Economic Theory Commons^™

Inequality Pyramid, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Shaikh, A. (September). Wicksell effect (Unpublished manuscript).
• Shaikh, A. (September). Inequality pyramids (Unpublished manuscript).

Chamberlin Monopolistic Competition, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Chamberlin, E. H. (1951). Monopolistic competition revisited. Economica, New Series, Volume 18, Number 72. Blackwell Publishing.

Why Supply Chain Collaboration Fails: The Socio-Structural View Of Resistance To Collaboration Strategies, Stanley E. Fawcett, Matthew W. Mccarter, Amydee M. Fawcett, G. Scott Webb, Gregory Magnan

ESI Publications

Purpose

The relational view posits that supply chain integration can be a source of competitive advantage. Few firms, however, successfully co-create value to attain supernormal relational rents. We therefore elaborate theory regarding the reasons why collaboration strategies fail.

Design/methodology/approach

This study employs a quasi-longitudinal, multi-case interview methodology to explore the reasons why collaboration strategies fail to deliver intended results. We interviewed managers at 49 companies in Period 1 and managers at 57 companies in Period 2. Fifteen companies participated in both rounds of interviews.

Findings

This paper builds and describes a taxonomy of relational resistors. We then explore how sociological …

The Effect Of Earned Vs. House Money On Price Bubble Formation In Experimental Asset Markets, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán González, Praveen Kujal, David Porter

ESI Publications

Does house money exacerbate price bubbles? We compare house money asset market experiments with an earned money treatment where initial portfolios are constructed from a real effort task. Bubbles occur; however, trading volumes and earnings dispersion are significantly higher with house money. We investigate the role of cognitive ability in accounting for the differences in earnings distribution across treatments by using the cognitive reflection test (CRT). Low CRT subjects earned less than high CRT subjects. Low CRT subjects were net purchasers (sellers) of shares when the price was above (below) fundamental value. The opposite was true for high CRT subjects.

Risky Business: An Analysis Of Teacher Risk Preferences, Daniel H. Bowen, Stuart Buck, Cary Deck, Jonathan N. Mills, James V. Shuls

ESI Publications

A range of proposals aim to reform teacher compensation, recruitment, and retention. Teachers have generally not embraced these policies. One potential explanation for their objections is that teachers are relatively risk averse. We examine this hypothesis using a risk-elicitation task common to experimental economics. By comparing preferences of new teachers with those entering other professions, we find that individuals choosing to teach are significantly more risk averse. This suggests that the teaching profession may attract individuals who are less amenable to certain reforms. Policy-makers should take into account teacher risk characteristics when considering reforms that may clash with preferences.

Do Prediction Markets Aid Defenders In A Weak-Link Contest?, Cary Deck, Li Hao, David Porter

ESI Publications

Laboratory experiments have demonstrated that prediction market prices weakly aggregate the disparate information of the traders about states (moves) of nature. However, in many practical applications one is attempting to predict the move of a strategic rival. This is particularly important in aggressor–defender contests. This paper reports an experiment where the defender may have the advantage of observing a prediction market on the aggressor's action. The results of the experiments indicate that: the use of prediction markets does not increase the defender's win rate; prediction markets contain reliable information regarding aggressors’ decisions that is not being exploited by defenders; and …

The Role Of The Decision-Making Regime On Cooperation In A Workgroup Social Dilemma: An Examination Of Cyberloafing, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán-González, Matthew W. Mccarter

ESI Publications

A burgeoning problem facing organizations is the loss of workgroup productivity due to cyberloafing. The current paper examines how changes in the decision-making rights about what workgroup members can do on the job affect cyberloafing and subsequent work productivity. We compare two different types of decision-making regimes: autocratic decision-making and group voting. Using a laboratory experiment to simulate a data-entry organization, we find that, while autocratic decision-making and group voting regimes both curtail cyberloafing (by over 50%), it is only in group voting that there is a substantive improvement (of 38%) in a cyberloafer’s subsequent work performance. Unlike autocratic decision-making, …

Experimental Evolution And Economics, Terence C. Burnham, Aimee Dunlap, David W. Stephens

ESI Publications

This is a theory paper that advocates experimental evolution as a novel approach to study economic preferences. Economics could benefit because preferences are exogenous, axiomatic, and contentious. Experimental evolution allows the empirical study of preferences by placing organisms in designed environments and studying their genotype and phenotype over multiple generations. We describe a number of empirical studies on different aspects of preferences. We argue that experimental evolution has the potential to improve economics.

Peer Pressure And Moral Hazard In Teams: Experimental Evidence, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán-González, Stephen Rassenti

ESI Publications

Team incentives have been found to be particularly effective both in the lab and in the field despite the moral hazard in teams problem identified by Holmström (1982). In a newly developed virtual workplace, we show that, in line with Holmström, moral hazard in teams is indeed pervasive. Subsequently, we find strong evidence for the conjecture of Kandel and Lazear (1992) that peer pressure may resolve the moral hazard in teams problem. Organizations equipped with a very weak form of peer monitoring (anonymous and without physical proximity, verbal threats or face-to-face interactions) perform as well as those using individual incentives.

First Full Uncorrected Proofs Of Capitalism, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

This collection includes:

• Capitalism: competition, conflict, crises, by Anwar Shaikh. Unpublished — first uncorrected proof, dated October 11, 2015.

Title Page, Anwar Shaikh Phd

Archives of Anwar Shaikh

Capitalism: competition, conflict, crises, by Anwar Shaikh. Unpublished, uncorrected proof, third copy in collection, revised October 25, 2015.

Comment: Entering The "Great School Of Self-Command": The Moralizing Influence Of Markets, Language, And Imagination, Sandra J. Peart

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

Economists for centuries have struggled to understand the self-other relationship and its implications for economic life. For economists in the classical tradition of Adam Smith, this was a central question regarding the wealth and flourishing of nations. Later, as this volume demonstrates, the relationship of the self to others was forgotten as economics became associated almost exclusively with the pursuit of what Peter Boettke and Daniel Smith describe as "ruthless efficiency."

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and a growing body of experimental and empirical evidence showing the predictive shortcomings of narrow self-interest models, a more capacious economics …

On "Strongly Fortified Minds": Self-Restraint And Cooperation In The Discussion Tradition, Sandra J. Peart, David M. Levy

Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications

Accordingly, this essay explores some unappreciated benefits of discussion. While educators frequently favor discussion as a means to encouraging engaged learning, they nonetheless rarely attempt to explain how or why these benefits arise. More than this, the role of economists from Adam Smith through Frank Knight and his student, James Buchanan, in explaining the benefits associated with discussion has been neglected both within economics and throughout the academy. In this tradition one accepts the inevitability of an individual "point of view" and the good society is one that can govern itself by means of an emergent consensus among points of …

A Class Of Symmetric And Quadratic Utility Functions Generating Giffen Demand, Massimiliano Landi

Research Collection School Of Economics

I provide a simple example of a quadratic utility function that generates a Giffen demand. The utility function is symmetric, increasing and concave. Interestingly, the Giffen effect arises in the subspace where the utility function is strictly increasing and strictly concave. A full characterization of the parameter conditions under which the Giffen demand arises is provided.

Language And Cooperation In Hominin Scavenging, Bart J. Wilson, Samuel R. Harris

ESI Working Papers

Bickerton (2009, 2014) hypothesizes that language emerged as the solution to a scavenging problem faced by proto‐humans. We design a virtual world to explore how people use words to persuade others to work together for a common end. By gradually reducing the vocabularies that the participants can use, we trace the process of solving the hominin scavenging problem. Our experiment changes the way we think about social dilemmas. Instead of asking how does a group overcome the selfinterest of its constituents, the question becomes, how do constituents persuade one another to work together for a common end that yields a …

Critique And Transformation: On The Hypothetical Nature Of Ecosystem Service Value And Its Neo-Marxist, Liberal And Pragmatist Criticisms, Andony P. Melathopoulos, Alex Stoner

Journal Articles

Ecosystem service valuation (ESV) attempts to transform the opposition of human economic necessity and ecological conservation by valuing the latter in terms of the services rendered by the former. However, despite a number of ESV-inspired sustainability initiatives since the 1990s, global ecological degradation continues to accelerate. This suggests that ESV has fallen far short of its goals of sustainable social transformation—a failure which has generated considerable criticism. This paper reviews three prominent lines of ESV criticism: 1) the neo-Marxist criticism, which emphasizes the “fictitious” character of ecosystem commodities; 2) the liberal criticism through Friedrich Hayek's concept “scientistic objectivism”; and 3) …

The Choice Of Technology And Equilibrium Wage Rigidity, Haiwen Zhou

Economics Faculty Publications

In this general equilibrium model, firms engage in oligopolistic competition and choose increasing returns technologies to maximize profits. Capital and labor are the two factors of production. The existence of efficiency wages leads to unemployment. The model is able to explain some interesting observations of the labor market. First, even though there is neither long-term labor contract nor costs of wage adjustment, wage rigidity is an equilibrium phenomenon: an increase in the exogenous job separation rate, the size of the population, the cost of exerting effort, and the probability that shirking is detected will not change the equilibrium wage rate. …

Sharing As Risk Pooling In A Social Dilemma Experiment, Todd L. Cherry, E. Lance Howe, James J. Murphy

ESI Working Papers

In rural economies with missing or incomplete markets, idiosyncratic risk is frequently pooled through informal networks. Idiosyncratic shocks, however, are not limited to private goods but can also restrict an individual from partaking in or benefiting from a collective activity. In these situations, a group must decide whether to provide insurance to the affected member. In this paper, we describe results of a laboratory experiment designed to test whether a simple sharing institution can sustain risk pooling in a social dilemma with idiosyncratic risk. We test whether risk can be pooled without a commitment device and, separately, whether effective risk …

Revisiting The Tradeoff Between Risk And Incentives: The Shocking Effect Of Random Shocks, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez

ESI Working Papers

Despite its central role in the theory of incentives, empirical evidence of a tradeoff between risk and incentives remains scarce. We reexamine this empirical puzzle in a controlled laboratory environment so as to isolate possible confounding factors encountered in the field. In line with the principal-agent model, we find that principals increase fixed pay while lowering performance pay when the relationship between effort and output is noisier. Unexpectedly, agents produce substantially more in the noisy environment than in the baseline despite lesser pay for performance. We show that this result can be accounted for by introducing agents’ loss aversion in …

Dynamic Directed Search, Gabriele Camera, Jaehong Kim

ESI Working Papers

The directed search model (Peters, 1984) is static; its dynamic extensions typically restrict strategies, often assuming price or match commitments. We lift such restrictions to study equilibrium when search can be directed over time, without constraints and at no cost. In equilibrium trade frictions arise endogenously, and price commitments, if they do exist, are self-enforcing. In contrast to the typical model, there exists a continuum of equilibria that exhibit trade frictions. These equilibria support any price above the static price, including monopoly pricing in arbitrarily large markets. Dispersion in posted prices can naturally arise as temporary or permanent phenomenon despite …

Generalizations Of The General Lotto And Colonel Blotto Games, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson

ESI Working Papers

In this paper, we generalize the General Lotto game (budget constraints satisfied in expectation) and the Colonel Blotto game (budget constraints hold with probability one) to allow for battlefield valuations that are heterogeneous across battlefields and asymmetric across players, and for the players to have asymmetric resource constraints. We completely characterize Nash equilibrium in the generalized version of the General Lotto game and then show how this characterization can be applied to identify equilibria in the Colonel Blotto version of the game. In both games, we find that there exist sets of non-pathological parameter configurations of positive Lebesgue measure with …

The Impact Of Social Information On The Voluntary Provision Of Public Goods: A Replication Study, James J. Murphy, Nomin Batmunkh, Ben Nilson, Samantha Ray

ESI Working Papers

Shang and Croson (2009) found that providing information about the donation decisions of others can have a positive impact on individual donations to public radio. In this study, we attempted to replicate their results, however, we found no evidence of that social comparisons affected donation decisions. Most of our donors were renewing members, a group which Shang and Croson also found were not influenced by social information.

On The Merit Of Equal Pay: When Influence Activities Interact With Incentive Setting, Brice Corgnet, Ludivine Martin, Peguy Ndodjang, Angela Sutan

ESI Working Papers

Influence costs models predict that organizations should limit managerial discretion to deter organizational members from engaging in wasteful politicking activities. We test this conjecture in a controlled, yet realistic, work environment in which we allow employees to influence managers’ decisions about rewards. We find that influence activities are pervasive and significantly lower organizational performance. Organizational performance suffers because principals offer weaker incentives when influence activities are allowed than when they are not. Importantly, we show that equal pay incentive schemes perform better when influence activities are available than when they are not. Our results thus support the idea that prevalent …

When Income Depends On Performance And Luck: The Effects Of Culture And Information On Giving, Pedro Rey-Biel, Roman M. Sheremeta, Neslihan Uler

ESI Working Papers

We study how giving depends on income and luck, and how culture and information about the determinants of others’ income affect this relationship. Our data come from an experiment conducted in two countries, the US and Spain, which have different beliefs about how income inequality arises. We find no cross-cultural differences in giving when individuals are informed about the determinants of income, but when uninformed, Americans give less than Spanish. Culture and information not only affect individual giving, but also the determinants of giving and the beliefs about how income inequality arises. Beliefs partially moderate cross-cultural differences in giving.

Competition Between And Within Universities: Theoretical And Experimental Investigation Of Group Identity And The Desire To Win, Zhuoqiong Charlie Chen, David Ong, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

We study how salient group identity, created through competition between students from different universities, as well as differences in the value of winning impact competitive behavior. Our experiment employs a simple all-pay auction within and between two university subject pools. We find that when competing against their peers, students within the lower tier university bid more aggressively than students within the top-tier university. Also, students from the lower tier university, in particular women, bid more aggressively when competing against students from the top-tier university. These findings, interpreted through a theoretical model incorporating both group identity and differential value of winning, …

Revisiting Information Aggregation In Asset Markets: Reflective Learning & Market Efficiency, Brice Corgnet, Mark Desantis, David Porter

ESI Working Papers

The ability of markets to aggregate disperse information leading to prices that reflect the fundamental value of an asset is key to assessing the often-debated efficiency of markets. We study information aggregation in the experimental environment originally created by Plott and Sunder (1988). Contrary to the current belief, we find that markets do not aggregate information. The model that best describes our data, as well as data on information aggregation subsequent to Plott and Sunder (1988), is prior information (Lintner, 1969). That is, traders use their private information but fail to use market prices to infer other traders’ information. We …

An Experiment On Retail Payments Systems, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Stefania Bortolotti

ESI Working Papers

We develop a novel theoretical and experimental framework to study adoption and use of cash versus electronic payments in retail transactions. The design allows us to assess the behavioral impact of sellers’ service fees and buyers’ rewards from using electronic payments. In the experiment, buyers and sellers faced a coordination problem, independently choosing a payment method before trading. Sellers readily adopted electronic payments but buyers did not. Eliminating service fees or introducing rewards significantly increased adoption and use of electronic payments. Buyers’ economic incentives played a pivotal role in the diffusion of electronic payments but cannot fully explain their adoption …

The Effects Of Make And Take Fees In Experimental Markets, Vince Bourke, David Porter

ESI Working Papers

We conduct a series of experiments to examine the effects of the make and take fee structure currently used by equity exchanges in the U.S. We examine the effects of these fees on measures of market quality (allocative efficiency, trading volume, book depth, and the bid-ask spread). With the exception of increased book depth, we document no significant effects of make and take fees relative to a baseline case in which trading fees are assessed on both sides of a transaction.

Asymmetric And Endogenous Within-Group Communication In Competitive Coordination Games, Timothy N. Cason, Roman Sheremeta, Jingjing Zhang

ESI Working Papers

Within-group communication in competitive coordination games has been shown to increase competition between groups and lower efficiency. This study further explores potentially harmful effects of communication, by addressing the questions of (i) asymmetric communication and (ii) the endogenous emergence of communication. Our theoretical analysis provides testable hypotheses regarding the effect of communication on competitive behavior and efficiency. We test these predictions using a laboratory experiment. The experiment shows that although asymmetric communication is not as harmful as symmetric communication, it leads to more aggressive competition and lower efficiency relative to the case when neither group can communicate. Moreover, groups vote …

Selective Recognition: How To Recognize Donors To Increase Charitable Giving, Anya Samek, Roman Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

Recognizing donors by revealing their identities is important for increasing charitable giving. We conducted a field experiment to examine how different recognition methods impact giving, and found that all forms of recognition that we examined had a positive impact on increasing donations, whereby recognizing only highest donors (positive recognition) and recognizing only lowest donors (negative recognition) had the most pronounced effect. We argue that selective recognition (both positive and negative) creates tournament-like incentives. Recognizing the highest donors activates the desire to seek a positive prize of prestige, thus increasing the proportion of donors who contribute large amounts. Recognizing the lowest …