government invested $191.5 billion into the …

The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac–Module F: Federal Reserve’S Large-Scale Asset Purchase (Lsap) Program, Daniel Thompson, Adam Kulam

Journal of Financial Crises

By late 2008, the secondary mortgage markets were suffering high default rates, causing mortgage lending to slow and the value of mortgage securities to plummet. The Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate, and the government placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship, yet credit in housing and other financial markets remained tight. On November 25, the Fed announced its intent to purchase up to $500 billion in agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and $100 billion in agency debt to reduce the cost and increase the availability of mortgage credit, which would support housing markets and improve conditions in financial …

The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac – Module C: Gse Credit Facility, Emily Vergara

Journal of Financial Crises

In 2007 and 2008, the collapse of the subprime mortgage market and the deterioration of the housing market more generally precipitated a crisis at the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), which together held or guaranteed $5.3 trillion in mortgage assets. Over the course of two years, both entities suffered high losses and saw their liquidity positions deteriorate as the market perceived their rapid decline. On September 6, 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), pursuant to the authority of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008, took Fannie …

The Rescue Of American International Group Module Z: Overview, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Aidan Lawson, Steven Kelly, Lily S. Engbith, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In September 2008, in the midst of the broader financial crisis, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors used its emergency authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to authorize the largest loan in its history, a $85 billion collateralized credit line to American International Group (AIG), a $1 trillion insurance and financial company that was experiencing severe liquidity strains. In connection with the loan, the government received an equity interest representing 79.9% of the company’s ownership. AIG continued to experience a depressed stock price, asset devaluations, and the risk of ratings downgrades leading to questions about its solvency. …

The Rescue Of American International Group Module D: Maiden Lane Ii, Lily S. Engbith, Devyn Jeffereis

Journal of Financial Crises

In September 2008, American International Group (AIG) faced increasing difficulty in returning cash collateral to counterparties looking to terminate, rather than roll over, their securities lending agreements, in part because the company had invested the collateral in residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), which were becoming illiquid. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) provided liquidity to the company, including through the Securities Borrowing Facility (SBF), which allowed for the repayment of cash collateral but did not address the falling values of the RMBS. In November 2008, the Federal Reserve Board authorized the creation of Maiden Lane II (ML II), a …

The Rescue Of American International Group Module B: The Securities Borrowing Facility, Lily S. Engbith, Alec Buchholtz, Devyn Jeffereis

Journal of Financial Crises

In 2008, American International Group (AIG) was among the largest insurance corporations in the world and maintained a profitable securities lending program. However, AIG invested much of the cash collateral received from counterparties in residential mortgage-backed securities, whose value began to collapse rapidly and unexpectedly, creating liquidity strain for AIG when borrowers returned their securities. Because of these strains, credit downgrades, and losses, in September, the company sought assistance from the Federal Reserve which, on October 6, 2008, approved the establishment of the Securities Borrowing Facility by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY). The FRBNY agreed to loan …

Stress Tests And Policy, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

Ten years after the Federal Reserve’s crisis-era bank stress test, it is time to recalibrate the stress tests for “peacetime.” Outside of a crisis, supervisors should tailor stress tests to focus on their comparative advantages by taking a macroprudential focus, with severe scenarios that enable them to learn about emerging risks in both traditional and shadow banking sectors. In peacetime, also, supervisors should emphasize risk- management practices and be wary of forcing rapid changes in capital levels for individual banks, while linking stress-test results with countercyclical capital buffers across the system.

The United Kingdom's Credit Guarantee Scheme (U.K. Gfc), Christian M. Mcnamara

Journal of Financial Crises

The September 15, 2008, bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers resulted in a collapse of wholesale funding markets that threatened the ability of UK financial institutions to continue funding themselves. By the end of the month, two leading UK banks—HBOS and Bradford & Bingley—had to be rescued, and there was a real risk that the entire financial system could collapse. Faced with the need to stabilize the system, UK regulators on October 8 introduced a package of measures that included a £250 billion Credit Guarantee Scheme (the Guarantee Scheme) aimed at providing banks with access to needed funding. Under the Guarantee Scheme, …

Sweden's Guarantee Scheme (Sweden Gfc), Lily S. Engbith, Kevin Kiernan

Journal of Financial Crises

Although Sweden was not as directly impacted by the Global Financial Crisis as some other economies, Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, prompted Swedish authorities to take preemptive measures to protect domestic banks and financial institutions. One such program, announced on October 20, 2008, and implemented on October 29, 2008, was designed to preserve credit extension to businesses and households through what became known as the Swedish Guarantee Scheme. Per the terms of the Scheme, new short- and medium-term debt of maturities ranging from 90 days to five years issued by eligible banks would be guaranteed by the Swedish …

The Portuguese Guarantee Scheme (Portugal Gfc), Julia A. Arnous

Journal of Financial Crises

By October 2008, Portuguese banks’ access to liquidity was severely restricted due to strains in international wholesale markets. On October 12-13, 2008, the Portuguese government notified the European Commission of a guarantee scheme intended to promote solvent credit institutions’ access to liquidity as part of the European policy response to the acute financial crisis aiming to achieve and maintain financial stability. Under the scheme, the Portuguese government guaranteed financing agreements and banks’ issuance of non-subordinated short- and medium-term debt. To obtain a guarantee under the Scheme, banks paid a fee based on the maturity of the debt and a risk …

The Polish Guarantee Scheme (Poland Gfc), Manuel Leon Hoyos

Journal of Financial Crises

Faced with the global financial crisis of 2007–2009, Poland implemented a scheme of State support for financial institutions. In view of a potential global credit crunch, it aimed at improving short- and medium-term liquidity of domestic financial institutions. The scheme came into force on March 13, 2009, and was approved by the European Commission under European Union State Aid rules on September 25, 2009. The scheme enabled the Ministry of Finance, on behalf of the State Treasury, to provide support in the form of Treasury guarantees on newly issued bank debt and the exchange of Treasury bonds for less liquid …

The Dutch Credit Guarantee Scheme (Netherlands Gfc), Lily Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

As fallout from the global financial crisis intensified in October 2008, governments around the world sought to implement stabilization measures in order to calm and protect their domestic markets. While not directly exposed to the subprime mortgage crisis, the Kingdom of the Netherlands announced the creation of the Dutch Credit Guarantee Scheme (the Guarantee Scheme) on October 13, 2008, to boost confidence in interbank lending markets and to ensure the flow of credit to Dutch households and companies. In establishing this program, the Dutch State Treasury Agency of the Ministry of Finance (DSTA) committed €200 billion to support the issuance …

The State Guarantee Of External Debt Of Korean Banks (South Korea Gfc), Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

Following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy of September 15, 2008, a number of foreign governments enacted stabilization measures in order to bolster their currencies and inject much-needed liquidity into domestic markets. As part of its effort, the Korean Ministry of Strategy and Finance announced a series of government interventions that included a three-year guarantee of foreign debt issued (including extensions of maturity) by domestic banks between October 20, 2008, and June 30, 2009. This opt-in program was introduced as a preemptive step in ensuring that Korean financial institutions would retain competitive access to external funding in the wake of the global …

Ireland's Credit Institutions (Eligible Liabilities Guarantee) Scheme (Ireland Gfc), Claire Simon

Journal of Financial Crises

Following the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, Irish banks found themselves unable to roll over their significant foreign borrowings on the interbank lending market. With the banks facing a liquidity crisis, the Irish government decided to issue a blanket guarantee of all liabilities of six banks through the Credit Institutions Financial Support Scheme (CIFS). As the crisis worsened, and it became clear that Irish banks were facing a solvency—not just liquidity—crisis, the Irish government was forced to provide additional support to the financial system, which took the form of capital injections and a national asset management company for …

The Hungarian Guarantee Scheme (Hungary Gfc), Alec Buchholtz

Journal of Financial Crises

In the midst of the global financial crisis, in October 2008, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB), the Hungarian national bank, noticed a selloff of government securities by foreign banks and a large depreciation in the exchange rate of the Hungarian forint (HUF) in foreign exchange (FX) markets. Hungarian banks experienced liquidity pressures due to margin calls on FX swap contracts, prompting the MNB and Minister of Finance to seek assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the World Bank. The IMF and ECB approved Hungary’s requests in late 2008 to create a €20 billion …

Austria's Oesterreichische Clearingbank Ag (Oecag) (Austria Gfc), Claire Simon

Journal of Financial Crises

In October 2008, euro-area countries adopted a joint framework to guide national policies combatting the effects of the global financial crisis. In Austria, this led to the enactment of a number of measures and amendments, including the Interbank Market Support Act (Interbankmarktstärkungsgesetz, or IBSG). IBSG called for the establishment of a new clearing bank to facilitate interbank lending. It also permitted the Minister of Finance to guarantee up to €5 billion of short-term securities issued by the clearing bank and to absorb losses of the clearing bank up to €4 billion. The clearing bank, Oesterreichische Clearingbank AG (OeCAG), was owned …

Austria's Ibsg Guarantee Program (Austria Gfc), Claire Simon

Journal of Financial Crises

Following the adoption of a joint framework by euro-area countries in response to the intensifying financial crisis in October 2008, Austria enacted a package of measures including the Interbank Market Support Act (Interbankmarktstärkungsgesetz, "IBSG"). In addition to calling for the establishment of a new clearing bank to facilitate interbank lending, IBSG permitted the Austrian government to guarantee debt securities issued by other eligible institutions. Securities issued by eligible institutions with a maturity of three years or less (five years in exceptional circumstances) were eligible for guarantee. According to IBSG, the amount outstanding for all measures taken under the act could …