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Articles 181 - 186 of 186
Full-Text Articles in Economic Theory
Dictatorial Domains, Navin Aswal, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen
Dictatorial Domains, Navin Aswal, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen
Research Collection School Of Economics
In this paper, we introduce the notion of a linked domain and prove that a non-manipulable social choice function defined on such a domain must be dictatorial. This result not only generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem but also demonstrates that the equivalence between dictatorship and non-manipulability is far more robust than suggested by that theorem. We provide an application of this result in a particular model of voting. We also provide a necessary condition for a domain to be dictatorial and use it to characterize dictatorial domains in the cases where the number of alternatives is three.
Incentive Compatibility In Multi-Unit Auctions, Sushil Bikhchandani, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen
Incentive Compatibility In Multi-Unit Auctions, Sushil Bikhchandani, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen
Research Collection School Of Economics
We characterize incentive compatibility in multi-unit auctions with multi-dimensional types. An allocation mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if it is nondecreasing in marginal utilities (NDMU). The notion of incentive compatibility we adopt is dominant strategy in private value models and ex post incentive compatibility in models with interdependent values. NDMU is the following requirement: if changing one buyer’s type, while keeping everyone else’s types the same, changes this buyer’s allocation then the new allocation must be relatively more attractive (or relatively less unattractive) to this buyer. We also establish a price characterization of incentive compatible mechanisms.
Is Ricardo's Essay On Profits A Precursor Of The New Trade Theory?, Hian Teck Hoon
Is Ricardo's Essay On Profits A Precursor Of The New Trade Theory?, Hian Teck Hoon
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper carefully analyzes a passage of Ricardo’s Essay on Profits ([1815] 1923), which suggests that he clearly understood the effects of both interindustry as well as intraindustry trade. In the context of the Essay model, Ricardo argues that free interindustry trade involving an exchange of manufactures for agricultural good (from England’s point of view) raises the rate of profit through lowering the relative price of the agricultural good. On the other hand, where trade involves simply an exchange of manufactures for manufactures, these being produced under conditions of economies of scale (division of labour in manufactures (pg. 25 of …
Temporary Equilibrium Dynamics With Bayesian Learning, Shurojit Chatterji
Temporary Equilibrium Dynamics With Bayesian Learning, Shurojit Chatterji
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper examines the stability of deterministic steady states in a class of economies where the state variable is one dimensional and where agents use Bayesian techniques to form expectations. The dynamics with learning are locally convergent if the prior mean is close to a stable perfect-foresight root having modulus less than 1 and if the prior beliefs are held with enough confidence. The dynamics are, however, divergent if the prior mean or the variance of the prior distribution is sufficiently large
Fallibility And Sequential Decision-Making, Winston T. H. Koh
Fallibility And Sequential Decision-Making, Winston T. H. Koh
Research Collection School Of Economics
Individuals typically make errors in evaluating information. In this paper, we consider a project selection problem, where fallible managers screen projects sequentially, and provide independent opinions on its quality. We compare the relative performance of the hierarchy and polyarchy when η (n > 2) managers are employed to evaluate projects. In addition to generalizing the existing results on the optimal screening standards, I discuss and characterize the optimal organizational size, and how the relative desirability of the two sequential decision processes are affected by changing the project quality. Finally, I also discuss the effect of variable evaluation costs on the optimal …
Differential Tariffs, Negative Value-Added And The Theory Of Effective Protection, Augustine H. H. Tan
Differential Tariffs, Negative Value-Added And The Theory Of Effective Protection, Augustine H. H. Tan
Research Collection School Of Economics
This article examines the implications for effective protection(EP) theory of allowing variable factor proportions and general equilibrium repercussions. The first claim of EP theory, is that it provides a measure of the maximum proportionate increase in factor rewards permitted by a tariff structure, as compared to a free trade regime. EP rates predict only a particular direction of resource flows whereas general equilibrium analysis, with variable input coefficients, indicates that flows contrary to EP prediction are possible. Two examples are provided, first, where there is a uniform tariff on final goods; and second, where one final sector has a higher …