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Articles 241 - 270 of 319
Full-Text Articles in Econometrics
Focality And Asymmetry In Multi-Battle Contests, Subhashish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, David Rojo Arjona, Nathaniel Wilcox
Focality And Asymmetry In Multi-Battle Contests, Subhashish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, David Rojo Arjona, Nathaniel Wilcox
ESI Working Papers
This article examines behavior in two-person constant-sum Colonel Blotto games in which each player maximizes the expected total value of the battlefields won. A lottery contest success function is employed in each battlefield. Recent experimental research on such games provides only partial support for Nash equilibrium behavior. We hypothesize that the salience of battlefields affects strategic behavior (the salient target hypothesis). We present a controlled test of this hypothesis – against Nash predictions – when the sources of salience come from certain asymmetries in either battlefield values or labels (as in Schelling (1960)). In both cases, subjects over-allocate the resource …
Dynamic Behavior And Player Types In Majoritarian Multi-Battle Contests, Alan Gelder, Dan Kovenock
Dynamic Behavior And Player Types In Majoritarian Multi-Battle Contests, Alan Gelder, Dan Kovenock
ESI Working Papers
In a dynamic contest where it is costly to compete, a player who is behind must decide whether to surrender or to keep fighting in the face of bleak odds. We experimentally examine the game theoretic prediction of last stand behavior in a multi-battle contest with a winning prize and losing penalty, as well as the contrasting prediction of surrendering in the corresponding contest with no penalty. We find varied evidence in support of these hypotheses in the aggregated data, but more conclusive evidence when scrutinizing individual player behavior. Players’ realized strategies tend to conform to one of several “types”. …
Mean-Dispersion Preferences With A Specific Dispersion Function, Mark Schneider, Manuel Nunez
Mean-Dispersion Preferences With A Specific Dispersion Function, Mark Schneider, Manuel Nunez
ESI Working Papers
A popular approach to modeling ambiguity aversion is to decompose preferences into the subjective expected utility of an act and an ambiguity index, or an adjustment factor, or a dispersion function. However, in these approaches the dispersion function (or ambiguity index, or adjustment factor) has very little structure imposed on it, leaving the selection of a specific dispersion function in applications to be rather arbitrary. In this note, working in the Anscombe- Aumann (1963) framework, we provide a simpler axiomatic characterization of mean-dispersion preferences which uniquely identifies the dispersion function from the infinite class of possible alternatives. Given the representation, …
Designing Contests Between Heterogeneous Contestants: An Experimental Study Of Tie-Breaks And Bid-Caps In All-Pay Auctions, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Roman M. Sheremeta, Nora Szech
Designing Contests Between Heterogeneous Contestants: An Experimental Study Of Tie-Breaks And Bid-Caps In All-Pay Auctions, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Roman M. Sheremeta, Nora Szech
ESI Working Papers
A well-known theoretical result in the contest literature is that greater heterogeneity decreases performance of contestants because of the “discouragement effect.” Leveling the playing field by favoring weaker contestants through bid-caps and favorable tie-breaking rules can reduce the discouragement effect and increase the designer’s revenue. We test these predictions in an experiment. Our data show that indeed, strengthening weaker contestants through tie-breaks and bid-caps significantly diminishes the discouragement effect. Bid-caps can also improve revenue. Most deviations from Nash equilibrium can be explained by the level-k model of reasoning.
Salience, Framing, And Decisions Under Risk, Uncertainty, And Time, Jonathan W. Leland, Mark Schneider
Salience, Framing, And Decisions Under Risk, Uncertainty, And Time, Jonathan W. Leland, Mark Schneider
ESI Working Papers
We propose a comparative model of decision making under risk, uncertainty, and time, in which large differences in payoffs and probabilities or dates of receipt are perceived as salient and overweighted in the evaluation process. The predictions of the model depend on what differences are compared across alternatives which, in turn, depends on how the choice is framed. We formalize a class of matrix-based frames which applies to decisions under risk, uncertainty, and time, and we specify two important types of frames within this class: minimal frames which provide the simplest representation of choice alternatives, and transparent frames which make …
The Effects Of Alcohol Use On Economic Decision Making, Klajdi Bregu, Cary Deck, Lindsay Ham, Salar Jahedi
The Effects Of Alcohol Use On Economic Decision Making, Klajdi Bregu, Cary Deck, Lindsay Ham, Salar Jahedi
ESI Working Papers
It is notoriously hard to study the effect of alcohol on decision making, given the selection that takes place in who drinks alcohol and when they choose to do so. In a controlled laboratory experiment, we study the causal effect of alcohol on economic decision making. We examine the impact of alcohol on the following types of tasks: math and logic, uncertainty, overconfidence, strategic games, food choices, anchoring, and altruism. Our results indicate that alcohol consumption, as measured by the blood alcohol concentration (BAC), increases cooperation in strategic settings and altruism in Dictator games. We do not find any effects …
Optimal Tilts, Malcom Baker, Terence C. Burnham, Ryan Taliaferro
Optimal Tilts, Malcom Baker, Terence C. Burnham, Ryan Taliaferro
ESI Working Papers
We examine the optimal weighting of four characteristic tilts in US equity markets over the period from 1968 through 2014. We define a “tilt” as a positive-Sharpe-ratio, characteristicbased portfolio strategy that requires relatively low annual turnover and a “trade” as a characteristic-based portfolio strategy that requires relatively high annual turnover and liquidity demands. Size is a tilt, because of its very low turnover; high frequency reversal is a trade. This dichotomy is necessary to make practical use of Fama-French style factor regressions. Unlike low-turnover tilts, a full history of transaction costs and an estimate of capacity is critical to determine …
Arousal And Economic Decision Making, Salar Jahedi, Cary Deck, Dan Ariely
Arousal And Economic Decision Making, Salar Jahedi, Cary Deck, Dan Ariely
ESI Working Papers
Previous experiments have found that subjecting participants to cognitive load leads to poorer decision making, consistent with dual-system models of behavior. Rather than taxing the cognitive system, this paper reports the results of an experiment that takes a complementary approach: arousing the emotional system. The results indicate that exposure to arousing visual stimuli as compared to neutral images has a negligible impact on performance in arithmetic tasks, impatience, risk taking in the domain of losses, and snack choice although we find that arousal modestly increases in risk-taking in the gains domain and increases susceptibility to anchoring effects. We find the …
Causes And Consequences Of The Protestant Reformation, Sascha O. Becker, Steven Pfaff, Jared Rubin
Causes And Consequences Of The Protestant Reformation, Sascha O. Becker, Steven Pfaff, Jared Rubin
ESI Working Papers
The Protestant Reformation is one of the defining events of the last millennium. Nearly 500 years after the Reformation, its causes and consequences have seen a renewed interest in the social sciences. Research in economics, sociology, and political science increasingly uses detailed individual-level, city-level, and regional-level data to identify drivers of the adoption of the Reformation, its diffusion pattern, and its socioeconomic consequences. This survey takes stock of the research so far, tries to point out what we know and what we do not know, and which are the most promising areas for future research.
Payment Scheme Self-Selection In The Credence Goods Market: An Experimental Study, Hernan Bejarano, Ellen P. Green, Stephen Rassenti
Payment Scheme Self-Selection In The Credence Goods Market: An Experimental Study, Hernan Bejarano, Ellen P. Green, Stephen Rassenti
ESI Working Papers
Given heterogeneity in expert behavior across payment schemes in credence goods markets, it becomes important to understand the consequences of payment scheme selection. To study the effect on customer well being of expert self-selection, we recruited subjects to participate in a real-effort credence good laboratory market. Experts were either randomly assigned or faced with the choice of three payment schemes: fee-for-service, salary, and capitation. We found that experts who selected fee-for-service payment resulted in customers with significantly worse outcomes in comparison with experts who had been randomly assigned to fee-for-service. In contrast, experts who selected salary payment did not change …
Bringing A Natural Experiment Into The Laboratory: The Measurement Of Individual Risk Attitudes, Zuzana Brokesova, Cary Deck, Jana Peliova
Bringing A Natural Experiment Into The Laboratory: The Measurement Of Individual Risk Attitudes, Zuzana Brokesova, Cary Deck, Jana Peliova
ESI Working Papers
Controlled laboratory experiments have become a generally accepted method for studying economic behavior, but there are two issues that regularly arise with such work. The first pertains to the ability to generalize experimental results outside the laboratory. While laboratory experiments are typically designed to mimic naturally occurring situations, ceteris paribus comparisons are rare. Using data from a promotional campaign by a bank and a matching laboratory experiment, we find similar patterns of risk taking behavior controlling for gender and age. The second issue pertains to the impact that the payment procedure in an experiment has on observed risk taking behavior. …
The Impact Of Taxes And Wasteful Government Spending On Giving, Roman M. Sheremeta, Neslihan Uler
The Impact Of Taxes And Wasteful Government Spending On Giving, Roman M. Sheremeta, Neslihan Uler
ESI Working Papers
We examine the impact of taxes and wasteful government spending on charitable giving. In our model, the government collects a flat-rate tax on income net of donations and wastes part of the tax revenue before redistribution. The model provides theoretical predictions which we test in a framed field experiment. The results of the experiment show that the tax rate has a weak and insignificant effect on giving. The degree of waste, however, has a large, negative and significant effect on giving, with the relationship moderated by the curvature in the utility function.
Ambiguity Framed, Mark Schneider, Jonathan W. Leland, Nathaniel Wilcox
Ambiguity Framed, Mark Schneider, Jonathan W. Leland, Nathaniel Wilcox
ESI Working Papers
In his exposition of subjective expected utility theory, Savage (1954) proposed that the Allais paradox could be reduced if it were recast into a format which made the appeal of the independence axiom of expected utility theory more transparent. Recent studies consistently find support for this prediction. We consider a salience-based choice model which explains this frame-dependence of the Allais paradox and derive the novel prediction that the same type of presentation format which was found to reduce Allais-style violations of expected utility theory will also reduce Ellsberg-style violations of subjective expected utility theory since that format makes the appeal …
Random Expected Utility And Certainty Equivalents: Mimicry Of Probability Weighting Functions, Nathaniel Wilcox
Random Expected Utility And Certainty Equivalents: Mimicry Of Probability Weighting Functions, Nathaniel Wilcox
ESI Working Papers
For simple prospects of the kind routinely used for certainty equivalent elicitation, random expected utility preferences imply a conditional expectation function that can mimic deterministic rank dependent preferences. That is, an agent with random expected utility preferences can have mean certainty equivalents that look exactly like rank dependent probability weighting functions of the inverse-s shape discussed by Quiggin (1982) and later advocated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and other scholars. It seems that certainty equivalents cannot nonparametrically identify preferences, at least not in every relevant sense, since their conditional expectation depends on assumptions concerning the source and nature of their …
Axioms For Salience Perception, Jonathan W. Leland, Mark Schneider
Axioms For Salience Perception, Jonathan W. Leland, Mark Schneider
ESI Working Papers
Models of salience-based choice have become popular in recent years, although there is still no known set of simple conditions or axioms which implies the existence of a salience function. In this paper, we provide simple and natural axioms that characterize the general class of salience functions. As an application we consider a salience-based model of decision making and show that within that setup the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes is a general property of a salience function and that the properties producing that pattern also account for other anomalies involving risky and intertemporal choice.
Trust And Trustworthiness Under Information Asymmetry And Ambiguity, Irma Clots-Figueras, Roberto Hernán-González, Praveen Kujal
Trust And Trustworthiness Under Information Asymmetry And Ambiguity, Irma Clots-Figueras, Roberto Hernán-González, Praveen Kujal
ESI Working Papers
We introduce uncertainty and ambiguity in the standard investment game. In the uncertainty treatment, investors are informed that the return of the investment is drawn from a publicly known distribution function. In the ambiguity treatment, investors are not informed about the distribution function. We find that both trust and trustworthiness are robust to the introduction of these changes.
What Makes A Good Trader? On The Role Of Intuition And Reflection On Trader Performance, Brice Corgnet, Mark Desantis, David Porter
What Makes A Good Trader? On The Role Of Intuition And Reflection On Trader Performance, Brice Corgnet, Mark Desantis, David Porter
ESI Working Papers
Using simulations and experiments, we pinpoint two main drivers of trader performance: cognitive reflection and theory of mind. Both dimensions facilitate traders’ learning about asset valuation. Cognitive reflection helps traders use market signals to update their beliefs whereas theory of mind offers traders crucial hints on the quality of those signals. We show these skills to be complementary because traders benefit from understanding the quality of market signals only if they are capable of processing them. Cognitive reflection relates to previous Behavioral Finance research as it is the best predictor of a trader’s ability to avoid commonly-observed behavioral biases.
Gender Biases In Delegation, Eleonora Bottino, Teresa García-Muñoz, Praveen Kujal
Gender Biases In Delegation, Eleonora Bottino, Teresa García-Muñoz, Praveen Kujal
ESI Working Papers
We explore gender biases towards delegation in a modified (delegation) dictator game. Under compulsory delegation and no (gender) revelation no significant gender differences are observed for choices made by principals. Male agents share little with the recipients, meanwhile, female (agents) are not responsive to the incentive scheme and return less to the dictator. However, a clear dichotomy in female behavior is observed under gender revelation. As principals, females behave similar to their male counterparts and appoint as agents those who return more to them. On the other hand, as agents’ females show greater redistributive concerns relative to their male counterparts …
The Effects Of Experience, Choice Architecture, And Cognitive Reflection In Individual And Strategic Decisions, Mark Schneider, David Porter
The Effects Of Experience, Choice Architecture, And Cognitive Reflection In Individual And Strategic Decisions, Mark Schneider, David Porter
ESI Working Papers
Cognitive reflection has been shown to be an important trait which is correlated with the propensity to: take risks, delay gratification, and form accurate beliefs about others’ behavior. However, previous research has not cleanly identified whether reflective thinkers make ‘better’ decisions than intuitive thinkers, since inferences of decision quality are confounded by inferences regarding risk preferences, time preferences, and beliefs. We directly test for differences in decision quality between reflective thinkers and intuitive thinkers in both individual and strategic decisions using a design which makes it possible to objectively rank risky and strategic choices, independent of one’s attitudes toward risk …
Money And The Scale Of Cooperation, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari
Money And The Scale Of Cooperation, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari
ESI Working Papers
This study reveals the existence of a causal link between the availability of money and an expanded scale of interaction. We constructed an experiment where participants chose the group size, either a low-value partnership or a high-value group of strangers, and then faced an intertemporal cooperative task. Theoretically, a monetary system was inessential to achieve cooperation. Empirically, without a working monetary system, participants were reluctant to expand the scale of interaction; and when they did, they ended up destroying surplus compared to partnerships, because cooperation collapsed in large groups. This economic failure was reversed only when participants managed to concurrently …
Tug-Of-War In The Laboratory, Cary Deck, Roman M. Sheremeta
Tug-Of-War In The Laboratory, Cary Deck, Roman M. Sheremeta
ESI Working Papers
Tug-of-war is a multi-battle contest often used to describe extended interactions in economics, management, political science, and other disciplines. While there has been some theoretical work, there is scant empirical evidence regarding behavior in a tug-of-war game. To the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first experimental study of the tug-of-war. The results show notable deviations of behavior from theory. In the first battle of the tug-of-war, subjects exert fewer resources, while in the follow-up battles, they exert more resources than predicted. Also, contrary to the theoretical prediction, resource expenditures tend to increase in the duration of the …
Public Goods With Punishment & Payment For Relative Rank, Terence C. Burnham
Public Goods With Punishment & Payment For Relative Rank, Terence C. Burnham
ESI Working Papers
A laboratory experiment designed to investigate the role of relative performance-based payoffs on cooperation in the context of punishment. Subjects play a repeated public goods game with high-powered punishment (50:1) and additional payoffs based on relative performance. Contributions to the public good are nearly maximal. Punishment levels are substantial, higher than the same game without relative rank payoffs, and sufficiently high that total payoffs are negative. The group would make much more money in the same setting without punishment. This study contributes to investigation of the role of altruism in human cooperation.
Sharing As Risk Pooling In A Social Dilemma Experiment, Todd L. Cherry, E. Lance Howe, James J. Murphy
Sharing As Risk Pooling In A Social Dilemma Experiment, Todd L. Cherry, E. Lance Howe, James J. Murphy
ESI Working Papers
In rural economies with missing or incomplete markets, idiosyncratic risk is frequently pooled through informal networks. Idiosyncratic shocks, however, are not limited to private goods but can also restrict an individual from partaking in or benefiting from a collective activity. In these situations, a group must decide whether to provide insurance to the affected member. In this paper, we describe results of a laboratory experiment designed to test whether a simple sharing institution can sustain risk pooling in a social dilemma with idiosyncratic risk. We test whether risk can be pooled without a commitment device and, separately, whether effective risk …
Revisiting The Tradeoff Between Risk And Incentives: The Shocking Effect Of Random Shocks, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez
Revisiting The Tradeoff Between Risk And Incentives: The Shocking Effect Of Random Shocks, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez
ESI Working Papers
Despite its central role in the theory of incentives, empirical evidence of a tradeoff between risk and incentives remains scarce. We reexamine this empirical puzzle in a controlled laboratory environment so as to isolate possible confounding factors encountered in the field. In line with the principal-agent model, we find that principals increase fixed pay while lowering performance pay when the relationship between effort and output is noisier. Unexpectedly, agents produce substantially more in the noisy environment than in the baseline despite lesser pay for performance. We show that this result can be accounted for by introducing agents’ loss aversion in …
The Cognitive Basis Of Social Behavior: Cognitive Reflection Overrides Antisocial But Not Always Prosocial Motives, Brice Corgnet, Antonio M. Espín, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez
The Cognitive Basis Of Social Behavior: Cognitive Reflection Overrides Antisocial But Not Always Prosocial Motives, Brice Corgnet, Antonio M. Espín, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez
ESI Working Papers
Even though human social behavior has received considerable scientific attention in the last decades, its cognitive underpinnings are still poorly understood. Applying a dual-process framework to the study of social preferences, we show in two studies that individuals with a more reflective/deliberative cognitive style, as measured by scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), are more likely to make choices consistent with “mild” altruism in simple non-strategic decisions. Such choices increase social welfare by increasing the other person’s payoff at very low or no cost for the individual. The choices of less reflective individuals (i.e. those who rely more heavily …
Dynamic Directed Search, Gabriele Camera, Jaehong Kim
Dynamic Directed Search, Gabriele Camera, Jaehong Kim
ESI Working Papers
The directed search model (Peters, 1984) is static; its dynamic extensions typically restrict strategies, often assuming price or match commitments. We lift such restrictions to study equilibrium when search can be directed over time, without constraints and at no cost. In equilibrium trade frictions arise endogenously, and price commitments, if they do exist, are self-enforcing. In contrast to the typical model, there exists a continuum of equilibria that exhibit trade frictions. These equilibria support any price above the static price, including monopoly pricing in arbitrarily large markets. Dispersion in posted prices can naturally arise as temporary or permanent phenomenon despite …
Generalizations Of The General Lotto And Colonel Blotto Games, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson
Generalizations Of The General Lotto And Colonel Blotto Games, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson
ESI Working Papers
In this paper, we generalize the General Lotto game (budget constraints satisfied in expectation) and the Colonel Blotto game (budget constraints hold with probability one) to allow for battlefield valuations that are heterogeneous across battlefields and asymmetric across players, and for the players to have asymmetric resource constraints. We completely characterize Nash equilibrium in the generalized version of the General Lotto game and then show how this characterization can be applied to identify equilibria in the Colonel Blotto version of the game. In both games, we find that there exist sets of non-pathological parameter configurations of positive Lebesgue measure with …
The Impact Of Social Information On The Voluntary Provision Of Public Goods: A Replication Study, James J. Murphy, Nomin Batmunkh, Ben Nilson, Samantha Ray
The Impact Of Social Information On The Voluntary Provision Of Public Goods: A Replication Study, James J. Murphy, Nomin Batmunkh, Ben Nilson, Samantha Ray
ESI Working Papers
Shang and Croson (2009) found that providing information about the donation decisions of others can have a positive impact on individual donations to public radio. In this study, we attempted to replicate their results, however, we found no evidence of that social comparisons affected donation decisions. Most of our donors were renewing members, a group which Shang and Croson also found were not influenced by social information.
On The Merit Of Equal Pay: When Influence Activities Interact With Incentive Setting, Brice Corgnet, Ludivine Martin, Peguy Ndodjang, Angela Sutan
On The Merit Of Equal Pay: When Influence Activities Interact With Incentive Setting, Brice Corgnet, Ludivine Martin, Peguy Ndodjang, Angela Sutan
ESI Working Papers
Influence costs models predict that organizations should limit managerial discretion to deter organizational members from engaging in wasteful politicking activities. We test this conjecture in a controlled, yet realistic, work environment in which we allow employees to influence managers’ decisions about rewards. We find that influence activities are pervasive and significantly lower organizational performance. Organizational performance suffers because principals offer weaker incentives when influence activities are allowed than when they are not. Importantly, we show that equal pay incentive schemes perform better when influence activities are available than when they are not. Our results thus support the idea that prevalent …
When Income Depends On Performance And Luck: The Effects Of Culture And Information On Giving, Pedro Rey-Biel, Roman M. Sheremeta, Neslihan Uler
When Income Depends On Performance And Luck: The Effects Of Culture And Information On Giving, Pedro Rey-Biel, Roman M. Sheremeta, Neslihan Uler
ESI Working Papers
We study how giving depends on income and luck, and how culture and information about the determinants of others’ income affect this relationship. Our data come from an experiment conducted in two countries, the US and Spain, which have different beliefs about how income inequality arises. We find no cross-cultural differences in giving when individuals are informed about the determinants of income, but when uninformed, Americans give less than Spanish. Culture and information not only affect individual giving, but also the determinants of giving and the beliefs about how income inequality arises. Beliefs partially moderate cross-cultural differences in giving.