Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Econometrics (28)
- Finance (10)
- Behavioral Economics (7)
- Business (6)
- Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations (4)
-
- Industrial Organization (4)
- International Economics (4)
- Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration (4)
- Environmental Policy (3)
- Public Economics (3)
- Education (2)
- Higher Education (2)
- Labor Economics (2)
- Macroeconomics (2)
- Urban Studies and Planning (2)
- Agricultural and Resource Economics (1)
- Mathematics (1)
- Physical Sciences and Mathematics (1)
- Political Economy (1)
- Social Welfare (1)
- Strategic Management Policy (1)
- Taxation (1)
- Keyword
-
- Strategy-proofness (21)
- Incentive compatibility (13)
- Implementation (8)
- Robust mechanism design (7)
- Decomposability (6)
-
- Rationalizability (6)
- Restricted domains (6)
- Robustness (5)
- Sd-strategy-proofness (5)
- Bilateral trade (4)
- Budget balance (4)
- Complete information (4)
- Duality approach (4)
- Equal treatment of equals (4)
- Full implementation (4)
- Measurability (4)
- Mechanism design (4)
- Revealed preference (4)
- Sd-efficiency (4)
- Unanimity (4)
- Bundles (3)
- Competition (3)
- Continuous implementation (3)
- Correlation (3)
- Ex post incentive compatibility (3)
- First-order belief (3)
- Global learning (3)
- High-frequency data (3)
- Mitigation (3)
- Random Social Choice Functions (3)
Articles 121 - 150 of 186
Full-Text Articles in Economic Theory
Nonparametric Testing For Anomaly Effects In Empirical Asset Pricing Models, Sainan Jin, Liangjun Su, Yonghui Zhang
Nonparametric Testing For Anomaly Effects In Empirical Asset Pricing Models, Sainan Jin, Liangjun Su, Yonghui Zhang
Research Collection School Of Economics
In this paper, we propose a class of nonparametric tests for anomaly effects in empirical asset pricing models in the framework of nonparametric panel data models with interactive fixed effects. Our approach has two prominent features: one is the adoption of nonparametric functional form to capture the anomaly effects of some asset-specific characteristics and the other is the flexible treatment of both observed/constructed and unobserved common factors. By estimating the unknown factors, betas, and nonparametric function simultaneously, our setup is robust to misspecification of functional form and common factors and avoids the well-known "error-in-variable" problem associated with the commonly used …
A Class Of Symmetric And Quadratic Utility Functions Generating Giffen Demand, Massimiliano Landi
A Class Of Symmetric And Quadratic Utility Functions Generating Giffen Demand, Massimiliano Landi
Research Collection School Of Economics
I provide a simple example of a quadratic utility function that generates a Giffen demand. The utility function is symmetric, increasing and concave. Interestingly, the Giffen effect arises in the subspace where the utility function is strictly increasing and strictly concave. A full characterization of the parameter conditions under which the Giffen demand arises is provided.
Optimal City Hierarchy: A Dynamic Programming Approach To Central Place Theory, Wen-Tai Hsu, Thomas J. Holmes, Frank Morgan
Optimal City Hierarchy: A Dynamic Programming Approach To Central Place Theory, Wen-Tai Hsu, Thomas J. Holmes, Frank Morgan
Research Collection School Of Economics
Central place theory is a key building block of economic geography and an empirically plausible description of city systems. This paper provides a rationale for central place theory via a dynamic programming formulation of the social planner's problem of city hierarchy. We show that there must be one and only one immediate smaller city between two neighboring larger-sized cities in any optimal solution. If the fixed cost of setting up a city is a power function, then the immediate smaller city will be located in the middle, confirming the locational pattern suggested by Christaller. We also show that the solution …
A Characterization Of Single-Peaked Preferences Via Random Social Choice Functions, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen, Huaxia Zeng
A Characterization Of Single-Peaked Preferences Via Random Social Choice Functions, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen, Huaxia Zeng
Research Collection School Of Economics
The paper proves the following result: every path-connected domain of preferences that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a compromise property, is single-peaked. Conversely, every single-peaked domain admits a random social choice function satisfying these properties. Single-peakedness is defined with respect to arbitrary trees. We also show that a maximal domain that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a stronger version of the compromise property, is single-peaked on a line. A converse to this result also holds. The paper provides justification of the salience of single-peaked preferences and evidence in favour of …
Econometric Analysis Of Continuous Time Models: A Survey Of Peter Phillips' Work And Some New Results, Jun Yu
Research Collection School Of Economics
Econometric analysis of continuous time models has drawn the attention of Peter Phillips for 40 years, resulting in many important publications by him. In these publications he has dealt with a wide range of continuous time models and the associated econometric problems. He has investigated problems from univariate equations to systems of equations, from asymptotic theory to finite sample issues, from parametric models to nonparametric models, from identification problems to estimation and inference problems, from stationary models to nonstationary and nearly nonstationary models. This paper provides an overview of Peter Phillips' contributions in the continuous time econometrics literature. We review …
Unilateral Emissions Mitigation, Spillovers, And Global Learning, Shurojit Chatterji, Sayantan Ghosal, Sean Walsh, John Whalley
Unilateral Emissions Mitigation, Spillovers, And Global Learning, Shurojit Chatterji, Sayantan Ghosal, Sean Walsh, John Whalley
Research Collection School Of Economics
What's the role of unilateral measures in global climate change mitigation in a post-Durban, post 2012 global policy regime? We argue that under conditions of preference heterogeneity, unilateral emissions mitigation at a subnational level may exist even when a nation is unwilling to commit to emission cuts. We establish that under certain assumptions, in a global strongly connected network of countries, learning the costs of switching to a low emissions activity can result in a universal adoption of such activities. We analyze the features of a policy proposal that could accelerate convergence to a low carbon world in the presence …
Random Dictatorship Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen, Huaxia Zeng
Random Dictatorship Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen, Huaxia Zeng
Research Collection School Of Economics
A domain of preference orderings is a random dictatorship domain if every strategy-proof random social choice function satisfying unanimity defined on the domain is a random dictatorship. Gibbard (1977) showed that the universal domain is a random dictatorship domain. We ask whether an arbitrary dictatorial domain is a random dictatorship domain and show that the answer is negative by constructing dictatorial domains that admit anonymous, unanimous, strategy-proof random social choice functions which are not random dictatorships. Our result applies to the constrained voting model. Lastly, we show that substantial strengthenings of linked domains (a class of dictatorial domains introduced in …
A Theory Of Aggregate Consumption, Yun K. Kim, Mark Setterfield, Yuan Mei
A Theory Of Aggregate Consumption, Yun K. Kim, Mark Setterfield, Yuan Mei
Research Collection School Of Economics
We develop a Keynesian model of aggregate consumption. Our theory emphasizes the importance of the relative income hypothesis and debt finance for understanding household consumption behavior. It is shown that particular importance attaches to how net debtor households service their debts, and that the treatment of debt-servicing commitments as a substitute for savings by these households creates the potential for 'sudden stops' in consumption spending (and hence aggregate demand).
Interim Equilibrium Implementation, Takashi Kunimoto
Interim Equilibrium Implementation, Takashi Kunimoto
Research Collection School Of Economics
A social choice rule is said to be implementable if one can design a mechanism(or institution) in which the set of outcomes prescribed by a given solutionconcept coincides with that specified by the social choice rule. I adoptinterim equilibrium (i.e., Bayesian Nash equilibrium where each agent’s interimbeliefs do not necessarily admit a prior) as the solution concept andinvestigate the corresponding implementation problem in general incompleteinformation environments. I identify arguably the weakest set of conditionsunder which implementation in interim equilibrium is possible. By doingso, I also unify the literature of the so-called Bayesian implementation andNash implementation.
Egalitarian Division Under Leontief Preferences, Jin Li, Jingyi Xue
Egalitarian Division Under Leontief Preferences, Jin Li, Jingyi Xue
Research Collection School Of Economics
We consider the problem of fairly dividing l divisible goods among n agents with the generalized Leontief preferences. We propose and characterize the class of generalized egalitarian rules which satisfy efficiency, group strategy-proofness, anonymity, resource monotonicity, population monotonicity, envy-freeness and consistency. On the Leontief domain, our rules generalize the egalitarian-equivalent rules with reference bundles. We also extend our rules to agent-specific and endowment-specific egalitarian rules. The former is a larger class of rules satisfying all the previous properties except anonymity and envy-freeness. The latter is a class of efficient, group strategy-proof, anonymous and individually rational rules when the resources are …
Robust Virtual Implementation With Almost Complete Information, Takashi Kunimoto
Robust Virtual Implementation With Almost Complete Information, Takashi Kunimoto
Research Collection School Of Economics
Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano (2013a,b, henceforth, AKS) study amechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the setof first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions Δ, they adopt Δ-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003)) and show that Δ-incentivecompatibility and Δ-measurability are necessary and sufficient conditions forrobust virtual implementation. By appropriately defining Δ in order to restrictattention to complete information environments, I exploit the implicationsof AKS and show that the permissive implementation result of Abreu andMatsushima (1992a) is robust to how the underlying type space is specified.However, AKS need to fix a complete information environment throughouttheir analysis and therefore does not …
Volatility Occupation Times, Jia Li, Viktor Todorov, George Tauchen
Volatility Occupation Times, Jia Li, Viktor Todorov, George Tauchen
Research Collection School Of Economics
We propose nonparametric estimators of the occupation measure and the occupation density of the diffusion coefficient (stochastic volatility) of a discretely observed Itô semimartingale on a fixed interval when the mesh of the observation grid shrinks to zero asymptotically. In a first step we estimate the volatility locally over blocks of shrinking length, and then in a second step we use these estimates to construct a sample analogue of the volatility occupation time and a kernel-based estimator of its density. We prove the consistency of our estimators and further derive bounds for their rates of convergence. We use these results …
Are Tournaments Optimal Over Piece Rates Under Limited Liability For The Principal?, Kosmas Marinakis, Theofanis Tsoulouhas
Are Tournaments Optimal Over Piece Rates Under Limited Liability For The Principal?, Kosmas Marinakis, Theofanis Tsoulouhas
Research Collection School Of Economics
A highly acclaimed result is that tournaments are superior to piece rates when the agents are risk averse and their production activities are subject to a relatively large common shock. The reason is that tournaments allow the principal to trade insurance for lower income to the agents. Our analysis shows that this celebrated result does not carry over to the case when a limited liability (bankruptcy) constraint limits the payments the principal can make, provided that the liquidation value of the firm is sufficiently small. This finding has important implications for the vast number of limited liability firms. Even though …
On Domains That Admit Well-Behaved Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions, Shurojit Chatterji, Rezmi Sanver, Arunava Sen
On Domains That Admit Well-Behaved Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions, Shurojit Chatterji, Rezmi Sanver, Arunava Sen
Research Collection School Of Economics
In this paper, we investigate domains that admit “well-behaved” strategy-proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be semi-single-peaked. Conversely every semi-single-peaked domain admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function. Semi-single-peaked domains are generalizations of single-peaked domains on a tree introduced by Demange (1982).
A Smooth Test For The Equality Of Distributions, Anil Bera, Aurobindo Ghosh, Zhijie Xiao
A Smooth Test For The Equality Of Distributions, Anil Bera, Aurobindo Ghosh, Zhijie Xiao
Research Collection School Of Economics
The two-sample version of the celebrated Pearson goodness-of-fit problem has been a topic of extensive research, and several tests like the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Cramer-von Mises have been suggested. Although these tests perform fairly well ´ as omnibus tests for comparing two probability density functions (PDFs), they may have poor power against specific departures such as in location, scale, skewness, and kurtosis. We propose a new test for the equality of two PDFs based on a modified version of the Neyman smooth test using empirical distribution functions minimizing size distortion in finite samples. The suggested test can detect the specific directions …
Robust Virtual Implementation: Toward A Reinterpretation Of The Wilson Doctrine, Georgy Artemov, Takashi Kunimoto, Roberto Serrano
Robust Virtual Implementation: Toward A Reinterpretation Of The Wilson Doctrine, Georgy Artemov, Takashi Kunimoto, Roberto Serrano
Research Collection School Of Economics
We study a mechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the sets of first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions Δ, we use Δ-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003, [5]) as our solution concept, and require that a mechanism virtually implement a socially desirable outcome. We obtain two necessary conditions, Δ-incentive compatibility and Δ-measurability and show that the latter is satisfied as long as a particular zero-measure set of first-order beliefs is ruled out. In environments allowing small transfers of utility among agents, these two conditions are also sufficient.
Optimal City Hierarchy: A Dynamic Programming Approach To Central Place Theory, Wen-Tai Hsu, Thomas J. Holmes, Frank Morgan
Optimal City Hierarchy: A Dynamic Programming Approach To Central Place Theory, Wen-Tai Hsu, Thomas J. Holmes, Frank Morgan
Research Collection School Of Economics
Central place theory is a key building block of economic geography and an empirically plausible description of city systems. This paper provides a rationale for central place theory via a dynamic programming formulation of the social planner's problem of city hierarchy. We show that there must be one and only one immediate smaller city between two neighboring larger-sized cities in any optimal solution. If the fixed cost of setting up a city is a power function, then the immediate smaller city will be located in the middle, confirming the locational pattern suggested by Christaller [4] . We also show that …
The Structure Of Strategy-Proof Random Social Choice Functions Over Product Domains And Lexicographically Separable Preferences, Shurojit Chatterji, Souvik Roy, Arunava Sen
The Structure Of Strategy-Proof Random Social Choice Functions Over Product Domains And Lexicographically Separable Preferences, Shurojit Chatterji, Souvik Roy, Arunava Sen
Research Collection School Of Economics
We characterize the class of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (or strategy-proof) random social choice functions in the standard multi-dimensional voting model where voter preferences over the various dimensions (or components) are lexicographically separable. We show that these social choice functions (which we call generalized random dictatorships) are induced by probability distributions on voter sequences of length equal to the number of components. They induce a fixed probability distribution on the product set of voter peaks. The marginal probability distribution over every component is a random dictatorship. Our results generalize the classic random dictatorship result in Gibbard (1977) and the decomposability results for …
Contracting Over Prices, Shurojit Chatterji, Sayantan Ghosal
Contracting Over Prices, Shurojit Chatterji, Sayantan Ghosal
Research Collection School Of Economics
We define a solution concept, perfectly contracted equilibrium, for an intertemporal exchange economy where agents are simultaneously price takers in spot commodity markets while engaging inefficient, non-Walrasian contracting over future prices. Without requiring that agents have perfect foresight, we show that perfectly contracted equilibrium outcomes are a subset of Pareto optimal allocations. It is a robust possibility for perfectly contracted equilibrium outcomes to differ from Arrow-Debreu equilibrium outcomes. We show that both centralized banking and retrading with bilateral contracting can lead to perfectly contracted equilibria.
Subgame Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations, Takashi Kunimoto, Drew Fudenberg, Takashi Kunimoto, Oliver Tercieux
Subgame Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations, Takashi Kunimoto, Drew Fudenberg, Takashi Kunimoto, Oliver Tercieux
Research Collection School Of Economics
We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature, which we refer to as information perturbations. First, we show that even under arbitrarily small information perturbations the Moore-Repullo mechanism does not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation and that in addition the mechanism has sequential equilibria with undesirable outcomes. More generally, we prove that any extensive form mechanism is fragile in the sense that if a non-Maskin monotonic social objective can be implemented with this mechanism, then there are arbitrarily small information perturbations under which an undesirable sequential equilibrium also exists. Finally, …
Unilateral Measures And Emissions Mitigation, Shurojit Chatterji, Sayantan Ghosal, Sean Walsh, John Whalley
Unilateral Measures And Emissions Mitigation, Shurojit Chatterji, Sayantan Ghosal, Sean Walsh, John Whalley
Research Collection School Of Economics
We discuss global climate mitigation that builds on existing unilateral measures to cut emissions. We document and discuss the rationale for such unilateral measures argue that such measures have the potential to generate positive spillover effects both within and across countries. In a simple dynamic model of learning we show that while single countries on their own may never get to the point of switching completely to low emission activities, a learning process with positive spillovers across nations is more likely to deliver a global switch to low emissions. We discuss the key features of a new global Intellectual Property …
A Generalized Representation Theorem For Harsanyi's ('Impartial') Observer, Simon Grant, Atsushi Kajii, Ben Polak, Zvi Safra
A Generalized Representation Theorem For Harsanyi's ('Impartial') Observer, Simon Grant, Atsushi Kajii, Ben Polak, Zvi Safra
Research Collection School Of Economics
We provide an axiomatization of an additively separable social welfare function in the context of Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem. To do this, we reformulate Harsanyi's setting to make the lotteries over the identities the observer may assume independent of the social alternative.
Inefficiency In The Shadow Of Unobservable Outside Options, Madhav S. Aney
Inefficiency In The Shadow Of Unobservable Outside Options, Madhav S. Aney
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper considers the problem of allocating an object between two players in an environment with one sided asymmetric information when their outside options depend on each other's type, causing the outside option of the uninformed player to be unobservable to her. Consequently efficient mechanisms under budget balance are not always available even when there is no uncertainty about which of the two players values the object more. A simple condition on the outside options turns out to be both necessary and sufficient to guarantee the first best. I also characterise the second best allocation under some conditions and show …
Random Dictatorship Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen, Huaxia Zeng
Random Dictatorship Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen, Huaxia Zeng
Research Collection School Of Economics
A domain of preference orderings is a random dictatorship domain if every strategy- proof random social choice function satisfying unanimity defined on the domain, is a random dictatorship. Gibbard (1977) showed that the universal domain is a random dictatorship domain. We investigate the relationship between dictatorial and random dictatorship domains. We show that there exist dictatorial domains that are not random dictatorship domains. We provide stronger versions of the linked domain condition (introduced in Aswal et al. (2003)) that guarantee that a domain is a random dictatorship domain. A key step in these arguments that is of independent interest, is …
Nonlinear Cointegrating Regression Under Weak Identification, Xiaoxia Shi, Peter C. B. Phillips
Nonlinear Cointegrating Regression Under Weak Identification, Xiaoxia Shi, Peter C. B. Phillips
Research Collection School Of Economics
An asymptotic theory is developed for a weakly identified cointegrating regression model in which the regressor is a nonlinear transformation of an integrated process. Weak identification arises from the presence of a loading coefficient for the nonlinear function that may be close to zero. In that case, standard nonlinear cointegrating limit theory does not provide good approximations to the finite-sample distributions of nonlinear least squares estimators, resulting in potentially misleading inference. A new local limit theory is developed that approximates the finite-sample distributions of the estimators uniformly well irrespective of the strength of the identification. An important technical component of …
Testing For Jumps In Noisy High Frequency Data, Yacine Ait-Sahalia, Jean Jacod, Jia Li
Testing For Jumps In Noisy High Frequency Data, Yacine Ait-Sahalia, Jean Jacod, Jia Li
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper proposes a robustification of the test statistic of Aït-Sahalia and Jacod (2009b) for the presence of market microstructure noise in high frequency data, based on the pre-averaging method of Jacod et al. (2010). We show that the robustified statistic restores the test's discriminating power between jumps and no jumps despite the presence of market microstructure noise in the data.
Wage-Vacancy Contracts And Coordination Frictions, Nicolas L. Jacquet, Serene Tan
Wage-Vacancy Contracts And Coordination Frictions, Nicolas L. Jacquet, Serene Tan
Research Collection School Of Economics
We consider a directed search model with risk-averse workers and risk-neutral entrepreneurs who can set up firms that post wage-vacancy contracts, i.e., contracts where firms can make payments to more than one applicant, and where the payments can be different for each applicant and be contingent on the number of applicants. We establish that the type of contracts the literature focuses on are not offered if firms can post wage-vacancy contracts. We show that there exists an equilibrium satisfying a Monotonic Expected Utility property which is efficient. Furthermore, we investigate the role of wage-vacancy contracts on welfare and competition.
A Comparison Of Cardinal Tournaments And Piece Rate Contracts With Liquidity Constrained Agents, Kosmas Marinakis, Theofanis Tsoulouhas
A Comparison Of Cardinal Tournaments And Piece Rate Contracts With Liquidity Constrained Agents, Kosmas Marinakis, Theofanis Tsoulouhas
Research Collection School Of Economics
Acelebrated result in the theory of tournaments is that relative performance evaluation (tournaments) is a superior compensation method to absolute performance evaluation (piece rate contracts) when the agents are risk-averse, the principal is risk-neutral or less risk-averse than the agents and production is subject to common shocks that are large relative to the idiosyncratic shocks. This is because tournaments get closer to the first best by filtering common uncertainty. This paper shows that, surprisingly, tournaments are superior even when agents are liquidity constrained so that transfers to them cannot fall short of a predetermined level. The rationale is that, by …
Single Peakedness And Giffen Demand, Massimiliano Landi
Single Peakedness And Giffen Demand, Massimiliano Landi
Research Collection School Of Economics
I provide a simple example of a single peaked utility function that generates a Giffen demand. The utility function is smooth, non piecewise defined, strictly concave but not globally increasing. A full characterization of the parameter conditions under which the Giffen demand arises is provided. In addition the properties of the demand function are studied: I find that the inferior commodity with a Giffen demand must be cheaper relatively to a substitute and that Giffen demand arises at relatively low levels of income. However it is not required that the share of income spent on that commodity be large.
Power Maximization And Size Control Of Heteroscedasticity And Autocorrelation Robust Tests With Exponentiated Kernels, Yixiao Sun, Peter C. B. Phillips, Sainan Jin
Power Maximization And Size Control Of Heteroscedasticity And Autocorrelation Robust Tests With Exponentiated Kernels, Yixiao Sun, Peter C. B. Phillips, Sainan Jin
Research Collection School Of Economics
Using the power kernels of Phillips, Sun, and Jin (2006, 2007), we examine the large sample asymptotic properties of the t-test for different choices of power parameter (ρ). We show that the nonstandard fixed-ρ limit distributions of the t-statistic provide more accurate approximations to the finite sample distributions than the conventional large-ρ limit distribution. We prove that the second-order corrected critical value based on an asymptotic expansion of the nonstandard limit distribution is also second-order correct under the large-ρ asymptotics. As a further contribution, we propose a new practical procedure for selecting the test-optimal power parameter that addresses the central …